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Abstract
This dissertation explores how the Upper Canadian and Ontarian belief that their
province could preponderate within Confederation impacted the dominion of Canada’s
political development. It reveals that federalism in Upper Canada remained weak until
Reformers recognized that their province could exercise preponderant influence in a
federation where representation in the national legislature was based upon population. After
this realization, Reformers increasingly believed that they could best serve their province and
country by using their potential parliamentary preponderance to quash policy demands from
the rest of Canada that did not align with their national vision. This was not, however, the
only way Upper Canadians interpreted their colony’s role within Confederation. As 1 July
1867 neared, many Upper Canadians acknowledged their province’s potential power but
doubted its ability to dominate national policy debates. They also argued that opposing
initiatives from the rest of Canada would destabilize Confederation. This second group,
therefore, cautioned against opposing the rest of Canada or suggested using their province’s
political muscle to support the passage of compromise policies that accommodated demands
from other parts of the country.
The dissertation explores how the ebb and flow of these two preponderant federalisms
in Ontario impacted Canadian political debates from 1867 to 1896. The sense of power and
entitlement that underlay preponderant federalisms often emboldened Ontarians to foment
national political crises by rallying their province’s politicians to oppose policy initiatives
from other parts of the country. The willingness of other Ontarians to withhold their support
from these agitations or to stand behind compromise policies, however, frequently divided
Ontario’s voice and limited the effectiveness of attempts to pit the province against other
parts of Canada. The dissertation also challenges several bodies of research. First, contrary
to the assumptions of political scientists, the House of Commons can be analysed as an
intrastate institution when studying the development and significance of asymmetrically
populous provinces within federations. It also proves that the inhabitants and politicians of
Ontario rarely acted with the unity that many political scientists passingly suggest.
Disagreements among Ontarians concerning the use of their province’s preponderance often
ii

fractured its potential influence. Second, the dissertation challenges several historiographical
assertions regarding Ontario political culture. The provincial consciousness inherent to
suggestions that Ontario’s preponderant potential required it to desist from antagonizing the
rest of Canada, or to use its potential influence to facilitate compromise, calls into question
the centralists’ contention that Ontario Conservatives supported nation-building policies
because they subordinated their provincial identity to national imperatives. The willingness
of provincial rights politicians and newspaper editorialists to advocate using Ontario’s
influence to safeguard provincial autonomy overturns the scholarly contention that pursuing
preponderant influence and provincial autonomy were contradictory goals. Lastly, by
examining the role Ontarians wanted their province to play in Confederation, instead of
focusing on their policy demands, this dissertation also questions the propensity of regional
alienation scholars to contend that Ontarians were apathetic to policy initiatives from the rest
of Canada.

Keywords: Federation, federalism, Ontario, Canada, provincial rights, centralization, regional
alienation.
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Introduction
“The essential is, that there should not be any one State [in a federation] so much more
powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If
there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations; if
there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ, everything
will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.”
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 2nd ed., 207.

In 1861 John Stuart Mill warned the world against creating federations where one
state or province could preponderate over the others. From its conception, Canada defied this
warning. In the nineteenth century, federalism in Upper Canada, and later Ontario, was
informed by the province’s political strength. Upper Canadians began to crave a
preponderant influence in the governance of the Province of Canada once they outnumbered
Lower Canadians in the 1850s. In 1867, the British North America (BNA) Act afforded
Ontarians the right to elect 45% of the Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of
Commons. By comparison, Quebec elected 36% and Nova Scotia elected a comparatively
paltry 10.5% of parliamentary ridings. Ontario’s numerical preponderance persisted, and by
the end of the century it still held 43% of the country’s federal ridings (see Appendix 1). If
Ontario MPs united, they could influence or control government policy with the support of a
small handful of additional MPs from the rest of Canada. Ontario was also a wealthy
province. Although Quebec was Canada’s industrial and banking centre, Ontario’s
agricultural and expanding manufacturing industries created a tax base that paid that largest
portion of dominion tariffs. Many Ontarians concluded that these contributions also entitled
them to a leading role in Confederation.1
Isolating this sense of entitlement and analysing its impact on Canadian politics
necessitates distinguishing between federations and federalism. Preston King argues that
decentralized government is not unique to federations; nearly all structures of government,

1

The precise portion of the dominion government’s revenues that came from Ontario is difficult to determine.
As subsequent chapters describe, Ontarians regularly claimed that their province contributed more than its
per capita share without opposition.

1

including legislative unions such as the United Kingdom, require local governments. He
concludes that federations are “a constitutional system which instances a division between
central and regional governments and where special or entrenched representation is accorded
to the regions in the decision-making procedures of the central government.”2 Intrastate
representation of autonomous provinces, in short, is what makes federations unique. In so
doing, King distances himself from previous scholars such as Kenneth C. Wheare, who
focused almost exclusively on the decentralization of constitutional jurisdictions to define
federations. According to Wheare, Canada was originally a “quasi-federation” because its
highly centralized constitution initially jeopardized provincial autonomy.3 By dismissing
decentralization as a method of classifying federations, King directs attention away from the
dominion-provincial jurisdictional disputes that form the brunt of centralist and provincial
rights scholarship. He and other political scientists including Michael Burgess also move
beyond this debate by distinguishing between federalism and federation.
Federalism is not a synonym for federation. Instead, according to Burgess,
federalism is “the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of support for
federation.”4 Federalism therefore has normative and ideological qualities. Many Upper
Canadians / Ontarians embraced the federal principle because they hoped that it would
provide sufficient guarantees of provincial autonomy to facilitate the acceptance of
representation by population (‘rep by pop’) in Lower Canada / Quebec. Such a constitutional
system, these Upper Canadians / Ontarians also anticipated, would allow their province to
exert preponderant and eventually dominant influence during national policy debates.
Although Ontarians rarely succeeded at uniting their political representatives to exercise
decisive influence, the attempts of some preponderant federalists to rally their MPs or
Members of Provincial Parliament (MPPs) to oppose initiatives from other parts of Canada
regularly contributed to heated political exchanges that alarmed Liberal and Conservative
leaders and harmed national unity. The failure of these agitations was partly due to a second
group of preponderant federalists who acknowledged Ontario’s preponderant potential but

2

Preston T King, Federalism and Federation (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982), 140-141.
Kenneth Clinton Wheare, Federal Government, 3 ed. (Oxford University Press, 1961), 19-21.
4
Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2. See also
King, Federalism and Federation, 76.
3
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attempted to reduce political tensions and foster national unity by either discouraging its use
or by realigning it behind compromise policies.
Analysing ‘rep by pop’ legislatures, such as the Canadian House of Commons as
intrastate institutions is unusual. Political scientists such as Preston King, Ronald Watts,
Kenneth Wheare, and William Riker are not unaware of the House of Commons’ potential as
an intrastate institution but they focus their analysis on provincial or regional representation
in national institutions such as the Senate. MPs are elected by approximately equal numbers
of voters from ridings across the country. These scholars thus concentrate on the House of
Commons as a democratic institution and give little or no attention to its intrastate potential.5
As William Livingston once argued, however, “the essence of federalism lies not in the
constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself.”6 Although Upper Canadians
and Ontarians were strong advocates of local representation in parliament, this dissertation
repeatedly demonstrates that the asymmetrically strong potential influence afforded to
Ontario in the House of Commons spurred many of its politicians and newspaper editors to
imagine parliament as a place where their MPs could unite to exert provincial influence. In
short, they consistently imagined the House of Commons as an intrastate institution.
Despite this aspiration, however, Upper Canadians, and subsequently Ontarians,
rarely agreed on when and how their province should use this power. Two rival
preponderant federalisms informed political debate in Ontario. As Mill predicted, the desire
to use Ontario’s preponderant potential to dictate the Canadian government’s policies raised
political tensions between it and the rest of the country. In the 1850s, Reformers aspired to
decisively influence in the Province of Canada’s legislature by securing representation based
on population. When they eventually secured the principle in 1867, many Ontarians entered

5

Preston T. King, “Federation and Representation,” in Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing
Traditions and Future Directions. ed. Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1993), 94-101; Ronald L Watts, A Comparative Perspective on Asymmetry in Federations,
Special Series on Asymmetric Federalism (Kingston: Queen's University, 2005), 5-6; William H. Riker,
Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), 87-91, 116119; Wheare, Federal Government, 92-96, 188-189; Donald V. Smiley and Ronald L. Watts, Intrastate
Federalism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) consider the possibility of the
Canadian House of Commons as an intrastate institution but conclude that it would be ineffective in this
role without partisan and electoral reforms.
6
William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 2.
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Confederation believing that their province’s large share of parliamentary seats meant that
they no longer had to compromise with the rest of Canada. Indeed, because Ontario was
Canada’s most populous province and contributed the most taxes to dominion coffers, these
Ontarians often assumed that their province was also a microcosm of the country. They
therefore insisted that what was good for Ontario would be good for Canada and expected the
rest of the country to accept their leadership. They were, to borrow from the words of Carl
Berger, emboldened by a “sense of power” and entitlement to shape Canada’s development.7
This sentiment even crept into Ontario’s Legislative Assembly where MPPs frequently tried
to use their province’s potential influence to pressure other provinces or the Canadian
government to follow their wishes. This meddling, in addition to the prejudiced rhetoric and
intransigence that often accompanied the agitations, antagonized the rest of Canada to oppose
Ontario’s influence. An Ontarian sense of entitlement and power, therefore, contributed to
the creation of a series of national political crises that endangered national unity.
Not all Ontarians fulfilled Mill’s fears. A second group of the province’s politicians
and newspapermen accepted the Westminster system of majority government but were less
trusting of majority rule when it concerned local interests or tastes. Mill recognized that
individuals “follow their own selfish inclinations and short-sighted notions of their own
good, in opposition to justice, at the expense of all other classes and of posterity.”8
Disinterested generosity and tolerance by the majority for minorities, he concluded, was
unlikely and rare. This second group of Ontarians, who were usually Liberal-Conservatives
(hereinafter Conservatives) regularly appealed to national imperatives in order to pass
initiatives through parliament. The struggle to explain how Ontarians would benefit from
their nationally-focused policies encouraged claims that what was good for Canada would be
good for Ontario. Their province benefited more from national economic development and
the continuation of British rule than from imposing its preferences upon the country. Ontario
could thus afford to be generous when other provinces expressed legitimate needs. They
admitted that their province possessed sufficient influence to destabilize Confederation. But
they also recognized that Ontarians could not dominate national policy formulation and

7

Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press Toronto, 1970).
8
Mill as quoted in Richard John Halliday, John Stuart Mill (New York: Routledge, 2003), 128.
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therefore concluded that its political representatives had to work with their counterparts from
the rest of Canada. Ontarians, they urged, had to recognize their preponderant potential and
avoid alarming the rest of Canada by interfering with the interests of the country’s smaller
provinces. They also advocated using their intrastate preponderance to promote compromise
solutions that fostered regional contentment and national unity.
The references to John Stuart Mill do not imply that Confederation was a Millian
construct. Instead, they highlight the similar assumptions that underlay representative
government and preponderant federalisms in Ontario and demonstrate that Confederation had
philosophical and ideological underpinnings. Frank Underhill lamented the absence of
“figures such as Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, Jay, Adams, and others like them,
who combined a genius for hard practical politics with a capacity for philosophy and a habit
of looking for the wider and deeper general implications of particular problems.” Underhill
concluded that “this lack of the philosophic mind to give guidance to the thinking of ordinary
citizens has been a weakness of our Canadian national experience throughout our history.”9
Several historians affirm that Sir John A. Macdonald was “essentially pragmatic” and “did
not work within any consistent theoretical or philosophical framework.”10 Yet, as Janet
Ajzenstat points out, the speeches of Canada’s founders supporting Confederation “were
peppered with references” to their American counterparts, and to leading British politicians
and political philosophers, including Mill. In her study examining how the philosophy of
John Locke informed Confederation, Ajzenstat admits that Canada’s founders
did not speak or write in the manner of political philosophers. They did not
write treatises. But they were indeed familiar with the philosophical principles
underlying classical liberalism. They were familiar with arguments criticizing
those principles. And they brought this knowledge of principles and
arguments to bear in the debates on the federation of the colonies and in the
creation of a new “general government” for the union.11

9

Frank H. Underhill, Image of Confederation (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1964), 3.
J.K. Johnson, “John A. Macdonald,” in The Pre-Confederation Premiers: Ontario Government Leaders,
1841-1867, ed. J.M.S. Careless, (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1980), 224. See also: P.B. Waite,
“The Political Ideas of John A. Macdonald,” in The Political Ideas of the Prime Minsters of Canada, ed.
Marcel Hamelin (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1969), 51-67.
11
Janet Ajzenstat, The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2007), 8.
10
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The founders, and especially Macdonald, were not ideologues, but as Peter Smith argues
“Canadian Confederation… was not without ideological underpinning.”12
In their abstract forms, neither preponderant federalism was inherently better or more
praiseworthy than the other. Majoritarianism has often been used to rationalize the
marginalization of minority rights. When analysing public debates such as the Jesuits’
Estates Act or the Manitoba Schools question, many Ontarians used majoritarian assumptions
to justify anti-French and anti-Catholic policies. Other debates, including those concerning
better financial terms for various provinces, generally lacked these offensive qualities.
Although regional disagreements persisted, and anti-Quebec sentiment occasionally crept
into the debate, the better terms agitations focused on preventing the dominion government
from violating the alleged provincial compact. The desire to use Ontario’s influence to
challenge demands from other parts of Canada, in short, was not always a destructive force in
Canadian politics.
The tendency of Ontario historians to focus on dominion-provincial relations leads
them to treat the two spheres of influence within federations as distinct and often
competitive. This approach is useful when examining jurisdictional contests before the
courts but it is too rigidly constitutional to adequately explore preponderant federalisms. The
contestation of Ontario’s preponderant potential was, admittedly, sometimes restricted to
parliament or the Legislative Assembly. More often, however, the same sense of entitlement
and power transcended the division of powers and inspired attempts to assert Ontarian
influence in both legislatures. Exclusively focusing on the contestation of Ontario’s intrastate
influence, therefore, would ignore the heated debates that occurred in the Ontario Legislative
Assembly. The full development and impact of preponderant federalisms in Ontario on
Canadian politics is only intelligible when these debates are analyzed in concert.
Ontarians rarely fulfilled the preponderant federalist vision of united provincial
action. The contestation of Ontario’s influence helped to fracture the province’s voice in
12

Peter J. Smith, "The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation," Canadian Journal of Political Science
20, no. 1 (1987), 29. See also: Robert C. Vipond, Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the
Failure of the Constitution (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991); Jennifer Smith,
"Canadian Confederation and the Influence of American Federalism," Canadian Journal of Political
Science 21, no. 3 (1988), 443-463.
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parliamentary debates. Its Conservatives and Liberals / Reformers generally embraced
different preponderant federalisms when considering their province’s role during important
Canadian debates. Although the lack of clear party lines during much of the nineteenth
century makes it difficult to quantify the partisanship of the popular vote across the province,
Ontarians voted in nearly equal numbers for Conservatives and Liberals during almost every
national and provincial election to 1900.13 With the exception of the unusual provincial
elections of 1867 and 1894, as well as the national election of 1896, the popular vote
variance in all general elections did not exceed 6.2% (see Appendixes 2 to 4). The close
popular vote in Ontario necessitates studying how Conservatives and Liberals coped with the
province’s preponderant federalisms.
The interaction of partisanship and preponderant federalisms has received little
scholarly attention.15 When a government policy was unpopular in Ontario, the Liberals (and
occasionally the Conservatives), tried to rally the province’s voters to support alternative
solutions. Ontarians, they argued, could impact national politics by toppling Canadian
governments that refused to heed their province’s demands. They also warned that Ontario
provincial governments which refused to use their province’s potential preponderant
influence to impact national debates would suffer a similar fate. Yet as the years passed,
attracting and maintaining electoral popularity across the country led many Liberals and
Conservatives to avoid this tactic by utilizing two distinct strategies. Sometimes politicians
and newspaper editors warded off attempts to assert their province’s influence against from
other parts of the country by acknowledging Ontario’s preponderant potential while insisting
that it be used to promote compromise and national unity. When Ontarians found a policy too

13

J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of
Canada, 1968); Ontario Chief Election Officer, Electoral History of Ontario: Candidates and Results with
Statistics From the Records 1867-1982 (Toronto: Office of the Chief Election Officer, 1984). See also:
Howard A. Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962); S.J.R. Noel, Patrons, Clients,
Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, 239; Sir
Richard John Cartwright, Reminiscences (Toronto: W. Briggs, 1912), 315.
15
Writers and academics from Joseph Pope, ed., Confederation Documents Hitherto Unpublished (Carswell Co:
Toronto, 1895) in the late nineteenth century to Richard Simeon and Amy Nugent, "Federalism, Political
Parties, and the Burden of National Unity: Still Making Federalism Do the Heavy Lifting?" In Canadian
Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, ed. Herman Bakvis and A Brian Tanguay, (Don
Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2008), 112-133 in the early twenty-first century have explored the
ways partisanship impacted Liberal and Conservative platforms do not adequately explore the interaction of
partisanship and the belief that Ontarians could unite to influence Canadian political debates.
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distasteful to support, however, the Conservatives (and occasionally the Liberals) combatted
the agitations in their province by evading assertions of its influence. Sending a dispute to
the courts or denying that the provincial and dominion governments possessed the
constitutional jurisdiction to impact a political debate allowed Liberals and Conservatives to
argue that the desire in Ontario for intervention was inappropriate. These latter strategies
helped Liberals and Conservatives to prevent the sense of power and entitlement in Ontario
from compromising their provincial or national electoral popularity.
A partisan lens, however, does not adequately explain the actions of preponderant
federalists. In some cases, individuals sympathized with the desire to rally Ontarians to
contest demands from other parts of the country but nevertheless supported the government
to preserve their office or partisan ties. On other occasions, the desire to foster national unity
was genuine. Moreover, neither Liberals nor Conservatives adhered to a single preponderant
federalism. Although Reformers / Liberals regularly urged Ontarians to use their influence to
contest initiatives from the rest of Canada while Conservatives generally asked Ontarians to
support or desist from interfering with the satisfaction of these demands, both parties
occasionally deviated from these patterns. Each, moreover, experienced significant breaches
in party discipline during the post-Confederation period. Notable politicians including
Mackenzie Bowell, John Charlton, N. Clarke Wallace, and D’Alton McCarthy, in addition to
a host of backbenchers, supported assertions of Ontarian intrastate power at the expense of
their respective parties’ attempts to accommodate the demands of the rest of Canada.
Partisan frameworks are not, therefore, adequate for analysing Ontario’s role in shaping
Confederation because neither party could claim a preponderant federalism as its own.
Describing and analysing these shifts and deviations necessitates recognizing two
preponderant federalisms and exploring their interaction with partisanship.
Historians have not interrogated the existence or importance of preponderant
federalisms in Ontario. They generally examine how national parties and politicians served
Ontario, or determine what Ontarians wanted, instead of analysing the significance of when
and why Ontarians expected to be served. In so doing, they tend to follow one of three
analytic traditions: centralization, provincial rights, and regional alienation. Although each
school of thought attributes considerable agency to Ontario, and not all Ontarians were
8

preponderant federalists, their research overlooks or misinterprets how centralist and
provincial autonomist ideals interacted with the belief that Ontario could decisively impact
national policy development.
According to centralists, Canada required strong, centralized institutions to prevent
the expansion of provincial, racial, and religious identities that endangered national unity.
They point out that John A. Macdonald was keenly aware of how the state’s rights doctrine
contributed to the outbreak of the American Civil War. The BNA Act gave the dominion
government “all the great subjects of legislation” (such as commerce, banking, defence, and
immigration), as well as the power to disallow provincial legislation within one year of its
passage, the right to legislate on residual jurisdictions that were not explicitly listed in the
constitution, and the right to legislate for the “peace, order and good government” of the
country. Even in the divisive issue of education, which the founders deliberately gave to the
provinces to avoid national political deadlock, the BNA Act gave the dominion government
the right to pass remedial legislation if provincial governments violated the education rights
of minority groups.16 Only the national government, centralists argue, possessed the
Crown’s sovereign power. The provinces, which had been mere colonies prior to
Confederation, were “subordinate” to the national government. These scholars, therefore,
conclude that the BNA Act was the product of centralist thinking.17
Ontario Liberals, centralists argue, played a pivotal role in destroying many of these
powers through a series of legal cases from the 1870s to the 1890s. Donald Creighton
insisted that the expansion of provincial powers crippled the Canadian government’s ability

16

Province of Canada, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North
American Provinces, 3rd Session, 8th Provincial Parliament of Canada (hereinafter Confederation
Debates) (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., Parliamentary Printers, 1865), 6 February 1865, 33.
17
Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952),
403; Peter B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867 3rd ed. (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio,
2001); Norman McLeod Rogers, “The Compact Theory of Confederation,” in Papers and Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 1931, 205-230; Alistair Sweeny,
George-Etienne Cartier: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); P.B. Waite, Macdonald:
His Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975); J.C. Morrison, “Oliver Mowat and the
Development of Provincial Rights in Ontario: A Study in Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1867-1896,” in
Three History Theses, edited by Bryan L. Cathcart. (Toronto: Ontario Department of Public Records and
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to maintain national unity.18 W.L. Morton agreed that only the dominion government could
safeguard the rights of provincial minorities from majoritarian movements. The defeat of
these powers in the courts by 1896 was a “disaster” for “the unity of the whole nation.”19
Richard Gwyn’s biography of Macdonald also contends that the purpose of Confederation
was to create a ‘new nationality’ across British North America that would remain apart from
the United States. Canada’s first prime minister “was a centralist because he was a
nationalist. He wanted power in order to nurture a fragile, fragmented collection of quasicolonies into a nation that could survive alongside the most dynamic nation-state in the
world.”20
The presumed antipathy of provincial and national identities leads centralization
scholars to argue that Ontario Conservatives privileged national interests at the expense of
provincial concerns. This argument is often implicit. When analysing the Conservative’s
national elections campaigns, for example, scholars like Creighton, Gwyn, and P.B. Waite
point to Macdonald’s dismissal of provincial rights agitations as well as his emphasis on
nation-building platforms such as the transcontinental railway and the protective tariff as
evidence of Canada’s centralist heritage. Although they acknowledge the prime minister’s
desire to secure Ontario’s ridings, they rarely note his willingness to self-identify as an
Ontarian and address his home-province’s policy concerns. With rare exception, they also
ignore the uneasiness that this nation-building emphasis caused among other Ontario
Conservatives. This lack of scholarly elaboration leaves the impression that Ontario
Conservatives embraced nation-building and discarded their provincial identities and
concerns.21 The identity argument is more explicit in the limited centralist scholarship that
explores Ontario’s intrastate and dominion-provincial influence. J.C. Morrison, for example,
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praises Macdonald for his willingness to disregard or oppose demands from Ontario Liberals
when they conflicted with the Canadian government’s policies. He also berates Sir Oliver
Mowat, who was premier from 1872 to 1896, for “being so provincially minded as not to be
able to see that… there were other Provinces in the Dominion besides Ontario.”22 Garth
Stevenson, who leans towards provincial rights, nevertheless contends that “John A.
Macdonald had no particular loyalty to the province in which he spent most of his life, and
could just as easily have been a Quebec anglophone.”23 Kenneth MacKirdy argues that
William Ralph Meredith, the leader of the provincial Conservatives from 1879 to 1894,
believed that “national interests should supersede provincial” imperatives.24 Although Peter
Dembski notes Meredith’s dissatisfaction with Macdonald’s parsimonious treatment of the
provincial Conservatives, he suggests that “Meredith’s stubborn backing of a centralized
federalism” contributed to his willingness to endanger his electoral support by endorsing
Macdonald’s protective tariff and joining the prime minister’s stand against provincial
rights.25 Ontario Conservatives, these scholars conclude, supported Macdonald’s policies
because they subscribed to his centralist message that subsumed or negated provincial
identities.
Penny E. Bryden’s exploration of Queen’s Park’s use of dominion-provincial
relations to secure their province’s interests from 1943 to 1985 in “A Justifiable Obsession”
challenges some centralist assumptions about Ontario political culture. At first, this pursuit
took the form of proposing alternative solutions to Ottawa’s policies to resolve national
questions including tax renting that better suited Ontario’s interests. After the Quiet
Revolution and the rise of Albertan concerns about Canadian energy policy, however,
Ontario’s governments recognized that their interests lay in “maintaining a functioning
federation” that included Ontario as its economic center.26 The government at Queen’s Park
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therefore worked to steer the Canadian debate towards resolving mega-constitutional issues
and strove to maintain communication between the provinces and the Canadian government.
Although these goals often led Ontarian delegations to side with their national counterparts,
Bryden points out that they did not “conflate province and nation.” Instead, Queen’s Park
took “responsibility for the idea of nation.”27 Ontario had an interest and unique role to play
in maintaining the Canadian union. This astute observation shares some similarities with this
dissertation’s discussion of Ontario Conservatives but leaves room for additional work.
Bryden’s analysis focuses on what successive Ontario governments wanted while devoting
comparatively little space to exploring whether or why they expected to be influential. The
book also does not adequately explore the breadth of what might be termed the ‘helpful fixer’
impulse in Ontario. Bryden does not, for example, explore whether Ontario MPs advocated
using their intrastate influence to preserve national unity. She also avoids analyzing how
Ontario Liberal MPPs responded to these policies and whether they helped or hindered the
provincial government’s initiatives. Although Bryden’s study explores the attempts of
successive Ontario governments to shape Canadian politics, the full scope and impact of
Ontarian initiatives to foster national unity are only discernable when these additional voices
are incorporated into historical analysis.
This dissertation argues that Ontarians did not have to forsake their provincial
consciousness to support centralist or compromise policies. Many maintained a provincial
consciousness by contending that Ontario’s preponderance gave its electors and political
representatives the unique opportunity to ensure the passage of legislation that facilitated
national unity. Supporting national unity, they consistently insisted, was in Ontario’s longterm interests. This argument sometimes became politically unpalatable when it required its
adherents to convince their supporters to accept and promote unpopular policies. Many
politicians and newspapermen lacked this courage. In the 1880s and 1890s, for example,
racial and religious prejudices led an increasing number of Ontario Conservatives to eschew
compromise and to instead support movements emboldened by the belief that Ontario could
obstruct policy initiatives emanating from Quebec. Despite this limitation, however, the
formulation of an alternative interpretation of Ontario’s preponderant potential was important
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to Canada’s political development because it was one of the only ways to challenge the
agitations. Ontario politicians and newspaper editors therefore espoused this alternative
preponderant federalism to justify their support for unpopular policies without eschewing
their province’s political culture.
Unlike centralist scholars, provincial rights historians and political scientists contend
that the best way to foster national unity is to preserve local autonomy. Each preConfederation colony, they note, had unique cultural characteristics that made a legislative
union impractical. The policy diversity that resulted from this decentralization fostered
rather than hindered the growth of national unity. Canadian loyalty spurred not from strong
central institutions but from the local freedoms enjoyed across the country. Dominion
governments that deviated from the BNA Act or tried to impose national designs on
provincial jurisdictions created local grievances that undermined the popularity and even
legitimacy of the central government. The provinces had the exclusive right to legislate on
important issues including education, property and civil rights, local transportation systems,
as well as “all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.”28 With only a
few exceptions, such as agriculture and immigration, each government had the exclusive
right to legislate within their respective jurisdictions. The national government was only
supposed to use its power of disallowance sparingly, after consulting with the provinces and
after giving them an opportunity to amend the offending parts of their own bill. They also
note the claims of Liberal politicians such as Edward Blake, who contended that each preConfederation colonial government exercised a portion of the Crown’s sovereignty and that
they employed this power when entering into an interprovincial compact that redistributed
the colonial powers between the provincial and dominion governments. The BNA Act was,
according to these Ontarians, a ‘treaty’ between the provinces, and neither they nor the
dominion government could deviate from its terms without acquiring the mutual consent of
all participants. Regardless of the historical legitimacy of a dominion-provincial ‘treaty,’
provincial rights scholars agree that the provinces were coordinate rather than subordinate to
the dominion government. Facilitating and respecting local freedom would ensure long-term
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Canadian allegiance. “Decentralized federalism,” Christopher Armstrong concludes, “suits
Canadian society.”29
Provincial rights scholarship therefore embraces Ontarians who rejected Macdonald’s
attempts to expand the dominion’s jurisdiction at the expense of the provinces’. Margaret
Evan’s biography of Sir Oliver Mowat applauds his repeated legal victories against Canadian
centralists before the British Empire’s highest court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (JCPC). Mowat’s successes ensured that Canada’s ‘quasi federal’ constitution was
politically unfeasible and instead became “predominantly federal in operation.”30
Christopher Armstrong and Paul Romney similarly commend the leading role Ontarians
played in protecting provincial autonomy.31
Yet provincial rights scholars struggle to explain the concurrent development of
provincial compact theory and the impulse to use Ontario’s preponderant potential to obstruct
policy demands from other provinces. The constitution did not grant Ontario any special
privileges; it did not create any jurisdictional asymmetries between Ontario and the other
provinces. Ontario was, these scholars conclude, a province like the others. This
constitutional equality leads some provincial rights scholars to overlook attempts to exercise
Ontario’s preponderant potential. Romney, for example, does not discuss the largely
Ontarian movement to secure the disallowance of the Quebec government’s Jesuits’ Estates
Act. His argument that the provincial rights movement pervaded Ontario‘s political culture
cannot explain why large portions of its population supported another movement that sought
to compromise Quebec’s legislative autonomy.32 A few historians including Frank
Underhill, Bruce Hodgins, and Christopher Armstrong, briefly recognize the willingness of
29
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Ontarians to use their parliamentary preponderance to shape national debates but they
struggle to align these actions with provincial rights; they do not interrogate the significance
of this sense of power and entitlement and consequently leave their readers with the
impression that such agitations contradicted the provincial rights movement. These same
scholars find attempts to use Ontario’s Legislative Assembly to pressure other governments
even more objectionable. Each ultimately concludes that Ontarian politicians and newspaper
editors were “inconsistent” when they defended Ontario’s provincial autonomy in one debate
and subsequently urged the provincial Assembly to pressure the dominion or other provincial
governments to conform to Ontarian preferences. “Partisanship,” they suggest, led these
Ontarians to overstep their provincial rights piety and rally against the Canadian or other
provincial governments.33 Provincial rights and a desire to interfere in policy development
outside of Ontario, according to these scholars, are antithetical concepts.
This narrow analysis misconceives how nineteenth-century Ontarians understood the
coexistence of these two desires. Ontarian political leaders and newspaper editors
recognized that their province’s asymmetrical population and taxation afforded its political
representatives the opportunity to unite and champion any policy that had widespread
support. They denied that there was any contradiction between simultaneously advocating
provincial rights and a strong dominion government. Ontario’s MPs had the right to vote on
all dominion legislation and there was no constitutional barrier prohibiting them from using
their aggregate intrastate preponderance to swing a parliamentary vote. In fact, many
provincial rights agitators advocated utilizing Ontario’s preponderant influence to safeguard
provincial autonomy by defeating dominion interference. The two ideas were not necessarily
contradictory. They could be mutually reinforcing.
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This combination was on shakier ground when Ontarians imported it to their
province’s Legislative Assembly. Although Ontario’s MPPs lacked the jurisdiction to
comment on national policies, they often justified the passage of petitions against the actions
of the Canadian or other provincial governments by arguing that Ontario’s large population,
contributions to dominion revenues, and Protestant demographic, gave its Assembly ‘moral’
influence. Using the Legislative Assembly in this manner was not consistent with the spirit
of provincial rights. Such debates often spurred from Liberal or Conservative attempts to
score political points by associating or disassociating themselves from the Canadian
government’s policies. Constitutional barriers aside, these agitators were intolerant when
other provincial Assemblies commented on national politics. Provincial rights, they decried,
required the national government and other provinces to confine their debates to their
respective jurisdictions. Despite these inconsistencies, noting that the same sense of
entitlement and power helped to inspire debates in Ottawa and Toronto reveals a consistency
that is not apparent when they are exclusively analysed with a provincial rights lens. There
was, moreover, no law preventing Ontario’s provincial Assembly from commenting on
politics in other parts of Canada and the Assembly could not compel these institutions to
obey its resolutions. In both legislatures, the belief that Ontarians were entitled to exercise
unique and powerful influence in Canada helped to inspire resolutions and debates that often
offended other provinces and raised Canadian political tensions.
Unlike provincial rights scholarship, the literature concerning regional alienation
emphasizes the importance of Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance to the formulation of
the Liberal and Conservative political platforms. From 1867 to the present, Conservatives
and Liberals consistently favoured policies that would win votes in Ontario and Quebec at
the expense of the Maritime and Prairie regions. As David Bercuson explains, this
favouritism occurred because “Central Canada is where the votes are and where elections are
won and lost.”34 Whether it was the National Policy, the dominion government’s retention of
resource rights of the Prairie provinces until 1930, freight rates that favoured Central
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Canadian industry, the National Energy Policy, the failure of Senate reform, or Stéphane
Dion’s 2008 carbon tax platform, the Canadian government’s policies reflected its central
province’s values or interests and marginalized Canada’s less populous regions. W.L.
Morton argues that the Prairies remained a “subordinate” territory and “the colony of a
colony” until 1930.35 Donald Savoie agrees. The Maritimes, he argues, were “sidelined” by a
national government that focused on promoting Canadian nationalism in Quebec and
ensuring that Ontario’s economy could compete against its American competition. They
remain, in Savoie’s words, the “big dogs” of Canadian economic policy formulation. “Big
dogs” he notes, “not only eat first, they also have a large appetite to satisfy when it comes to
national economic development policies, federal investment, and the location of federal
government activities.”36
The tendency of these scholars to focus on Western or Maritime victimization and
resistance, however, leads them away from examining the political role Ontarians wanted
their province to play in Confederation. Ontario becomes part of a “Central Canadian”
amalgam that obtusely seeks its own interests. In fact, Ontarians who opposed these regional
interests knew their actions antagonized other parts of Canada but they generally believed
that they had to use their province’s influence to safeguard national interests from sectional

35

W.L. Morton, "Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian History," In Context of Canada's Past:
Selected Essays of W.L. Morton, ed. A.B. McKillop, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 105, 109. See
also the discussion in Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian
Historical Writing since 1900, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), chapter 10.
36
Donald J Savoie, Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2006), 13, 304-305. For additional regional alienation scholarship consult: Ernest Forbes,
Challenging the Regional Stereotype; Ernest R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A
Study in Canadian Regionalism (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979); T W.
Acheson, "The Maritimes and ‘Empire Canada.’" in Canada and the Burden of Unity, ed. David Bercuson.
(Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1977), 87-114; T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the
Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910," Acadiensis I, (Spring 1972), 3-28; W.L. Morton, The
Progressive Party in Canada, revised edition, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971); Don
Nerbas,"Revisiting the Politics of Maritime Rights: Bourgeois Saint John and Regional Protest in the
1920s", Acadiensis 37, no. 1 (2008), 110-130; Vernon Clifford Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat
Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957); Howard Darling, The Politics of Freight Rates:
The Railway Freight Rate Issue in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980); Gerald Friesen, The
Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987; Roger Gibbins, Prairie Politics
and Society: Regionalism in Decline (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980); Mary Janigan, Let the Eastern
Bastards Freeze in the Dark: the West Versus the East Since Confederation (New York: Knopf Canada,
2012); Paul Phillips, "The National Policy Revisited,” Journal of Canadian Studies 14, no. 3 (1979): 3-13;
Paul Phillips, "National Policy, Continental Economics, and National Disintegration,” In Canada and the
Burden of Unity, ed. David Bercuson, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), 19-43.

17

tampering. Regional alienation scholars’ analytic focus also leads them away from
recognizing that the desire among Ontarians to maintain partisan or national unity sometimes
led its political representatives and newspaper editorialists to discourage Ontarians rallying
against the rest of Canada or to advocate using their province’s parliamentary influence to
support the initiatives from Canada’s other provinces. This reinterpretation of Ontario’s
influence made it easier for its Conservatives and Liberals to support unpopular policies.
Regional alienation scholars do not, in short, recognize that Ontarians tried to use their
preponderant potential to hinder and facilitate the satisfaction of the rest of Canada’s
demands.
Ontario historians are not unaware of preponderant federalisms, yet their consistent
focus on dominion-provincial relations deters them from interrogating their nature and
significance. In the 1980s, for example, the Ontario Historical Studies Series published
biographies of Ontario’s leading premiers. In one volume, Margaret Evan uses provincial
rights to challenge the centralist assertion that Mowat’s fight against Macdonaldian
centralization was a mere partisan ploy. Her focus on the premier’s pursuit of provincial
rights before the JCPC and Ontario’s electorate, however, leads her to only occasionally
mention the sense of entitlement in Ontario to influence national policy debates.37 The
biographies of premiers Sir James Pliny Whitney, G. Howard Ferguson, and Mitchel
Hepburn, have similar limitations.38 Even Christopher Armstrong’s The Politics of
Federalism, which analyses Ontario’s dominion-provincial relations from 1867 to 1942, only
rarely notes the desire in Ontario to use the province’s influence to impact national debates.39
Although this dissertation explores the intersections of provincial rights and preponderant
federalisms, its focus on the latter reveals new ways that Ontarians shaped Canada’s political
development.
A few scholars give the desire in Ontario to preponderate more attention. In 1961,
J.C. Morrison recognized that Ontario Reformers not only desired “to free Ontario from all
37
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outside interference,” but also wanted “to secure for her a preponderant, if not dominant,
position in the Confederation.”40 Although Morrison describes the Ontario Liberals’ desire
for preponderant influence in his thesis, he struggles to apply it to Ontario’s boundary dispute
with Manitoba, and only succeeds when analysing the adjustments of dominion subsidies to
the provinces. Even here, however, his complete reliance on the Toronto Globe for editorial
opinion, his preoccupation with centralism, and his refusal to examine Ontario
Conservatives, limits his ability to analyse the character and extent of preponderant
federalisms. In his Canadian Historical Association booklet entitled “Ontario and
Confederation,” Donald Swainson repeatedly describes Ontario’s desire for intrastate
“preponderance” in Confederation. Ontarians tried and failed, Swainson notes, to control the
Canadian government’s power of the purse by using the preponderant influence that ‘rep by
pop’ afforded them. Like Morrison, however, Swainson’s post-Confederation discussion
largely focuses on the provincial rights debates between Mowat and Macdonald and does not
explore the nature and significance of preponderant federalism to Canadian politics.41 S.J.R.
Noel’s Patron’s, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896 notes the
common assumption among Ontarians regarding their province’s “rightful and important
place in some larger, grander national entity.”42 He also describes the crusade of Reformers
for representation by population during the 1850s and early 1860s as a “majoritarian
challenge.”43 Aside from his discussion of Ontarian interest in the North-West, however,
Noel provides little evidence to support this claim. The sense of entitlement and power that
emboldened many Ontarians to rally against other parts of the country, in short, remains an
under-researched aspect of Ontarian political culture.
Political scientists have also contributed to the academic discussion concerning the
significance of asymmetries within federations. Like John Stuart Mill, political scientists
initially worried that large asymmetries in a federation would destroy national unity. In his
pioneering 1965 article, Charles Tarlton noted that the tendency of political scientists such as
Wheare to study federations as a whole led them to overlook the asymmetries that exist
40
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within federations. Just as each province in a federation has unique cultural, political,
demographic, geographic, and economic traits, “each component unit would have about it a
unique feature or set of features which would separate in important ways, its interests from
those of any other state or the system considered as a whole.”44 Federations with greater
asymmetries, he argued, were more likely to desire local autonomy. Tarlton found this
conclusion “discomforting” because he believed expanding local autonomy would lead to
dissolution.45 In 1970 Ivo Duchacek also worried that federal asymmetries could harm
national unity:
No member of a federal system can rule out the possibility that one leading
element, be it a state or a coalition of states, may emerge and distort the
principle of equality into that of a master-servant relationship. This may be
the result of environmental changes such as uneven economic development,
population shifts, new technology, or dynamic leadership and political skill in
one of the component units. Hegemony in a federation, which is the very
opposite of the federal principle, may be a fact, may be half-fact and halffiction, or may be a matter of wrong perception altogether. In either case it
will lead to strain and in some cases to explosion.46
Today, most political scientists are no longer as alarmed by federal asymmetries.
Michael Burgess and Franz Gress argue that they are “a fact of nature” within federations
because “federal political systems are consciously and purposively designed to facilitate
flexible accommodation for the many diversities which acquire political salience.”47
Although Ronald Watts admits that extreme disparities (such as Nigeria in 1960 when the
Northern Region dominated the other two regions with 54% of the country’s population and
three quarters of its territory) can disrupt and destroy national unity, he is not concerned by
most federal asymmetries.48 Daniel Elazar also contends that the “division of the whole
territory of a body politic into constituent units need not be exactly equal, but can be based
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on dispersed inequalities among the different units, as long as no single unit is so
overwhelming or predominant as to jeopardize or appear to jeopardize the integrity or power
of the others.”49
The line between harmful and sustainable asymmetries, however, remains vague.
Ronald Watts, regularly notes the asymmetrically large populations of Ontario and Quebec in
Canada, of Prussia in Germany, of New South Wales and Victoria in Australia, and of the
Northern Region in Nigeria. He also notes that the proportionately large populations of these
provinces, states, and cantons, gave them “a preponderant influence” within their
federations.50 Despite being aware of these examples of intrastate preponderance, however,
Watts limits his analysis to noting that “these units have tended to play a predominant role in
the federal politics of their federations, to the resentment of the more numerous smaller
constituent units.”51 Duchacek and Bertus de Villers offer similar generalizations.52 These
comparisons do not explore how intrastate preponderance impacts a country’s political
development. Indeed, de Villers asks:
How far is asymmetry in the size and wealth of regional units tolerable,
especially where the predominance of one or two large units (eg Ontario and
Quebec in Canada, UP in India, Prussia in the old Germany, or Northern
Nigeria in the early 1960s) can itself become a source of disharmony. The
discussion at this conference indicated that rather than appealing simply to a
priori reasoning, we need more empirical research into the limits of
asymmetry both de jure and de facto within federal systems.53
Watts also admits that “there has been surprisingly little systematic comparative analysis of
the degree to which the operation of federal political systems and federations is affected by
the number of constituent units and their relative size and wealth.”54
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A few scholars are answering the call for empirical studies. Edward Gibson and Tulia
Falleti note asymmetries in Argentina during the nineteenth century, and argue that its past
“struggle over political centralization…was less a struggle over how a national government
would dominate local governments than over how the provinces would dominate one
another.”55 So long as it believed it could dominate the federation, Buenos Aires (which
boasted the country’s only major port, and had four times the population of the country’s
second largest city in the 1850s) demanded a strong and highly centralized federation that
allowed its citizens to dominate its intrastate and bureaucratic institutions as well as the
country’s trade. Gibson and Falleti label this behavior “hegemonic federalism.” Although
many Ontarians wanted their province’s representatives to wield hegemonic power in
parliament, they never secured this degree of influence. Indeed, they only described
Ontario’s hegemonic potential as a future possibility. It is therefore a mistake to generalize
about states and provinces like Buenos Aires, Prussia, and Ontario without considerable
investigation.
Political scientists such as Duchacek, Elazar, Watts, Michael Burgess, and de Villers,
moreover, do not consider the possibility of multiple federalisms within a single province.
Their limited recognition of Ontario and Quebec as provincial power blocs does not discern
the varied ways Ontarians interpreted their province’s preponderant potential. By utilizing
two preponderant federalisms to frame their responses to political developments, Ontarians
often compromised their ability to preponderate during Canadian policy debates. This
division of Ontario’s influence frequently gave the Canadian government more policy
freedom than might otherwise be assumed.
This dissertation relies heavily on newspapers. Ontario’s politicians regularly utilized
preponderant federalisms to defend their policies on the hustings and in the legislatures.
Hansard reports and reprints of public speeches in newspapers provide indispensible
discussions of Ontario’s influence. Newspaper editorials also provide a wealth of evidence.
The majority of newspapers during the 1800s were heavily reliant on party patronage
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comprising printing contracts and official advertisements for their financial wellbeing. These
‘organs’ rarely strayed from their patron’s political tunes. Paul Rutherford in A Victorian
Authority: The Daily Press in Late Nineteenth-Century Canada insists that editorials can
provide insights into public opinion. He admits that editorials could not alter the views of
decided individuals. Yet, as a “leading agency of legitimation” used in concert with other
institutions such as political parties, editorials could sway undecided constituents.56
Conversely, “the press baron, whatever his idiosyncrasies, had to satisfy his clientele or else
the popularity of his newspaper, and so his influence and revenue, would wane.”57 The
Globe, for example, reversed its editorial stance during the Jesuits’ Estates controversy in
March 1889 when its management realized that their original position hurt sales.58 Although
determining agency between the public and the press is rarely possible, successful
newspapers did not veer far from their owners’ perceptions of popular opinion, and are useful
sources for analyzing the character of Ontario federalism.
Many of the newspapers examined in this dissertation were produced in Toronto.
This methodology reflects the intensive discourse production that radiated throughout the
province from the metropole. Although P.B. Waite admits that it is “difficult to say” how
closely the hinterland papers followed Toronto’s example, he argues that
the small journals had their opinions… But there is not much differentiation in
opinion. The editorials, written locally, seemed to embody ideas which, if not
imported from the larger journals, at least tend to reflect their general policy,
seen through the glasses of local issues. The Leader and the Globe [sic] were
recognized as the two giants of Canada West; no other papers in the Province
had their circulation, and undoubtedly they exerted considerable influence.59
To verify these assertions, this dissertation relies heavily on two non-Toronto newspapers.
The Advertiser was a Liberal organ published in London. David Mills, who was one of
Ontario’s leading Liberals and one of Canada’s sharpest legal minds, edited the newspaper
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from 1882 to 1887.60 The paper closely mirrored the Globe and enjoyed wide circulation
throughout south-western Ontario. The Belleville Intelligencer was a Conservative organ
that had a large circulation in eastern Ontario. Sir Mackenzie Bowell, the Conservative MP
for Hastings North, edited the newspaper from the late 1840s to 1878. Bowell was also a
prominent Orangeman. He joined the Order in 1842 as a doorman at the age of eighteen (the
youngest possible age for membership) and rose to become Grand Master of the Orange
Lodge in British North America from 1870-1878. A prominent Conservative, he eventually
became prime minister of Canada from December 1894 to April 1896.61 Even after 1878
when Mackenzie became a silent owner of the paper, the Intelligencer’s editorials continued
to tow the party line. Like the Advertiser, the Intelligencer’s preponderant federalist
editorials contained a measure of local character but almost always mirrored their
metropolitan contemporary’s message.
Each chapter of this dissertation explores a stage of the evolution of federalisms in
Ontario and analyses their significance for Canadian politics. Chapter 1 describes the
gradual emergence of federalism in Upper Canada and explains why it took so long to
develop. The federal principle made repeated appearances in Upper Canadian politics prior
to 1858 but fell out of favour on each occasion. Gross misconceptions and ignorance about
the principle, in addition to the tabling of underdeveloped proposals that rarely considered
intrastate influence, harmed federalism’s initial popularity. The 1851 census could have
fostered federalism in Upper Canada but George Brown and his followers expected ‘rep by
pop’ to allow Upper Canada to control the Province of Canada’s policies. Until the end of
the 1850s virtually all Upper Canadian politicians and newspaper editorialists imagined
representation by population and federation as competing (rather than complimentary)
solutions to the growing political friction between the colony’s two sections. The
Conservative’s 1858 proposal to form a British North American confederation reflected this
belief by largely overlooking intrastate arrangements. It was only in 1859 that Reformers
proposed combining ‘rep by pop’ and Canadian federation to resolve the impasse. This
platform marked the first time that a Canadian political party (if that term can be used to
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describe the Reformers in 1859) linked the two constitutional reforms. According to Brown,
this combination of constitutional reforms would give each province local autonomy. Yet, he
and other conventionists also began to murmur about the possibility of using their colony’s
potential preponderant intrastate influence to dominate such a federation. Despite these brief
surges of Upper Canadian federalism, however, Reformers and Conservatives reverted to
their pre-1858 platforms from 1860 to 1864 when their federal proposals failed to gain
momentum. ‘Rep by pop’ and the constitutional status quo were still more politically
expedient than federal compromises. Federalism thus remained weak in Upper Canada until
the formation of the Great Coalition in 1864.
Chapter 2 revisits the well-travelled ground of the Confederation negotiations and
debates from 1864 to 1867. Throughout this period, the leading politicians of most British
North American colonies debated the merits of the federal principle, and negotiated its
application to British North America. Despite the achievement of ‘rep by pop’ during these
discussions, Upper Canadian preponderant federalisms developed surprisingly slowly.
Several leading Reformers hoped that Upper Canada’s burgeoning population would allow it
to dominate a British North American House of Commons. Yet this aspiration continued to
have limited currency among Upper Canadians because its adherents remained tight lipped to
avoid sabotaging Confederation supporters in Lower Canada and the Maritimes with
statements of Upper Canadian domination. In fact, Brownites did not openly proclaim their
ambitious expectations until after the 1866 London Conference finalized the dominion’s
constitution. As these Reformers opened up about their preponderant federalist aspirations,
Conservatives and Reform-Coalitionists offered an alternative assessment of Ontario’s
preponderant potential and the ways that it could be used in Confederation. On 1 July 1867,
therefore, Upper Canadian Reformers and several Conservatives expected their province to
exert preponderant influence but they contested the role that their province would play in
Confederation.
Chapter 3 explores the evolution and impact of preponderant federalisms from 1867
to 1872. This period marked the first serious clashes of the two preponderant federalisms.
From the outset, many Ontarians (and especially Liberals) expected to preponderate in
Canadian politics. Although they hoped that Ontario would one day dominate Confederation
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by acquiring an absolute majority of seats in the House of Commons, they expected their
province’s voters to elect a solid bloc of mainly Liberal candidates who would exercise
Ontario’s preponderant potential in the interim. The belief that their province’s intrastate
influence would enable them to force the government to adopt their demands emboldened
agitators to strongly oppose the Canadian government’s policies concerning the Intercolonial
railway route, better financial terms for Nova Scotia, the Red River resistance, and the entry
of Manitoba and British Columbia into Confederation. When the Canadian government
proved intractable, they shifted their opposition to their province’s Legislative Assembly
where they again demanded that the rest of Canada heed the demands of the province that
contributed the biggest portion of the dominion government’s revenues and sent the largest
delegation of MPs to parliament. The pre-Confederation debates had not anticipated this
reaction and many contemporaries as well as present day commentators accused these
Ontarians of being ‘inconsistent’ provincial autonomists. Although this move conflicted with
the spirit of provincial autonomy, these Ontario agitators continued to describe their efforts in
the Assembly as another legitimate way of exercising their province’s preponderant influence
to reinforce provincial autonomy. Ultimately, Ontario’s provincial Assembly passed some of
the agitators’ resolutions but these had little impact on national policy.
The ineffectiveness of these agitations was partly due to the opposition of
Conservatives and a few Liberal-Coalitionists who refused to set Ontario against the rest of
Canada. Sometimes these supporters utilized jurisdictional and nation-building rationales to
oppose these agitations. On other occasions, they argued that national unity required Ontarian
support for the unpopular policies. In their estimation, Ontario benefited most by the
solidification of Confederation. Although these opponents often struggled to explain how
dominion policies served their province’s interests, their support spurred from a culture of
preponderant expectations that was unique to Ontario. The consequent split of Ontario’s
preponderant influence ensured that the Canadian government enacted the other province’s
policy demands. Despite the Ontarian agitators’ inability to unify the province behind their
platforms, however, their stand raised sectional tensions and validated the rest of Canada’s
concerns about Ontario’s preponderant potential. Moreover, because the same sense of power
and entitlement informed the debates in the national and provincial legislatures, this chapter
also demonstrates that preponderant federalisms amounted to more than attempts to form
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parliamentary power blocs. Preponderant federalisms were rationales to organize Ontario’s
potential constitutional and extra-constitutional asymmetrical influence to support or oppose
policy initiatives from the rest of Canada.
Preponderant federalisms waned somewhat from 1872 to 1884. Leaders of the
national Liberals from Ontario recognized that they were unlikely to sweep their province’s
ridings and accepted the fact that they required the support of the rest of Canada to form
national governments. Chapter 4 explores how this understanding led them to curtail their
willingness to rally Ontarians against the rest of Canada. A belief that Ontario could
influence the state’s policies that simmered beneath the surface of debates concerning Louis
Riel’s expulsion from parliament, an amnesty for Red River’s resistors, and the New
Brunswick school question, forced national Conservatives and Liberals alike to carefully
manage their responses. Despite pursuing compromise solutions to these controversial
questions, neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives advocated aligning Ontario’s potential
preponderant influence behind these policies. The curtailment of agitations against the
initiatives from other parts of Canada, combined with perceptions about the Canadian
government’s legal and constitutional obligations, rendered such a strategy politically
unnecessary and unwise. In the early 1870s and 1884, however, new demands for better
terms evoked a limited return of preponderant federalisms. Ontario Liberals once again
suggested that their province could unite and derail additional deviations from the financial
terms of union but the imperative of maintaining national parties deterred these agitations
from matching their previous intensity. In fact, threats of preponderant action against these
better terms amounted to hollow attacks designed for voter consumption and did not
endanger the Canadian government’s proposals. The curtailment of the sense of power and
entitlement in Ontario ensured that these debates did not reach the high political tensions of
1867 to 1872.
The unwillingness of Conservatives and Liberals to frame their politics with
preponderant federalisms from 1872 to 1884, however, was not absolute. Chapter 5
refocuses on provincial Liberals and Conservatives to explore how preponderant federalisms
turned Ontario’s northwest boundary dispute into a heated political debate. Many Ontarians
expected the additional territory to attract a new population that would bolster their
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province’s intrastate representation. Yet Macdonald obstructed Ontario’s attempts to take the
territory because he feared that the province’s enlargement would destabilize Confederation.
Ontarians who believed that their province needed the political strength to oppose initiatives
from the rest of Canada were infuriated. They claimed that opposition from Quebec forced
Macdonald to ‘rob’ Ontario of this territory and to instead enlarge the partly French-Catholic
province of Manitoba. The possibility that a united Ontario could force the Canadian
government to relinquish the land emboldened the Mowat government and its supporters to
adopt aggressive and confrontational strategies that elevated the political stakes and alarmed
the rest of Canada. This stand forced provincial Conservatives into a difficult position.
These MPPs and their supporters did not, as scholars suggest, forsake their province’s
interests and political culture by embracing Macdonald’s desire for a smaller Ontario.
Instead they continued to demand Ontario’s enlargement but argued that Mowat’s seizure of
the territory abused Ontario’s preponderance and harmed national unity. They insisted that
the only way Ontario could secure the disputed territory without alarming the rest of Canada
was for it to submit its claim to the JCPC for judgement. Acknowledging Ontario’s intrastate
power and expansionist aspirations allowed the provincial Conservatives to oppose Mowat’s
policies without seriously harming their electoral prospects. The consequent split of
Ontario’s voice and influence eventually forced Mowat’s government to submit its claim to
the JCPC in 1883.
Chapter 6 analyses how a sense of entitlement and power to challenge movements in
Quebec contributed to the intensification of racial and religious tensions in Canada from
1885 to 1889. During the political debates following the execution of Louis Riel, as well as
the Quebec Legislature’s passage of the Jesuits’ Estates Act, the belief that Ontarians could
unite and force the dominion government to satisfy their demands at the expense of Quebec’s
resurged. In the case of the Riel execution debate this belief, in addition to anti-French and
anti-Catholic sentiment, emboldened Ontarians to oppose the attempts of Quebecers to
censure the Canadian government in parliament. This antagonism contributed to the
increasing distrust between Quebec and Ontario. Yet not all Ontarians supported these
campaigns. Virtually no Ontarian defended Riel but the suggestion that Ontario had a unique
ability to restore national unity allowed some to acknowledge their province’s influence
while opposing the agitations against Quebec. An awareness of Ontario’s influence even
28

provided a rationale to extend an olive branch to Quebecers to help restore national unity.
Ontarians were not, therefore, as unified as most scholars claim. The agitation in Ontario
during the Jesuits’ Estates debate was nearly impossible to subdue and again pitted Ontario
against Quebec. It was so intense that several Ontario politicians and newspapers rejected
their party’s lines and joined a movement attempting to organize Ontario’s influence to
pressure for the disallowance of Quebec’s legislation. Ontarians who steadfastly opposed
disallowance were hampered by the widespread belief that the Jesuits’ Estates Act was
unconstitutional and a threat to English-Protestantism in Canada. Although the disallowance
campaign failed, it nevertheless contributed to lasting resentment in Quebec.
The final chapter analyses how preponderant federalisms shaped the North-West
language debate of 1890 and the Manitoba school debate of 1890 to 1896. In both cases,
Ontarians were emboldened by the belief that they could use their preponderant influence to
protect local autonomy from parliamentary interference. During the North-West language
debates, D’Alton McCarthy encouraged Ontarians to use their parliamentary preponderance
to support his bill terminating French as an official language of the North-West Territories.
Although it initially appeared that McCarthy had successfully rallied Ontarians to his side, a
compromise solution and limited appeals for Ontarians to align their influence to support
national unity helped to defeat his bill. In the case of Manitoban schools, the belief in
Ontario’s ability to influence national disputes inspired an activism and intransigence in
Ontario that offended French-Catholics and threatened to split both political parties. The
Liberals managed to contain the tension within their own caucus by allowing Ontarians to
join the anti-remedialist campaign while promising justice to the Manitoban minority in
Quebec. The obligation to govern limited the Conservative’s flexibility. Multiple
Conservative defectors ultimately broke with their party and supported the anti-remedial
agitation. Those who advocated tolerance struggled to maintain their Ontarian support. The
Conservative government first managed the agitation by deferring the school question to the
courts. When the JCPC eventually found in favour of the French-Catholic minority and the
Conservatives committed to remedial action, its Ontario supporters were unable to quell the
sense of power and entitlement in Ontario to use their parliamentary preponderance to
oppose the bill. The Canadian government and its supporters acknowledged Ontario’s
preponderant potential and tried co-opt it by once again urging Ontarians to use their power
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to buttress national unity but the strategy ultimately failed to capture the imaginations of the
majority of Ontarian voters. This failure contributed to rising political tensions and the
Conservative’s defeat in the 1896 election.
After 1896, Canadian politics entered a new era. An increasingly diverse range of
policy debates ranging from the Autonomy Acts of 1905 to Imperial policies concerning the
Boer War, the Naval Crisis, and the First World War, increased Canadian political tensions.
A new generation of politicians who were not present at Confederation’s founding introduced
new dynamics to federal politics including dominion-provincial conferences and stronger
party discipline. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine whether preponderant
federalisms impacted these changes. From 1867 to 1896, however, Ontario never exercised
hegemonic influence. Yet attempts to achieve or block the province’s influence were integral
to Canada’s political development. This sense of empowerment, however, required nearly a
century to develop.
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Chapter 1: The Gradual Development of Upper Canadian
Federalism to 1864
"There is a magic to the word [federation] which permits us to dispense with the details."
Globe, 17 June 1862.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, Iroquoian and Algonquian nations along with a few
thousand French fur traders and settlers inhabited present-day Ontario. By 1763
approximately twenty thousand Algonquin, Huron, and Iroquois peoples occupied the
region.1 During and after the American Revolutionary War (1776-1783), tens of thousands
of Loyalists left the United States. Approximately thirty thousand went to Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick. By 1790, a further fourteen to twenty thousand Loyalists flooded into the
Great Lakes peninsula.2 The Imperial government recognized that this new population
constituted a generally Protestant peoples loyal to the British Crown that strengthened its
hold on the remainder of British North America. It passed the Constitution Act of 1791,
creating two separate districts out of the former colony of Quebec. Lower and Upper Canada
each received their own appointed Governor and Legislative Councils representing wealthy
landowners. They elected representatives to Legislative Assemblies based on a landowning
franchise. After the 1837 to 1838 Rebellions, the Imperial government reunited the two
governments into a single legislature. Upper and Lower Canada each received an equal
number of seats in the joint Legislative Assembly. Emigration from Great Britain and Ireland
to Upper Canada increased the domestic desire for constitutional change that would afford
the colony greater self-rule. Over the subsequent decades Upper Canadians resisted and
promoted a variety of different constitutional solutions, including the federal principle.3
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The federal principle played an intermittent but prominent role in Upper Canadian
politics from 1791 to 1858. Throughout this early formative period Upper Canadians
contemplated a variety of federal union proposals. The British government and John Beverly
Robinson considered the federal principle during the early 1820s. Lord Durham initially
proposed a federal solution when contemplating the best way to resolve political turmoil in
Upper and Lower Canada in 1838. After Britain moved to free trade in the 1840s, Upper
Canadian members of the British American League proposed the creation of a British North
American federation. The federal principle was, therefore, not unfamiliar to Upper
Canadians.
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Figure 1: Population of the Pre-Confederation Colonies4
Yet these federal proposals did not attract widespread support. Why did federalism
remain so weak in Upper Canada? A partial explanation can be found in British assessments
of the federal principle. According to John Kendle, most nineteenth century British political
4
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thinkers were sceptical of dividing sovereignty between national and provincial governments.
They believed that undivided government was the best way to ensure national unity.5 Many
Upper Canadians shared this view and it hampered their federalism right up to 1867.6 This
chapter discusses four additional factors that contributed to the unpopularity of federal
proposals in Upper Canada. First, pre-1858 federal proponents in Upper and Lower Canada
conflated the federal principle with the expansion of British (as opposed to American)
presence and governance into the North American interior. Many used the terms “union” and
“federation” interchangeably and their commitment to the former at the expense of the latter
resulted in underdeveloped federal proposals that contributed to further misunderstanding.
Second, the federal principle was still under development during the eighteenth century and
several politicians exacerbated confusion by referring to the Province of Canada as a
“federal” or “quasi-federal” union. Equating the federal principle with the Province of
Canada’s government made it difficult for Upper Canadians to understand how it afforded
greater provincial autonomy. As the popularity of the union in Upper Canada began to wane
in the 1850s, this misunderstanding also detracted from the federal principle’s appeal. The
third concern was cost. The multiple levels of government inherent to federations also made
them expensive structures. Many Canadians believed that the colony did not require, and
could not afford, this expensive form of government. Lastly, Upper Canadians preferred
other constitutional solutions to the federal principle. The 1851 census transformed the
dynamics of Canadian politics by confirming, for the first time, that Upper Canada was more
populous than Lower Canada (see Figure 1). Over the next decade Brownite Reformers, and
an increasing number of Tories, became increasingly frustrated with Upper Canada’s limited
intrastate influence. These men advocated the principle of representation by population (‘rep
by pop’) to ensure Upper Canadian autonomy. Despite the example of the American House
of Representatives that combined ‘rep by pop’ and the federal principle, however, Upper
Canadians imagined these two concepts as competitive rather than complimentary. Other
political groups, moreover, preferred different constitutional solutions. Clear Grits often
favoured dissolving the union. Still another group of moderate Reformers preferred giving
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each section a veto by implementing the double majority principle. Most Upper Canadian
Conservatives relied on Lower Canadian support to form their governments and therefore
defended the constitutional status quo. In this increasingly acrimonious debate, federation
became a distant option. Prior to 1858, Upper Canadians did not find the federal principle
very appealing.
The increasing legislative deadlock resulting from constitutional discontent in Upper
Canada led Reformers and Conservatives to suddenly embrace the federal principle in 1858
and 1859. The Conservatives proposed a British North American federation in 1858 as a
means to reassemble their government and sidestep the divisive ‘rep by pop’ debate. The
following year, Upper Canadian Reformers debated combining ‘rep by pop’ and federation
within the existing union. As in the past, neither Conservatives nor Reformers devoted
themselves to the realization of these proposals. Instead, when each proposal failed to gain
traction with the other colonies, or to even attract the support of the majority of Canadians,
the political debate returned to ‘rep by pop’ as a stand-alone measure. The federal principle
again faded into the political background.
This brief flash of federal debate in 1858 to 1859 had lasting consequences.
Reformers began to understand a new recommendatory aspect of federation that scholars
have not interrogated: the possibility of Upper Canadian intrastate preponderance. A federal
structure of government could ensure each province’s autonomy while ‘rep by pop’ would
give Upper Canada a preponderant proportion of seats in the federal legislature. During the
early 1860s, the possibility of Upper Canadians using these seats to preponderate or dominate
national policy debates percolated in the minds of leading Reformers. Not all Upper
Canadians, however, accepted this vision of Upper Canada’s place in a federation. When
discussing their proposals for a British North American confederation, Macdonald’s Upper
Canadian Conservatives continued to emphasize the importance of geopolitical union and
avoided debating their province’s parliamentary representation. While the pre-Confederation
period was formative to the development of Upper Canadian preponderant federalisms, both
types remained weak in 1864.
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Early Union and Federal Proposals
The idea of uniting all of the British North American colonies had a long history.
William Smith, a Loyalist who later became Chief Justice of Lower Canada, suggested a
union in both 1785 and 1790. Smith hoped that a union of all of the North American
colonies would solidify British rule and deter rebellion. When considering British North
America’s future a generation after the end of the American Revolutionary War, the Chief
Justice of Lower Canada, Jonathan Sewell, suggested curtailing the autonomy of each of
Britain’s remaining North American colonies by uniting them under a strong executive
authority. The colonies, however, were still too disparate, geographically isolated, and
underdeveloped to unite effectively. These proposals attracted little attention.7
In 1822, the Imperial government tried to resolve a number of Canadian problems by
proposing the reunion of Upper and Lower Canada. Since 1818, Lower Canada’s Governors
and the Legislative Assembly engaged in a prolonged and bitter struggle to control the Civil
List budget. The Parti Canadien, which represented French-Canadian interests in the Lower
Canadian Assembly, insisted that the elected body had the right to control the government
purse. The Crown, however, maintained the right to spend the Civil List without the
Assembly’s approval, and multiple governors refused to resign this prerogative. Because
neither side possessed superior jurisdiction regarding expenditures, the Imperial government
hoped to circumvent the problem by dissolving the existing system and simultaneously
limiting linguistic, religious, and property rights, while submerging the popular Parti
Canadien within a larger legislature where it would have to compete with a united English
bloc.8
Montreal’s merchant class long desired Canadian reunification. This class emerged
from the fur trade but by the 1820s these mainly British merchants also profited from the
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import of European goods, as well as the export of Canada’s new staples: wood and wheat.
Reunion would permit the full development of the Laurentian system. Splitting the Canadas,
Laurentianists complained, made coordinating canal construction or the colony’s financial
sector nearly impossible. Merchant values and interests were not exclusive to the major
trading cities of Montreal and Quebec; they also impacted the politics of numerous upstream
towns such as Kingston and Niagara that relied on Laurentian commerce.9 With their wealth,
and political connections, the merchants were an influential force in favour of union.
Towards this end, Edward Ellice, who had not been in Canada since 1803 but who had just
facilitated the union of the Hudson’s Bay Company and the North-West Company, began to
quietly lobby the Imperial government in London to reunite Canada during the opening
months of 1822.10
Complaints by the Upper Canadian government also contributed to the Imperial
government’s decision to propose reunion. Lacking a seaport of its own, Upper Canada
imported its goods through Montreal and Quebec. At the turn of the century, Lower Canada
agreed to give the Upper Canadian government the revenues from the goods passing through
its ports that were bound for the western province. After the War of 1812, however, this
system broke down. Customs officials under-reported Upper Canadian imports, and thereby
reduced the latter’s revenues. The Upper Canadian government protested, but by 1819 the
Civil List dispute prevented the Lower Canadian government from even appointing
commissioners to negotiate a new agreement. During a two-year interim period, the Upper
Canadian government lost four-fifths of its revenue. When the negotiations failed to reach a
solution in 1821, the Upper Canadian government decided to petition the Imperial
government to intervene by assuming control of the collection of import duties, and assigning
an arbitration board to settle Upper Canada’s outstanding claims against Lower Canada.11
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To deliver its petition, the Upper Canadian legislature despatched its AttorneyGeneral: John Beverley Robinson. Despite being only thirty-one years old in 1822,
Robinson was a leading Tory who had already served as Attorney-General for four years.
Upon arrival, the Undersecretary of War and the Colonies, Sir Robert John Wilmont Horton,
surprised Robinson by revealing the discussions with Ellice and two members of the Lower
Canadian government then in London, to reunite Upper and Lower Canada. Although Upper
Canadians had heard rumours that the Imperial government had been contemplating reuniting
Canada, neither the lieutenant governor nor the Assembly had discussed it. Robinson
opposed the scheme by claiming that it defied the cultural geography that inspired the
Constitution Act of 1791. Upper and Lower Canada remained very different colonies, and
the latter’s French population ensured that even the combination of English Upper and Lower
Canadians would not overcome its “preponderance.”12 Despite his misgivings, the Imperial
government proceeded with a union bill. It proposed fusing the two Legislative Assemblies
with their existing memberships but preserved the executive branches of each section. The
representation of each section in the Assembly would grow until each section had sixty seats.
The British opposition, however, quashed the bill because the colonies had not been
consulted, it would be extremely unpopular in Lower Canada, and because it had been
introduced so late in the session. Unwilling to risk controversy, the Imperial government
dropped the bill, and instead passed the less ambitious Canada Trade Act, which Robinson
drafted almost single-handedly.13
When passing the Canada Trade Act, the Imperial government promised to
reintroduce unifying legislation during the next session. The negative reaction across most of
Canada to the now public 1822 union bill, however, gave them pause. The Parti Canadien
strenuously objected to the bill’s overrepresentation of Upper Canadians. Representing
120,000 Upper Canadians with forty representatives and Lower Canada’s half-million with
fifty representatives was unacceptable. The clergy strongly disapproved of the bill’s many
assimilative measures. Eventually 60,642 Lower Canadians signed petitions opposing the
12
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union. Most Upper Canadians also opposed the bill. Many western frontiersmen considered
the measure to be anti-democratic because the colonies were not consulted. Western
frontiersmen thought little about the Laurentian transportation system and worried that union
could harm local autonomy. Many in York worried that a union would move the capital to
another city, resulting in significant job losses. The most commonly held objection, however,
was that the cultures of the two colonies were simply too different for a union to succeed.
Only in Upper Canada’s eastern townships, as well as other towns and cities dependent on
Laurentian trade, did the union bill receive strong support.14
From 1822 to 1824 some British Americans contemplated the creation of a larger
union, comprising all of the colonies. Robinson, for example, who was still in London in
January 1823, drafted a proposal for a British North American confederation. His proposal
preserved the local legislatures, but gave them comparatively few responsibilities or taxing
powers. Instead, the general government received sweeping powers to legislate on trade,
defence, and even religious concerns (subject to the 1791 Constitution Act). In the general
Assembly, Lower Canada would have twelve seats, Upper Canada, Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick would each have ten seats, and Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland would
each have six seats. Robinson believed that his plan would “elevate” the colonies to become
a “really integral part of the Empire” and thereby solidify their British connections while
nullifying republicanism.15 He also believed the English representatives would pursue
national interests instead of local prejudices and would therefore collectively overpower any
assertions of French power in the general Assembly.16 After the humiliation of 1822,
however, the Imperial government did not seriously consider proposals like Robinson’s.
Instead it recognized that union was unpopular in the colonies, and the lack of adequate
communication and transportation systems made the proposals impractical.17
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The Canadian Rebellions of 1837-1838 revived discussion of union and federation in
Upper Canada. Lord Durham was appointed High Commissioner and Lieutenant Governor
of Lower Canada and sent to report on the causes of the Rebellions. He stepped off his ship
on 29 May 1838 confident that he already knew how to rectify the situation. In 1837 J.A.
Roebuck, a British Whig in the House of Commons who had spent part of his youth in Lower
Canada and currently served as the agent for the Lower Canadian Assembly, proposed a
federal union of British North America. Although the proposal received little attention at the
time because most Imperial parliamentarians still judged it to be impractical, Durham seized
it as a means to assimilate Lower Canada’s French population and preserve a British
counterweight to American influence in North America.18 An Executive Council would
perform the duties of a national upper house. The plan preserved the provincial Assemblies
and furnished them residual powers. Each provincial Assembly would elect five members
plus an additional member for every additional 50,000 residents to a national Assembly. The
proposal recognized the compatibility of representation by population and federation. If a
British North American union proved unworkable, the same plan could be applied to the
Canadas until the other colonies decided to join.19
Durham knew a proposal to maintain the separation of Upper and Lower Canada
would be unpopular among Lower Canada’s English-speaking minority but he “was
confident he could either win it over or carry his policy without its support.”20 He was
wrong. The Atlantic colonies expressed interest in a Maritime union but were not interested
in Durham’s larger project.21 Upper Canadians also proved intractable to Durham’s
proposed federation. According to William Ormsby, despite the previous proposals of
government elites, “most Upper Canadians had not given any consideration to the possibility
of a British North American union.”22 George Herkimer Marland, Inspector General of
Upper Canada and prominent member of the Family Compact, believed confederation was
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possible but only in the distant future once adequate communications, transportation, and
common interests had been established.23
The Family Compact was a group of wealthy Loyalist and Tory elites, who
dominated Upper Canada’s executive and judiciary branches of government. The latter
group were immigrants from Britain who imported Burkean anti-democratic notions of
privilege along with preferences for a strong and centralized executive. The Family
Compact’s wealth and desire for government patronage led its members to closely align with
the lieutenant governor’s policies. Although the lieutenant governor and the Family
Compact preferred operating with the sanction of the elected colonial Assembly, they
regularly went against its expressed wishes.24
Durham heeded the opposition to federation and his famous Report instead proposed
a Canadian legislative union. The Imperial government, desiring to limit French influence,
inflated the power of Upper Canada’s smaller population by allotting each section forty-two
seats in the united Legislative Assembly. The Imperial government sent Charles Poulett
Thomson (later Lord Sydenham), a veteran Whig with over ten years of parliamentary
experience, to secure colonial approval of the new constitutional framework in November
1839. Upper Canadians, Thomson soon learned, were not against the union in principle, but
were very concerned about subduing French influence. Thomson devoted the next two
weeks to meeting with Upper Canadian politicians from across the political spectrum. Upper
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Canada’s debt from public works, he emphasized, would be consolidated into the union and
would finally receive a fair share of the import duties. Equal representation, he assured his
audiences, would give the English-speaking inhabitants of Upper and Lower Canada
supremacy within the union’s legislature. After considerable lobbying and debate, the Upper
Canadian Assembly approved the proposed union. Most Reformers supported the plan
because they believed it would lead towards responsible government. Moderate Tories also
voted for the plan because it would solve the province’s continued revenue problems. They
remained suspicious of the Family Compact and believed that loyalty to Britain obligated
them to accept it.25 The majority of Upper Canadians, therefore, agreed to the creation of the
Province of Canada, hoping that English-Protestants would have preponderant influence in
the united legislatures.
Family Compact Tories remained obstinate. The new union made the Executive
Council more responsible to the Assembly. It also threatened the official position of the
Anglican Church in Upper Canada by ending its exclusive claim to the clergy reserves.26
The Tories also worried that equal representation would leave English Canadians powerless
to combat French influence. An infuriated Robinson published a lengthy response to
Durham’s report, wherein he reiterated his fears regarding the continuation of Lower
Canadian preponderance within a united legislature. Robinson believed the assimilative
intent of the union was doomed to fail because, in part, Upper Canada lacked sufficient
population to rival Lower Canada. The English in Lower Canada often voted with their
French neighbours and could not be relied upon to vote as a bloc with Upper Canada.
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Robinson also worried that Upper Canadian Catholics might vote with their Lower Canadian
brethren.27 Consequently, Robinson concluded that the
French would either have the ascendancy, or be so nearly equal in number to
the others as to enable them to keep up an obstinate contest which should
make the issue of every important public question in a manner doubtful, or
that, by combining, as in their present temper they certainly would, with
whatever other portion of the Assembly they might find ready from different
motives to embarrass and obstruct the government, they might at any time
pervert the free institutions bestowed upon them to purposes destructive of the
public welfare.28
Although Toryism’s antipathy to responsible government soon declined into political
obscurity, Robinson’s concern that Lower Canada’s aggregate influence could overcome
Upper Canada’s traditionally divided representatives proved to be prophetic. The lack of
confidence in Upper Canada’s ability to influence the politics of the province of Canada
therefore predated the union. This concern proved to be an integral ingredient to the
development of preponderant federalisms.
The Imperial government united the two colonies to form the Province of Canada on
10 February 1841. Upper and Lower Canada became Canada West and East, though most
colonists continued to use the old names. The anticipated coalitions of English Lower
Canadians and Upper Canadians did not materialize. Instead, the union was governed by a
variety of coalitions of English Upper Canadians and French Lower Canadians. One of the
most famous of these partnerships was between Robert Baldwin and Louis-Hippolyte
LaFontaine, who together secured responsible government. The struggle, which lasted until
1849 with the passage of the Rebellion Loses Bill, dominated Reform politics. In this era of
relatively harmonious cooperation between the two sections, constitutional reform to convert
the legislative union into a federation seemed unnecessary. Besides, by 1842, the union
government began to operate on a dualistic basis and appeared to many to be a “quasi
federation.” Although one individual technically headed the cabinet as Prime Minster,
separate Attorney Generals for Canada East and West led ministries for each section of the
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province. It was not a federation. The idea of a British North American union continued to
circulate but as Ged Martin explains, “general union was now identified as a development for
the future.”29

The British American League
Increased tensions led Upper Canadians to again consider the federal principle.
Canadian merchants were deeply affected by the dramatic drop in commodity prices during a
depression from 1846 to 1849.30 Having suffered the union and the loss of their monopoly
on trade with Britain when it moved to free trade during the 1840s, some Tories and other
disillusioned individuals considered annexation to the United States. The final straw came in
1849 when the Canadian government passed the Rebellion Losses Act compensating
participants of the rebellion who were not convicted of high treason for lost or damaged
property. In Toronto, protesters smashed several of the windows in George Brown’s house
and burned prominent Reformers in effigy. Even Lord Elgin, the Province’s Governor, could
not escape the mobs. In Montreal, Tories torched the parliament buildings and formed the
Annexation Association.31
In general, however, Upper Canadian Tories were more moderate than their Lower
Canadian counterparts. They rejected annexationism by supporting a rival British American
League. Although Montrealers led by George Moffat ran the movement’s headquarters,
Upper Canadians dominated its ranks. Nearly every Upper Canadian town and city sported a
local association. “The membership” according to C.D. Allin, “was recruited almost entirely
from the ranks of the Tory party,” although a few Reformers and annexationists also joined.32
The League was particularly attractive to moderate Tories because they believed it was a
means of distancing themselves from the violent excesses in Montreal.

29

Martin, Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 86.
Douglas McCalla, Planting the Province: The Economic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 193-196.
31
Gerald A Hallowell, "The Reaction of the Upper Canadian Tories to the Adversity of 1849: Annexation and
the British American League," Ontario History 62 (1970), 42; Careless, The Union of the Canadas, 126.
32
Cephas D. Allin, "The British North American League, 1849,” Ontario History 13 (1915), 79.
30

43

The League held its first convention at Kingston in late July 1849. Upper Canadians
closely followed the convention’s proceedings, hoping it would produce an alternative to
annexation.33 For the first three days, the convention focused on commercial relations within
the Empire. On the third day, after considerable additional debate, the delegates
unanimously approved British North American confederation. This endorsement was not,
however, evidence of strong Upper Canadian federalism. As Allin notes, most of the
delegates possessed “only a rudimentary knowledge” of the federal principle because they
had not studied it in advance.34 “The scheme of a federal union,” he concludes,
commended itself to the delegates, less on its own merits as a distinctly
national policy than as a utilitarian measure well designed to meet the
immediate necessity of the time. To the ultra Protestants, it appealed as a
means of overcoming the domination of the French; to the imperialists, it held
out the hope of preserving the British connection; to the nationalists, it
prepared the way for the country's independence; to the business men, it
presented the prospect of a wider market, and to the opportunists, it appeared
as a likely means of escape from a horrible embroglio [sic]. Thanks to the
combination of these discordant elements, the resolution was agreed to
unanimously.35
Nor were all of the delegates as convinced about union and the federal principle as the
unanimous vote implied. According to Donald Creighton, a young John A. Macdonald who
had only recently been elected to the Assembly in 1844 and who attended the League’s first
convention, considered a British North American confederation to be “immature and
impractical for the moment.”36 Nevertheless, a federal union was now the League’s policy,
and the convention consequently passed resolutions requesting the Maritime provinces to
appoint League delegates for a future conference to negotiate terms.
The parochial nature of the League’s platform was soon obvious. The League,
dominated by Upper Canadian Tories, was unlikely to garner the cooperation of the Reform
governments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The Maritimes were also uninterested
because they recognized that they would be junior players in any union. Moreover, the
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League’s Upper Canadian contingent lacked the authority to negotiate on behalf of the
Canadian government, and this greatly weakened Maritime interest in its overtures.
Ultimately, a similar association in New Brunswick appointed a delegation, which the
League’s representatives met on 12 October. As neither delegation spoke for its
governments, however, their discussions had little significance. The need to review the fruits
of these meetings, nevertheless, spurred another convention.37
The second convention, held in Toronto in early November 1849, had a more
challenging purpose than its predecessor. It had to clarify the League’s amorphous platform
with specific constitutional proposals and encourage further negotiations with the other
colonies. The convention failed to achieve either goal. Lacking new information from the
other colonies, and knowing the considerable disagreements that simmered beneath the
surface of the officially non-partisan meeting, most of the speeches remained vague. J.W.
Gamble, a Tory representing Vaughan who often spoke during the proceedings, avoided
detailed proposals, and instead focused on the expected benefits of a British North American
federation. Each province of the federation, he declared, “would be able to make its own
laws, to carry out its own views, and pursue the course it deems most for its interest, with
Free Trade between all the provinces.”38
James Strachan of Goderich was the only delegate who attempted to outline a federal
structure. On the fourth day of the convention, he proposed a federation that included a
Legislative Council and Assembly, but avoided stating whether the national Assembly’s
membership would be based on ‘rep by pop,’ or provincial / regional equality. He did not list
any specific provincial or national jurisdictions, and only assured his audience in passing that
a federal structure would render each province’s vital interests “inviolable.” This vagueness
rendered Strachan unable to forecast Upper Canada’s potential influence within his
envisioned federation. 39 Even Strachan, however, could not resist emphasizing the merits of
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British North American union. The union government, he argued, would attract the
country’s best men and allow them to pass “more correct” policies than would be possible in
the provincial legislatures. Good governance would quickly instil “a community of feeling
as well as interest, and thus carry along with it the popular voice.” This solid commercial and
political bloc would withstand annexation pressures. So long as British North American
union occurred, Strachan remained remarkably flexible on federal particulars. As the coming
decades would demonstrate, many Ontarians would try to focus dominion politics on national
expediencies instead of ethnic divisions.40
The second convention’s lack of innovation contributed to the League’s unpopularity.
The convention, for example, did little to assuage Maritime concerns.41 The League even
failed to capture the hearts of Upper Canadians:
Although attractive in appearance, the scheme of a federal union, upon which
the reputation of the League chiefly depends, fell signally flat on the
electorate. The general public were not prepared to accept offhand such a far
reaching constitutional proposal. They were almost entirely in the dark as to
the national significance and importance of the proposed federation since no
preliminary efforts had been made to educate them as to the advantages of an
intercolonial union.42
The League’s federalism, in short, was “a loose and almost meaningless plank” that dressedup a growing Conservative movement to enlarge the empire of the St. Lawrence across
British North America during a time of economic crisis.43 League members focused on the
benefits of a British North American union and did not dwell upon the specific government
structures that would facilitate their vision. In Upper Canada, federalism continued to be a
political expedient or crisis mentality to be married with union schemes when it seemed
attractive.
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The crisis soon passed. Although the Annexation Association published a Manifesto
in October 1849, the movement never overcame loyalist sentiment. Even at its peak, it failed
to gain much credence beyond Montreal. The British American League did not officially
disband but instead drifted into obscurity in the proceeding months. Upper and Lower
Canadians were still reasonably content with the existing legislative union. British and
American markets also recovered in the early 1850s, further compromising the economic
rationale for union.44 Yet the League was not inconsequential to Upper Canadian federalism.
“Thanks to the league’s propaganda,” Allin concludes, “the Canadian public were
familiarized with the idea of a federal union and were made conversant with some of the
chief advantages of a confederation.”45 Ged Martin agrees that this ‘familiarization’ caused
the federal principle to “reappear whenever an issue involving the future of the colonies came
to the fore.”46

The Census, ‘Rep by Pop,’ and its Competition
Although few took up the federal cause during most of the next decade, the federal
principle never entirely disappeared from public debate. The activities of the British
American League inspired small and insignificant stirrings during the early 1850s. At the
beginning of the decade James Lesslie, the editor of Toronto Examiner, believed “it is a
matter of speculation” whether the colonies would ultimately form a British North American
confederation, or annex themselves to the United States.47 A few Reformers sponsored
resolutions proposing a federal union of all the British North American provinces during the
Legislative Assembly’s 1850 and 1851 sessions. Both debates, however, focused on the
benefits and liabilities of creating a larger union and left the proposed federal structure of
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government unevaluated. Indeed an 1851 resolution asked the house to express its favour for
either a federal compact or a legislative union.48
In 1850 Henry Sherwood, a Tory and former Attorney-General for Canada West,
published an unusually detailed and lengthy draft constitution for a federal union. Like
Robinson, Sherwood advocated British North American confederation to check the
expansion of American influence on the continent and to preserve the remaining colonies’
links with the British Empire. He proposed granting each province fifteen seats in the
nation’s upper house. Representation in the national Assembly would be based on
population. Sherwood estimated that Upper Canada would be initially entitled to sixty seats,
Lower Canada sixty-four, New-Brunswick eighteen, Nova Scotia twenty-three, Prince
Edward Island five, and Newfoundland seven. Despite his plan’s combination of ‘rep by
pop’ and federation, Sherwood’s pamphlet focused on delimiting jurisdictions as well as the
British connection. It entirely overlooked speculating about intrastate and interprovincial
relations.49 Most Upper Canadians still doubted the merits of federation or British North
American union. After reviewing Sherwood’s pamphlet, the Toronto Globe’s editorialist
wondered “what earthly interest have the Canadas in Newfoundland?”50 By the Globe’s
estimation, Upper Canada’s future lay in the west; the Maritimes’ future lay to the east.
British North American confederation was therefore a non-starter. In a subsequent editorial
which the Globe reprinted from the British London Free Press, the Toronto paper also
complained that the general government of a British North American confederation
would simply cost a great deal and have little or nothing to do. We have no
need for a foreign or diplomatic system, the expense or the cares of a standing
army are unnecessary, and the office of a viceroy is one for which the need
has not been felt. Bearing this in mind, the advantage of uniting the whole of
the British Provinces for the purpose of subdividing them again seems quite
unnecessary. The object of the union between Upper and Lower Canada was
a good one - to unite a people having similar interests, but differing in some
external matters. The result of a union such as that proposed would only serve
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to continue distinctions which are already wearing away. In place of a united
Province we would by such a union as the one proposed have a French and an
English one.51
The failure of the Globe to recognize that a federation would relieve the national government
of having to legislate on persistently divisive local matters demonstrated the continued desire
of Reformers to assimilate French Canada. At this juncture, Reformers did not recognize the
recommendatory characteristics of the federal principle when it was combined with ‘rep by
pop.’52
With responsible government achieved after 1849, a new generation of politicians
emerged to lead Canadian politics. Upper Canadian Reformers became less willing to
cooperate with Lower Canada. Old disagreements concerning church and state bubbled to
the surface, shattering old alliances. The divisions became so unmanageable that Baldwin
resigned as leader of the Reform movement in the Assembly in 1851, making Francis Hincks
co-premier and leader of the Reform moderates. Hincks came to Canada from Ireland in
1832 where he soon gained political prominence as a moderate Upper Canadian Reformer
from his short-lived Examiner and Pilot newspapers. Elected to the Legislative Assembly in
1841 as the representative for Oxford County, he rose rapidly through Reform ranks. In
1848, Hincks became Inspector General in the Lafontaine-Baldwin cabinet and was soon
Baldwin’s chosen successor. As a moderate Reformer, Hincks opposed elite privileges and
supported voluntaryism (the belief that churches and their institutions should be supported by
their memberships, rather than by the state). His newspapers supported responsible
government, non-sectarian schools, and the secularization of clergy reserves provided to the
Upper Canadian Anglican and Lower Canadian Catholic Churches. Hincks, however, was
also a realist, and once he became co-premier, he proved willing to deviate from these
principles and compromise with Lower Canadians if he believed it would serve the union’s
overall unity or keep his party in power.53
George Brown was a rival Upper Canadian Reform leader. After immigrating to New
York from Scotland with his father in 1837, they re-settled in Toronto in 1843. George
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Brown founded what soon became Upper Canada’s most popular newspaper: the Globe. As
an evangelical Presbyterian, George Brown supported the Free Kirk movement and was
deeply suspicious of the close relationship between church and state in Lower Canada.
Unlike Upper Canadian agrarian radicals, however, Brown had commercial holdings in the
Laurentian economy and recognized its economic importance for Upper Canada. He noted,
for example, that if Canada was ever again at war with the United States, its access to the icefree port at Portland, Maine, would disappear. Upper Canada, in Brown’s estimation,
therefore required access to the St. Lawrence. ‘Brownites’ also believed in cabinet
government and a limited franchise but they remained suspicious of American-style
republican democracy. Depending on the issue, they sided with moderate or radical
Reformers. Elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1851 in Kent County, Brown gained the
support of more and more Reformers as the decade progressed.54
The 1837 Rebellion discredited radical Reformers but they returned in modified form
as ‘Clear Grits’ openly opposing the moderation and compromise of the Hincksites. The
movement was particularly popular among western Upper Canadian farmers who saw no
immediate benefits from Laurentian trade in their day-to-day lives. Their membership
included former radicals such as William Lyon Mackenzie and energetic young Reformers
such as William McDougall. McDougall sympathized with the 1837 rebels after witnessing
the burning of Montgomery’s tavern by loyalist forces after the uprising’s failure. His family
provided him with an extensive liberal education in Canada and the United States. Trained
as a lawyer, he soon moved into the field of journalism.55 By 1849 McDougall’s home was a
meeting place for Reformers who disagreed with moderate leadership. These meetings soon
spawned the Clear Grit movement. Clear Grits wanted to use responsible government to end
the system of privilege that still underlay much of Canadian politics. They believed “in
individual equality – of opportunity but not of condition.”56 As admirers of American
agrarian democracy and the British radical tradition, they split with Upper Canadian
moderates Reformers as well as Brownites by demanding the conversion of government
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patronage positions to elected offices. Clear Grits, like Brownites, advocated voluntaryism
and the secularization of the clergy reserves.57
The Upper Canadian Conservatives divided between extremists and moderates. Both
strongly supported the Laurentian economy and big business. Extreme Tories, including
John Hillyard Cameron, rarely led the Conservative caucus due to their small numbers. They
clung to the increasingly out-dated notion that state patronage should privilege the wealthy
upper class and also supported the continuation of the Anglican Church’s right to state
support. Cameron, like many Tories, was also an Orangeman and vehemently opposed the
influence of the Catholic Church.58
The Orange Order was a Protestant fraternal organization founded in Ireland in 1796.
Its namesake was William of Orange who defeated the Catholic armies of James II at the
Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Lodge members swore secret oaths promising to defend
Protestantism, monarchism, and the continuation of the Imperial connection. Its members
distrusted the Catholic Church, and Canadian lodge members were deeply suspicious of
Catholic schools and French Lower Canadian influence in Canada. To demonstrate their
solidarity and to commemorate the Battle of the Boyne, Lodge members held marches on 12
July each year. They also participated in anti-Catholic demonstrations that sometimes
became violent. Most often, their opposition to the Catholic Church led them to support
government policies that further separated church and state. The organization was
hierarchical, with a Grand Master overseeing each country’s lodges. Ogle Robert Gowan
brought the Order to Canada in 1829 by founding its first lodge in Brockville. The movement
spread through the Irish Protestant communities of Upper Canada and then across the colony.
In the first three years alone, the Grand Lodge issued ninety-one warrants for new lodges
across Upper Canada. By 1870 the Order operated 930 Lodges in Ontario. Although the
Orange Order operated across British North America, the Order was most successful in
Upper Canada / Ontario. Its expansion was not merely due to religious bigotry but also to its
emerging respectability by the mid-1850s. The rural lodges were small, generally hosting 2040 men; their secrecy and willingness to accept all Protestant denominations made them ideal
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places for frontiersmen to escape from the doldrums of pioneer life. Although officially nonpartisan, the personal politics of the Order’s leaders in addition to the Reform suspicion of
secret organizations, led the Orange leadership to favour moderate Conservative candidates.
The tendency of Conservatives to work with Lower Canadian Bleus often led to conflict (and
even contributed to a brief schism within the Order from 1853-1856). Not all Orangemen
accepted this official bias but Upper Canadian politicians respected the power of the Orange
vote in their ridings.59
Moderate Conservatives, such as William Draper and John A. Macdonald, believed
that geography rendered the Province of Canada “indissoluble.”60 Macdonald had come to
Kingston from Scotland as a youth. A successful lawyer, he won Kingston’s seat in the
Legislative Assembly in 1844. Macdonald was part of a generation of new and more
‘practical’ Conservatives. They were less interested in government structures, and more
interested in the economic development of the province. These Conservatives accepted the
merits of responsible government. They also accepted that Canada’s sectional differences
required its government to operate on a dualistic basis. As a result, the Conservatives were
tolerant of separate schools and were more natural allies for Lower Canadians than the
voluntaryist Reformers. They believed that maintenance of the existing system of
representation, along with a willingness to compromise, would foster the continued economic
growth of Canada and ensure peace between the two sections. Their conservatism was, as
Creighton describes, “qualified by a genuine liberalism.”61 Upper Canada’s Conservatives
thus situated themselves as the party that would preserve the union for the mutual benefit of
both sections. In the coming decades, however, Conservatives and Tories rarely received the
majority of Upper Canada’s seats and therefore tried to increase their governments’ power by
reaching out to moderate Reformers.62
In Lower Canada, the general political unity that characterized the Lafontaine era
shattered by the early 1850s. In its place were two factions: the conservative Parti Bleu and
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the liberal Parti Rouge. The main Bleu leader was George-Étienne Cartier. Born into a wellto-do family named for King George III, and trained as a lawyer, Cartier was a Patriote
during the 1837 to 1838 Rebellions, and had spent half a year in exile in the United States
before returning to Lower Canada in late 1838. He was first elected to the Legislative
Assembly in 1848 for Verchères and soon developed an extensive following among the
Bleus. The Bleus were conservatives who sought the survival of French-Canadian traditions
and culture. Part of this culture was the Catholic Church which, during the late 1840s and
early 1850s, enjoyed revived influence in Quebec. The Bleus were therefore a “Catholic
conservative grouping” that, with the public support of the clergy, enjoyed immense electoral
success. Some Bleus were ultramontanes and obeyed clerical instruction in the secular
sphere. Other Bleus, including Cartier, maintained a degree of independence from the
Catholic Church; their alliance with the Church was close, but not absolute. The Bleus
cultivated strong business ties and Cartier was no exception. He introduced the bill creating
the Grand Trunk Railway in 1852 and was its board’s long-time legal representative. His
close ties with the company gave him access to patronage, which he and his followers used to
shore up political support. Like Macdonald’s Conservatives, the Bleus focused on building
up the Laurentian economy and opposed annexation. He and Macdonald became, as Cartier’s
biographer Alastair Sweeny describes, “Siamese twins” in Canadian politics. Macdonald
required the Bleu’s majority of Lower Canadian votes, and the Bleus found the Conservatives
to be much more natural allies than the Reformers.63
Opposing the Parti Bleu was the Parti Rouge. Antoine-Aimé Dorion was first elected
to the Legislative Assembly in a Montreal riding in 1854 and soon became the Rouge leader.
The Rouges were more radical due to their strong American-inspired liberalism. They
advocated an elected Legislative Council, an elected public service, and universal suffrage.
Although Dorion was a devout Catholic, the Rouge were anti-clerical and opposed
ultramontanism. This dissent attracted the ire of the Catholic Church and contributed to the
Rouge’s electoral unpopularity. To help publicize its ideals, the Rouge supported the
creation of the Institut Canadien in Montreal. At the Institut, Lower Canadians could read
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the works of blacklisted authors such as Voltaire, and hear liberal speakers discuss current
issues. Like the other political leaders, Dorion also had extensive business connections,
which led him to sign the Montreal Annexation Manifesto, and later to advocate dissolution
of the Union.64
A population boom catalysed the sectional conflict that had been simmering in the
Province of Canada. The end of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent Irish Potato Famine
brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants to Upper Canada. Each successive decennial
census documented a near doubling of Upper Canada’s population. The 1851 census showed
that Upper Canada with 952,004 inhabitants had, for the first time in its history, become
slightly more populous than Lower Canada with 890,261 people.65 Representation by
population had a new appeal for Upper Canadians. They were already familiar with the
principle, having rejected it in 1849 because they had judged their own population to be too
small to compete with Lower Canada. Now, some Upper Canadians began to hope that ‘rep
by pop’ would free their section from having to compromise further with Lower Canada.
In 1853 Brown initiated his push for ‘rep by pop’ during a debate to redistribute the
existing seats within each section of the Province of Canada. According to the census,
Brown bragged, Upper Canada now possessed “a preponderance” of the province’s
inhabitants, and its phenomenal population growth showed no signs of slowing. He
considered it unjust to continue Upper Canada’s underrepresentation when, according to his
estimates, its inhabitants paid two-thirds of the province’s import duties. Brown concluded
that “if the union of the Provinces is to work harmoniously and efficiently,” the sectional
barrier between Canada East and West had to be removed via the implementation of ‘rep by
pop.’ This change would encourage the treatment of all Canadians “as one people.”66
Brown recognized that his proposal would not garner the two-thirds majority required for
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constitutional change yet he claimed the moral high ground and rebuked the Hincksite
Reformers for using this as an excuse not to support the measure.67
Moderate Reformers and Conservatives denied the immediate importance of this
demographic shift. Lower Canadian political representatives would never agree to increase
Upper Canadian representation because it would leave them vulnerable to overzealous Upper
Canadian voluntarists who might try to impose their beliefs on Canada East. Hincksite
Reformers therefore defended the status quo and clung to their alliance with French Canada.
They claimed that demanding representation by population indicated a desire among Upper
Canadians to ignore these inviolable divisions and would lead to “scenes of bloodshed.”68
Hincks denied that his government wanted Upper Canada to be governed against its will but
insisted that Upper Canada had to “take the constitution as she found it. If she did not like
that constitution, then let her agitate for dissolution of the Union.”69 The St. Lawrence was
too important to Upper Canada’s economy to allow these sorts of divisions to develop. The
Assembly ultimately rejected Brown’s amendment 57 to 15 and passed the government’s
redistribution legislation.70
Over the proceeding years, both the Upper Canadian Clear Grits and Tories became
increasingly frustrated with their inability to topple successive moderate administrations led
by Hincks, MacNab, and Macdonald which consistently relied upon their Lower Canadian
majority to overcome Upper Canadian preferences. For example, Upper Canada had public
and separate school systems since 1841. After the union, Montreal Bishop Ignace Bourget
(1840-1876) as well as Toronto Bishop Armand-François-Marie de Charbonnel (1850-1860)
pressured moderate Canadian governments to increase government funding and autonomy of
Upper Canadian separate Catholic schools.71 During the same 1853 parliamentary session,
the Hincks government passed legislation making Upper Canadian separate schools more

67

Province of Canada, Debates of the Legislative Assembly of United Canada, 15 March 1853, 2154.
Ibid, 16 March 1853, 2172.
69
Ibid, 2173.
70
Ormsby, “Sir Francis Hincks,” in The Pre-Confederation Premiers, 176.
71
Craig, Upper Canada, 25, 51; Robert Choquette, “L’Église de l’Ontario français,” in Les Franco-Ontariens,
ed. Cornelius J Jaenen, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1993), 215; Terence J Fay, A History of
Canadian Catholics: Gallicanism, Romanism, and Canadianism (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 2002),
111-113.
68

55

financially and bureaucratically independent from municipal interference. The government
took this step after Bourget applied pressure to give the Catholic minority in Upper Canada
the same rights as English Canadians enjoyed in Lower Canada. Only ten of twenty-seven
present Upper Canadian representatives voted for the legislation, yet Lower Canadian
support ensured the measure’s passage.72 Macdonald sponsored another school bill in 1855
that allowed any ten persons wishing to start a separate Catholic school to qualify for public
financial support. The government had waited until the end of the session, when nearly half
of Upper Canadians had already left Quebec for home, to table the bill. The vote was not
announced in advance and even the government’s Superintendent of Education was kept
unaware. Like its predecessor, the Conservative government passed a bill that affected Upper
Canada against the will of the majority of its representatives. “Never before,” J.M.S.
Careless points out, “had the existing provincial union looked so unsatisfactory to aggrieved
Upper Canadians.”73
In the minds of the aggrieved, these failures to heed the will of the majority of Upper
Canadian representatives on legislation that concerned their section of the province
confirmed the need for constitutional change. Some Clear Grits, recognizing that Lower
Canada would not accept ‘rep by pop,’ instead advocated the dissolution of the legislative
union to secure Upper Canadian autonomy. The former rebel, William Lyon Mackenzie,
moved a resolution proposing dissolution in 1853. Brown vehemently opposed dissolution
because he wanted Canada to expand into the Hudson’s Bay Company territory or Rupert’s
Land, and this required Lower Canadian (and particularly Montreal) resources. Dissolution
would also isolate Upper Canadian commerce and agriculture from Atlantic trade. Brown
therefore committed the Globe to a concerted campaign to convince dissolutionists to support
‘rep by pop’ during the summer of 1855. ‘Rep by pop’ was achievable, Brown contended
during a speech at Brampton that summer, if Upper Canadians united behind the concept.
The only reason Conservatives opposed it, his newspaper agreed, was because it would
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sweep them from office. Brown’s campaign succeeded. By the end of the summer most
Clear Grits turned away from dissolution and instead lined up behind ‘rep by pop.’74 The
following year at the first Reform convention in Toronto, the Hinckites also promised to
support the idea. Reformers now united behind a common “Brownite” policy comprising
‘rep by pop,’ expansion into the North-West, and resistance to Lower Canadian influence.75
Aside from dissolution or representation by population, Canadians debated a third
alternative to the status quo. Beginning in the mid-1850s John Sandfield Macdonald
advocated the old but seldom followed double majority principle. Sandfield was a Roman
Catholic Scotsman who modelled his politics on the “Baldwinite” Reformers. As an eastern
Upper Canadian, he stressed the fundamental compatibility of interests between Canada’s
two sections while also recognizing its cultural duality.76 The advocates of the double
majority principle claimed that they could prevent regional discontent by accepting this
duality and requiring the government to obtain a majority of votes from both sections of the
province on national issues. Representatives from Canada East increasingly viewed this
principle as a means to protect themselves from the swelling ‘Protestant mob’ in Canada
West. With the exception of Sandfield and his few followers, however, few Upper
Canadians considered the principle a viable form of governance because it allowed either
section of the province to effectively veto legislation, thereby compromising responsible
government. Deciding which bills were of national or local scope, moreover, proved
impossible.77
The federal principle received little attention during these years. In fact, a number of
Canadians confused the federal principle with the Province of Canada’s division of powers.
In 1853, for example, Hincks described the existing union as being “in many particulars a
federal union” because it institutionalized many divisions between the two sections. The
cabinet divided its positions between east and west, and the government passed laws that
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aligned with each section’s cultures.78 In March 1858 Louis-Victor Sicotte, a former Speaker
of the House and future co-premier from Lower Canada, similarly alluded to Canada’s
geographical division of cabinet posts and legislation, and thus insisted that Canada’s
constitution was “more federal” than its American counterpart.79 The Province of Canada
was not a federation; it lacked distinct and constitutionally entrenched national and provincial
governments. Nevertheless, since many individuals believed that the Province was already
(at least in part) a federation, logic dictated that its problems could not be resolved by the
federal principle. In this infertile climate, federalism had little chance.
It was not until 1856 that Dorion rekindled the federal debate. During that
parliamentary session, as well as the following year, Dorion told the Assembly that the Upper
Canadian desire for increased representation was just, and he warned that Lower Canadian
resistance would encourage dissolutionist sentiment in Upper Canada. Recognizing Lower
Canada’s reluctance to agree to ‘rep by pop,’ Dorion instead proposed continuing the
Canadian union under the federal principle. A federal government would allow each section
to independently legislate on divisive issues while simultaneously facilitating the
coordination of common interests in the general legislature. Dorion believed that the lack of
affinity between the colonies rendered a larger British North American confederation
unfeasible for the time being.80
Upper Canadians, however, continued to view the federal principle with suspicion.
Although Brown did not offend Dorion by openly opposing his 1856 federal proposal, he did
not lend it his support. Instead, he threatened dissolution if Lower Canadians did not accept
‘rep by pop’ in the near future.81 During the mid-1850s the Globe remained highly critical of
federal proposals. According to the Reform organ, the business of the state required two
governments. “If each state is to manage its own finances, its own public works, and its own
legislation – protection in time of war, and diplomacy in time of peace, being in the hands of
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the Imperial Government,” it asked, “what remains for the Federal Government?”82 The
Globe also repeated the common Reform warning that a federation would entrench, rather
than remove, the sectional line dividing Canada’s two provinces. A strong and united
country could only emerge, it contended, if this line was eliminated.83 Charles Clarke, an
Elora retailer and close friend of Clear Grits such as McDougall, expressed another concern
that would become extremely common in the coming years. Like many Upper Canadians,
Clarke was tired of demanding ‘rep by pop’ by 1856, yet he refused to support a federal
solution because he believed it would be too complex to implement quickly.84 Despite
knowing that it had no immediate prospects, Reformers continued to demand ‘rep by pop’
because they lacked an alternative solution.
Most Conservatives remained interested in British North American union and even
federation, but they continued to view it primarily as means of expanding the Laurentian
economy. Some, such as J.W. Gamble and W.H. Merrit pushed for union without
mentioning federation.85 The Toronto Leader, founded in 1852 by James Beaty, was the
chief Conservative organ and contended that American experience demonstrated that a
federal system of governance was best suited to territorial expansion.86 Although desiring
the creation of a country stretching from Atlantic to Pacific, the Leader warned that
no single Legislature could dispose one half of the business that would come
before it. And could the member for Gaspé qualify himself to pass opinion
upon some local question affecting Vancouver Island, or vice versa. It may be
that the present settlers at the Red River would be governed from the point of
Toronto or Quebec; but there is little doubt that, in that case, they would feel
themselves to be a sort of appendage to Canada; the colony of a colony, as it
were; and there would not be a wanting of sources of irritation in abundance.
It is true they would have their representatives in the Legislature; but the few
votes to which they would at first be entitled would leave them completely at
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the mercy of a body which they would have no possible means of
controlling.87
As these “younger sisters” grew across the North-West, the Leader assured its readers, each
colony would join a “great northern federation.” These separate colonies would have the
expertise to manage their own resources and save Canada the cost of financing their
development. Canadians, therefore, needed to wait until separate colonies formed in the
North-West before taking control of the territory.88 Macdonald and Cartier shared this
opinion.89
Conservatives consequently dismissed calls for a smaller Canadian federation.
“Mutual forbearance and prudent toleration,” the Leader contended, were all that was
necessary for good governance of the union. The Reform crusade for ‘rep by pop’ was
premature. Although the Leader did not doubt that Canada West’s population would become
much larger than that of Canada East, the province’s current “superiority” was “still
questionable.” Once Canada West’s preponderance was unequivocal, the Leader vaguely
reassured its readers, the East “would necessarily, in due time, afford Upper Canadians all
the rightful advantages of any advanced position.”90 Prudent statesmanship required
patiently waiting for the next decennial census in 1861 to reveal the extent of Upper
Canada’s preponderance.91 In March 1858 the Leader still only admitted that
there has long existed a vague idea in the public mind of this section of the
Province that… federation would ultimately be found the only possible
solution of the representation question, on which the two sections of the
Province are in danger of becoming every year more antagonistic. This idea
may in future become fixed in the public mind, if some other and more
feasible solution of the question be not found.92
Conservatives continued to imagine the federal principle as a distant option, preferable only
as a method to incorporate the North-West.
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Upper Canadian federalism remained weak in the opening months of 1858.
Unfamiliarity with federal principle limited the popularity of proposals by Robinson, Lord
Durham, and the British American League. After 1822, neither the Maritime nor the
Imperial governments seriously considered a British American union. When Canada West’s
population surpassed its Eastern counterpart and demands emerged for constitutional change,
Upper Canadians advocated a variety of different solutions. ‘Rep by pop,’ double majority,
and federation were, according to Careless, the “three great competing solutions” to the
Province of Canada’s impasse.93 Even in April 1858 the Leader described ‘rep by pop’ and
federation to be “antagonistic” because “if a Federal Union were adopted there would no
longer be any question of an adjustment of the representation between Upper and Lower
Canada.”94 Partisanship increased the incentive to treat the solutions as competitive rather
than complementary. This combination of perceptions and incentives led Upper Canadians
to dismiss the handful of individuals, like Henry Sherwood, who recognized that ‘rep by pop’
and federation could be complimentary solutions. Reformers used representation by
population as a partisan rallying cry and disparaged the federal principle. Rather than
proposing a rival solution, most Conservatives opposed the idea, and instead advocated the
continuation of the status quo for the time being, and associated federation with the future
expansion of the Laurentian system. Until mid-1858, therefore, federation remained a distant
choice with Conservatives and Reformers. All of this was about to change.

Federalism’s Brief Ascension
Nothing in 1857 or early 1858 indicated that federalism was on the rise in Upper
Canada. Dorion’s 1856 and 1857 proposals for a Canadian federation were not novel and
failed to gain momentum. Yet Reformers and Conservatives subsequently reconsidered the
recommendatory components of federation. The existing legislative union was becoming
increasingly unpopular in Canada West, and the Assembly debated the merits of double
majority principle as well as representation by population. Alexander Tilloch Galt, an
accomplished industrial and railway tycoon and well-known independent representative for
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Sherbrooke, Canada East, sponsored a series of resolutions on 7 July 1858 advocating a
British North American confederation. Like Dorion, Galt recognized that a federation of the
Province of Canada would allow local governments to deal with “sectional matters” and
thereby free the national government to legislate on areas of general agreement. Unlike
Dorion, however, Galt believed the time was ripe for a British continental union. Federation,
he argued, would be the ideal mechanism to secure the vast resources of the North-West.
Galt’s resolutions also recognized that the federal principle’s preservation of local autonomy
might entice the Maritimes to join a British North American confederation. Because Galt’s
resolutions merely asked the Legislative Assembly to endorse the federal principle for British
North America, they did not include specific constitutional measures. His resolutions did not
cover other important aspects of federations, such as intrastate representation or provincial
subsidies.95
Upper Canadians generally opposed Galt’s resolutions for the same reasons they had
opposed its predecessors. Oliver Mowat considered the proposal “premature since he
perceived no popular desire for it.”96 Despite his extensive Conservative connections, Mowat
had successfully stood as a Reformer for the riding of Ontario South in 1857. George Brown
openly opposed Galt’s proposal and stuck to his platform of ‘rep by pop’ or dissolution if
necessary. Earlier in the year Brown had considered the federal principle in a private letter to
his friend and fellow Reformer from Montreal, Luther Holton. A Canadian federation
seemed impractical, and Brown wondered “what powers should be given to the state
Legislatures and which to the Federal? Would you abolish the County Councils? … if you
did not, what would the local Parliaments have to control?” A British North American
confederation seemed more practical but the colonies were not yet ready, and Brown doubted
he would still be in politics when they eventually united. He therefore continued to support
‘rep by pop’ while remaining open to federal proposals.97 John A. Macdonald, now premier
for the past two years, did not deviate from his treatment of past federal proposals; he
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continued to support the current constitutional system. For the time being he “stuck by the
union.”98 Galt’s resolutions seemed destined to fail.
A ministerial crisis, however, breathed life into Galt’s federal proposal. The
Macdonald-Cartier government fell in late July 1858 on the seat of government question, and
Governor Edmund Head asked Brown and Dorion to form a government.99 The Reformers
accepted the invitation and promised to establish ‘rep by pop’ with some sort of “checks” to
protect Lower Canada from Upper Canadian infringements.100 It was only two days,
however, before their government also fell. Governor Head asked Cartier and Macdonald to
attempt to form another government. Galt agreed to join the cabinet as Inspector-General on
the condition that the government adopt his federal resolutions. After the notorious “double
shuffle,” the government announced its intention to work toward a confederation of British
North America.101 The government sent a delegation, including Cartier and Galt, to England
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to solicit the opinion of the Imperial government in early October. Although the British press
and government accepted the eventuality of a British North American union, the Canadian
proposal was unexpected. There had not been any of the extensive correspondence from the
Canadian government and Governor that usually preceded such important proposals.
Distracted by violent uprisings in India, the Canadian proposals even caught the Colonial
Office off-guard. It hesitated supporting the project, and sent a despatch to the governors of
each province warning them against becoming caught up in the hasty Canadian federal
campaign.102 The Maritime colonies, in fact, were preoccupied with proposals for their own
legislative union and were therefore uninterested or, in the case of New Brunswick, even
hostile to the Canadian overtures that seemed only to address Canadian problems.103 In the
face of these obstacles, federation receded from the Canadian government’s agenda.
Although Conservatives and Bleus adopted confederation as their long-term policy to placate
those desiring constitutional reform in, federalism among Upper Canadian Conservatives
remained weak. Whether Macdonald and Cartier knew a British North American
confederation would be impractical from the outset, or whether they subsequently recognized
their proposal’s unpopularity, they rarely defended the federal principle during Reform
attacks the following year. Instead, Conservatives resumed their normal pattern of
compromise while blaming the Imperial government for its refusal to organize a colonial
convention.104
Seeing no way forward, both parties attacked each other during the early months of
1859. The Toronto Daily Colonist and Atlas, for example, alleged that Dorion had only
accepted ‘rep by pop’ after Brown had agreed to “emasculate” it “by limiting the influence of
the Upper Canadian majority to Upper Canada.”105 When confronted with these accusations,
Brown dodged the issue by claiming, with some justification, that it was unreasonable to
expect his government to produce a mature constitutional alternative in two days. Yet
because Upper Canadian Reformers and Rouges did not develop their program in the coming
months, Brown could only note the Conservative government’s failure to elaborate on its
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own federal proposals to the Assembly.106 This partisan mudslinging did little to advance
federalism in Upper Canada.
Brown’s evasion was probably due to the internal disarray within the Reform
movement. Most Reformers rejected the double majority principle. Sandfield’s followers
favoured the principle, but the Globe dissented because the imperative of maintaining
parliamentary support often led governments to spend equally in each section, regardless of
need. In order to secure funds to continue the abolition of seigneurial tenure in Lower
Canada in 1859, for example, the government had to promise to contribute the equivalent
funds to Canada West’s Municipal Loan Fund.107 The likely perpetuation of this pork
barrelling, the Globe claimed, would lead to nothing short of “financial ruin.”108 Most
Reformers, such as Oliver Mowat, continued to advocate ‘rep by pop,’ even though they
knew it could not be secured.109
Federation loomed large but few were willing to push for it. James Ross, the MLA
for the riding of North Wellington, exhibited the federalism of many Reformers in an open
letter to his constituents. Ross declared his continued support for representation by
population throughout the Canadas while also confessing that “I can express no decided
opinion on the federal union question, not having given much consideration to the matter.”110
The Globe mirrored Brown’s opinions by attacking the government’s federal program
without condemning the federal principle. The newspaper expressed “every confidence” that
all of British North America would “ be united in one gigantic confederation” at some future
date. Federation, however, remained impractical for the time being. The Maritimes were not
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interested and Upper Canada’s future seemed to be in the North-West. The commercial
advantages from closer union with the Maritimes remained “hardly appreciable.”111
George Brown, however, was crestfallen from the failure of his own attempt to form a
government and became increasingly reclusive. To add insult to injury, the CartierMacdonald administration used Lower Canadian votes to pass its seigneurial tenure buyout
legislation against the wishes of the majority of Upper Canadian MLAs. The Upper Canadian
representatives, whose electorate provided the majority of the government’s revenues,
futilely insisted that Lower Canadians pay for the resolution of this local matter.112 After
years of advocating ‘rep by pop,’ Brown began to doubt that it could ever be achieved. In
May 1859 he allowed his new editor, George Sheppard, to launch a campaign for what
Brown had long threatened to be representation by population’s only realistic alternative:
dissolution. Sheppard was an English radical who had previously worked for the
Conservative Toronto Colonist before bringing his extensive editorial experience to the
Globe. Throughout most of the summer, the Globe condemned the government for failing to
address Upper Canada’s grievances and proposed dissolution as an alternative solution.
Sheppard opposed the government’s plan for a British North American confederation.
Again, however, the Globe did not explicitly disavow the federal principle. Instead, it
proposed that the two provinces create a “federation… limited to the few relations which are
common to both” provinces.113 The powers of the general government would be so narrow
in scope that the Globe believed it would only need to meet every “two or three years; and
then but for a few days.”114 While this proposal technically called for a federal government,
the limits that the editorials proposed on general government would have rendered it
impotent. In practice, Sheppard’s proposals amounted to the dissolution of the Province of
Canada. Conservative papers contended that this dissolutionist movement was tantamount to
annexationism and Sheppard used federal diction to allay these allegations.115
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By July, Brown re-emerged, and reversed his position on Dorion’s 1856 proposal for
a Canadian federation. The transition was not easy. The Globe continued to placate
dissolutionist Reformers by insisting that its new alternative would “secure to us all the solid
advantages of dissolution, and at the same time secure the means of meeting the exigencies
which will be inseparable from the opening and settlement of the North-West."116 Fixated on
the tendency of governments to use Lower Canada’s influence to overpower Upper Canadian
preferences, the Globe envisioned a highly decentralized federation. The provinces would
possess nearly all of the state’s powers, leaving only the postal service, customs, and “control
of the territory not yet formed into states” for the general government. Many Upper
Canadian Reformers now recognized that a recommendatory feature of federating the
Canadian government was the assurance of provincial autonomy. Federation would free
each province to legislate without fearing interference.117
There were additional reasons for Upper Canadians to support federation. By the late
1850s, Upper Canadian settlers were running out of frontier, and wanted to expand into the
North-West. The territory, however, belonged to the Hudson’s Bay Company, which still
preferred to use it for fur trading. Americans were also moving into the mid-west, creating
new states like Minnesota in 1858. Canadians had to move quickly, Reformers believed, if
they wanted to settle the North-West. The federal principle now seemed to be the most
promising structure for expansion. Like its Conservative counterpart, the Globe now agreed
that it would be “impossible to govern a country so distant” by a legislative union. But if the
territory were separated into “a state or states of a Federation [sic],” governing the region
“would be easy.”118 The principle would also assure Lower Canadians that their autonomy
would not be compromised by the addition of millions of new settlers to the North-West.119
The federal principle, Brown now believed, could be used to unite Upper Canadians behind a
platform that would also be acceptable to Lower Canadians.
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By September Brown moved to make his vision a reality. After securing Dorion’s
support, he met with the Reform caucus at the Rossin House hotel in Toronto. Shortly
thereafter, he began an all-out drive for Canadian federation and called for a convention to
unite Reformers behind federalism.120 Brown had to be careful, however. Dissolution
remained popular, and in the ensuing months, the Globe continued to recognize the
recommendatory aspects of dissolution and treated it as a viable option if Canadian
federation failed.121
By early November nearly six hundred Reform delegates convened in Toronto.122
With the exception of the eastern parts of Upper Canada, where the Reform movement
struggled to find supporters, the attendance was roughly representative of Upper Canada’s
population distribution. On 9 November the delegates convened in St. Lawrence Hall, and
commenced the business of presenting the drafting committee’s resolutions that were, as
historian G.W. Brown pointed out, designed to move the convention to support their leader’s
federal vision.123 The first two resolutions expressed the standard Reform complaint that
there was “universal dissatisfaction throughout Upper Canada” with the existing union. The
“antagonisms” of Canada East and West arose from several differences, including “origin”
and “local interests.” Maintaining the union was desirable but only if Upper Canada could
secure adequate safeguards against further Lower Canadian interference in Upper Canadian
local interests. The double majority principle, according to the second resolution, could not
achieve these ends. The Conservative policy for a British North American confederation was
not practical, the fourth resolution explained, because “the delay which must occur in
obtaining the sanction of the Lower [Maritime] Provinces... places that measure beyond
consideration as a remedy for present evils.” Instead, the fifth resolution proposed “the
formation of two or more local governments, to which shall be committed the control of all
matters of a local or sectional character, and a general government charged with such matters
as are necessarily common to both sections of the Province.” The sixth and final resolution
120
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declared that Upper Canada would only be satisfied if membership in the general Assembly
of the federation was based on representation by population. For the first time, a Canadian
political party (if the term can be used to describe the political allegiances of the period)
considered ‘rep by pop’ and federation to be complimentary rather than competing
solutions.124
The delegates quickly split, however, as the federalists and dissolutionists vied to
dictate the Reform platform.125 Representation by population remained a key component of
the Reform platform but Oliver Mowat contended that it would take too long to achieve as a
stand-alone measure. The young Brownite argued that federation was a “shorter method” to
achieve representation by population because it would assure Lower Canada of its local
autonomy by providing the necessary “check” on the extent of Upper Canadian power. 126
Despite the preponderance ‘rep by pop’ would give Upper Canada, Brown still wanted the
general government to have “as little to do as possible.”127 To ensure that the general
government did not infringe on provincial autonomy the former’s powers would be clearly
defined in a written constitution. Several delegates, including Brown, also emphasized that
this provincial autonomy would free Upper Canada to pursue its desire to acquire the NorthWest without raising Lower Canada’s concerns about being swamped by English Canadian
votes in the national legislature.128
Canadian federation was the only practical way to apply the federal principle. Brown
emphasized that a British North American confederation was a desirable long-term goal and
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many of the delegates shared Brown’s hope that this eventual confederation would spawn a
“national character.” Brown and Sheppard described this character as the extension of
Canadian control into the North-West, as well as the reduction of Canada’s reliance on the
Empire for defence, merchant marine, and other forms of Imperial assistance.129 All of the
delegates agreed, however, that it would take years to negotiate a British North American
confederation with the Maritimes and the Imperial government. A Canadian federation was
therefore the most expedient way to solve Upper Canada’s immediate problems while
simultaneously laying the groundwork for a “great confederation” spanning from the Atlantic
to the Pacific Oceans.130
Like many previous federal proposals, the convention’s resolutions were vague, and
several delegates challenged Brownites to elaborate on their platform before seeking the
convention’s approval. John McNaughton of Haldimand, for example, complained that “a
federation might be well enough in itself, but the details were everything, and these had been
kept back. What were the delegates to say to those who sent them there? They could only
say that they had voted for federation; but what the details were to be they could say nothing
about.”131 Few Brownites responded to this plea. William McDougall rejected it outright,
claiming that “we are here… for the purpose of agreeing upon certain great principles.”132
Reform federalism was at a new apogee yet, like their Conservative counterparts, their
federal vision remained undeveloped and vulnerable to attack.
Instead of answering these criticisms most federalist delegates disputed the
dissolutionist platform. Dissolution, federalists proclaimed, was impractical. The two
sections of the province had grown together. They shared a common tariff and an economic
interest in the development of the Laurentian economy. Dissolution would also require the
disaggregation of the two sections’ public debt. Brown claimed that only one Lower
Canadian French newspaper was in favour of dissolution while five favoured federation.133
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Upper Canadians from the eastern region (whose local economies continued to heavily rely
on Laurentian trade) were particularly insistent on this point and they warned that dissolution
would split the Reform movement.134 Upper Canada would also have to convince the
Imperial government to dissolve the union. Settling all of these matters, Mowat contended,
“will certainly take a long time” and he doubted whether “it can be accomplished at all.”135
According to Mowat, the Imperial government was already considering a federation of the
Maritimes and would be much more amenable to a similar arrangement for Canada.136
Several delegates concurred.137 Hope Mackenzie (the Reform MLA for North Oxford)
feared that dissolution would re-route Canada West’s trade through the United States,
thereby encouraging annexationism.138 Moreover, several delegates believed dissolution
would be a “retrograde” step in colonial development.139 Although Brown and other
federalists were willing to consider dissolution if federation failed, they continued to insist
that it be a last resort.140
Dissolution, as Careless notes, received the most support from the western delegates,
who comprised the majority of the convention’s attendance and were furthest removed from
Laurentian commerce.141 These facts, combined with their own impatient temperaments,
made the western representatives doubt the viability of federation and support dissolution.
Sheppard had not planned to speak at the convention but on the second day he took the
podium to advocate dissolution “pure and simple.” Dissolution would not raise the cost of
imported goods, Sheppard contended, because it was not in Lower Canada’s interests to drive
away Upper Canadian business. It was in Lower Canada’s interest to part amicably with
Upper Canada by fairly settling tariffs, public works, and revenues. Federation required
complex planning while dissolution would be comparatively simple to achieve. Moreover,
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and in sharp contrast to Brown, Sheppard claimed that “the vast majority” of Lower
Canadian newspapers favoured dissolution over federation.142
The dissolutionists were much more effective at criticizing federalists than
communicating their own vision. Some preyed on fears of the unknown. James Lesslie of
York believed “federation was something new” and wondered whether it might prove to be
“like the grand panacea of Responsible Government – surrounded by difficulties of which
nothing was at present known.”143 Other sceptics pointed out that federations are expensive.
As Romney summarizes, the dissolutionists “were not convinced that replacing one
government by three would make for cheapness.”144 Dissolutionists also worried that
federalist plans to expand into the North-West would be prohibitively expensive. Sheppard
told the delegates that a large central government would be necessary to “organize,” defend,
and police the North-West. ‘Organizing’ the territory would also require immense road
construction. He doubted that Upper Canadians wanted to bear the additional tax burden that
all of these measures would require. Federation would in fact be much more expensive than
dissolution. Sheppard was also very familiar with the federalist and anti-federalist debates
from the United States, and recognized that central governments tended to seek more power
and he pointed out that this ran contrary to the Reform desire for Upper Canadian
autonomy.145 He also contended that Upper Canadians knew little about federations and
Reformers would be hard pressed to “educate” their ridings. “The federative plan of
government,” Sheppard argued,
is a more refined system – rendering it unfitted to the simple requirements of
the people of Canada. What are you going to give your Federative [sic]
Government to do? Are you prepared to create local governments, and then to
create a central legislature, a central executive, and with a vice-roy at the top –
all to transact the business of a Province? Especially will you do this, simply
that we may say we are not retrogressive? that [sic] we are still allied to
Lower Canada? If you want a principle which shall rouse public attention, it
must be a principle which commends itself to the common sense of
community. And as against Federation [sic], a Dissolution [sic] of the Union,
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being simple, direct, and already familiar to the minds of thousands, offers
immense advantages when considered as the basis of a popular movement.146
Federation, in short, was too cumbersome and expensive to implement and too complicated
for the average voter to accept. Dissolution was Upper Canada’s only realistic solution.
The convention organizers had to salvage some semblance of unity from the impasse.
After consulting with William McDougall, they arranged to have him speak shortly after
Sheppard proposed his dissolution amendment. McDougall was an appropriate choice to
sponsor a compromise solution because he had been a founder of the Clear Grit movement
(and had founded their newspaper organ: the North American) but now worked for the
Globe. He also maintained close ties with the moderate Reformers.147 McDougall proposed
amending the convention’s fifth resolution to instead read:
That in the opinion of this assembly, the best practicable remedy for the evils
now encountered in the government of Canada is to be found in the formation
of two or more local governments, to which shall be committed the control of
all matters of a local or sectional character, and some joint authority charged
with such matters as are necessarily common to both sections of the
Province.148
Even the dissolutionist plan, McDougall pointed out, would require the coordination of some
policies (such as tariffs) between the East and West. The proposal had little immediate effect,
as the dissolutionists and federalists continued their binary debate. Ultimately, however, the
desire for partisan unity, and a final appeal from Brown emphasizing the common ground
between dissolutionists and federalists, decisively turned the delegates to support
McDougall’s amendment. Sheppard withdrew his amendment, and McDougall’s passed with
less than seven dissenters.149
Paul Romney concludes that “autonomy for Upper Canada… remained the sine qua
non. That was what the [1859] convention was about.”150 The conventionists’ desire for
local autonomy was undoubtedly strong but Romney’s fixation on this aspiration leads him

146

Ibid, 12 November 1859.
Careless, Brown of the Globe Vol 1: The Voice of Upper Canada, 318-319; Romney, Getting It Wrong, 80.
148
Emphasis added. Globe, 14 November 1859.
149
Jones, "Ephemeral Compromise,” 25.
150
Romney, Getting It Wrong, 86.
147

73

to overlook an important and novel subtheme that also informed the gathering: murmurs
regarding Upper Canadian preponderance within a federal legislature if population was the
basis of representation. Elwood Jones recognized Brown’s attempt to use Upper Canada’s
representation by population to assure his adherents to assume that their province would
“leave its impress on national government,” but he uses this observation to argue that Brown
was sympathetic with a centralized federation.151 These murmurs, in fact, marked the
beginnings of a desire for Upper Canada to preponderate or dominate in a federation.
Sheppard tried to disabuse Upper Canadians of these preponderant expectations. He
doubted, for example, that Lower Canada would accept ‘rep by pop’ under any circumstance
because it would be tantamount to “bondage to the French race… Think you they do not
know your federation would shut them up in a corner of Canada – that in fact if this scheme
of federation were carried out you would have them at your mercy?”152 A federation based
on representation by population was, therefore, a non-starter. On the other hand, Sheppard
also doubted the plausibility of Upper Canadian preponderance within a true federation. Like
many Upper Canadians, Sheppard associated the federal principle with the equality afforded
to each state in the American Senate, and this led him to doubt the plausibility of an Upper
Canadian majority of seats in the Lower House. “You say that Upper Canada is to have the
preponderance in the federation,” Sheppard taunted, “to unite Upper and Lower Canada… on
a basis which would give the major power to Upper Canada, is to do violence to the
federative principle.”153 To be a true federation, the upper house would cancel out any Upper
Canadian preponderant influence in the Lower House. The federal principle could not, he
concluded, satisfy the hunger among Upper Canadians for preponderant influence via ‘rep by
pop’
Even if the proposed Canadian federation lacked a senate, some of the convention’s
delegates still doubted that representation by population would ensure Canadian
preponderance. Without explaining how, Dr. D. Clark worried that Lower Canada would
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still dominate a Canadian federation. He favoured dissolution but promised to also support a
British North American confederation that included Red River once it was “established and
populated” because it would eventually create a “federation so colossal that Lower Canada
will not have in it the influence she now possesses, and yet she will have her rights.”154
Robert McLean appeared to entirely forget the convention’s sixth ‘rep by pop’ resolution
when he repeated his concern that the general government of a federation would still
implement a tariff policy that favoured Lower Canada.155 Continued suspicion of Lower
Canadian influence led many Upper Canadian Reformers to doubt the preponderant power
their section of the province could wield in a general government based on representation by
population.
In fact few Upper Canadians understood the full recommendatory possibilities of
combining the preponderant influence that ‘rep by pop’ would afford Upper Canada, with the
federal principle that would ensure provincial autonomy for both Upper and Lower
Canada.156 Those who did understand it, such as Brown, likely hesitated sharing their vision
more openly because honesty risked offending the very Lower Canadian allies whose support
he desperately required.157 In the end, unravelling this confusion and dispelling distrust
required several additional years of debate.
The Globe initially supported the spirit of the convention by admitting that the ‘joint
authority’ compromise could take the form of either dissolution or Canadian federation.158
Within a few weeks, however, both dissolutionists and federalists began to deviate from the
vague consensus. Sheppard, for example, speaking at a Reform function in North
Wellington, told his audience that the ‘joint authority’ resolution alluded to dissolution.
Brown forbade re-printing of Sheppard’s speech in the Globe and gave his editor strict
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instructions: “No further recognition of different [constitutional] views – no further
acknowledgment of compromise. Federation only is to be spoken of.” Sheppard believed
this policy was “suicidal” and he only agreed to remain at the Globe after Brown asked him
to preserve Upper Canadian Reform unity for the next session of parliament. If Lower
Canada did not support Brown’s planned motion for ‘joint authority’ federation, then Brown
promised to support Sheppard’s “extreme views.”159
In the coming months Brown worked to consolidate Upper and Lower Canadian
support for a Canadian federation. He even called a special caucus in March 1860 and
offered to step aside as Reform leader in an effort to force Reformers to join his cause. The
Globe used the terms ‘joint authority’ and federation interchangeably, and defended its
federalism. Although the Reform newspaper organ admitted that the cost of a federal
government might be marginally higher than the existing system, it concluded that corruption
rather than the structure of government, created the majority of public expenses.160
Federation, therefore, would protect Upper Canada from Lower Canada’s alleged
extravagance. Moreover, the ‘joint authority’ would only possess a few responsibilities,
including the public debt and navigation of the St. Lawrence.161 The periodic meeting of a
small general government, consisting of “a few able and experienced politicians of sound and
well-tried integrity,” could oversee these limited responsibilities.162 Devolving sectional
subjects to the provincial governments, the Globe assumed, nullified the need for a bicameral
parliament.163
Brown presented his federal proposal to the Assembly at the end of April. He
estimated that Upper Canada provided 70% of the province’s revenues and required
increased representation to more closely match this commitment. He also claimed that Upper
Canada had 350,000 to 400,000 more people than Lower Canada. Based on these estimates,
Brown projected that Upper Canada was entitled to “at least 25 more members” in the
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Assembly.164 The double majority system was “impracticable” and he freely admitted that
Lower Canada would never accept representation by population as a stand-alone measure.
The Conservative plan for a British North American confederation was “premature.” Brown
instead proposed his highly decentralized scheme for a Canadian federation. The only two
jurisdictions he listed for the general government were the common debt and navigation of
the St. Lawrence. He was even willing to give the provincial governments the jurisdiction
for the postal service and militia. His proposal also lacked any mention of a senate.165
The effort proved futile. Already in mid-April, Alexander Mackenzie, a Scottish
stonemason turned newspaper editor, prominent Brownite, and soon to be representative for
Lambton in the Assembly, warned Brown that “the Federation Scheme will not of course
have any chance in Lower Canada.166 The Legislative Assembly decisively rejected Brown’s
federation resolution 74 to 32. Most Upper Canadian Reformers voted with Brown but
nearly as many Conservatives voted against it. Only nine Lower Canadian representatives
supported the measure.167
It was easy for Upper Canadian Conservatives to mock the ‘joint authority’ proposal.
In fact, it became something of a sport. ‘Joint authority,’ most Conservatives eagerly pointed
out, was “not intended to have any exact meaning or actual value.”168 Federalists and
dissolutionists alike claimed it represented their platform. ‘Joint authority’ therefore lacked
substance and future historians, the Leader jeered, would “be able to gather the ashes of the
grand Convention… into an urn of very small dimensions.”169 The Conservative organ also
openly mocked the Reformers as “Rip Van Winkles” who had only recently awakened to the
benefits of federation.170 Despite the enthusiasm of some Reformers, Conservatives judged
the opposition’s proposal to be altogether too narrow. Canada could not form its own
federation because “there is not enough of it.”171 Federations were expensive government
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structures and their greater costs had to be spread among all of British North America’s
colonies. It would be inordinately expensive to bear the burden of an additional legislature
alone. Regardless, Lower Canada would demand equal representation in a senate so that it
could check Upper Canada’s influence. A Canadian federation, therefore, would not change
Upper Canada’s influence.172
Conservatives also questioned the viability of Brown’s vision for a decentralized and
limited general government. Noting the heightened tensions in the United States that would
soon erupt in civil war, the Leader contended that a stable federation required a strong
centralized general government.173 George Benjamin, the Conservative for North Hastings
and former Grand Master of the Orange Order, similarly doubted that “a mere set of
Commissioners” could take credible charge for important tasks such as the public debt and
the navigation of the St. Lawrence which would require strong executive authority. He also
denounced representation by population as the “blackest ingratitude” because “Upper Canada
was indebted to Lower Canada” for the 1840s when the latter had suffered
underrepresentation.174
The renewed debate of the federal principle revived another long-standing question.
Since at least 1849, Canadians had considered the possibility of subdividing their province
into three or more roughly equal sections to create a better economic and demographic
balance among the provinces. Few Upper Canadians gave it serious thought, yet the idea’s
longevity and eventual demise illustrates the rise and evolution of Upper Canadian
preponderant federalism. At the second convention of the British American League, for
example, J.W. Gamble suggested that “in the event of a federal union, Canada might be
divided into three Provinces.”175 This proposal, which usually entailed the creation of a third
province between Kingston and Montreal, was the most popular and likely the most viable of
the subdivision proposals. Although he did not outline any borders, Dorion suggested the
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subdivision of Canada into four provinces when reviewing his federal proposal in 1857.176
Galt’s 1858 proposal for a British North American union also allowed for the division of
Canada into “several” provinces.177 A more concerted debate began in 1859 when the
Reform Convention’s original fifth resolution proposed the creation of “two or more local
governments.”178 Some Reformers doubted the proposal. Sheppard, for example, doubted
that French-Canadians would consent to the creation of “three British provinces.”179 A
representative from Prince Albert opposed subdivisions because he feared it would
complicate the separate schools question.180 In subsequent months, the Toronto Leader also
argued that subdividing the province would be costly because it would needlessly multiply
Canada’s political and bureaucratic positions.181
No speaker supported subdividing Canada during the convention but the Globe
defended the principle before and after the convention. While subdividing the province
might have temporarily compromised Upper Canadian influence, the Reform organ assured
its readers that the new provinces in the North-West would identify “in feeling and interest”
with Upper Canada.182 Subdivision moreover, would not cost more because, according to the
Globe, Canada already had government officials spread across the province, and “we would
have no more under a scheme of federation.”183 As in the past, the public debate on
subdividing the Province of Canada receded into the background.
In 1858 and 1859, both parties sewed federal seeds believing that their species of
federalism was right for the political season. The Conservative seeds fell on the rocky
ground of the uninterested Maritimes; the Reform variety struggled to take root in the
increasingly violent Canadian political climate. Partisan aggression and genuine
disagreement kept both parties from reaping strong Upper Canadian federalism.
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The Revival of Old Remedies
The events of the early 1860s altered the Canadian political landscape and
compromised Upper Canadian federalism. As Christopher Dunkin the Conservative MLA
for Brome, later commented:
We never heard another word about it [Confederation]. The [Imperial]
despatches were laid on our table in 1859, but nobody asked a question about
them. The child was still-born, and no one troubled himself about its want of
baptism. We went on with our old questions—representation by population;
Upper Canada against Lower Canada… And we quarrelled and fought about
almost everything, but did not waste a thought or word upon this gigantic
question of the Confederation of these provinces.184
Dunkin exaggerated the decline of Canadian federalism, but his observation cautions against
scholarship that describes the 1858 and 1859 federal proposals as conversion experiences that
directly led to the BNA Act of 1 July 1867. Conservative apologists such as Creighton and
Sweeny used the 1858 federal proposal to argue that the Conservative partisans first
envisioned Confederation and merely waited for other British North American political
leaders to catch up. Creighton, for example, claims that the failure of the Conservative
mission to London had little long term significance: “what mattered most was the fact that
Macdonald and Cartier, the two sectional leaders of the party, had been converted to the idea
of a federal union.”185 In reality, as Careless contends, these men “were chiefly interested in
the immediate political advantages that would accrue from the advocacy of a policy of
federal union,” including the postponement of further debate on sectional issues such as ‘rep
by pop’ and the seat of government question.186 In the years immediately following 1858,
they did not pursue a federal solution. Yet the desire of Liberal apologists such as Careless
to link the 1859 convention with the achievement of Confederation in 1867 also leads him to
assert that “rep by pop was still conceived as linked with and leading to a scheme of
federation.”187 Romney even claims that federation was “Brown’s favourite policy since
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1859.”188 Although the federal principle was not entirely absent from public debate from
1861 to 1864, Conservative and Reform federalisms lacked stamina. Rather than defending
the viability of their respective programs, they reverted to their previous platforms or
occasionally made empty promises to pursue their federal visions. The proposals of 1858
and 1859 were important developmental steps for the federalisms of both parties. They
forced Upper Canadians to grapple with the federal principle, and this undoubtedly facilitated
the acceptance of the Great Coalition in 1864. Given the reluctance of both parties to pursue
their federal platforms in the interim, however, it is misleading to use the 1858 and 1859
proposals to argue that either Conservatives or Reformers instigated Confederation.
After a decade of ‘rep by pop’ debates, Conservatives and Reformers awaited the
1861 census results. Using interim population estimates to predict growth patterns, Brownite
Reformers recognized that Upper Canada was not growing as quickly as during the previous
decade. Still they eagerly anticipated an Upper Canadian “preponderance” of three to four
hundred thousand people and expected to renew their clamouring for ‘rep by pop.’189 Upper
Canadian Conservatives desperately combatted the renewed popularity of representation by
population. Some newspapers lowballed their own estimates of the census results. In
October 1860, Conservative newspapers admitted that Upper Canada’s population was larger
than that of Lower Canada but insisted that the disparity would be insignificant.190 As late as
May 1861, the Leader claimed that the census would prove that Upper Canada contained no
more than an additional 180,000 inhabitants. The Conservative organ even speculated that
Lower Canada’s population would regain its preponderance in the coming decades.191 Upper
Canadian population growth during the previous decade had been hampered, Conservatives
claimed, by the departure of hundreds of thousands of its immigrants for the United States.192
The Belleville Intelligencer exhibited its Laurentian bias when it argued that the union of the
provinces remained economically beneficial to Upper Canadians, and that ‘rep by pop’ was
both unattainable for the time being and unnecessary. Lower Canadians would never consent
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to giving the west a “preponderating influence.” Lower Canada had “never infringed” upon
Upper Canadian rights, and if the western peninsula lacked political power, it was because
they had alienated themselves by failing to consider the opinions and desires of Lower
Canadians. Lower Canada, moreover, had been underrepresented for decades and fairness
dictated that Upper Canada accept the same condition “for a series of years.”193 Perhaps
sensing that these arguments were not allaying its readers’ desire for representation by
population, the Intelligencer even claimed that the Reform policies of ‘rep by pop,’
federation, and dissolution, were in fact annexation projects in disguise.194 Ultimately, the
1861 census found 284,525 more people in Upper than Lower Canada.
This demographic information made renewed calls for ‘rep by pop’ too tantalizing to
resist but unique circumstances delayed the reunification of Reform politicians. Instead of
calling an election when the Macdonald-Cartier government fell in May 1862 after failing to
pass its militia bill, Governor Charles Monck asked John Sandfield Macdonald to form a
government. His was composed primarily of moderate Upper Canadian Reformers and Bleus
and led by Louis-Victor Sicotte, and committed to governing by the double majority
principle.195 This move was the only remaining untried solution to Canada’s political
instability that did not require imperial legislation. Sandfield brought William McDougall,
Michael Foley, William Howland, and Adam Wilson into his cabinet on the condition that
they drop their support for representation by population. Brown was furious, but friends later
convinced him that the concession was necessary. The Sandfield-Sicotte government
survived until it passed a separate schools bill against the votes of the majority of Upper
Canadian representatives in March 1863. Despite his violation of the double majority
principle, Sandfield did not resign. Instead, after losing a non-confidence vote, he met with
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leading Reformers, including Brown and Dorion. To preserve his government, Sandfield
abandoned the double majority principle and accepted ‘rep by pop’ advocates such as Oliver
Mowat and Fergusson Blair, as well as Brown’s close friend and Montreal Liberal Luther
Holton into his cabinet. Brown pushed for the ministry to adopt ‘rep by pop’ as its policy but
Dorion’s concerns about Lower Canadian opinion convinced him to let the government treat
it as an open question. In the general election that followed, the Upper Canadian Reformers
(who enjoyed unusual unity) captured 40 of 65 seats. The increased exposure of ‘rep by
pop,’ however, cost the Rouge in Lower Canada, where they only secured 24 seats. The new
Reform ministry, therefore, remained as weak as its predecessor.196
During Sandfield’s premiership from 1862 to 1864, public debate focused on ‘rep by
pop’ and generally ignored the federal principle. In the Assembly Brownites and Clear Grits
complained about Upper Canada’s parliamentary underrepresentation as well as its payment
of most of the province’s revenues. Mowat and McDougall both alluded to the need for the
combination of representation by population with federation in the Legislative Assembly in
order to appease Lower Canada. Yet in so doing, both politicians awkwardly avoided the
words “federation” or even “joint authority.”197 The Globe’s editorials frequently demanded
‘rep by pop’ without advocating federation.198 The private correspondence of Upper
Canadian Reformers focused entirely on representation by population, and contained no hint
of federation.199 Even Careless admits that federation fell “well into the background” and
that it was, “almost like old times.”200 Brown’s “favourite policy” during the early 1860s
was ‘rep by pop’ and not federation as Paul Romney claims.201
After 1862, when the Globe occasionally discussed the federal principle, it described
a new recommendatory component of federation for Upper Canada: preponderance in
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common affairs. Although the pairing of ‘rep by pop’ and Canadian federation had always
implicitly promised this possibility, the 1859 convention delegates and the Globe consistently
represented the plan as a means to secure Upper Canada’s autonomy rather than a means to
bolster Upper Canadian influence beyond its own borders. The frustrated Reform organ now
claimed that the delegates had “desired to get rid of Lower Canadian domination, not only in
regard to local Upper Canadian affairs, but also to matters common to both Provinces.”202
Looking to the future in January 1863, the Globe again argued that “it should be the effort of
Upper Canadians to regulate the affairs of their own Province, to obtain Representation by
Population, to open the North-west territory, so that when the federation of all the British
American Provinces does come it may be formed with Upper Canada as the central figure of
the group of States, with Western adjuncts as well as eastern.”203 Such expressions of
preponderant federalism were rare between 1862 and 1864. Moreover, the Reform desire for
Lower Canadian support led them to send mixed signals when discussing their federalism.
While advocating representation by population, for example, Mowat tried to allay Lower
Canadian fears of English domination. Mowat compared the tendency of Lower Canadians
to cross party lines on sectional votes with Upper Canada’s tradition of more rigid
partisanship. “Upper Canada would never be united on the floor of the Legislature,” Mowat
concluded, assuring Lower Canadians that they would continue to wield the “balance of
power.”204 Nevertheless, by the early 1860s a few Upper Canadians recognized that
combining ‘rep by pop’ and federation could promise both provincial autonomy and
preponderant influence beyond Upper Canada’s borders.
The census split the Upper Canadian Conservative caucus. In 1861 Macdonald still
rejected ‘rep by pop’ but his caucus was less agreeable. Too many Upper Canadian voters
now considered the disparity too large and many Conservatives openly supported
representation by population. After spending five years in the political wilderness while
attending to personal losses from bad investments, John Hillyard Cameron promised to
support ‘rep by pop’ during his successful campaign in the Peel County by-election of 1861.
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George Benjamin who had attacked Brown’s proposals during the previous session, now
suggested that Canada adopt ‘rep by pop,’ that the house create a standing committee to
distinguish general from local questions, and that only the applicable section’s
representatives vote on the latter.205 The desire for representation by population was so
strong that Macdonald risked losing followers to John Hillyard Cameron, so he brought three
‘rep by pop’ Conservatives, including Benjamin, into the cabinet, and made the issue an open
question.206 The result was staggering. In 1862 forty-three of sixty-five Upper Canadian
MLAs, including most of its Conservatives, supported ‘rep by pop’ against the CartierMacdonald government’s stated policy.207 Despite this internal division, Macdonald
continued to support Cartier’s stand against the popular measure, pronouncing it “as dead as
Julius Caesar” in mid-March 1864.208
Conservatives continued to treat ‘rep by pop’ and federation as competitive solutions.
Their preoccupation with the former limited their consideration of the latter. Macdonald’s
followers promised federation as an alternative to representation by population or double
majority whenever they felt threatened, but they treated it as a long-term solution. Although
“it may not be obtained in a day or a year,” the Leader commented in May 1861, British
North American confederation was the only solution acceptable to Lower Canadians.209 The
Toronto organ also argued that the Maritimes were far more likely to eventually join a British
North American confederation than a smaller Maritime union. Like Canada, they were too
small to form their own federation and the Leader expected that sectional issues, such as
local jealousies over the location of a common seat of government, would sunder their
negotiations for a legislative union. A British North American confederation would create
one common government while still affording each province its own capital.210
Conservatives offered no promises, however, on when this eventuality would come to
fruition.
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The American Civil War also contributed to the decline of federalism in Upper
Canada during the early 1860s. Six months after the war began, the Globe admitted “that the
present crisis is one of the most trying that has yet occurred to test the stability of the Federal
[sic] system.”211 Once the war broke out, both Reformers and Conservatives dramatically
curtailed espousing their federal proposals. This crisis of faith facilitated the return of
Reformers to representation by population. In the lead-up to the 1861 election, Macdonald
promised to continue to push for a British North American confederation. To avoid the
decentralized “defects” of the American constitution that he believed led to their Civil War,
Macdonald tried to preserve federalism by pledging his support to a highly centralized
federation.212 By 1863 and early 1864, the fear that provincial autonomy would destroy a
British North American confederation was so pronounced that Macdonald and the Toronto
Leader broke with Cartier by abandoning the federal proposal. Instead they supported a
British North American legislative union with “checks,” that were presumably based on the
British model.213 As the subsequent Confederation debates demonstrated, this change suited
many Upper Canadian Conservatives.

Conclusion
Examining the pre-1864 period explains why federalism took so long to develop in
Upper Canada. Both parties, at different times, advocated or opposed federation based upon
their limited understanding of the federal principle, as well as their shifting assessments of
Upper Canadian politics. Few Upper Canadians supported federation in 1822; they also
rejected it in 1838. The British American League had slightly more success in 1849 but even
this movement failed to generate federalism at the grass-roots level. Nearly all of these early
federal proposals were vague and the lack of detail limited the ability of Upper Canadians to
recognize the recommendatory aspects of the federal principle. The lack of adequate
transportation and communication networks, in addition to Lower Canada’s larger
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population, also reduced the practicality and appeal of these early federal proposals in Upper
Canada.
The 1851 and 1861 censuses made Upper Canadians increasingly aware of their
colony’s preponderant potential but most linked this potential to their demands for ‘rep by
pop’ alone. Both parties continued to imagine the federal principle as a rival solution to
representation by population and the double majority principle. The inclusion of both ‘rep by
pop’ and federation in the Reform Convention’s 1859 platform only temporarily challenged
this construct. With rare exceptions, both parties reverted to considering federation as a rival
to the other solutions after the Legislative Assembly’s 1860 session.
Only a handful of individuals prior to 1864 understood how combining ‘rep by pop’
and federation could empower Upper Canada while making popular representation palatable
in Lower Canada. Certainly the necessity of cultivating the support of Lower Canadians
deterred some Reformers from espousing a desire to preponderate or dominate in a
federation. The absence of this aspiration from the private correspondence of Reformers,
however, suggests a second, and less sinister explanation: a lack of reflection. Many Upper
Canadian Reformers were so fixated on securing autonomy from Lower Canada that they
rarely considered how preponderant intrastate influence could be used to shape the entire
country. Still others doubted that ‘rep by pop’ would give Upper Canada sufficient muscle to
overcome Lower Canadian traditional non-partisan unity on sectional issues. Even after the
1859 convention, only a minority of Reformers described how ‘rep by pop’ would also allow
Upper Canada to shape events and policies effecting areas beyond its borders.
The desire for Upper Canada to dominate a federation was not yet widespread and
remained underdeveloped at the beginning of 1864. Conservatives wanted a British North
American confederation and tended to emphasize national benefits at the expense of local
interests but they did not discuss their province’s potential intrastate power prior to 1864.
Both preponderant federalisms required several additional years of intense public debate to
reach fuller forms.

87

Chapter 2: The Rise of Preponderant Federalisms in Upper
Canada, 1864-1867
“When the new Constitution comes into operation on Monday next, we in Upper Canada get
17 representatives more than Lower Canada. We will have 82, and Lower Canada 65. And,
looking at the rate at which the population in the two sections has hitherto advanced, the
probability is that in 1871 we will be entitled to 94 or 95 representatives, and that ten years
later, if the same ratio of increase in the population is maintained, Upper Canada will have a
majority in the House of Commons in the Federal Legislature. If our people, therefore, are
not well governed under the new Constitution, it will be their -own fault. (Hear, hear.)”
George Brown at the third Reform convention, Toronto Globe, 27 June 1867.
“The Province of Ontario has one evil to avoid: that of isolating itself from the rest of the
Confederation and thus compelling the formation of an union of the other three Provinces for
self-protection… The majority in the Maritime Provinces will be in search of allies, and they
ought to find them in majorities here.”
Toronto Leader, 2 May 1867.

By 1864 the Sandfield-Dorion government was in a perilous state, and the
Conservatives and Bleus were eager to topple it with a non-confidence motion. When new
attempts to attract moderates from both parties to the government side of the house
(including John A. Macdonald) failed, the Sandfield-Dorion government resigned before a
confidence vote could be arranged.1 Who could command a parliamentary majority? Lord
Monck, the Governor General, was at a loss. Everyone he asked, including western Liberal
Fergusson Blair, Conservative Alexander Campbell, Cartier, and Dorion were unable to rally
sufficient support. Ultimately, only Macdonald and Étienne-Paschal Taché mustered the
necessary backing. Few believed, however, that their government would last because it
relied upon the old and worn alliance of Upper Canadian Conservatives and Lower
Canadians Bleus. Continued deadlock seemed all but certain, and constitutional reform
inescapable.
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Yet Canada’s political deadlock was not the only reason its inhabitants desired
constitutional reform. A series of crises during the American Civil War made British North
Americans aware of their inadequate defences. The Trent Affair in late 1861, for example,
brought the Northern United States and British Empire to the brink of war.2 Other
inflammatory incidents such as the two-year carnage wrought by the C.S.S. Alabama,3 and
the St. Alban’s Raid of October 1864,4 also contributed to British North American
uneasiness. If war broke out, British North America would be the front lines for an
advancing Northern army that was “greater than Napoleon’s.”5 In this “atmosphere of
crisis,” the Canadian government ramped up its militia spending to nearly half a million
dollars; a sum still woefully inadequate for the defence of Canada’s long boundary with the
United States.6 Although London did reinforce British North America with 14,000 troops
after the Trent affair, its main focus was on expansion in Asia and Africa, Britain was
increasingly unwilling to stand up to the emerging power of the United States.7 Perhaps,
many Canadians hoped, British North American defences would be better coordinated if they
were part of a political union. “In practical terms,” historian Ged Martin acknowledges,
“political union would achieve very little [for the defence of the colonies], but
psychologically it seemed to be a response on a scale appropriate to the crisis.”8 By 1864 the
US government also announced that it would abrogate the 1854 reciprocity treaty and
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Canadians were desperate to find new markets for their goods. A British North American
union seemed an opportune solution to these problems.
Despite the 1859 Reform conventionists’ recognition that ‘rep by pop’ could give
Upper Canada decisive influence in a federal parliament, the colony’s inhabitants only
gradually developed and expressed preponderant federalisms. George Brown adamantly
defended ‘rep by pop’ during the constitutional negotiations that preceded Confederation, but
the public debates that followed only moderately expanded the discussion of Upper Canadian
dominance within a federation. Maritime distrust of Central Canadian domination and Lower
Canadian fears of English-Protestant hegemony led many aspirants to avoid sharing their
expectations and to instead emphasize other benefits of the Quebec Resolutions when
discussing Confederation in public. It was not until after the 1866 London Conference
finalized Canada’s new constitution that these Ontarians began to openly share their hopes.
By 1865, however, discussion of Upper Canada’s potential intrastate influence was
widespread enough to encourage the development of an alternative interpretation. A few
Upper Canadian Conservatives and Reform-Coalitionists who broke with Brown doubted
that ‘rep by pop’ would give their province the ability to oppose the rest of the country’s
representatives, and insisted that Ontario’s Members of Parliament (MPs) would need to
cooperate with their counterparts from the rest of the country. They even implied that
Ontario MPs should use their combined parliamentary influence to ensure the passage of
compromise policies. Yet the espousal of this alternative vision of Ontario’s role within
Confederation remained rare. The majority of Conservatives accepted Confederation because
they recognized that it was the only way the other colonies would accept political union.
They hoped that provincial control of sectional concerns, such as education, would allow
them to focus on the expansion of the Laurentian commercial empire. Even as Brown and
his supporters began to openly express their aspirations for preponderant and dominant
influence in early 1867, Upper Canadian Conservatives and Reform-Coalitionists only
sporadically countered with their alternative assessment.
These limited expressions of preponderant federalisms, however, were significant.
The Brownite desire for Upper Canadian preponderance ensured strict adherence to ‘rep by
pop’ and encouraged Upper Canadians to contemplate their province’s role within
90

Confederation. Resistance to the Brownite desire to overrule other parts of the country with
Ontario’s asymmetrical intrastate representation exacerbated partisan divisions. Despite their
speculative forms, therefore, preponderant federalisms contributed to the politics surrounding
Confederation.

Federalism Gains a Firm Hold
When the Taché-Macdonald government assumed power, Upper Canadians were
hungry for constitutional change. In May 1864 the Assembly approved Brown’s proposal to
create a constitutional committee comprised of leading proponents of all of the major
solutions to consider Canada’s future. In the next few weeks, this committee met eight times
behind closed doors to facilitate frank discussion, and quickly determined that dissolution,
‘rep by pop,’ and double majority, were unworkable solutions. On 14 June its chairman,
George Brown, presented its conclusions to parliament. The committee favoured a federal
solution but to avoid division, it did not express a preference for either a Canadian or British
North American federation. Even this open-ended recommendation garnered dissent. Three
of the committee’s twenty members, including John A. Macdonald, refused to sign the
report. That same day, however, the Taché-Macdonald government fell on a non-confidence
motion. It was the fourth ministry to fall in two years.9
The need for a new coalition had been obvious for some time, but the lack of crisis
forestalled the requisite willingness to compromise. Now Brown discretely approached
several Conservatives about the possibility of a coalition of Reformers, Conservatives, and
Lower Canadian Bleus. Galt and Macdonald met with Brown on 17 June to discuss possible
terms. Practical politics now forced Macdonald to reconsider his movement away from the
federal principle, and he re-joined the campaign for a British North American confederation
by suggesting it as the coalition’s constitutional platform. Rather than immediately
proposing his 1859 Reform convention platform (a Canadian federation that could be
expanded to include the rest of British North America over time), which might have served
as a compromise solution, Brown suggested that the proposed coalition pursue ‘rep by pop’
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within the existing legislative union.10 Brown’s proposal was, of course, unacceptable to
Bleus, who feared English-Protestant domination. After several days of additional talks, the
negotiators achieved a compromise agreement. On 22 June Macdonald announced the
formation of the Great Coalition of Lower Canadian Bleus, and Upper Canadian Reformers
and Conservatives. Macdonald informed the stunned Assembly members that the coalition
would propose legislation during the next parliamentary session to remake the Province of
Canada into a federation and make allowances for the future integration of the rest of British
North America. In the interim, the government would also send delegates to the Maritimes
to solicit their interest in a British North American confederation. To ensure Reform
inclusion in these actions Brown, Mowat, and McDougall joined the cabinet.11
When the Great Coalition first announced its plans, Dorion pushed the government to
elaborate on its new platform. At first the unprepared and somewhat ill-informed Coalition
leaders evaded the request, but they eventually tried to answer these appeals. Cartier was the
first to speak. He claimed that the federal principle required equal representation for each
province in one legislature and representation according to “population and territory” in the
other. When Dorion pressed for more details, Cartier explained that “the details of the
scheme had not been in any way considered” by the Great Coalition’s members. When
Dorion persisted, Macdonald affirmed the government’s lack of clear vision by repeating
Cartier’s definition. For the first time, a Canadian government’s platform included both ‘rep
by pop’ and federation, but it had not yet had the time to consider details.12 To fill this gap,
the cabinet spent the next few months preparing behind closed doors for the Maritime union
conference planned for 1 September.
Without concrete measures to consider, some Canadian newspapers turned to
international and historical examples to debate the merits of the federal principle. Many
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Upper Canadians continued to harbour doubts. One reader, who wrote to the editor in the
Leader, implied that federations were un-British and unnecessary because the United
Kingdom ruled England, Scotland, and Ireland as a legislative union.13 Federation’s
detractors also used ancient Greece to argue that federations were doomed to dissolve.14 The
government’s supporters responded in kind. They used the example of New Zealand, which
was still a federation in the 1860s, to demonstrate the stability of the federal principle.15
Switzerland’s federal history proved that federations could provide provincial autonomy for
diverse ethnic groups while uniting them against common aggressors. The experience of the
small European federation also demonstrated that federal governments were not prohibitively
expensive to operate.16 Federalists also dismissed suggestions that the American Civil War
discredited the federal principle. The Globe insisted that the conflict was due to northern and
southern disagreements over slavery, rather than the United States’ federal structure of
government. “The wonder is not,” the Globe argued, “that the…general government failed to
keep these two peoples together in peace for three generations. The surprise should rather be
that differences so fundamental did not bring on the crisis before the colleagues of
Washington had passed from earth."17
The Canadian government delegation left for Charlottetown on 29 August 1864
aboard the Queen Victoria. The Maritime delegations assembled for their first meeting on 1
September but news of the Canadian delegation’s imminent arrival led them to postpone their
discussion of Maritime union until after they heard the alternative Canadian proposal. The
Canadian presentation thus began the following day. The meetings were closed to the public
and only fragmentary records of the proceedings survive.18 On 2 and 3 September Cartier and
then Macdonald outlined the advantages of a British North American confederation. The next
day Galt described the financial aspects of the Canadian proposal. After a Sunday respite,
Brown presented the finer constitutional aspects of the Canadian plan including the
composition of the general and provincial governments, the division of powers between
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them, and the role of a judiciary.19 On 6 September the Maritime delegates followed up with
questions, and the next morning they met alone to consider the Canadian proposal. Within
hours they discarded Maritime union and approved the Canadian proposal pending the
establishment of satisfactory terms. The delegates then discussed many of these terms and
agreed on several important points, including ‘rep by pop’ in the national Assembly, and the
allotment of twenty seats to Upper Canada, Lower Canada, and the Maritimes (Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island) in the senate. Before committing to such terms,
however, the delegates had to consult with their governments and prepare for a follow-up
conference to iron out a full constitutional proposal. They would reconvene at Quebec City
on 10 October. The delegates then boarded the Queen Victoria for a tour of the Maritimes.20
During this period the Canadian newspapers began exploring the implications of
combining ‘rep by pop’ and federation for Upper Canada. Prior to the Charlottetown
conference, the Globe and Leader described the combination of representation by population
and federation as a defensive measure. ‘Rep by pop’ would give Upper Canadians the
“majority of representatives” in the Lower House, and these individuals would be
blameworthy if they did not block legislation that their constituents considered “unjust.”21
The equal representation of each province in the upper house would, conversely, protect
Lower Canada from the possibility of Upper Canada forcing unjust legislation through the
Lower house. Although Upper Canadians might find this empowerment of Lower Canada to
be “annoying,” they had nothing to fear because it was a preventative rather than positive
capability. Upper Canada’s autonomy would remain intact.22 After the Charlottetown
conference the Leader adopted a more critical view of Confederation and backed away from
this message. The Globe, however, continued to emphasize the defensive merits of Upper
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Canadian preponderance in the proposed Lower House.23 For the time being, as Romney
insists, provincial autonomy continued to be the primary focus of Reform federalism.24
Although the establishment of a British North American confederation was still
uncertain, the Charlottetown conference effectively ended the idea of subdividing Canada
into more than two provinces. During the early 1860s, the Leader had occasionally mocked
the 1859 Reform convention’s resolutions by restating its warnings regarding the potential
costs of subdivisions.25 In June and July 1864, the Leader condemned the Reform-inspired
Coalition backup plan for a Canadian federation by repeatedly associating it with
subdivisions. Instead of bringing the province of Canada into a larger British North American
union that would foster the birth of a new “nation,” subdividing Canada into its own smaller
federation would increase “jealousies” between each of the less powerful provinces.26 The
Leader even speculated that the Maritimes preferred to keep Upper and Lower Canada intact,
because subdividing their territory would create a third Canadian province that would
demand its own additional representation in a federal senate.27 The idea of dividing Canada
into more than two sections did not survive the Charlottetown conference. Canada would be
divided into two provinces. Without an advocate, the idea of subdividing Canada quickly
faded into oblivion.28 Two large provinces would loom over Confederation.
The delegates to the Quebec conference of October 1864 put flesh on the bones of the
Charlottetown agreements. In only seventeen days, they drafted a set of resolutions
acceptable to Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The negotiations were not easy;
each colony made difficult compromises. In terms of intrastate influence, the first struggle
arose on the third day of the conference when the delegates contemplated the senate’s
composition. At Charlottetown, delegates had agreed to the equal representation of the
Maritimes as well as Upper and Lower Canada in the senate but, because Newfoundland had
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been unable to attend the conference, it had not been included in the Maritime allotment. It
took four days and a host of failed resolutions and amendments to develop a new formula.
On the first day of the senate discussions, Macdonald and Mowat moved that the senate have
72 members and that the Maritimes (including Newfoundland), Lower Canada, and Upper
Canada each receive twenty-four members. The Maritime colonies refused to diminish their
respective proportional representation by forgoing senators to accommodate Newfoundland,
and demanded the Maritimes receive slightly more than one-third of the upper house’s
seats.29 This deviation from the Charlottetown conference agreement opened Pandora’s box.
Each delegation, including the Canadians, tried to increase their senate representation.
According to Edward Whelan, a Prince Edward Island delegate and reporter, Lower Canada
requested more seats in order to protect itself from Upper Canadian influence as well as the
combination of the “British element” from Upper Canada and the Maritimes.30 This fear
may have been fuelled by Brown’s alleged request for Upper Canada to receive more seats
than Lower Canada.31 Over the succeeding days, the delegates considered a host of
formulas, including equal representation for each province. Eventually, however, Macdonald
successfully resurrected Charles Tupper’s previously rejected suggestion to maintain the
Charlottetown agreement and simply add another four seats for Newfoundland as a separate
Senate contingent. This proposal compromised the Charlottetown agreement of equal
regional representation, but only slightly. Upper Canadians took solace from the knowledge
that the North-West would eventually provide additional seats that would likely balance the
increased Maritime representation. The Prince Edward Island delegation, which still desired
equal provincial senate representation, was the sole dissenter.32
The delegates then shifted to debating how senators would be selected. In 1865,
American state legislatures selected Senators. This provided the Senate with the necessary
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popular authority to rival the House of Representatives. The British tradition of governance
emphasized the primacy of elected parliament. Appointed senators would only possess the
authority to block or revise hasty legislation passed by the House of Commons. Appointing
Senators for life, many of the delegates hoped, would free the upper chamber from partisan
bias. Most of the delegates accepted the appointment of senators because they privileged
responsible government more than regional power. Even Nova Scotian and New Brunswick
delegates, who desired a senate capable of defending their interests, did not want it to also
possess the legitimacy to rival the representatives their electorate sent to the House of
Commons. Ultimately the majority of the conference members prevailed: the Governor
General, on the advice of the prime minister, would appoint senators for life. In the coming
months, most Upper Canadians also supported the appointment system, although Clear Grits,
who continued to oppose appointment on ideological grounds, preferred an elected system.33
The debate concerning senator selection, however, was somewhat inconsequential for Upper
Canadians. As the Globe explained:
the constitution of the federal assembly is vastly more important than that of
the upper chamber… The mode of selecting the upper chamber in the
confederation – the mode of selecting the local governors and other provincial
officials…. are all questions of vastly less importance than that of the
representation in the federal assembly. Having a right decision upon that main
point, we can well afford to be generous and exhibit a spirit of compromise
relative to the minor questions.34
The conference gave Brown and Macdonald the gist of their preferred senate design
but it also forced Upper Canadian delegates to protect a more cherished goal: representation
by population in the House of Commons. By common consent, Quebec would be perpetually
divided into sixty-five ridings, and the average population of that province’s ridings would
serve as the average for the dominion ridings in the other provinces. This ratio created a
House of Commons with 194 members. Upper Canada had eighty-two seats, Nova Scotia
nineteen, New Brunswick fifteen, Newfoundland eight, and Prince Edward Island five.
Prince Edward Island’s delegates, however, wanted each of their six counties to have its own
representative. Brown strongly opposed this suggestion. The voters of the island colony
33
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were already over-represented with five MPs and, if PEI were instead used as a base and its
representation increased to six members, ‘rep by pop’ would require the House of Commons
to swell to an unnecessarily large 230 members. Galt and most of the delegates concurred.
The increasingly disenchanted Prince Edward Island delegation again accepted defeat.35
Upper Canadians could privately rejoice at the entrenchment of ‘rep by pop’ in the
conference’s resolutions.
The delegates also debated a host of other issues. The dominion government would
buyout all provincial debts. In provinces like Ontario and Quebec, where the colonial debt
exceeded $25 per capita, the province would repay the difference to the dominion
government at a rate of 5% interest. The remaining provinces, which owed less than this $25
per capita allowance, would receive a 5% interest grant from the dominion government for
the unused portion of their debt. The delegates also decided that the general government
would provide each province an annual grant of eighty cents per capita according to the 1861
census. New Brunswick also secured an additional allowance of $63,000 per annum for ten
years from the dominion government, as well as special permission to charge an export duty
on timber and lumber to balance its books (see Table 1). Because Upper Canadians would
contribute the largest portion of these payments to the other provinces, they insisted that
resolution sixty-four of the Quebec Resolutions promise that “such aid shall be in full
settlement of all future demands upon the General Government for local purposes.”36 The
delegates also agreed to the construction of an Intercolonial railway linking Riviere-du-Loup
to Truro (central Nova Scotia) and, as finances permitted, the construction of communication
and transportation infrastructure in the North-West.37 This railway linking Quebec to Nova
Scotia, its advocates believed, would facilitate interprovincial trade and travel. Both the
colonial and Imperial authorities also desired the railway because it would permit the rapid
transportation of infantry and military equipment across the union. With the possible
exception of expansion into the North-West, none of these decisions shaped the development
35

John A. Macdonald (JAM), Notes, 19 October 1864 and JAM, Notes, 20 October 1864, LAC, MG26-A, Vol
46; Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 104-105.
36
J.A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in Canada (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1937), 14 contends that “there can be no doubt that the declaration was literally meant and was
literally given.”
37
“The Quebec Resolutions, October 1864,” Library and Archives Canada,
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/confederation/023001-7104-e.html (accessed 10 March 2014).

98

of Upper Canadian preponderant federalisms. Instead, they were part of the deal that would
make Upper Canada’s preponderance possible. With the Quebec conference’s Seventy-Two
Resolutions in hand by the end of October, the conference delegates adjourned and began a
tour of Canada.38
Table 1: Annual Monies to be Paid by the Dominion to the Provinces
Province
Ontario
Quebec
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick

Debt
Allowance
62,500,000*
8,000,000
7,000,000

Subsidy ($)
1,116,873
889,253
264,686
201,638

Grant in Aid of
Government ($)
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000

Special
Grants ($)
63,000

* Because the Canadians could not agree how much of the Province of Canada belonged to Canada
East and Canada West, they combined the debt, and assigned the division to arbitration.
Data from Morrison, “Oliver Mowat and the Development of Provincial Rights in Ontario,” 21.

In the coming months, British North Americans considered the Quebec resolutions.
The Canadian Legislative Assembly debated the resolutions during February and March
1865. During these debates, the Great Coalition adamantly defended the Quebec Resolutions.
Although both parties desired the union of British North America, it was the primary goal of
the Conservatives. Upper Canada’s economic and political future lay in consolidating the
Laurentian economy. British North American union would provide an ice-free port for
Upper Canadian goods in case of hostilities between Britain and the United States. The union
would also unite the disparate colonies into a new nation and facilitate “Canada’s survival as
a distinct, un-American society.”39 Once this base was established, the Laurentian economy
could expand its influence westward to the Pacific Ocean.40 Increased geographic size and
wealth, Conservatives insisted, would increase trade among the provinces, create a larger tax
base from which to launch public works, and increase British North America’s prestige
abroad making it easier for it to borrow money and attract immigrants.41 The union would
also create opportunities for new alliances that Macdonald’s Upper Canadian Conservative
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minority could use to maintain a hold on government power and patronage.42 In fact, the
Conservative desire for British North American union was so strong that it often eclipsed
their federalism. In many instances, Conservatives used “union” as a synonym for
“Confederation.”43
Macdonald sympathized with those who preferred legislative union, but he insisted
that a centralized federation was the best that could be achieved. Lower Canada would not
agree to a plan that did not promise constitutional means to protect its language, culture, and
religion. Neither Lower Canada, nor the Maritimes would forfeit their legal codes. Practical
politics necessitated provincial governments.44 Most Upper Canadian Conservatives accepted
this argument. J.S. Ross, the Conservative MLA for Dundas offered a typical response. He
was not particularly concerned about the structure of the government. “Whether Legislative
or Federal,” he insisted that “union is strength, and union is desirable if we expect future
growth and greatness.”45 Although Upper Canadian Conservatives generally supported
Confederation, Conservative federalism remained weak because its members subordinated it
to expanding the Laurentian economy.
Reformers also desired the union of the existing British North American colonies to
resist American territorial encroachment, but they continued to focus on the economic
potential of western expansion. The North-West would become an immense agricultural
empire that would help fill the void left by the abrogation of the Reciprocity treaty and turn
the fledging union into an important country.46 According to Romney, Upper Canadians also
craved autonomy from Lower Canada’s influence. They therefore continued to frame ‘rep by
pop’ and the creation of separate provincial governments as means to liberate themselves
from French-Canadian influence.47
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The Canadian government also tried to combat allegations that Confederation would
be unreasonably expensive. When introducing the Quebec Resolutions in parliament, for
example, Macdonald claimed that the Quebec Resolutions would not cost Upper Canadian
taxpayers more than the existing union. The sessions of the general legislature would be
shorter because they would not have to consider sectional matters. Galt also emphasized cost
efficiency and assured the House that the Quebec agreement “does not contemplate any
future extension” of the eighty cent subsidy to the provinces.48 Brown admitted that he
would have preferred an arrangement wherein each province raised the funds to cover its
own expenses but because the Maritimes lacked the municipal tax system common in Upper
Canada, the conference had to accommodate this financial demand.49 The costs, moreover,
were worthwhile. “If we were offered Michigan, Iowa or Minnesota” under similar
resolutions, Brown rhetorically asked the Assembly, “I would like to know what sum, within
the compass of Canada, we would not be prepared to pay?”50 On occasion, Reformers such
as Brown and Hope Mackenzie even speculated that Upper Canadians might pay less tax
under the new scheme than under the current union.51 The newspapers repeated many of
these arguments. The Leader admitted that Confederation would be expensive, but it
nevertheless contended that the deal would be “a good investment” in Upper Canada’s
defensive and commercial future.52 The Globe conceded that Upper Canada would
contribute more than its share of the country’s tariff revenues but it claimed that this was
reasonable because Upper Canadians consumed more tariffed goods than their colonial peers.
The financial terms of Confederation were set. No province could receive more than the
Quebec Resolutions specified, and while this redistribution would be a net loss for Upper
Canadians, the terms were final rather than open ended.53
Many Canadian politicians were critical of the Quebec Resolutions. Conservatives
argued that a legislative union would better inculcate national unity. Christopher Dunkin
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gave the lengthiest and most comprehensive critique of the Quebec Resolutions.54 Dunkin
worried that the federal principle would preserve and even institutionalize provincial
identities. This provincialism, he feared would hamper the development of national unity:
It is proposed to adopt here a plan which had a direct tendency to place on the
floor of our House of Commons a number of provincial delegations, and not a
number of independent members of parliament. The tendency is therefore
towards a system antagonistic to, and inconsistent with, those principles on
which the British Constitution reposes. With provincial delegations, rather
than members of parliament, on the floor of the Federal Legislature, we are
not likely to have that political longevity, whether of men or parties, without
which the British system of government can hardly exist.55
Dunkin was not the only speaker to express this concern. Prominent Conservative and
Orangeman, Matthew Crooks Cameron, represented North Ontario in the Assembly and was
one of the few to vote against the Quebec Resolutions.56 In a private letter to Macdonald, he
worried that "the scheme itself based on the federal principle does not inspire me with a
feeling of confidence that it will succeed in making us live more in harmony... or work with
an eye solely to the common good."57 He elaborated on this fear during his parliamentary
critique of the Quebec Resolutions. Cameron advocated a legislative union because “if we
are to be united, it ought to be in fact as well as in name; that we ought to be one people, and
not separated from each other by sections.”58 Conscious of how the Southern desire for local
autonomy sparked the American Civil war, Cameron concluded that if Canadians joined the
British North American union proposed in the Quebec Resolutions, they “would be sowing
the seeds of discord and strife, which would destroy our union.”59 Walter Shanly, the
Conservative MLA for Grenville, ultimately voted with his party, despite sharing these
doubts. Like Cameron and Dunkin, Shanly believed that the American experience proved
that federations produced “politicians rather than statesmen.”60 Politicians only cared about
getting re-elected; statesmen convinced their constituents to value national imperatives and
54
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compromise. To succeed, the new country’s structure of government needed to foster unity,
and many worried that the federal principle’s preservation of provincial identities would
compromise this goal. The tendency to believe that provincial interests lay in nation-building
would be fundamental to subsequent appeals for Ontarians to desist from rallying against
initiatives from the rest of Canada, or to use their influence to facilitate the passage of
compromise policies. However, these men were so fearful of the persistence of any regional
divisions, and so desirous of legislative union, that they overlooked the possibility.
Other Upper Canadian Reformers, as well as a number of Conservatives, believed
Confederation would be prohibitively expensive. They questioned whether the province’s
additional seventeen seats would be worth the considerable costs that the Quebec Resolutions
required their province to shoulder. Maintaining a provincial and federal government would
be expensive. The step towards nationhood and independence would also require British
North America to maintain its own army and naval fleet. Some Upper Canadian taxpayers
worried that their province would shoulder the largest portion of these additional
expenditures.61 The London Advertiser warned that the Quebec Resolutions gave Upper
Canada “representation by population – and taxation by population.” Although it did not
condemn the Confederation scheme, the Advertiser judged the above commitments to be a
heavy price to pay for freedom from Lower Canadian “domination.”62 John McMurrich (the
Reform representative of Saugeen in the Legislative Council) and M.C. Cameron disliked the
plan to redistribute some of the general government’s revenues back to the provinces. Both
men believed each province should pay its own expenses instead of dipping into the general
government’s revenues. According to this interpretation, Upper Canadians risked continued
exploitation by additional provinces if they agreed to the Quebec Resolutions.63
Few Upper Canadians defended one of the Resolutions’ most costly provisions: the
construction of the Intercolonial railway. The project had never been popular in Upper
Canada because its taxpayers knew that their province would be responsible for the largest
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portion of its construction costs despite the fact that the line would provide them with few
immediate benefits, and would not even enter their province. In an extremely negative
editorial, the Perth Courier estimated that Upper Canada would pay for half of the
Intercolonial’s construction costs.64 To make matters worse, the cost of construction was not
yet clear, and many Upper Canadians worried that they were signing a blank cheque. Other
Upper Canadians believed it would, like the Grand Trunk Railway, fail as a commercial
venture. Many also worried that, if war with the United States occurred, the railway’s close
proximity to the border made it an easy target for American occupation. Nevertheless, most
Upper Canadians held their noses, and accepted the Intercolonial’s construction as a
necessary inducement for Maritime participation in the union.65
Several Upper Canadians also doubted that their province’s seventeen additional seats
would be enough to overcome French-Canadian influence. John Macdonald (the Reform
MLA for Toronto) believed Joseph Cauchon’s (the Bleu MLA for Montmorency) assertion
that the senate, rather than the House of Commons, would be the final arbitrator of sectional
disputes. He therefore expressed his desire for increased Upper Canadian representation in
the senate.66 M.C. Cameron also believed Upper Canada’s strengthened intrastate influence
could “be easily checked and completely swamped by the addition of forty-seven members
from the Lower Provinces!”67 He was not alone. While speaking to a Reform club in Toronto
in January 1865, John McMurrich worried that Lower Canada and the Maritimes would join
forces against Upper Canada’s interests in the House of Commons.68 The Perth Courier also
warned that the rest of Canada’s MPs could overpower Upper Canada’s 82 representatives in
the House of Commons.69 Other MLAs shared this concern.70
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Upper Canadians who wanted to dominate in the federation’s national debates still
walked a fine line when commenting on their province’s potential preponderant influence.
They accepted Confederation, in part, because they continued to believe that ‘rep by pop’
would give their province preponderant influence in the House of Commons. One Globe
editorial from January 1865 even described representation by population, rather than
provincial autonomy or even federation, as the Reformer “sine qua non.” It insisted that
strict adherence to rep by pop was in the entire country’s best interests. Giving the Maritime
provinces a few more seats, for example, would not appreciably increase their power, but
would give Upper and Lower Canadian MPs a “sense of injustice which might possibly tend
to make them somewhat intolerant towards the smaller provinces.”71 Yet French Lower
Canada and the Maritimes remained nervous about Upper Canada’s preponderance, so
Reform supporters often downplayed their province’s potential influence during public
discussions. Hope Mackenzie insisted that in crusading for representation by population,
Upper Canadians “never sought or wished for supremacy, but only our just and fair influence
according to our numbers and the public burdens.” Rather than exploring what Upper
Canada would do with its preponderant influence, he emphasized the colony’s long history of
political division, and noted that it would limit Upper Canadian preponderant influence in the
House of Commons.72
During the Confederation debates in the Assembly, Brown continued to describe
Upper Canada’s preponderance as a defensive capability. He recognized that his province
would be comparatively weak in the senate, but clung to the knowledge that Upper
Canadians would “have [the] power, which we never had before, to prevent them [Lower
Canadian representatives] from forcing through whatever we may deem unjust to us” in the
House of Commons.73 In a vague speech the following week in the Legislative Council,
Reformer William McMaster echoed the Reform leader by explaining that Confederation
would “secure to the people of Upper Canada representation by population in that branch of
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the Federal Legislature which controls the purse-strings.”74 Similarly, on 12 January 1865,
the Globe tried to assuage Maritime concerns of Upper Canadian dominance by admitting
that it expected the populations of Upper Canada and the North-West to dwarf Lower Canada
and the Maritimes in the decades to come. Unlike previous editorials that traditionally
expressed the belief that Upper Canadians would overwhelmingly inhabit the North-West,
however, this editorial described the region as a potential counterweight to Upper Canada. If
that was not enough to placate Maritime concerns, the Globe assured its readers that the
British tradition of justice and tolerance would lead the rest of the British North American
representatives to block any measure Upper Canada might try to pass against another section
of the country.75
The tendency of Reformers to describe their province’s preponderance as defensive,
or insignificant, was less than sincere. Although the scenarios they described were plausible
(and in some cases prophetic), Brown and his followers did not believe they were probable.
In one of his speeches downplaying the significance of Upper Canada’s preponderance,
Alexander Mackenzie could not help but encourage Upper Canadians to push the general
government to fulfil the 69th article of the Quebec Resolutions that promised expansion into
the North-West “with all the influence that can be brought to bear.”76 Reformers also
believed that their province’s influence would grow in the coming decades. On 12 January
1865 the Globe declared that “any one who has any faith in the future of British America,
must believe that the day will come when but a minority of her people will live in Lower
Canada and the Eastern Provinces. Upper Canada and the vast country known as the Red
River territory ought, if they have fair play, in forty years time to contain many millions of
people.”77
George Brown revealed his aspirations in his private correspondence. He recognized
that the same defensive power he described in public could be used to shape Confederation to
suit Upper Canadian preferences. On the closing day of the Quebec conference, Brown
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enthusiastically informed his wife that he was not worried by the “Tory” aspects of the
Resolutions because Upper Canadians had “the power in our hands (if it passes) to change it
[the constitution] as we like! Hurrah.”78 Five months later, Brown reaffirmed these
expectations when he expressed sympathy for Maritimers, who he believed faced a difficult
decision on Confederation. The decision to join Confederation was easier in Upper Canada
because it would have “all the advantages” in the proposed union.79 Other Reformers who
joined Brown in celebrating the achievement of ‘rep by pop’ without explaining what Upper
Canadians could do with their potential intrastate preponderance undoubtedly held similar
private aspirations.
Conservatives avoided or cast doubt upon the Reform contention that ‘rep by pop’
would give their province preponderant influence in the proposed Confederation. When
introducing the Quebec Resolutions, Macdonald focused on how each provincial share of
representatives in the House of Commons would be calculated and did not discuss the
significance of ‘rep by pop’ for Upper Canadian influence in the general government.80
Alexander Morris, the Conservative MLA South Lanark, referred to John Stuart Mill’s
warning about creating federations with large asymmetries of power between the constituent
members. Rather than trying to explain why the Canadian context would not violate this
warning, Morris simply noted that Canada and Prince Edward Island were prima facia
similar to New York and Rhode Island, and moved on to his next point. If asymmetries were
not a problem among Northern states, they would not be a problem in a British North
American confederation.81 The Leader also discounted Brownite aspirations. Representation
by population guaranteed Upper Canada “all she is fairly entitled to,” the Leader recognized,
“but she will not have the majority which has so often been promised to her.”82 Upper
Canadians, therefore, could not expect to “swamp the Lower Provinces.” In fact, the Leader
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argued that the union could not be effectively governed if each region’s representatives to the
House of Commons acted as provincial blocs.83
Instead, Ontarian politicians in the new House of Commons would need to be
‘statesmen.’ George Jackson, the Conservative MLA for Grey, provided the most thoughtful
rendition of this argument. “Statesmen” according to Jackson, had to eschew “abstract
propositions,” and instead embrace practicality and compromise. He was glad ‘rep by pop’
would give Upper Canada its due influence in the House of Commons but recognized that a
federal union was the only way the other colonies would accept this arrangement.84 Canada
would remain a country of diverse interests and he suggested that “it is hardly to be
conceived that gentleman called together for the performance of certain high purposes would
attempt to do an injury to one part of the country over another.”85 Using Upper Canada’s
influence in the House of Commons to ram through narcissistic policies was both immoral
and contrary to its interests:
If Upper Canada is blessed with more wealth than any of the other provinces,
it ought not to be forgotten that its accountability and its responsibility are
greater – that they are in proportion to its riches – and while the people of that
important section of the Confederacy may be called upon to concede some
things that they have valued very highly for the general welfare, yet it is not
for a moment to be supposed – and no one who dispassionately examines the
whole subject can come to that conclusion – that Upper Canada will not
receive very important advantages in return, in other respects. There must be
conciliation and compromise between the several conflicting interests found
in so large and so varied a territory, and we never can have a union without
meeting and accommodating ourselves to this difficulty.86
This pragmatic, yet ironically ideological statement summarized many of the assumptions
that would underlie the willingness of Ontarians to use their influence to support compromise
policies. Their province would be central to the new Confederation because it possessed so
much of the country’s wealth and influence. Rather than using these attributes to narrowly
pursue its own ends at the expense of the rest of Canada, the larger project of Confederation
required Upper Canadians to compromise with the other provinces, even if doing so
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occasionally conflicted with their interests. In 1865 Jackson remained one of the few Upper
Canadians who linked statesmanship with preponderant federalism.
The federal debates remained somewhat impressionistic and still often lacked detail.
No one had an answer, for example, when M.C. Cameron and Christopher Dunkin asked
about provincial representation in the national cabinet. This “vagueness,” Cameron rightly
pointed out, detracted from the Quebec Resolutions’ credibility.87 Some of the vagueness of
the debates was due to ignorance. C.B. de Niverville, the Bleu MLA for Trois-Rivières,
famously confessed that he had not read the Quebec Resolutions prior to debating them in
parliament.88 He probably was not alone. Others politicians were deliberately vague.
Macdonald, for example, believed that it would be unwise to hamstring Canada’s future
leaders with a lengthy constitution. The English government’s longevity, he asserted, arose
in large part from its ability to evolve over time.89 The allure of preponderant influence,
British North American union, provincial autonomy, in addition to continued inter-colonial
distrust, also remained strong deterrents to publicly exploring the nuances of the Quebec
Resolutions. The colonial delegates had “made a deal” and Upper Canadian advocates
understood the importance of not jeopardizing goodwill by speculating.90 The debates
therefore passed without concerted public discussion of preponderant federalisms. The few
who talked or wrote about moulding the national government’s policies with Upper Canada’s
preponderant influence focused on the mechanism to create change. They rarely described
the type of country they envisioned.
The intensive Confederation debates, therefore, did not prepare Upper Canadians to
consider how to use their province’s future preponderance. Those who hoped to use
Ontario’s intrastate influence to dominate confederation welcomed the deal with great
anticipation but did not yet share their hopes with the masses. Without this activism,
Conservatives only rarely and vaguely explored Upper Canada’s potential role within
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Confederation. Another year would pass before Upper Canadians began to more openly
debate the role they would play within Confederation.

Anticipating Ontario’s Preponderance
Public debate of the Quebec Resolutions in Upper Canada slowed to a crawl after
their approval in the Canadian Legislature. Most political observers focused on political
developments in the Maritimes. Few of the inhabitants of Prince Edward Island supported a
scheme that would give the Island’s six counties five seats in the general parliament without
resolving its land tenure problem. Newfoundlanders questioned how their province’s small
population could secure its tariff and foreign policy preferences within a general government
dominated by Canada. They also foresaw few benefits to contributing to the costs of the
Intercolonial railway or expansion into the North-West.
New Brunswick’s Premier, Samuel Tilley, called an election for March 1865 to solicit
support for Confederation but was soundly defeated. For a time it seemed that the
Confederation movement had stalled. The unpopularity of Confederation in Nova Scotia led
its premier, Charles Tupper, to postpone debate in the Assembly. Nova Scotia’s leading antiConfederate and former Premier, Joseph Howe, published a series of editorials against the
Quebec Resolutions in the opening months of 1865. Before year’s end, George Brown also
contributed to the Confederation drama. His distaste for Macdonald, his continued desire to
supplant the Kingston Conservative as Upper Canada’s leader, along with several clashes in
the cabinet regarding tariff negotiations with the United States during the summer and fall of
1865, led Brown to resign from the Great Coalition in December. Fergusson Blair, a
moderate Reformer who had served in Sandfield’s government and currently sat in the
Legislative Council for the Brock district, assumed Brown’s place in the Coalition cabinet as
President of the Council. Despite his dissent of the government, Brown continued to support
the union cause. Confederation was on shaky ground.91
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The following year, however, many dissenting Nova Scotians and New Brunswickers
re-evaluated their opposition. The Colonial Office in London favoured British North
American union. Attacks by American radicals from the Fenian Brotherhood in New
Brunswick in April 1866 also encouraged reassessment. Although the raid had little military
consequence, the panicky atmosphere led many of Confederation’s detractors to reconsider
their position.92 In this new political climate the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick,
Arthur Gordon, forced another election for May and June 1866. It ultimately restored Tilley
and his supporters to power. Capitalizing on Tilley’s restoration, Tupper secured the
permission of the Nova Scotian legislature “to arrange with the Imperial government a
scheme of union which will effectually secure just provision for the rights and interests of
this Province.”93 Shortly thereafter Tilley passed a similar resolution. The Maritime
legislatures did not approve the Quebec Resolutions; they only sanctioned further
negotiations. With these limited mandates in hand by the spring of 1866, both provinces sent
delegations to London to secure the best possible terms.94
When the negotiations resumed in London in December 1866, the Maritime delegates
needed to secure better terms than those promised in the Quebec Resolutions. The Imperial
government did its part by offering to guarantee part of the loan required for the Maritime’s
long desired Intercolonial railway. This, however, was not enough.95 Both provinces lacked
municipal taxation and the Quebec Resolution’s assignment of tariffs to the dominion
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government deprived them of their main revenue source. The Canadian delegation
recognized the Maritime’s financial need but did not want to violate “the principle that the
Provinces should receive equal treatment on the basis of population rather than on the basis
of fiscal need.”96 The conference delegates found ways to improve the Maritime’s financial
terms without blatantly violating this precept of the Quebec Resolutions. They promised to
raise the Maritime subsidy by applying the same eighty-cents per capita to Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick’s 1871 populations, while Ontario and Quebec’s subsidies continued to be
based on the 1861 census. To placate the Canadians, this arrangement would only persist
until each province’s population reached 400,000. The new formula ensured that the subsidy
technically continued to be calculated on a per capita basis. The London conference also
added annual grants to the financial package and these were not strictly proportionate to
population. Each year the general government would pay Ontario $80,000, Quebec $70,000,
Nova Scotia $60,000 and New Brunswick $50,000 (see Table 1). Although these financial
concessions were not unreasonably expensive, many Brownite Reformers who were now
outside the cabinet and who consequently responded to the negotiations from across the
Atlantic, worried that the unequal treatment of each province might lead to further
concessions in years to come. The London delegates anticipated this concern, and their
resolutions, as well as the BNA Act, reassured Upper Canadians that these financial terms
would be the “full settlement of all future demands.”97
The London adjustments led the Upper Canadian representatives to reopen the issue
of senate representation. In a letter to Lord Monck, McDougall described the debate. For
“three or four days” the London delegates rehashed the question of elected or appointed
officials, lifetime appointments, and “especially” what McDougall referred to as “fixed”
regional representation. McDougall and the other Reform Coalition delegates expected
Upper Canada’s population to continue to grow at the phenomenal rates of the previous two
decades, and therefore pushed for the regional representation in the senate to be adjustable.
The other delegations, however, continued to fear that if the regional representation formula
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was modified, “the smaller Provinces would be at the mercy of Upper Canada, [and] that the
fixed Upper House was their only protection.”98 Ultimately, the London conference rejected
modifying regional representation in the senate and instead inserted a provision for the
dominion government to appoint an additional three or six senators to the chamber if their
inclusion preserved the existing regional proportions.99 Upper Canadian Reformers had to
content themselves with preponderant representation in the lower house.
Aside from these intrastate debates and financial questions, the London conference
delegates also amended the Quebec Resolutions by adding provisions that protected separate
schools. The Quebec Resolutions only guaranteed the rights that Protestant and Catholic
minorities in Lower and Upper Canada enjoyed “at the time when the Union goes into
operation.”100 During the Canadian parliamentary session in August 1866, Alexander Galt
pushed the government to introduce legislation that would have expanded the administrative
independence of Upper Canadian separate schools. The government bill had wide support
from both Upper and Lower Canada. But then Robert Bell, the Conservative member for the
Franco-Ontarian riding of Russell, proposed a bill that promised Upper Canadian Catholics
the same rights as Lower Canadian Protestants. Although Macdonald initially supported
Bell’s bill, other Upper Canadian Conservatives and Reformers opposed it. Bell’s bill was
extremely popular among Lower Canadian Catholics, but Macdonald recognized that
allowing their political representatives to force the measure through the Assembly would
have infuriated Upper Canadians and created ill-will at Confederation’s outset. The
government therefore withdrew its education bill and effectively terminated the debate. Galt
protested this decision by resigning from the government but his counsel and pressure from
Lower Canadian Protestants led the government to include him in their London delegation.
This time Galt successfully pushed through measures that eventually became section 93 of
the BNA Act. Each of the four sub-sections qualified the otherwise exclusive provincial
jurisdiction in education. Sub-section one guaranteed the perpetuation of separate school
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rights, as they existed “by Law in the Province at the Union.” The second sub-section
guaranteed Upper Canadian Catholics the same rights as Lower Canadian Protestants. The
third sub-section gave minorities across Canada the right to appeal to the Governor General
to disallow provincial education legislation that eliminated separate school rights that existed
“by Law at the Union.” Sub-section four empowered the dominion parliament to “make
remedial Laws” if a provincial legislature violated the guarantees set out in section 93.101
Catholic Upper Canadians nervously followed these negotiations. Franco-Upper
Canadians compromised 4.7% of the province’s 1871 population. Despite their high
concentration in the southwest in Essex and Kent counties, in the northwest counties of
Prescott and Russell, as well as the Ottawa region, this ethnic minority elected few
representatives to either the provincial or dominion legislatures. They therefore looked to
Lower Canada and Quebec for the protection of their minority rights.102 Irish Catholic
support weighed more heavily on the minds of Upper Canadian politicians. Irish Catholics
comprised approximately 17% of Upper Canadians in 1871, and constituted a potentially
powerful swing vote. From 1864 to 1867 their two major Toronto newspapers maintained a
strong ethnic perspective. The Canadian Freeman, founded in 1858 by James G. Moylan,
whose close ties to Toronto Bishop John Joseph Lynch, as well as the continued Reform
emphasis on representation by population drove his newspaper to support the
Conservatives.103 Patrick Boyle, who had previously worked as a printer at the Globe,
founded and edited the Irish Canadian in 1863 as a reaction against clerical oversight and
eventually supported Reformers.104 Although the issues of the Irish Canadian for much of
this period no longer exist, the Canadian Freeman regularly commented on Confederation’s
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development. Given past Canadian politics, Irish Upper Canadians were understandably
concerned about maintaining minority rights to publicly funded separate schools, and both
organs therefore closely followed the attempts by Galt and others to secure these rights at
home and in London. Even after the London conference published its guarantees for
minority education rights, the Canadian Freeman argued that the promises would only be as
good as the representatives elected to parliament.105 The newspaper also noted the extensive
representation of English-speaking Protestants in Lower Canada, and encouraged Irish
Catholics to vote as a bloc to secure the election of a proportionate number of Catholic
representatives in both provincial and federal parliaments, as well as the dominion cabinet.106
Despite these different interests, the Irish newspapers did not entirely ignore their province’s
preponderance prior to Confederation. In August 1864, the Irish Canadian worried that a
“Saxon spirit of aggression” would deter French-Canadians from accepting a federal
solution.107 In January 1867 the Canadian Freeman nervously noted that representation by
population would give Ontario and Quebec “the controlling influence” in the dominion
parliament.108 Whether Ontario Irish Catholics would benefit from their province’s
preponderant influence, however, remained to be determined.
Irish Catholics were not the only Upper Canadians unsure about their province’s
preponderance. After the London conference, Upper Canadians resumed debate on the role
their province would play in Confederation. Brown’s resignation and revival of partisanship
divided Reformers. A few supported the decision of Howland, Blair, and McDougall to
remain in the government coalition. A more significant minority continued to support
Sandfield. Most Reformers, however, followed Brown.
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With Confederation a certainty, Brown began to encourage Upper Canadian voters to
elect his followers to the first session of the House of Commons. Confederation’s
achievement negated the need for the Great Coalition’s continuation. In the past, Macdonald
and his Conservatives had overpowered the more numerous Upper Canadian Reformers by
allying with Lower Canadian Bleus in the Assembly. Brownites therefore repeatedly warned
Upper Canadians to be vigilant. The Bruce riding Reform Association warned its voters in a
lengthy address to guard against “a new unholy alliance.” Upper Canadian Reformers would
now have to “contend” with three provinces instead of one. The construction of the
Intercolonial railway and the opening of the North-West to European settlement would create
immense patronage opportunities that those in power could use to sway Upper Canadian
Members of Parliament from pursuing their riding’s interests. The BNA Act gave Upper
Canadians the opportunity to influence these actions but only if they nominated “men of
unimpeachable moral character” who would not succumb to the temptations of patronage and
power once in Ottawa.109 Similarly, Joseph Gould (a wealthy farmer and businessman) noted
Ontario’s additional seventeen parliamentary seats and told a Reform meeting in the riding of
North Ontario that “it will depend on ourselves… whether Confederation shall be an
advantage to us.”110 In short, Brownite Reformers contended that Upper Canadians had to
elect a solid phalanx of their candidates if they expected Upper Canadian interests to gain
any traction in Ottawa.
George Brown organized another convention to solidify the Reform base behind his
post-Confederation vision. On June 27 over six hundred delegates crowded into the Music
Hall on Church Street in Toronto.111 These delegates overwhelmingly rejected Howland and
McDougall’s appeals for the continuation of the Great Coalition. The Coalition government,
the delegates declared, did not serve Upper Canada’s interests. Macdonald’s government
would sacrifice the interests of any constituent province to maintain power. In the dominion
cabinet, the convention’s speakers argued, Macdonald and the Quebec representatives would
act as a single power bloc, requiring the support of only one additional Maritime minister to
overwhelm the influence of Blair, Howland, and McDougall. Supporting the Coalition was
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thus tantamount to admitting that Upper Canadian Reformers were “unable to control the
destinies of the new confederation.”112
Brownites were extremely judgemental of those who continued their association with
the Conservatives from the Great Coalition in the dominion cabinet. The delegates, and
particularly the Globe, condemned them as “traitors” who lacked principle, sought only
power, and insisted the that Ontario contingent was “without influence in the new
Government.”113 The Globe argued that Reformers, as the only reliable protectors of
provincial interests, would win the elections and thereby secure even fuller representation in
the post-election cabinet. Anything else would be a distortion of Ontarian federalism.
Fortunately, these Upper Canadians argued, their province’s intrastate preponderance
would allow it to stand apart from the other provinces if necessary. Now more concerned
about his appeal in Upper Canada than his image in Lower Canada, Brown openly shared his
aspirations. ‘Rep by pop’ gave Upper Canadians the opportunity to shape the dominion. He
twice reminded the delegates that time was on Upper Canada’s side. Even if Upper Canada’s
population grew at the diminished rate of the past decade, Brown projected that the 1871
census would raise the province’s parliamentary representation to “94 or 95” seats, “and that
ten years later if the same ratio of increase in the population is maintained, Upper Canada
will have a majority in the House of Commons.”114 Brown advocated patience. Upper
Canada’s day would come:
If we have a majority we will carry the House, and if we have not we will wait
till the Coalition falls to pieces, which will not be long; and then, when the
Coalition no longer commands the confidence of the House, the GovernorGeneral must send for the Reformers, and do you think these gentlemen
would then refuse an alliance with the Reformers of Upper Canada? Take my
word for it, gentlemen, if the Reformers of Upper Canada are true to
themselves, and stand united as they have done in the past, they hold the
balance of power in this Dominion.115
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A host of other delegates, including Edward Blake and Adam Crooks of Toronto, Robert
Fraser of Brockville, and J.G. Currie of St. Catharines expressed similar hopes.116 The BNA
Act gave Ontarians preponderant influence, and “it will be their own fault,” Brown bluntly
concluded during his speech to the convention, if Upper Canadian Reformers did not secure
their province’s interest by playing a central role in dominion affairs.117
Reformers denied that these aspirations were sectionalist. During the convention’s
proceedings, Brown suggested that the Maritimes would elect a strong Reform contingent
that would support the Upper Canadian Reform agenda.118 Yet even he admitted that this
was mere conjecture. As Careless points out, Upper Canadians still knew little about the
Maritimes and, until the disparate Reformers joined as a single national party, the Globe
instructed its readers to “avoid speaking or acting as though general questions were to be
settled by the vote of Ontario alone" because it could encourage further fear of Upper
Canada’s preponderance.119 Although Reformers were more open about their hopes for
influence than they had been at the 1859 convention, they still worried about how they would
be perceived in the rest of British North America.
By the final months of 1866 and early 1867, Conservatives began to explain why
compromise would be so crucial to the infant country’s development. They favoured
Confederation because they continued to hope that it would relegate the sectional issues that
had plagued the union parliament to the provinces and allow national politicians to focus on
expanding, populating, and strengthening the new dominion. In so doing, they would enrich
and enlarge the Laurentian economy and construct a bulwark against American
encroachment. All of Canada would benefit from the union of British North America. In
one excessively optimistic editorial, the Leader forecasted that the four provinces would
eventually contain fifty million inhabitants. Halifax, the Conservative organ bragged, would
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serve as an ice-free port for this immense interior, and would consequently grow to rival New
York City.120
In this new political environment, old partisan divisions would be unnecessary,
quaint, or detrimental to national development. New partisan divisions would develop over
time but, for the time being, the country needed its most able men to guide the country to
maturity. Confederation was a fresh start, and good governance necessitated the continuation
and expansion of the Coalition government to include all of the dominion’s provinces. To do
otherwise, Conservatives claimed, would be regressive. Patriotism, the Leader insisted,
required the dominion’s voters to give the coalition a “fair trial” before returning to
partisanship.121
Coalition supporters did not deny that the provinces’ varied interests would create
some tension but defended their allegiance to the government. Navigating these differences,
McDougall told his Hamilton audience at the end of October 1866, would require
“statesmanlike” men who were willing to put aside their previous “petty” differences and aim
for “higher policy.”122 Ontario, he warned, was not strong enough to secure its interests while
remaining aloof from the government. At the 1867 Reform convention McDougall argued
that if he and the other Reform-Coalitionists had not maintained their position in the cabinet,
“we would have seen the three eastern Provinces banding together and supporting a
government to which the majority in Upper Canada was opposed.”123 When discussing
Confederation in his memoirs, Howland alleges that Brown had lost “interest in the success
of the measure,” and implied that Brown was only interested in supplanting Macdonald after
his departure from the Great Coalition.124 At the 1867 Reform convention Howland insisted
that “there could not be a more ruinous thing for us to do than for the great reform party of
Upper Canada to preclude those representing us from uniting with men no matter where they
may come from, who have worked earnestly to bring about the [constitutional] change.” The
alternative was to “coalesce with those… who have strenuously opposed the Union
120
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throughout, with those prominent among whom is one who has said that if it had not been for
the oath he had taken to her Majesty he would be among the first to shoulder his rifle and
march to the border to shed his blood in opposition to Confederation.”125 Upper Canadian
voters would harm Confederation by supporting Brownite candidates.126 The Leader agreed.
If Upper Canada did not support its Coalition candidates it risked “isolating itself from the
rest of the Confederation and thus compelling the formation of an [sic] union of the other
three Provinces for self-protection.”127 The Maritimes were not eager to contribute to the
costs of Canadian expansion into the North-West and convincing them to support such
policies required strong Upper Canadian representation in the government. An Upper
Canadian bloc vote for Brownite candidates, the Leader warned, would not secure this
goal.128 Upper Canada, like the other provinces, had to participate in the governing coalition
if it wanted its needs to be met.
By the eve of Confederation, Upper Canadian Coalitionists recognized their colony’s
preponderant potential. They nonetheless opposed independent provincial action because
they continued to believe that the other provinces would still prevail against their influence in
the House of Commons. For Confederation to spawn a ‘new nation,’ all of the provinces,
including Ontario, needed to elect representatives who would cooperate and compromise
with their peers from other parts of British North America.

Conclusion
Upper Canadian preponderant federalisms developed relatively quickly between 1864
and 1867. When the Great Coalition first formed, few politicians publicly espoused
preponderant federalisms. Even the intense negotiations at Charlottetown and Quebec City
as well as the debates in the Canadian Assembly, failed to generate significant public
discussion of their province’s potential influence. Until the London conference, Upper
Canadians who hoped to dominate Confederation avoided alarming Lower Canada and the
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Maritimes by keeping tight-lipped about these desires. They waited until after the London
conference made Confederation a certainty before openly proclaiming their provincial
aspirations. Conservatives generally focused on the economic and defensive benefits of
British North American union, and few initially conceived of their province as a prospective
‘first among equals.’ They accepted the federal principle by necessity rather than by choice.
At the same time, however, a few Conservatives and Reform-Coalitionists responded to
Brownite aspirations for preponderant intrastate influence 1865 and 1866 – or their outright
declarations of future dominance in 1867 – by proposing an alternative vision for Ontario’s
role in Confederation. They admitted that Ontario might exercise strong influence within the
new dominion but denied its ability to outvote the rest of the country. These Ontarians
therefore advocated restraint and cooperation with the rest of the country. They even began
to hint at using Ontario’s potential influence to support the passage of compromise policies.
On the eve of 1 July 1867, therefore, many Brownites, Reform-Coalitionists, and
Conservatives believed that representation by population would assure Ontario’s provincial
autonomy and ‘just’ influence in national affairs, but they disagreed about the role their
province would play within Confederation.
In late June 1867 both preponderant federalisms still lacked breadth. The prolonged
‘rep by pop’ debate limited discussion of the role Ontario would play within the House of
Commons and the Senate and it further led both parties away from considering other forums
of intrastate influence, such as the cabinet. The desire for provincial autonomy and
confidence concerning Ontario’s intrastate power also discouraged Reformers from
considering the potential influence that Ontario’s Legislative Assembly might exert during
national debates. Neither of these oversights would survive the first years of Confederation.
At times, both parties used their preponderant federalisms to serve their partisan
interests. Reformers, and especially Brown, appealed to Upper Canadian prejudices, and
claimed that their province would only be safe if its electors sent a solid bloc of Reformers to
parliament. Conservatives similarly asked Upper Canadians to support the continuation of
Coalition government by claiming that it would prevent Brownite Reformers from misusing
Ontario’s influence and sabotaging Confederation at its birth. These partisan appeals
sometimes strained credibility. According to Donald Creighton, for example, Macdonald
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continued to describe his government as a coalition in Upper Canada despite knowing that it
was “a rather dubious fiction” to consider McDougall, Howland, and Blair to be
representative Upper Canadian Reformers.129 Not all partisan rallying cries, however, were
insincere propaganda. Coalition supporters from Upper Canada had good reason to fear the
possibility that an intrastate power struggle led by Ontario could compromise national unity.
Conversely, Brownites had fought long and hard for ‘rep by pop’ and provincial autonomy,
and were understandably unwilling to accept further dictations from the rest of
Confederation.
Paul Romney insists that English-Canada’s intelligencia increasingly ‘got it wrong’
after the Laurier era by imposing their desire for centralized government that could overcome
local prejudices and maintain national unity onto Upper Canadians. “By prematurely
converting Upper Canadians into Canadians,” he writes, “centralist story-tellers prevented
themselves from seeing Confederation as Oliver Mowat had seen it: as the belated
achievement of autonomy under monarchical institutions - that is, of responsible government
- by Upper Canada.”130 Upper Canadians, Romney rightly contends, did not forsake their
affinity for autonomy on 1 July 1867. They continued to value their provincial
consciousness and did not subordinate it to national identities. Some would soon espouse a
provincial compact theory of Confederation. But Romney’s eagerness to uphold Mowat as a
kindred spirit to Quebec’s provincial autonomists leads him to overlook the desire in Ontario
to preponderate in Canadian policy debates. Upper Canadians wanted provincial autonomy
and they entered Confederation believing ‘rep by pop’ would provide them with sufficient
seats in parliament to defend themselves from further interference by the other provinces.
‘Rep by pop’ also promised Upper Canadians the potential to strongly influence the national
government’s policies. At the end of June 1867, most Upper Canadians expected their
province to become a ‘first among equals’ that would have strong intrastate representation
that could be used to sway national policy debates. It remained to be seen, however, if
Ontarians would unite and whether they would use their strength to oppose or support policy
initiatives from other parts of the country.
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Chapter 3: ‘The Ishmael of Confederation’?, 1867-1872
“Under our present Constitution we are not divided sectionally… and so it will be under the
proposed Confederation… In claiming, then, that under it there will, on all questions, be a
majority against Upper Canada, is to assume that Upper Canada will be at war with all the
other provinces, and that they will be continually at war with it. Well, what right has any
man to assume that this will be the case – that Upper Canada will be the Ishmael of the
Confederation? I think he has none whatever.”1
Hope Fleming Mackenzie, Province of Canada, Confederation Debates, 6 March
1865, 677.

On 1 July 1867 Canadian Confederation became a reality. Only Ontarians, however,
widely celebrated the new country. Many were confident that their opinions would have
more weight than those from other provinces but was sharp disagreements persisted
concerning the use this influence. In the Biblical book of Genesis, Ishmael’s illegitimacy sets
him apart from Abraham’s family. An angel prophesized that Ishmael’s “hand will be
against everyone and everyone’s hand against him.”2 That Ontario might be similarly
alienated troubled many during the Confederation debates. Would Ontarians become the
disfavoured Members of Parliament? In 1865, Hope Mackenzie did not think so.
Brownite Liberals and a few Independent MPs such as Mackenzie Bowell expected
‘rep by pop’ to ensure that their province rarely need to accommodate the conflicting
demands of other parts of the country. They hoped that Ontario MPs would form a voting
bloc in parliament and therefore expected to exercise decisive influence during national
debates concerning the Intercolonial railway’s route, better financial terms for Nova Scotia,
the Red River resistance, and the entry of Manitoba and British Columbia into
Confederation. The belief that such alliances were plausible emboldened these Upper
Canadians to turn these policy questions into heated political debates that damaged national
unity. In each of these debates, Brownites and a few Independents knew that Ontario lacked
the absolute majority to dominate in the House of Commons, yet they sought to attract a
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handful of votes from the rest of Canada and rally Ontario’s MPs to nevertheless exert
decisive influence. The repeated failure of these agitators to secure their policies led many to
wonder whether their province was the abandoned child of Confederation. Despite these
setbacks they clung to the hope that Ontario could still impose its will upon national policy
debates. This continued faith in Ontario’s preponderant potential emboldened the agitators to
continue to boldly antagonise the rest of Canada and reject compromise policies.
Despite the Brownite Liberals’ focus on intrastate influence during the three years
preceding Confederation, preponderant federalisms unexpectedly contributed to a second set
of debates in Ontario provincial politics. Beginning with the 1867 national and provincial
elections, and following several failed attempts to rally Ontario MPs to oppose initiatives
from the rest of Canada, preponderant federalists urged Ontario’s MPPs to unite and impose
their will on other parts of the country. Provincial rights historians have misunderstood these
agitations. Bruce Hodgins concludes that Edward Blake was an “inconsistent” federalist
because he flip-flopped between upholding and ignoring the division of powers between the
dominion and provincial governments. Blake espoused provincial compact theory when
opposing better terms for Nova Scotia in 1869 but then tried to convince Ontario’s
Legislative Assembly to censure the Canadian government for its handling of the Red River
resistance in 1871 and 1872.3 Christopher Armstrong also alleges that there was a conflict
between Blake’s demands for “non-interference” in provincial affairs and his attempts to use
the Ontario Legislative Assembly to interfere with the dominion government’s policies.4 In
fact, Blake and other Liberals insisted that Ontario use its intrastate preponderance and
‘moral’ influence to prevent the Canadian government from setting precedents that
compromised their vision of Canada. These politicians and newspaper editorialists also
claimed that enforcing their perception of Ontarian interests was the only way to build
national unity. Exerting strong influence and safeguarding the provincial compact were
mutually reinforcing goals.
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Conservatives who followed the leadership of Macdonald, Sandfield and M.C.
Cameron have also been misunderstood. Centralists such as Creighton, Morrison, Gwyn, and
Morton, as well as provincial rights historians like Romney and Armstrong, focus on
Macdonald and write as if these Ontarians forsook their provincial political culture and
focused on national interests after 1867.5 This assertion is not accurate. Sandfield, M.C.
Cameron, as well as Macdonald, cautioned Ontarians against Brownite ‘sectionalism’ and the
danger of setting their province against the rest of Canada. If Ontario was immoderate, they
warned, it would alienate itself from the rest of Canada or even spur secession or dissolution
in other provinces. They also argued that Ontarians could facilitate greater interprovincial
harmony by refusing to unite against initiatives of other provinces or by using their
preponderant influence to secure compromises.
The willingness of Ontario MPPs to engage these national debates and discuss
Ontario’s potential influence demonstrates that preponderant federalisms amounted to more
than attempts to form parliamentary power blocs. Admittedly, the Conservatives often
denied that their province had a right to intervene, but their dismissals were accompanied by
warnings premised on Ontario’s ability to antagonize national unity by interfering in affairs
that did not concern its provincial legislature. Preponderant federalisms led Ontarians from
national and provincial politics to imagine that their province could exercise constitutional
and extra-constitutional influence in national debates. This common belief contributed to
Liberal attempts to rally against the rest of Canada, and Conservative attempts to discourage
such agitations.

The 1867 Elections
John A. Macdonald surprised the country by selecting John Sandfield Macdonald to
take his place as leader of the Coalition at Toronto and become Ontario’s first premier.
Sandfield was a moderate Reformer who had often challenged Macdonald’s rule in the past.
He also lacked an extensive Ontarian following and he had opposed Confederation during the
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1865 debates. Macdonald, however, selected Sandfield because he valued the Cornwall
MP’s desire for dominion-provincial harmony. Sandfield, the prime minister hoped, could
construct a moderate Conservative-Liberal coalition that would cooperate with a similar
coalition in Ottawa. Both men hoped that this alliance would keep Brownites from
controlling the provincial government in Toronto, or Parliament Hill in Ottawa.6
The concurrent Canadian and provincial election campaigns that ended in September
1867 established the political battle lines for the next five years.7 As J. Murray Beck argues,
the dominion election was hardly a national election: “it was, in fact, four separate elections,
each conducted in splendid isolation from the others, each taking its tone from the events
leading to Confederation in the particular provinces.”8 Ontarians did not debate the merits of
Confederation in either the national or provincial election campaigns but their different
perceptions of Ontario’s interests led them to favour different dominion-provincial and
intrastate relationships.
During the campaigns, Coalition candidates claimed that Canada could not yet afford
partisanship. Confederation righted old wrongs, such as Lower Canadian dominance in the
former Legislative Assembly. At a political meeting in West York, Sandfield argued that
those who tried to renew old interprovincial rivalries “were the enemies of the country,”
because such actions would only jeopardize Confederation.9 Macdonald went even further
by contending that prospective provinces were not interested in the Province of Canada’s old
partisan divisions, and that perpetuating these differences could hinder the expansion of the
dominion across British North America by compromising the appeal of Confederation in
Prince Edward Island or British Columbia.10 The campaigns of both the dominion and
provincial Coalitions, therefore, emphasized the need to give the new Confederation a “fair
trial” by allowing them to govern until new partisan divisions emerged.
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Coalition supporters also solicited electoral support by insisting that a strong
Confederation required Ontarian collaboration. The Toronto Leader explained that “Ontario,
in respect of population, is nearly one half of the dominion; and serious inconvenience would
arise if it were to come in collision with the General Government.”11 A week later, the
Leader elaborated:
Mr. Sandfield Macdonald has, in this combination, taken the best possible
precaution against Ontario being brought into collision with the Dominion. It
was of the utmost importance to this Province that this should be done; for if
Ontario had been arrayed against the rest of the Confederation, the other
Provinces would, in self-defence, have united against her. In that event, she
would have found herself in a minority, and more at the mercy of the other
three Provinces than Upper Canada was of Lower Canada.12
Ontario was large and important, and could sabotage Confederation if it did not support
Ottawa. Yet Ontario lacked the strength to dominate Confederation. Going it alone in
parliament would alienate their province from the rest of the Canada and limit their ability to
influence the cabinet. Cooperating with the other provinces was the best way to protect
Ontario’s interests. Coalitionists repeatedly emphasized these themes. Historian Bruce
Hodgins notes several occasions when Sandfield emphasized the importance of harmony
between Ontario and the dominion government or told Ontario’s voters that their province
had to “prevent Ontario from being politically isolated.13 In a public letter to Torontonians,
Robert Harrison, the Coalition MP for West Toronto, argued that the election of Brownite
Liberals to the House of Commons would encourage sectionalism in the Maritimes and
endanger the fragile new Confederation.14 The Belleville Intelligencer agreed.15 Ontarians
had to protect their country’s future by preventing their province’s influence from being
misappropriated and misused by Liberal sectionalists.
Brownite Liberals expected to sweep Ontario’s ridings in both elections and dominate
the provincial and dominion governments. They claimed that Sandfield’s dominionprovincial cooperation was a “patent combination” steeped in corruption and jurisdictional
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confusion that would undermine Ontario’s provincial autonomy and intrastate influence.16
The Globe opined that Quebec’s ability to “command” the country would only end if
Liberals won Ontario’s dominion and provincial ridings.17 On 24 July, the same newspaper
published an editorial expounding its vision of Ontario’s future dominance. Representation
by population guaranteed that “no great injustice can be done to a section like Ontario, which
has now nearly half of the whole representation, and will have more than half before many
years go by.” Should Ontario’s majority prove insufficient in the interim, the Globe believed
either Quebec’s English ridings, or Maritime representatives, would vote with Ontario MPs.
The main threat to Ontario’s intrastate influence was therefore Ontarian voters. The Globe
contended that “it is absolutely necessary, at the coming election to see that men are returned
who will not submit to French domination.”18 Only the election of Coalition representatives
could compromise Ontario’s preponderant influence and expose Ontario’s wealth to
predation by the rest of Canada.
When the campaigning ended, Ontario voters gave John A. Macdonald’s dominion
Coalition 52 seats (nearly two-thirds of the province’s ridings). Most of these were
Conservatives, but the tally also included Liberal-Coalitionists such as McDougall.
Sandfield’s majority is harder to determine, but it did not exceed ten seats. Like its national
counterpart, Sandfield’s government contained mainly Conservatives, but also included
Liberal-Coalitionists such as Edmund Wood19 The popular vote was much closer. John A.
Macdonald’s government, for example, won 63% of Ontario’s seats with only 51% of the
popular vote (see Appendix 2). These divisions demonstrate that Ontarians continued to
contest what type of preponderant federalism would inform their representatives’ actions.
Ontario also secured the largest number of cabinet ministers. The appointment of
Senators limited their willingness to protect regional interests by overruling the House of
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Commons. This inefficacy made the Canadian cabinet the next logical place for intrastate
representation. Macdonald only struck the regional balance of five Ontarians, four
Quebecers, and four Maritimers, after extensive dealing and “great difficulty.”20 The prime
minister, along with Alexander Campbell, became Ontario’s Conservative representatives.
Campbell, who articled and later became a partner in Macdonald’s Kingston law office
during the early 1840s, was a member of the Great Coalition. He attended the Charlottetown
and Quebec conferences, and joined the cabinet as Postmaster General and leader of the
government in the Senate. Despite his lifelong service as one of Macdonald’s Ontario
lieutenants, he also maintained a friendship with Mowat, who had also articled in
Macdonald’s law office.21 Three Liberal-Coalitionists from Ontario also joined the cabinet:
William McDougall became the Minister of Public Works, William Pearce Howland became
the Minister of Inland Revenue, and Fergusson Blair became the President of the Privy
Council.

The Intercolonial Railway Route
After the elections, Ontarians contested the route of the Intercolonial Railway (see
Figure 2). The Northshore route (which was also known by a variety of other names
including the “Robinson Route”) travelled furthest up the St. Lawrence and then down the
eastern side of New Brunswick before linking into existing rail lines at Truro and terminating
at Halifax. Peter Mitchell, a Senator for New Brunswick who was also Macdonald’s Minister
of Marine and Fisheries, was the root’s chief proponent in the cabinet. The Northshore route
had advantages and disadvantages. Critics pointed out that the line was among the longest
envisioned, and that the line’s higher construction and operating costs would reduce or
destroy its profitability. Sanford Fleming estimated it would cost approximately $20 million
to construct the route. The Imperial government, however, agreed to guarantee part of the
loan required to construct the Intercolonial at 4% instead of 6%, but this guarantee was
contingent on the railway’s defensibility from the United States in any potential future
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conflict.22 The British therefore favoured the Northshore route’s distance from the border,
and its Canadian advocates used this preference to justify their stance. The Northshore route
was also the least risky to construct because it was already extensively surveyed. Quebecers
preferred the Northshore route because they believed its extension through their province
would facilitate further settlement.23
Opponents of the Northshore route favoured a terminus at Saint John. A Central
route turned south much earlier, and travelled through the centre of New Brunswick. The
line could still be connected to Truro if desired, but the route would make Saint John the
closest ice-free port to Central Canada.24 Tilley was the Central route’s chief cabinet
advocate. It promised to be less expensive to construct because it was significantly shorter
and would utilize more existing or pre-planned lines. Tilley claimed his preferred line would
cost $10 or $12.5 million to construct. McDougall supported this route, as well as a Frontier
route that ran even closer to the international border and claimed that this latter option would
only cost $7.5 million to construct.25 Ontarians who were critical of the Northshore route
frequently repeated Fleming’s $20 million construction estimate to emphasize the savings of
alternative routes. McDougall’s supporters also believed that the shorter distance to Saint
John would make the line more competitive against existing American alternatives to ice-free
ports. Critics pointed out that the Central and Frontier routes were less surveyed than the
Northshore route. They also warned that the closer proximity of the Central and Frontier
routes to the American border would jeopardize the Imperial loan guarantee. McDougall
replied that the dominion would still be ahead if it forewent the Imperial guarantee, accepted
the higher interest rate of 6%, and built the cheaper route.26
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Figure 2: Proposed Routes for the Intercolonial Railway, 1868.27
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The debate would last a year-and-a-half and jarred the emergent preponderant
federalisms of many Ontarians. Many Ontarians, and especially Brownites, framed the debate
as an initial test of their province’s intrastate power. High expectations of their province’s
influence led them to try to reach across the country and impact the route of a railway that
did not run through their province. This sense of power contributed to their demands for a
parliamentary vote as well as their disappointment with their cabinet representatives. Without
this intransigence, the route debate would have been a small affair. New Brunswickers
would have still contested the railway’s route but Quebec’s influence would have ensured the
construction along the Northshore route. Ontario’s agitation against the route not only failed,
it sowed a spirit of discontent that contextualized their reactions to subsequent debates. The
Canadian government managed to prevent a parliamentary vote by asserting that the
Northshore route was the best for Canada. Few, Ontarians however, were willing to
advocate using their province’s intrastate influence to support the Northshore route. Instead,
they deflected blame by pointing to the constitution and Imperial influences.
As early as 16 December 1867, Antoine Dorion complained that the Canadian
parliament was shirking its “duty” by allowing the Imperial government to determine the
railway’s route. The Canadian government claimed that London insisted on making the final
selection before issuing its guarantee for the Canadian loan.28 Brownite Liberals supported
Dorion’s demand for a clear parliamentary vote, but a larger group of Ontario Coalitionists
voted against it, defeating Dorion’s amendment 83 to 35.29 Behind closed doors, however,
the Canadian cabinet debated the best route to satisfy the Imperial government’s
requirements. According to historian Gene Allen, the question was divisive. Mitchell, along
with Edward Kenny and A.G. Archibald from Nova Scotia, as well as Cartier, Hector-Louis
Langevin, and Jean-Charles Chapais, all supported the Northern route.30 Sir Leonard Tilley,
John Rose of Quebec, in addition to Howland, Campbell, and McDougall, favoured Central
or Frontier routes. Macdonald avoided committing to either course.31 During the cabinet
discussions, McDougall fought to turn the cabinet away from the Northshore route but was
28
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ultimately unsuccessful. Instead, Macdonald used the alleged Imperial preference to
leverage the Northshore route and secure the loan guarantee by May 1868.32 The debate
ended on 17 May 1869 when Alexander Mackenzie proposed resolutions expressing the
desirability of ceasing current construction, and the shortening of the planned route to
Halifax. After considerable discussion Richard Cartwright, the Conservative MP for Lennox,
proposed an amendment denouncing any discussion of the Intercolonial route. Although a
small handful of Liberals defected, most Ontarians voted with their party. Cartwright’s
amendment passed 114 to 28.33
During this year-and-a-half long route debate, Brownites were frustrated by the lack
of a clear parliamentary vote regarding the Intercolonial’s route. The Globe argued that
Macdonald avoided a vote because he knew that if it were held in parliament where “Ontario
has almost a controlling voice, not one in ten of their political friends would sustain it.”35
Edward Blake expressed similar frustration when he called Cartwright’s 1869 amendment
“an ingenious attempt to evade the responsibility of the members of this house, and to save
them from voting either approval or disapproval of the Northern route.”36 Blake was a young
and wealthy Toronto layer who had spent the last decade becoming a leading Reformer.
Elected to both the provincial and dominion legislatures in 1867, he was an ambitious leader
in the Reform caucus who was not above using Ontarian prejudices to promote himself or his
party. Even William McDougall was dissatisfied. In one of several letters to Macdonald
expressing frustration about Ontario’s lack of influence, McDougall asked the prime minister
“to make the route an open question and leave to it Parliament” to determine the route.37
Brownites also expressed frustration with the inability of Ontario cabinet ministers to
influence the government’s decision. In April 1868 the Globe argued that these men were
powerless to stop the government from selecting the Northshore route. “Sir John will yield to
Mr. Cartier, as he has so often done before” and the editorialist doubted that even the
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resignations of Howland and McDougall would change government policy.38 Mackenzie
believed that McDougall and his Ontario peers would also “yield” to Cartier’s preference in
the cabinet.39 David Mills, the Liberal MP for Bothwell, began to privately consider
provincial cabinet representation to be a “pernicious principle.”40
McDougall was, in fact, deeply disturbed by the inability of Ontario’s cabinet
ministers to influence policy. He believed that they had a duty to represent Ontario’s
“material interests,” and bitterly complained to Macdonald that Howland’s illness and Blair’s
death diminished their province’s influence in the cabinet to a point that he described as
“quasi-constitutional.” In order to prevent the “sectional policy” of Quebec and Nova Scotia
from succeeding, McDougall urged Macdonald to “at once” fill Blair’s empty cabinet seat.41
Despite his public appeals for Ontario to use its influence to support compromise at the 1867
Reform convention, McDougall still privately hoped that Ontario could overcome the
influence of the rest of Canada’s cabinet representatives.
Ontario Coalition MPs were not the only individuals Brownites blamed for the
selection of the Northshore route. In a letter to Charles Clarke, George Brown believed that
the constitutional guarantee of ‘rep by pop’ had forever freed Ontario from Quebec’s
influence and it was therefore
no fault of mine or those who like you so long fought for this constitutional
change - that rascalities [sic] still go on in high quarters and a bad Railway
policy is being proposed. No constitution that the wit of man could suggest,
can make men pure and wise. Our new constitution did all it could - it placed
the power over public affairs fully and fairly in the hands of the electors
[Ontarians] - and if the electors chose to send back to power men who had
abused their confidence in past years, they could expect nothing else than the
scemers [sic] we now [illegible] at Ottawa.42
Ontarian voters had failed to exercise their birthright by electing office-seeking officials who
used their power to serve their own interests, rather than their province’s.

38

Globe, 7 April 1868.
Mackenzie to Brown, 16 March 1868, LAC, MG24, B40, Vol 8. See also: Advertiser, 18 April 1869.
40
David Mills, Daily Journal, 13 April 1868, UWO, David Mills Papers, B4285, File 244.
41
McDougall to JAM, 20 February 1868, LAC, MG26-A, Vol 230.
42
Brown to Charles Clarke, 31 October 1868, AO, F 26. See also: Globe, 12 September 1868.
39

134

Representation by population, however, was not the only reason Ontario was entitled
to influence the Intercolonial’s route. While these preponderant federalists recognized the
dominion’s constitutional obligation to build the railway, the fact that their province would
pay the highest portion of the costs and would receive no benefit other than an alternative
(and likely more expensive) route to an ice-free port, led them to resent the higher costs of
the Northshore route. In his letters, McDougall asked Macdonald to let the “representatives
of the taxpayers” determine the route.43 The Globe claimed that Ontarians would gladly bear
the cost of building a railway that would contribute to the growth of a political and economic
“nationality,” but it insisted that the province’s large financial contribution gave it “the right
of saying that it should be built along the shortest route and in the cheapest matter.”44 While
speaking at Bowmanville, Blake also contended that it was unfair to ask
the people of Ontario who contribute five-ninths of the receipts of the
Dominion, - who pay largely in excess of their proportion according to
population, and who are willing to pay their proportion of the fair cost of the
work on the most economical, commercial route - … to pay twice as much as
the first cost of such a line and a large annual sum in addition for working
expenses.45
Ontario’s immense financial contributions, Blake concluded, gave it “a right to say whether
the longest and most expensive route, or the shorter one, should be chosen.”46 Although their
lobbying ultimately failed, these Ontarians demanded influence in return for their taxation.
At this early stage in the post-Confederation development of preponderant
federalisms, those who tried to use Ontario’s influence to thwart initiatives from other parts
of Canada rarely felt the need to solicit support from outside of Ontario. On 15 March 1869,
for example, the Toronto Globe contended that Ontario’s preponderant representation in the
House of Commons left the province “the responsibility of introducing better administration
into the affairs of the Dominion. When she undertakes that work in earnest, she will not lack
assistants in any of the other Provinces.”47 But such statements were exceptional and
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assumed that the rest of Canada’s interests aligned with Ontario’s. Confederation was still
too new for these Ontarians to recognize that they could not reliably control dominion policy
with their votes. They did not yet understand that securing their assessment of Ontario’s
interests required support from the other provinces.
The majority of Ontario Conservative MPs followed their leader. Macdonald
reminded Ontarians that the Canadian government had to consider the interests of the entire
country when determining the Intercolonial’s route. During the debate on Dorion’s
amendment, he insisted that “the government had no interest in selecting the line except that
it should be for the benefit of the whole country” and that “the consequence of the question
of a route being referred back to Parliament, would simply be to make this House the arena
for fighting the battle between the local and conflicting interests of the two sections of New
Brunswick.” 48 In March 1868 Macdonald repeated his contention that it was the duty of the
cabinet, rather than parliament, to weigh “the great diversity of local interest.”49
Other government supporters concurred by noting the dominion’s constitutional
obligation to construct the Intercolonial and often alleged that their opponents wanted to
renege on this commitment. The Leader mockingly recalled Brown’s willingness during his
tenure in the Great Coalition for the dominion to construct six Intercolonial lines, and
compared it with the Globe’s post-Confederation opposition to the Northshore route.50 In his
speech in Bowmanville, Blake commented on the Northshore route’s questionable
profitability by arguing that: “when we have built the track, erected the bridges, and laid the
rails, the cheapest plan for us to pursue would be to tear them up again, sell the iron and burn
the bridges.”51 The Leader considered this statement “tantamount to a condemnation of” any
Intercolonial route and a violation of the constitution that endangered national unity.52 Even
the Globe, which agreed that Blake’s suggestion would save money in the long run, admitted
that such a course was unthinkable given the dominion’s constitutional obligations to
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construct the railway.53 By citing these examples, Conservatives avoided the route question
and claimed that they were the only representatives willing to fulfill Ontario’s constitutional
obligations to support the construction of an Intercolonial railway.
Yet Macdonald’s supporters struggled to link the Northshore route to Ontario’s
interests. James Beaty, who still owned the Leader and represented the riding of Toronto
East in Ottawa, reminded his fellow parliamentarians that “Confederation would never be
fully completed until” the dominion government satisfied the desires for the Intercolonial and
the “annexation of the North-West territory.”54 By reminding parliament that the Quebec
conference tied these two projects together, Beaty linked the construction of the Intercolonial
to Ontarian interests. He did not, however, explain why the Northshore route was in
Ontario’s interests. Others mentioned the defensive benefits of the route.55 The Leader
claimed that the selection of the Northshore route would satiate Nova Scotian concerns and
strengthen Canadian unity. The editorial left the reader to assume that a stronger Canada was
automatically worth the additional expense to Ontarian taxpayers.56 Robert Harrison, the
Conservative MP for West Toronto, came closest to linking the Northshore route, nationbuilding, and Ontario’s preponderant influence. “As one of the representatives of Ontario,”
Harrison:
felt bound to state his reasons for the vote he was about to give. It had been
said that the great mass of the people of Ontario were opposed to this
work…None of the [proposed] routes had any advocates on the ground that
they would pay. There were other considerations which rendered this road
necessary. It was a great political necessity, being absolutely needed for the
transport of troops and munitions of war through the Provinces. Again, it was
a great commercial necessity, for it would form a main link of that great line
of connection between ocean and ocean which would one day draw across
British territory the rich merchandize of India and China. Apart from these
considerations, however, the road was a necessity arising from Confederation,
was provided for in the Act of Union and could not be repudiated.57
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What was good for Canada was good for Ontario. The line’s existence, rather than its route,
was Ontario’s paramount interest. All Ontarians desiring a strong and prosperous country
needed to support the dominion government’s route.
Despite their firm stand, however, many Ontario Coalitionists remained
uncomfortable with their choice. Macdonald had considerable difficulty defending his
conduct as an Ontarian representative. During the parliamentary debate in May 1869,
Mackenzie mocked the prime minister for being “one of the famous minority” in his own
cabinet on the Intercolonial route question. Mackenzie went on to doubt that Macdonald had
“the interest of his own Province at heart.” To these allegations, Macdonald only replied: “I
did not say that I had not the interest of Ontario at heart.”58 Other Ontarian MPs sometimes
treated the Intercolonial as a poison pill that their province had to swallow in order to gain
the benefits of Confederation. Francis Jones, the Conservative MP for Leeds North and
Grenville North, admitted that Ontario would pay for “one half” of the costs “without
deriving any advantage, directly or indirectly, from the construction of the road” but, like
other supporters, he emphasized Ontario’s constitutional duty to contribute to the costs so
long as Nova Scotia remained a part of Confederation.59 Others expressed their doubts in
private. Sandfield communicated his concerns about the unfairness of the Northshore route to
Ontario in a strongly worded letter to Macdonald, but remained silent during the
parliamentary debates despite holding seats in both the provincial and dominion legislatures
and being the premier of Ontario.60
Gene Allen insists that the Imperial government would have accepted a Central route
if the Canadian government proposed one, but Macdonald supporters also alleged that the
Imperial preference for the Northshore route tied their hands and thereby absolved
themselves from responsibility for selecting the Northshore option. Harrison, for example,
claimed that “without the Imperial guarantee they could not undertake the construction of
this line.”61 The Leader agreed.
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Holding no unimportant part in the Imperial policy as to Confederation, the
Imperial Government guaranteed the loan necessity to its construction. The
least we could do was to allow that Government to control the route which the
railroad should take. As the railroad must be built, and the guarantee for the
loan – obtained thereby under the most favourable circumstances – was had
ungrudgingly, it is sheer folly to say that we are paying too dear for our
whistle.62
By discussing the route within the context of Imperial preferences, provincial interests
(including Ontario’s) seemed petty. By placing agency for unpopular decisions elsewhere,
Ontario Conservatives tried to evade responsibility for the route and preserve their
constituents’ support.
From the outset of Confederation, Ontarians believed that their province had the right
to play a preponderant role in the formulation of the national government’s policies. Yet
Ontarians did not agree on how their province’s influence should be used. Brownite
Reformers and McDougall claimed that their province’s population and taxation entitled it to
veto the route of a major dominion public work that lay completely outside of Ontario’s
borders. By opposing this route and expecting the rest of Canada to listen to their demands,
these agitators elevated the Intercolonial route question to a major national debate that pitted
their province against politicians from all of the other provinces. The inability of Brownites
to prevent the construction of the Northshore route inspired some Ontarians to resent the
Maritimes and the Intercolonial’s dispute remained a Liberal rallying cry for years to come.
Ontario Coalition supporters, and especially Conservatives, countered the agitation by
claiming that they had to support the Northshore route. They insisted that Canadian and
Ontarian interests required the longer and more expensive route but struggled to explain this
claim. This difficulty partly spurred from the disbelief of many government supporters.
Although many Ontarians hinted at the need for their province’s support only a few, like
Harrison, were bold enough to openly court Ontarian support for the unpopular measure. It
was easier for government supporters to blame the constitution and the Imperial government
for the route. Had the Intercolonial been an isolated event, these exchanges could be
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discarded as political sabre rattling, but it was only the first of several national debates to be
complicated by preponderant federalisms from Ontario.

Nova Scotia’s Better Terms
Nova Scotia did not enter Confederation willingly and its citizens overwhelmingly
elected anti-Confederates to the House of Commons in 1867. From the outset it was clear
that Nova Scotian dissatisfaction would become a national concern. The province’s strongest
grievance, according to James Maxwell, was its financial situation. Confederation stripped
Nova Scotia of over 90% of its taxing powers but only relieved the provincial government of
just over half of its expenditures. Because Nova Scotia lacked municipal taxation, the
provincial government was financially strapped. Its government was also hard pressed
because it constructed some railways before Confederation in anticipation of the
Intercolonial. When the dominion appropriated these lines for the Intercolonial, it did not
compensate the provincial government for the associated debt.63
Nova Scotians aired their concerns at the openings of the first two sessions of the
dominion parliament. Ontarians tended to dismiss their complaints. Ebenezer Bodwell (the
Liberal MP for Oxford South) described the BNA Act’s financial arrangement for the
Maritimes as generous compared to Ontario and Quebec, and urged Nova Scotians to give
Confederation the same “fair and impartial trial” it was receiving in the rest of Canada.64
The Belleville Intelligencer believed Nova Scotia’s grievances were “imaginary,” that Nova
Scotia had “obtained all they asked for” in the BNA Act, and that it would therefore be in the
best interests of Nova Scotia and “the country as a whole” if its representatives focused on
working within the existing constitutional arrangement. Despite this stand, the editor ended
his opinion piece by vaguely anticipating that “any defects” could be “remedied by future
legislation.”65 A year later the Toronto Leader admitted that strict comparisons between
Ontario and Nova Scotia were unfair because the Maritime province lacked the municipal tax
system that contributed to the Ontario government’s balanced budgets. Yet even as
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Macdonald prepared to begin negotiations with Joseph Howe, the Leader argued that
increasing Nova Scotia’s subsidy would be unfair to the rest of the provinces, and especially
unfair to Ontario.66
Few Ontarians discussed the Nova Scotian problem until Macdonald and Howe
reached an agreement in January 1869. Howe would join the dominion cabinet, and as
Donald Creighton describes, Nova Scotia would “be put on a financial equality with New
Brunswick.”67 Both Macdonald and Minister of Finance John Rose worried about the
possibility of the Nova Scotia agreement triggering a series of domino claims from other
provinces. Macdonald also worried about the unpopularity of the agreement in Ontario.68
Rose therefore tried to make it appear that the bill was a “rectification of an original
mistake.”69 On 11 June 1869 Rose proposed Nova Scotia’s better terms, including an
additional $82,689 annual subsidy for a period of ten years. The dominion also raised Nova
Scotia’s debt allowance by $1,188,756. Rose claimed that the dominion government
accepted these changes to bring Nova Scotia into line with existing arrangements with New
Brunswick.70
As Robert Vipond and Richard Gwyn note, Blake opposed Rose’s assertion of the
Canadian government’s spending power by presenting an amendment and espousing the first
coherent and sustained expression of provincial compact theory. Confederation, he asserted
was a partnership. On July 1 1867, each province surrendered some of its powers to the
dominion government in return for certain guarantees enshrined in the constitution. The
BNA Act outlined the financial terms of union and the dominion government did not have
the power to deviate from these allotments. Only the Imperial parliament had that power and
even it could not act until all of the provincial Assemblies and the dominion government
consented to the change. He admitted that Ontario had a special interest in the question
because it would contribute approximately five-ninths, or roughly $1.1 of the $2 million
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increase promised by Rose. Blake feared that violating the provincial compact would open
the “flood gates” of requests from other provinces for more concessions at Ontario’s
expense.71
Blake’s attempts to combat Nova Scotia’s better terms during the next year stemmed
from more than provincial compact theory. Historians overlook how many Ontarians
supported Blake’s contention that Ontarians could unite and successfully challenge the
government’s policy. These same scholars also overlook how Blake’s repeated failure to
summon Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance led him to cling to provincial compact
theory in November 1869. Research on the responses of Ontario Coalitionists, and especially
Conservatives, to these debates is even more limited. Most historians either ignore the
responses of Ontario Coalitionists to the Liberal attacks, or limit their discussion to
Macdonald’s replies.72 Swainson claims that Ontario Coalitionists “acquiesced” to the
dominion government’s attempts to “prevent the preponderance of Ontario” during the
debate.73 Far from adopting a passive role, Coalition supporters from Ontario regularly
appealed to the sense of power and entitlement in Ontario to influence national debates when
combatting Blake and his followers. Although many rejected the Assembly’s right to
intervene, they acknowledged Ontario’s preponderant potential and they also tried to refocus
this belief in Ontario’s ability and right to preponderate behind the dominion government’s
better terms deal.
Many Ontarians who opposed better terms advised the rest of Canada to respect the
provincial compact because it was their only protection against Ontario’s parliamentary
preponderance. The passage of Nova Scotia’s better terms, they warned, would set a
precedent allowing parliamentary majorities to rewrite the financial terms of union. Blake
claimed that Ontario would be free to use its parliamentary preponderance to secure better
terms:
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How long would it be till the other Provinces brought forward their cases of
injustice and necessities. Where will those demands cease? When will the
flood gates now opened be closed again? Never. Have not we in Ontario a
right to assert, and by our votes establish, that injustice has been done us?
Have not the representatives of each Province a right to say to the
Dominion—‘You departed from the provisions of the Quebec Conference in
an unjust measure, and in an unjust principle you gave a subsidy to one of the
Provinces not in proportion to its population— hence we claim a
reconsideration in our favour?’ He was not aware that any representative of
Ontario ever uttered a word of complaint in reference to any injustice felt. For
his part, he had been careful to avoid suggesting anything of the kind.74
If Ontario MPs united, the rest of Canada would not be able to stop them. The Globe agreed.
It warned that if parliament continued to rob Ontario of additional taxes, Nova Scotia would
“not be the only Province clamouring for repeal.”75 Ontario did not even have to raise its
subsidies to benefit from this preponderant power. The province’s large contributions to
dominion coffers made reducing provincial subsidies and grants just as attractive. Joseph
Rymal, the Liberal MP for Wentworth South, suggested that granting better terms to Nova
Scotia would set a precedent that would “re-open” the terms of union and “he believed
Ontario, which furnished most of the funds, would not be so favourable to Confederation as
she had been.”76 The rest of Canada, in short, could not afford to provoke Canada’s largest
province. They required Ontario’s financial support. Altering the terms of union via
parliamentary majorities would only embolden Ontarians to use their parliamentary
preponderance to improve their own financial position at the expense of the rest of Canada.
Each speaker recognized that such decisive action by Ontario would destabilize
Confederation and therefore warned that national unity necessitated respect for the provincial
compact. Majority rule on the financial terms of union, they concluded, suited Ontario, but
harmed national unity.
Macdonald and his supporters insisted that better terms were critical to national unity.
Richard Gwyn describes Macdonald’s response to Blake’s provincial compact claims as
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“muddled;” a better description of his reaction throughout 1869 would be evasive.77 The
prime minister avoided confronting Blake’s jurisdictional query and instead asserted that
national unity necessitated the dominion government’s decision. The “annexationists of
Nova Scotia” had to be discredited and Newfoundland still had to be wooed into
Confederation. Opposing better terms constituted a “blow to the union.”78 Frank Killam, the
Liberal MP for Yarmouth, affirmed the prime minister’s stand. He expressed surprise at the
“parsimony exhibited by the members for Ontario in this debate” and regretted their
willingness to deny his province “what was necessary to carry on her local services.”79
Ontario Conservatives also vaguely asserted the government’s jurisdiction. Without
elaborating, John Hillyard Cameron (who was now the Conservative MP for Peel) contended
that “there was no question of constitutionality or unconstitutionality;” the Canadian
government had the right to spend and share its revenues however it wished.80 The Toronto
Leader was more specific. Ottawa possessed the jurisdiction to change the financial
arrangements between the dominion and the provinces because it was tasked with the “peace,
order and good government” of the entire country.81
Conservative MPs, however, did not specifically urge Ontarians to use their
parliamentary preponderance to support the bill. Macdonald avoided discussing Ontario’s
influence by appealing for all of Canada to support the deal. “Those who were in favour of
Confederation,” he charged, “would vote against the amendment.” Those who opposed better
terms were “an enemy to Confederation.”82 Pro-government newspapers, including the
Leader and the Canadian Freeman, also avoided discussing Ontario’s role while contending
that the “true friends of the Union” favoured better terms.83 The unwillingness to rally
Ontarian influence behind the bill during the debate probably arose from the knowledge that
most Ontario MPs would not support the government. At the end of the debate only one
Ontario Liberal supported the government but one third of Conservative MPs, including
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Robert Harrison and Mackenzie Bowell, supported Blake. Despite these defections, Blake
lost the vote of 57 to 96.84
Discontentment in Ontario, however, continued. Immediately after the conclusion of
the parliamentary debate Conservative supporters addressed the sense of entitlement in
Ontario to influence the debate. On 15 June, the Leader claimed that it was Ontario’s duty to
assist the cash strapped province. The Nova Scotian government required better terms
because its “position in the Union was not as advantageous as it was out of it.” Ontario, it
pointed out was “in no need of money,” and because Nova Scotia’s position in the
Confederation was “less favourable,” the Leader implied that Ontario could easily afford
Nova Scotia’s better terms.85 A few weeks later, the Conservative organ explicitly appealed
for Ontarian support. “There is not a thoughtful man in Ontario,” it asserted, “who does not
at heart feel that if the government had not done something to conciliate the people of Nova
Scotia the consequences would have been of a most serious character.”86
As historians such as Joseph Schull, Christopher Armstrong, Peter Baskerville, and
J.C. Morrison note, Blake resumed his provincial compact crusade by proposing thirteen
resolutions protesting the better terms when Ontario’s Legislative Assembly met in
November. The first twelve resolutions emphasized the generosity of Ontarian taxpayers to
the rest of Canada under the terms of union, acknowledged the validity of provincial compact
theory, reaffirmed the finality of the financial terms as defined in the BNA Act, and
requested the Imperial government to disallow the dominion’s legislation. The thirteenth
resolution stated that it was in “the interests of the country” that legislation be passed barring
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the Canadian parliament from further deviating from the financial terms of union.87 In a
speech full of rhetorical excess, Blake revisited the same themes he explored in June.
Because Ontario paid five-ninths of the dominion’s expenditures, Blake feared that better
terms for Nova Scotia would lead the other provinces to “show a most calf-like appetite for
the milking of this one most magnificent cow [Ontario].”88 If the dominion government did
not adhere to this provincial compact then every province would try to secure better terms.
Subsidies secured one day could be eliminated the next day by a simple majority vote.
National unity necessitated stable financial terms of union.89
These scholars do not, however, explore the way preponderant federalisms informed
the Assembly’s debate. Liberals, who championed ‘rep by pop’ in the decades preceding
Confederation, now suffered a crisis of faith. Their failures to determine the Intercolonial’s
route and prevent the passage of better terms for Nova Scotia demonstrated that Ontarians
could not expect their preponderance in the House of Commons to protect them from other
provinces’ influence. This new fear led them to rely much more heavily on provincial
compact theory. The week before the Assembly’s debate, the Advertiser admitted that “the
Ontario Members may not be able to rescind the Nova Scotia subsidy, but it is their duty to
make an emphatic protest against the partial and dangerous principle.”90 When proposing his
resolutions in the Assembly, Blake was even more despondent about Ontario’s influence:
The argument has been stated that representation by population exists… that
we have a strong representation there, and that that ought to suffice us... It is
bad logic… to say that that is a remedy – that that is a sufficient protection,
which is the very instance… we are discussing has proven to be utterly
insufficient; but, sir, all the Provinces stand upon an equal footing. It is said
that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are on just the same footing as Ontario,
in a constitutional point of view. If Ontario has, under this view, a fair
representation, what is to be said of New Brunswick or Nova Scotia,
represented by only fifteen or eighteen in a House compromised of about 200
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members. (Hear.) Was it possible that the rights of these districts would be of
avail within such a house that they had any security?91
Partisanship prevented Ontario from using its parliamentary preponderance to secure its
interests. Coalition MPs, Blake concluded, chose power over provincial loyalties. When he
appealed to the Assembly to support his resolutions, Blake maintained that every provincial
legislature had the right to petition against violations of the compact. Ontario’s concern
about paying for further better terms underlay this appeal, but Blake avoided describing any
unique Ontarian right to protest the dispute. Ontario, under this description, was a province
like the others. Additional speakers wondered whether eighty-two parliamentary seats was an
adequate guarantee of their province’s preponderance and even feared the collective
intrastate power of the rest of Canada. James Boyd, who was the Liberal MPP for Prescott,
accepted the constitutionality of Nova Scotia’s better terms. Yet after noting that Ontario was
in the “minority” in the House of Commons, he had the audacity to ask whether “a majority
[should] rule merely because it was a majority?”92 Provincial compact theory, rather than
Ontario’s intrastate influence, seemed to be the only way to protect Ontarian taxpayers from
the demands of the rest of Canada.
Despite this rhetorical retreat, provincial Conservatives recognized that Blake’s
resolutions constituted an attempt to use the legislature of Canada’s largest province to
denounce better terms for Nova Scotia. Many Conservative MPPs echoed the prime minister
by defending the dominion government’s spending power and framing better terms as a
national unity measure. Matthew Crooks Cameron, who would assume leadership of the
provincial Conservatives in December 1871 due to Sandfield’s declining health, led the
provincial government’s response to Blake’s resolutions. Cameron argued that the Canadian
government had the right to “to resist any one part of the Dominion for the benefit of the
whole.” Expending two million dollars to quell Nova Scotian discontent was “to the
advantage of the country… and this House was not doing right when they attempted to excite
discontent again.”93 Frederick Cumberland, the Conservative MPP for Algoma, insisted that
commenting on the Nova Scotian deal was contrary to the provincial Assembly’s interests.
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By “meddling with matters beyond their control” Blake and his supporters “opened the door
for an invasion of our rights by the Legislature which we defy.” He admitted that every
legislature had the right to petition other governments on matters beyond its jurisdiction but
he “objected to always using and abusing it,” and advised the Assembly to reserve this
privilege for “great occasions.” Better terms for Nova Scotia was a “cheap” way to cement
the union.94
Coalition MPPs also acknowledged Ontario’s potential preponderant influence and
warned against spurning better terms. Cameron admitted that if the dominion could change
its financial arrangements with Nova Scotia, it could also alter its arrangements with other
provinces such as Quebec. But he believed that the members of the House of Commons
would not support further concessions, and concluded by repeating Rose’s contention that the
Nova Scotian case was unusual and required rectification. Granting better terms to Nova
Scotia, he concluded, would not expose Ontario to additional taxation for the benefit of other
provinces. Cameron asked the representatives of both parties to “do their duty” and “bend
their energies to the advancement of the peace and prosperity of the whole Dominion, of each
and every portion of it” by defeating Blake’s resolutions. The Ontarian Assembly, in short,
could foster national unity by refusing to interfere in affairs that were not the Assembly’s
concern.95
Edmund Wood, whose loud voice and outspokenness earned him the nickname “Big
Thunder,” went even further. Wood served as both Liberal MP and the Liberal-Coalition
MPP for Brant South. He was also Sandfield’s Minister of Finance. Despite his opposition to
the better terms arrangement in June, he appealed to Ontarians to support national unity
during the Legislative Assembly’s November debate. Supporting Blake’s resolutions, he
warned, would “give such vast strength and power to the opponents of Confederation in
Nova Scotia.” Wood predicted that the Assembly’s passage of the resolutions “would array
the whole of the lower Provinces against Ontario.” Instead of begrudging the additional
expense of the better terms for Ontario, he suggested that his province imitate Great Britain.
The Imperial government, he contended, “did not go about computing how much money she
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spent on the different parts of the empire. Her aim had been to build up and consolidate a
great and noble empire.” Ontario, like the Imperial government, needed to support policies
that fostered unity. Fighting against the rest of Canada did not serve Ontario’s interests
Mcneil Clarke, the Conservative MPP for Grenville South agreed:
If this Legislature set itself up as a Court of Appeal against the Government at
Ottawa they would place themselves in a position of antagonism to the Central
Government, to the Imperial Government, and to the people of Nova Scotia.
If they set themselves in such a position towards the Central Government, the
victory must lie either way. And in whichever way the victory lay, either the
prestige of the Central Government or that of the Provincial Government
would be lessened and degraded. Both of these results should be carefully
avoided.96
Coalitionists ruled out opposing parliament. Ontario could not secure its interests by
alienating itself from the rest of Canada. They nevertheless asserted Ontario’s uniqueness.
By comparing Ontario to Great Britain, and encouraging MPPs to foster national unity by
supporting the dominion government, Coalitionists acknowledged the sense of power and
entitlement in Ontario to influence national politics but questioned its limits and urged
Ontarians to desist from alienating themselves from the rest of Canada.
These tactics reduced the willingness of Ontario MPPs to protest against better terms
for Nova Scotia but they did not entirely overcome impulse. Sandfield’s government
defeated the first eleven resolutions by a vote of 42 to 35. Blake withdrew the twelfth
resolution requesting Imperial disallowance. His thirteenth resolution, however, was less
aggressive than the rest and was therefore more popular. Rather than suffer a mass defection,
the government supported this final resolution. It passed by a vote of 64 to 12. This
concession, as Bruce Hodgins notes, embarrassed Sandfield’s government.97 There was no
escaping the fact that the representatives of Canada’s most populous province
overwhelmingly supported the passage of legislation debarring the dominion government
from passing further better terms.
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Blake almost immediately tried to capitalize on this victory. On 1 December 1869 in
the Ontario Legislative Assembly, and on 30 March 1870 in the House of Commons, he
motioned for an address to be sent to the Imperial government requesting it to debar the
dominion government from further altering the financial terms of Confederation by
amending the BNA Act. When defending his resolution in the Assembly, Blake again
contended that the provincial legislature did not require constitutional jurisdiction to impact
the dominion government’s policy. Ontario’s sheer size entitled it to influence. He urged
Ontario’s provincial representatives to use “the moral effect of the passage of this address” to
the Imperial government, to combat the better terms precedent.98
When making these assertions in both legislatures, Blake denied that he and his
supporters were appealing to sectionalism. Blake warned against giving parliamentary
majorities the power to alter the financial terms of Confederation. Doing so would not only
set a dangerous precedent that endangered provincial interests, including those of Ontario, it
would also lead to continuous discontent and possibly even dissolution.99 The dominion
government should heed Ontario’s demands, and not set a precedent that jeopardized
Canadian unity. What was good for Ontario was good for the country. When replying to his
critics in the Ontario Legislative Assembly, Blake asked:
…what part of Canada was Ontario? Was it not the largest Province of the
Union? and [sic] were not the interests of Canada almost in a literal sense our
own? If the interests of the two could conflict, he knew of no case in which
the Dominion could injure Ontario without injuring the whole Dominion; or
Ontario damage the Dominion without damaging itself. Their interests were
interwoven.101
By defending Ontario’s interests Blake claimed that he was, by definition, also considering
the country’s needs. Federalism and national unity would only grow if the dominion
government abided by the constitution. Despite being shaken, Blake and his followers
believed in their province’s preponderant influence. Although Nova Scotians understandably
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disagreed, these Ontarians insisted that they were fulfilling their moral responsibility to
Canada by trying to use their province’s preponderant influence to oppose better terms.
Once again, Coalition MPPs responded to Blake’s attack on the dominion
government’s spending powers by warning against overestimating Ontario’s influence.
Sandfield believed that the Imperial government would not act on the Address, and warned
that “the people of Ontario, who knew they were the greatest power in the Dominion, and
who had a larger measure of interest than the other Provinces would feel injured.”
Disappointing Ontarians would harm their infant nationalism. The premier intimated that
this discontentment would lead Ontarians away from accepting future dominion government
policies. Abram Lauder (the Conservative MPP for Grey South) agreed. He claimed that it
was the “duty” of the provincial Assembly’s MPPs “to work as harmoniously as they could”
with the dominion government because Ontario was “the most powerful of the Provinces.”
The passage of Blake’s resolution by the Ontario Assembly, he worried, would have a
“disquieting effect” in the rest of Canada.102 The popularity of Blake’s motion, however, won
over many converts. Only 12 MPPs opposed his resolution. Sandfield was canny enough to
be absent when the vote was called. Lauder even supported Blake’s resolution.103
Blake had less success in the House of Commons. He repeated his appeals for panOntarian support and noted that sixty-four MPPs from “the most important Province”
supported his thirteenth November 1869 resolution. It was “the bounden duty” of those who
hail from Ontario,” he declared, “to assert what they believed to be right and just towards
their Province.”104 When responding to Blake’s motion, Macdonald and his government did
not urge Ontarians to unite against the Liberal leader and support national unity. Instead, the
prime minister stuck to reasserting the Canadian government’s right to spend as it chose and
moved an amendment asserting this position.105 Parliament passed Macdonald’s amendment
by a vote of 87 to 60. All but one Ontario Liberal voted against the government. Six Ontario
Conservative MPs, including Bowell, supported Blake. Nova Scotia’s better terms were
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unpopular in Ontario, but this dissent was not strong enough to overcome partisan obligations
and fuel a successful campaign against the measure in parliament.106
Only a month after the conclusion of the Intercolonial route debate, the desire to
dictate the Canadian government’s policies again turned a relatively inexpensive financial
concessions into a heated and prolonged debate that demonstrated the willingness of many
Ontarians to rally against the rest of Canada. Ontario’s ability to influence national policy,
however, was not beyond doubt. The timing of Blake’s famous November 1869 provincial
compact speech was no coincidence. After failing to secure their visions for the Intercolonial
railway and the financial terms of union, Blake and other Liberal supporters suffered a crisis
of faith. Ontarians, it seemed, could not rely on ‘rep by pop’ to prevent the rest of Canada
from using their tax dollars to fund projects that they opposed. In this context provincial
compact theory, an idea that afforded Ontario no special status, became ascendant. Still, the
belief that Ontario could decisively impact national debates persisted; hope continued to
embolden Blake and his province’s supporters to oppose better terms in 1869 and 1870.
Coalition supporters from Ontario were not the passive politicians that the ‘patent
combination’s’ detractors often alleged. They provided uniquely Ontarian rationales for
supporting better terms for Nova Scotia. Even when deferring to the dominion government’s
jurisdiction they regularly described their province’s unique ability to compromise or solidify
national unity. Nationalism did not subsume provincial identities; Ontario’s interests and
‘duty’ lay in respecting or supporting nation-building endeavours like Nova Scotia’s better
terms. This alternative assessment of Ontario’s influence had a limited impact on the
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parliamentary debate but was fundamental to the Assembly’s discussions. Quebec’s support
for Nova Scotian better terms virtually ensured the bill’s survival and made appeals to
Ontarian influence unnecessary. Sandfield’s followers lacked this luxury and therefore had
to directly confront the agitation led by Blake. Their attempts to redirect Ontario’s
preponderant influence away from interfering in the national debate were only partly
successful. Nonetheless, they demonstrated that Ontarians continued to have a provincial
consciousness when supporting Macdonald’s nation-building policies.

The 1871 Census
The national census of 1871 spurred a brief but important debate that further
demonstrates the continued importance of ‘rep by pop’ to nearly all Ontarians. The BNA Act
promised a decennial census to calculate the representation of each province in the House of
Commons. The dominion also used this demographic data to determine the value of some of
its provincial subsidies. As the census year neared, the Liberal press became more and more
excited by the possibility of Ontario increasing its parliamentary preponderance. No one
would say whether this anticipated increase would be sufficient to give Ontario an absolute
majority of seats but Liberal editorialists continued to stoke their readers’ anticipation. In
1868 the Globe speculated that the census would document sufficient population growth in
Ontario to justify giving the province an additional twelve ridings.107 By December 1869 the
same newspaper contented that it was “only a question of time,” until Ontario’s
“representatives will outnumber those of all of the other provinces put together.”108 A year
later the Advertiser believed that the “principle of representation by population will largely
augment the preponderance of Ontario after the next census.”109 Even the Canadian
Freeman, whose Catholic writers felt apart from mainstream Ontarians and therefore usually
lobbied for Ontarian Irish Catholic representation in parliament and the cabinet, denied that
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they were alarmed by the “inevitable” prospect of Ontario becoming the “ruling province” of
the dominion.110
The official results disappointed Liberal expectations. According to the census,
Ontario only grew by 224,751 people in the decade after 1861. This count only afforded it an
additional six seats in the House of Commons. By referring to past censuses that documented
considerable immigration to Ontario and population increases of double this number, and by
comparing Ontario’s growth to separately compiled immigration figures, the Globe insisted
that Ontario had actually grown by 400,000 inhabitants. Even Quebec, it noted, grew by
79,741 from 1861 to 1871 “without the assistance of any appreciable immigration.” The
leading Liberal organ therefore condemned the census as a “conspiracy to defraud Ontario of
her due share of Parliamentary Representation [sic].”111 Other Ontario newspapers shared
this concern. The Woodstock Sentinel, for example, was also dismayed when it compared
the census report with the county’s records. It too concluded that “Sir George Cartier is
interested in preventing any preponderance of Ontario’s influence in the Parliament of the
dominion; and we are justified in believing, from the census returns, that those in power have
not hesitated to use the opportunities afforded them to secure the desired end.”112 Some
Ontarians alleged that the census takers deliberately made “mistakes” that understated their
province’s population. The Globe also complained about the census survey method. The
census counted the de jure inhabitants of homes, rather than their de facto residence on a
particular day. Consequently, it included Quebec emigrant workers living in the United
States because their family considered them to be transient workers. Similarly, the Globe
alleged, family members living in other Quebec counties may have been counted twice, once
as residents of their counties, and once as part of their parent’s households. But transient
workers or merchants in Ontario, for example, were not counted because they resided in
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hotels. Ontario, they argued, had been robbed. The only way to right this wrong, Liberal
newspapers concluded, was to use Ontario’s influence in the upcoming dominion election to
foist the Coalitionists from power and elect Liberal representatives who would furnish the
country with fairer censuses in the future. These sentiments were widespread. The Globe
reprinted a host of editorials from across the province that repeated the same arguments.113
The Toronto Leader, by contrast, avoided discussing the census. Aside from one
editorial expressing the hope that Ontario would “be entitled to a much larger representation
in the House” of Commons after the 1871 census, it did not eagerly anticipate the publication
of the census results.114 The Conservative organ continued this avoidance after the results
were published. On 17 November it noted the results for each province and claimed to be
“gratified” that Ontario’s population grew by nearly a quarter million people. The Leader
also acknowledged that immigrants were not staying in Canada, but anticipated that more
would stay as the dominion opened the North-West to European settlement. The editorial did
not, however, comment on the veracity of the census’ results.115 The Leader published a
second editorial the following day expressing disappointment regarding the reported
population growth of the entire country, but it did not comment on Ontario’s rate of growth.
Although it stood by the census’ findings, its editor felt obligated to doubt whether “the
census of 1871 is in the main more perfect than the census of 1861.”116 Neither of these
editorials explored the impact of the census on Ontario’s intrastate representation. It seems
likely that Ontario Conservatives avoided discussing the census and its significance to their
province’s potential preponderance because the possibility of achieving decisive intrastate
influence through ‘rep by pop’ was increasingly accepted (even in Conservative circles)
during the two preceding decades. On the other hand, the silence of Conservative supporters
was consistent with their attempts to use Ontario’s influence to foster intrastate harmony.
Like their mainly Liberal opponents, Ontario Conservatives recognized their province’s
potential to exert strong intrastate influence, but it was not their primary concern because
they imagined the rest of Canada’s provinces as allies rather than competitors.
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The desire for preponderant influence in Ontario led both Liberals and Conservatives
to be conscious of the census. For Ontarians, the statistics amounted to more than a source of
regional pride. Liberal newspapers associated the results with their province’s preponderant
potential. Conservative newspaper organs recognized the popularity of this interpretation,
however, and avoided directly confronting the sense of power and entitlement that underlay
the Liberal complaints.

The Red River Resistance
The Red River resistance was another issue of contention for Ontarians who wanted
to use their province’s influence to shape Canadian policies at the expense of objections from
other parts of the country. Although Ontarians initially showed some sympathy for the
resistance, Louis Riel’s decision to execute Orangeman Thomas Scott diminished this
support. When the Canadian and Manitoban governments refused to arrest the resistance’s
military commander Ambroise Lépine or to extradite Riel from the United States, many
Ontarians accused Quebec of using its influence to protect French-Catholic ‘murders’ from
prosecution. For the next two years Ontario Liberals and Conservatives jockeyed for political
position.
Historians analysing Ontarian responses to Scott’s death focus on Liberal and
Conservative attempts to harness or sidestep the religious and racial bigotry that contributed
to the debates.117 They do not distinguish how the attempts of Ontarian politicians and
newspaper editors to exploit or constrain their province’s sense of entitlement to influence
government policies across Canada also shaped the debate. This confidence emboldened
Ontarians to act on their sense of justice as well as their religious and racial prejudices. The
intense response from Ontario alarmed Quebecers. Yet these agitations suffered from
limitations. Partisan incentives encouraged agitators at the provincial Assembly but
discouraged them on Parliament Hill. On the other hand, urging Ontarians to align their
support behind a compromise that was acceptable to French-Catholics was politically
unfeasible. Macdonald’s supporters could not expect their constituents or subscribers to
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support the use of Ontario’s preponderant power to protect a ‘murderer’ from prosecution.
Conservative supporters instead combated the agitation in Ontario by denying that their
province could use its influence to ensure the punishment of Scott’s killers.
Ontarian expansionists believed that they would enrich themselves, their province,
and their country, by integrating the North-West into Canada’s agricultural and commercial
economies. They also feared that Canada’s population and economic growth would stagnate
if it did not secure additional territory. As Doug Owram observes, “until 1857… the
majority of scientific expeditions and a large portion of the writings on the region had been
concerned with the Arctic and sub-arctic, the region that was to become the agricultural
heartland of the West had generally been traversed only in a perfunctory manner on the way
to the more northerly regions. This changed as questions of settlement and commerce came
to the fore.”118 During the late 1850s, new expeditions to the Prairies led by men such as
John Palliser and Henry Hind returned with descriptions of an immense frontier ripe with
agricultural potential. “By the later 1860s,” Owram continues, “expansionism had become
intertwined with nationalism. The very definition of the young Dominion of Canada and its
hopes for the future were increasingly thought to be inseparable from the opening of the
West.”119 In 1869, even Ontarian ethnic minorities such as Irish Canadians incorporated
expansionism into their aspirations. The Canadian Freeman declared that the region’s future
provinces would “ultimately be the controlling influence of the Dominion of Canada.” The
newspaper encouraged Ontarian Irish Catholic families to move to the region to ensure that
they would be “fully represented in that new power” and secure minority rights across the
Prairies.120 Ontarians expected to benefit from, and even control, the Prairie region’s vast
economic and intrastate potential. They were, as S.J.R. Noel summarizes, “more imperialist
than colonial.”121
On 1 July 1867, however, Canada did not yet possess the North-West. The Hudson’s
Bay Company’s (HBC) charter for Rupert’s Land (roughly the Hudson Bay’s watershed),
allowed it to continue using the region for the fur trade at the expense of White settlement.
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The Company was willing to surrender this charter, but only in return for £1 million and
huge land tracts. The British government, which negotiated with the Company on Canada’s
behalf, was eager for Canada to acquire the territory and facilitate mass agricultural
settlement but was unwilling to buy out the Company’s charter. Yet the Canadian
government initially rejected the Company’s terms. After protracted negotiations, the parties
reached an agreement in March 1869. The HBC relinquished all claims to the North-West in
return for £300,000, one-twentieth of the fertile belt lands, and 45,000 acres of land adjacent
to their trading posts. By the end of June, the Canadian parliament ratified this agreement
and passed the Act for the Temporary Government of Rupert’s Land. This Act, which would
take effect on 1 December, recognized all North-Western law that did not contradict
Canadian law, and provided for the establishment of a territorial government by a Governor
and Legislative Council. The dominion government appointed William McDougall as the
territory’s first Governor and he departed for his new home in early October. Despite over a
decade of surveys and negotiations in London, Canadians remained relatively uninformed
about the North-West and its inhabitants.122
According to the 1870 census, Manitoba contained 11,963 persons. The Métis, who
had long inhabited the Red River area, comprised 5,757 of its population. The offspring of
mainly French-Canadian-Cree fur traders, the Métis were a unique blend of European and
indigenous cultures. These Roman Catholic French or Algonkian speaking peoples lived a
semi-nomadic lifestyle. Contrary to the contentions of George Stanley, who argued that the
Métis were “primitive” and could not withstand the onslaught of “civilized” Europeans,
subsequent scholars have proven that they were an adaptive and successful peoples. Their
economy centred on subsistence agriculture and the buffalo hunt. According to Gerhard Ens,
the Métis developed a proto-industrial system for processing the animals. Métis agriculture
was based on narrow river lots that families passed down from generation to generation
without registering their holdings with the HBC. The arrival of dominion surveyors who
utilized a square-lot system, was therefore alarming to the region’s inhabitants. The Métis
were not afraid to confront those who obstructed their success. When they tired of the

122

Chester Martin, Dominion Lands Policy, ed. Lewis H. Thomas, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 15; Sweeny, George-Etienne Cartier, 184-187; Careless, Brown of the Globe Vol 2: Statesman of
Confederation, 178-179, 198, 271.

158

HBC’s enforcement of its fur trading monopoly during the trial of Guillaume Sayer in 1849,
for example, they intimidated the courts out of punishing the Métis trader, and forced the
company to lift its restrictions. By 1870, the Red River region also hosted 4,083 Protestant
and English-speaking mixed-bloods who were descendants of the Selkirk settlers. Newer
arrivals included approximately 1,500 Canadian expansionists. The census takers did not
count the thousands of additional aboriginals who lived beyond the Red River
communities.123
None of these groups were consulted or invited to the negotiations among the
Imperial government, dominion government, and Hudson’s Bay Company. The participants
of the London negotiations, as W.L. Morton rightly contends, treated “one of the greatest
transfers of territory and sovereignty in history… as a mere transaction in real estate.”124
Many of the inhabitants of Red River, not just the French Métis, worried that a new stampede
of Ontarian settlers would trample their lands, faith, and language. They organized a
“National Committee” to resist annexation by Canada until their demands were guaranteed.
The young twenty-eight year old Louis Riel soon headed the movement. Riel, who was born
in Red River and received a Catholic education in Quebec, was among the most educated of
the movement’s leaders. At first, Ontario newspapers were unconcerned by the Committee’s
actions. They took note, however, when the Métis first repelled the Canadian surveyors in
August 1869, prevented McDougall from entering Red River in late October, and then seized
Upper Fort Garry on 2 November. Although these actions were provocative, no property was
damaged and no one was injured. In late January 1870 delegates from across Red River met
at Upper Fort Garry for a convention. Over seven days they established a Provisional
Government, drafted a “list of rights,” and appointed delegates to go to Ottawa to negotiate
on behalf of the government. The list of demands included provincial status for Manitoba,
two representatives in the House of Commons, official status for both the English and French
languages, and Canadian recognition of the Métis’ lands. The conventionists did not discuss
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education rights. Macdonald agreed to meet with the delegates and delayed annexing the
territory.125 In Ontario, newspaper editorials remained calm. They often debated the
competence of the failed Lieutenant-Governor McDougall, the right of the resistors to selfgovernment, and the justice of Red River’s complaints against the dominion government. A
few newspapers, such as the Irish Canadian, openly cheered the resistance of Catholic
Métis.126
It was only after the news of Thomas Scott’s death on 4 March 1870 reached Ontario
that its population turned en masse against the Red River resistance. Thomas Scott was a 28
year-old Orangeman from Perth who was among the expansionists attempting to thwart
Riel’s government. During his imprisonment by the Provisional Government, Scott became
“the most hated man in the barracks. His dysentery and his contempt for the metis irritated
his captors beyond endurance.”127 After threatening the Métis leader’s life, Riel ordered a
court-martial where his military commander, Ambroise Lépine, presided. The court-martial
sentenced Scott to death. The motivation behind his execution remains unclear. Gerald
Friesen emphasizes the guards’ exasperation with the Orangeman. According to Morton,
Riel believed that Scott’s death would convince Ottawa to take the Provisional Government
seriously.128 Regardless of the reason, it took weeks for news of Scott’s demise to reach
Ontario. As late as 29 March, MPs still questioned the veracity of reports of his death in the
House of Commons.129
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The return of John Christian Schultz and Charles Mair from Red River in early April,
however, dispelled any doubts and ignited Ontarian tempers. Schultz was an Ontarian
businessman who moved to Red River in 1861 and subsequently led the failed Canadian
opposition to the resistance. Mair, who had a longstanding interest in the North-West, was a
prominent Canadian poet and founding member of the Canada First movement. Established
in April 1868, this non-partisan movement sought the realization of D’Arcy McGee’s
expressed desire for a pan-Canadian nationalism to solidify national-unity. The movement
was intensely imperialistic and anti-American. Its leaders quickly decided that Canadians
shared a common nordicity. Canada Firsters argued that surviving in the harsh climactic
conditions of high latitudes produced great civilizations and races. The Red River resistance,
however, revealed the superficiality of this pan-Canadian rhetoric. Mair, like most Canada
Firsters, had strong anti-French and anti-Catholic prejudices. The movement viewed FrenchCanadians, and particularly the Métis, as impediments to the expansion of English-Protestant
hegemony and therefore found few followers outside of Ontario. “Although Canada First
talked of creating a Canadian nationalism,” historian D.R. Farrel notes “they in fact equated
this with Ontario provincialism.”130
Schultz and Mair used Scott’s death and the belief that Ontario possessed the power
to oppose Quebec’s influence to invigorate English-Canadian nationalism (or Ontario
provincialism) against French-Canada. The Métis, Mair contended, had an “aptitude for
falling into the modes of savages” and were an obstacle to Canadian settlement. At a mass
rally in Toronto they claimed that Riel’s followers had rebelled against the British Crown and
murdered Scott for his unwavering allegiance. They demanded “justice” and “revenge” for
Scott’s death. According to Schultz, Ontario was especially entitled to counter the resistors.
“It was from Ontario this movement to add Red River to the Dominion commenced; it was in
Ontario this expression of indignation was expressed; and it was to Ontario the Territory
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properly belonged. He only hoped the day was not far distant when Ontario would have
peaceable possession of it, and that he would meet many of his hearers in Red River.”131
This rally inspired further “indignation meetings” in Toronto and across Ontario. The
outrage against the Métis broadened into a campaign against alleged French-Catholic
aggression emanating from Quebec. Ontario, these men claimed, had to prevent Quebec from
controlling government policy in the North-West. At another rally in Toronto on 9 April, a
Toronto Alderman blamed Quebec influence for the dominion government’s refusal to
pursue Scott’s killers. Ontarians, he insisted, could force the Canadian government to change
its policy.
The speaker wished to ask them if the people of Ontario were ready to submit
to the humiliation that was about to be put upon them?…There was in the
Parliament at Ottawa one little man who had more power than all Ontario whose three or four words could whip the entire Government into line, and
unfortunately could whip the entire people of Ontario into line too; and that
little man had only to pronounce the words “call in de members," and the
business is done. (Laughter.) Were they to be sold by the friends of this little
man? ("No.") It was to prevent such a humiliation as that that this meeting
had been called; it was to show that he took no part in such a humiliation as
that that the speaker had come forward on that platform to denounce that state
of affairs and call upon them, men of Ontario, loyal and true to the institutions
under which they lived, to put down with scorn and indignation any
Government or any men who might treat them in that way. (Cheers).132
F.E. Cornish, a speaker at a London indignation meeting, also appealed to this Ontarian sense
of power. “It is our duty,” he argued, “to enter our solemn protest (cheers) and to call upon
the representatives of Ontario to insist that Cartier and his followers shall not stand in the
way of pushing on this Red River expedition until all engaged in opposing the establishment
of British rule there are brought under subjection.” If the rest of Canada allowed Quebec’s
influence to spread, Cornish warned that “in less than five years the cry in Ontario will be for
dissolution” of Confederation.133 The Advertiser agreed. Ontarians could not trust the
dominion cabinet to heed their province’s demands because “Cartier is king.”134 Their
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province had to respond to the aggressive influence of its provincial rival. The Canadian
government could not privilege one ethnicity at the expense of others. The basic premise of
British justice was “equal rights to all, exclusive privileges to none.”135 According to A.I.
Silver, this linkage was unfortunate but “natural,” given Riel’s French heritage and the
attempts of Provencher Bishop Alexandre-Antonin Taché to secure an amnesty for the
resistors.136
The widespread agitation in Ontario alarmed French-Catholic Quebecers. According
to Silver, Quebecers had been “indifferent” about the resistance in 1869 and early 1870. Most
concluded that the resistance was a struggle for local autonomy rather than a French-Catholic
struggle against English-Protestantism and this understanding limited their empathy.
Quebecers also uniformly denounced Scott’s execution. Ontario’s reaction, however, shifted
public opinion in Quebec. As Silver notes, Ontarians seemed more interested in punishing
French-Catholics than in punishing Riel and Lépine. French-Catholic Quebecers now moved
from “ambiance” to a “pro-Métis position.” While Quebecers did not yet consider the Métis
to be fellow French-Canadians, they believed that their province needed to protect the Métis
from Ontarian prejudice.137 This shift, however, was the product of more than Ontarian
religious and racial antagonism. The offensive statements emanating from Ontario were also
the product of a longstanding belief that their province had the ability and right to determine
the national government’s policies over the objections of other provinces.
Macdonald, wary of offending the voters of Quebec or Ontario, tried to calm tensions.
To ensure Canada’s assumption of Rupert’s Land, the dominion government assuaged the
Métis’ concerns. Cartier and the prime minister met with the Provisional Government’s
delegates and satisfied nearly all of their demands. The Manitoba Act promised that the
provincial government’s records would be published in both French and English, established
a Legislative Council where French and English would have an equal voice, recognized the
Métis’ land claims, and promised an additional 1.4 million acres for their use. Section 22 of
the Act even protected the province’s denominational schools to satisfy a last minute demand
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by the delegates. The prime minister also sent Adams G. Archibald, a man who understood
the importance of Métis consent, to Manitoba to replace McDougall as Lieutenant-Governor.
Colonel Garnet Wolseley, however, beat Archibald to Manitoba. Wolseley commanded a
military expedition of Imperial troops and Canadian militiamen who Macdonald sent to
establish Canadian authority at Red River. Ostensibly a peaceful force, the militia contingent
was full of Ontarian volunteers who were eager to avenge Scott’s death. Their arrival forced
Riel to flee to the United States. Robbed of their chance for revenge, many of the militiamen
attacked Métis resistors and destroyed their property. Archibald tried to combat these
tensions by appointing moderates to his government. Both he and Macdonald discouraged
Riel from running for public office. Yet Archibald also recognized Riel’s immense
popularity among the Métis and deliberately avoided issuing warrants for the former leader’s
arrest. He even urged the dominion to grant a full amnesty to all of the resistors.138
Archibald’s refusal to sign warrants for Riel’s arrest allowed the latter to return to
Manitoba from his exile in North Dakota on several occasions. Although Riel sometimes had
to flee gangs intent on his capture, he remained a leader among Manitoban Métis. When
William O’Donoghue, a former resistor, tried to assemble a Fenian force to invade Manitoba
from Minnesota, the English and Métis inhabitants of Red River contributed to the defence of
the province. When Archibald inspected the Métis troops, he shook the hand of their leader,
Louis Riel. Despite this limited cooperation in Manitoba, an amnesty did not come. Riel
attempted to raise his public visibility by successfully campaigning to become the MP for
Provencher in the 1872 dominion election but it did not provoke an amnesty.139
The gradual establishment of Canadian control in Manitoba did not alter the
precarious position of Ontarian provincial and national government supporters. No Ontario
politicians or newspaper, not even Toronto’s Irish Catholic publications, dared to excuse
Scott’s execution.140 The widespread belief that the execution was a murder, in addition to
anti-French and anti-Catholic sentiment, made appealing for Ontarians to use their influence
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to facilitate compromise impracticable. Yet government supporters had to dissuade
Ontarians from believing that their angry province could determine the government’s Red
River policies. Instead, they tried to limit Ontario’s potential influence by moving politically
sensitive questions to the Imperial arena. The Canadian government had promised a general
amnesty in 1869, but that preceded Scott’s execution. The Red River delegates pushed hard
for the fulfilment of this promise. The widespread outrage in Ontario concerning Scott’s
execution, however, made it politically impossible for the Canadian government to
accommodate this demand. The dominion government nevertheless led Red River’s
delegates to believe that an Imperial amnesty would be forthcoming. In subsequent months,
both Macdonald and Cartier tried to persuade the Imperial authorities to grant an amnesty
without reference to the dominion government. The move, they repeatedly warned, was
politically untenable in Canada. The Imperial authorities refused to grant a general amnesty
without a formal request from the Canadian government and the two governments spent the
next few years avoiding responsibility for an amnesty.141
When rumours began to circulate that the dominion government desired an amnesty
newspapers supporting Macdonald countered the perceived affront to Ontario’s intrastate
influence by claiming that the dominion government lacked the power to affect the fate of
Riel and Lépine. The Toronto Leader noted that Riel took up arms when Red River was
Imperial, rather than Canadian, territory. An amnesty, it concluded, was an Imperial
responsibility.142 The Irish Canadian echoed this argument as part of its attempts to
moderate the mounting anti-Catholicism in Ontario.143 Even Bowell’s Intelligencer did not
take a hard line against the government. It desired Riel’s capture, but postponed discussing
the jurisdictional question by claiming that no amnesty could be issued (whether by
dominion or Imperial decree) until the courts issued a conviction.144 By situating the
amnesty question within the Imperial sphere, rather than national politics, these newspapers
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hoped to dissuade Ontarians from believing that their province could influence the fates of
Riel and Lépine.145
Several newspapers also challenged the sense of power and entitlement underlying
the agitation by questioning its allegations of French or Catholic ‘domination.’ Irish Ontarian
newspapers, alarmed by the rising anti-Catholicism in their province, categorically denied the
allegations of the Catholic Church’s support of the Red River resistance.146 In April 1870 the
Toronto Leader proclaimed that “there is no man in the whole Dominion more true to British
institutions and more intensely loyal – be he French Canadian or of English origin – than Sir
George Cartier.”147 The same paper also offered a more limited defence of Taché.148
Ontario’s preponderant influence was therefore not endangered or necessary, the Leader
claimed. The same newspaper, however, admitted that Ontarian anger concerning Scott’s
death was just. “At this particular moment the aim of good citizenship and true journalism
should be rather in the direction of smoothing down the bitter feelings which were created by
the North-West difficulties than of intensifying them. Ontario is sufficiently strong to
withhold frequently from giving back a hard answer even when it has been provoked.”149
These attempts to assuage these concerns regarding Ontario’s influence did not succeed.
Discontentment over Riel’s escape to the United States and Lépine’s continued residency in
Manitoba continued to mount.
By the beginning of 1871 little had changed. The agitators remained appalled by their
province’s inability to force the dominion government to pursue Riel and Lépine. If Ontario
lacked the necessary intrastate influence, they reasoned, it was incumbent upon their
Legislative Assembly to secure justice for Scott. In the Ontario Legislature on 2 February
1871, Blake asked the Assembly to censure the dominion government for its failure to pursue
Riel and Lépine by moving a resolution asserting that “every effort should be made to bring
to trial the perpetrators of this great crime.” The resolution also asked the Lieutenant
Governor “to take such steps as may be best calculated to further” this end. The motion was
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politically astute. It was an election year and Blake hoped to capitalize on the widespread
hatred of Riel in Ontario. The resolution amounted to a petition; the Assembly lacked the
power to coerce either the Manitoban or Canadian governments to seek Riel and Lépine.
Blake nevertheless contended that the Assembly had the right to demand justice. A “son” of
Ontario had been “murdered,” he proclaimed, and Ontario’s MPPs had the right to “express
the feeling” of their province.150
The resolution’s supporters protested that it was not a mere publicity stunt. They
insisted that their province possessed the influence to encourage the apprehension of Riel and
Lépine. Blake, for example, appealed to the Assembly to lend its “great weight, influence,
and authority, in favour of the vindication of justice in the matter.”151 The Liberal organs also
justified their support for the resolution by emphasizing the importance of Ontario’s voice to
national policy development. According to the Globe, constitutional jurisdictions were not
relevant to the question. The British House of Commons protested the massacre of British
citizens in Greece the preceding year. How did an Ontarian address to its Lieutenant
Governor differ? The Ontario provincial government may have lacked legal jurisdiction, but
the Globe repeatedly argued that MPPs could exert “moral force” because they represented
Canada’s “Premier Province.”152 If Blake’s resolution had passed, it “would have compelled
the Governments of Ottawa and Fort Garry to arrest the murderers. The demand of the
Ontario Parliament could not have been disregarded.”153 The Globe repeated this sense of
power the following week:
Let it be borne in mind… that the opinion of Ontario could never be more
fully expressed than through the Legislature; that the whole proceedings
against the murderers were degenerating into a transparent sham; and that the
standing of Ontario in Confederation and her particular interest in this case all
showed how valuable and influential her formally-expressed opinion and
wishes on the subject would be. If the voice of public meetings, such as were
held last spring, were valuable, much more the united voice of the whole
Legislature. And if that voice could not help to secure justice, at any rate, it
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might have been raised in solemn protest against a flagrant and deliberate
failure of right.154
The Advertiser also supported the Assembly’s entitlement to pronounce on the question. “It
is most particularly our duty, not only as the Province whose citizen has been assassinated,
but as the largest section of the Dominion, to discuss this affair, and to use all our
endeavours, unitedly as well as individually, to see that the murderers escape not from
justice.”155 Ontarians were not merely outraged by Riel and Lépine’s continued freedom,
they were also emboldened by the belief that they could ‘compel’ the Canadian government
to capture the former resistance leaders.
In this heated political climate, asking Ontarians to put their political weight behind
compromise policies remained politically impracticable. The widespread assumption that
Riel and Lépine were guilty of ‘murder,’ in addition to allegations that French-Catholic
‘domination’ protected them from prosecution, precluded an appeal for Ontarians to
compromise with the rest of Canada. Instead, Ontario Conservatives contended that
provincial autonomy and Ontarian interference in dominion or Manitoban jurisdictions were
antithetical. Blake, Matthew Crooks Cameron alleged, “seemed to think that it was his
special province and function to censure the Government at Ottawa on every occasion that
was presented to him.”156 The Assembly, however, “had no power or authority to demand
the extradition of this man Riel for an offence committed in Manitoba.” He therefore moved
an amendment that “deplored” Scott’s death but nevertheless asserted that “it would be
unwise and inexpedient to interfere with the prerogative which properly belongs to another
Government, and to discuss a question over which this house has no control.”157 According
to the Intelligencer, the Globe’s assertion that Ontario could ‘compel’ the Manitoban or
dominion governments to arrest Riel and Lépine was “the veriest buncombe.”158 The Leader
agreed with its contemporary. The Assembly, it declared, “has nothing to do with the
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matter.” It went on to dare Blake to table his cause in parliament.159 Cameron’s argument
proved effective. The Assembly supported his amendment by a vote of 47 to 28 in the
Assembly.160
Ontarian attempts to affect the fate of the resistance’s leaders were far from over.
After four years as premier, Sandfield had to call a general election and the Liberals once
again attacked the Sandfield government’s unwillingness to use Ontario’s influence to
antagonize Quebec. While giving a speech in Toronto in early March 1871, LieutenantColonel George Denison charged that the “French Canadian party…had its claws upon the
whole Dominion.” Its influence was so strong that it used the ‘patent combination’ to force
Sandfield’s government to oppose Blake’s 1871 resolutions. At that time, it took Sandfield’s
government “by the throat” and told it: “you must not vote for these resolutions.”161 Like
D.R. Farrel, David Gagan suggests that such speeches spurred from “‘Ontario First’ if not
‘Toronto First’” sentiments.162 This sense of power and entitlement was not, however,
limited to the Ontario First movement. The Globe, which did not endorse the Canada First
movement, also used the same argument to encourage Ontarians to elect Blake. On 20
February, the Globe asserted that Ontario currently lacked the power to influence dominion
policy. “The two Macdonalds,” it alleged, repeatedly bowed to the demands of “the united
phalanx of Quebec.”163 “The best way to reach John. A.,” it concluded, “is through John S.”
…the Combination [sic] at Toronto needs to be overturned quite as much as
the Coalition at Ottawa. For the people of Ontario to endorse John S. and his
doings is practically to declare that the steps taken by the Dominion Cabinet at
Red River have been all right…. If, then, the people of our Province desire to
have English law and liberty extended over all the North-West, they must not
only look well to the Dominion elections, but to those of our Local
Parliament. It is in these that the question of the future of the Dominion is to
be determined…164
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The Globe repeated this conflation on 23 February. Ontario had a right “to assert her just and
proper place in the Dominion, of which she is the most important member. At present she is
all but ignored in the Government… When Ontario speaks, her voice must not be stifled but
heard. The time is at hand when she may assert her own will, and that resolutely.”165
Ontarians needed to elect MPPs who would unanimously support Blake’s resolutions. Only
then would the Canadian or Imperial governments heed their province’s “moral influence.”166
Confederation gave Ontarians the ability to overpower Quebec’s influence and ensure justice
in the North-West, but they had to choose representatives who were willing to stand up to the
rest of Canada.
Sandfield’s government tried to avoid the agitation by calling attention to its large
surplus and new railway bill (which created a $1.5 million grant fund to help railways
operate after their initial construction). Its supporters also addressed concerns about Ontario’s
influence in Confederation. They attacked Blake’s Liberals as “factionalists” who would
harm the still infant Confederation with Ontario’s influence. 167 “It is high time,” the Leader
grumbled, for Ontarians to “cease talking about French-Canadian influence in a House in
which the English element outnumbers the French more than two to one.”168 The
Intelligencer and a meeting of the Orange Lodges of Ontario disparaged Blake by
emphasizing the Liberal leader’s obvious desire to “create political capital” from Ontarian
indignation.169 A co-authored letter by leading Orangemen including D’Alton McCarthy
(senior) and Ogle Gowan discredited the agitation for the arrest of Scott’s killers by
proposing a hypothetical scenario. If a Canadian were murdered in Ontario and escaped to
the United States, they doubted that Ontarians would accept petitions from the Lieutenant
Governors of Manitoba or Quebec demanding the fugitives’ capture: “Would not every man
of every party in this Province look upon such a piece of impertinent interference in our
affairs, as an insult to our Government, our Parliament, and our people?” Ontarians should
judge the other provinces “as we should wish to be judged ourselves under like

165

Ibid, 23 February 1871. See also: Ibid, 6 March 1871.
Ibid, 9 March 1871.
167
Schull, Edward Blake: The Man of the Other Way, 72-73; Hodgins, John Sandfield Macdonald, 94,112.
168
Leader, 16 March 1871.
169
Intelligencer, 25 February 1871.
166

170

circumstances.”170 Ontario, in short, had no right to pressure the rest of Canada to follow its
desires. Such cavalier actions were bound to fail and would harm national unity.
The election did not overturn Sandfield’s government. Although his party secured
slightly less than half of the Assembly’s seats (see Appendix 3), electoral irregularities left
eight ridings unoccupied while the courts determined the need for by-elections. Sandfield
tied to escape his precarious position by arguing that it would be premature for his party to
resign the government until the courts and by-elections determined the partisanship of these
ridings.171
After the election, parliament debated the government’s policy on Riel and Lépine.
The debates on 11 and 12 April demonstrated the limits of the national Liberal’s confidence
in Ontario’s influence. On 11 April, Joseph Rymal, the Liberal MP for Wentworth South,
moved a resolution that criticized the Canadian government for its failure to pursue Riel and
Lépine and urged the Governor General to take action to secure their capture and trial.
Although the resolution resembled Blake’s February resolution, the parliamentary debate was
much more subdued and did not incorporate Ontario’s potential influence. The Canadian
government defended its inaction by claiming that it lacked the jurisdiction to punish crimes
committed in Red River in March 1870. It did not, after all, formally annex the region until
July of the same year. Cartier concluded that “the administration of Justice rested entirely
with the Local government.”172 Rymal, Bowell, Wood, and Blake dismissed this defence by
claiming that Imperial legislation allowed Upper and Lower Canada to try individuals for
crimes committed in Red River during the early nineteenth century. Thus they concluded
that the Canadian government possessed the jurisdiction to capture and try Riel and Lépine.
Blake urged the government to extradite Riel from the United States and arrest Lépine in
Manitoba. By focusing on the jurisdictional dispute, Conservatives and Liberals from
Ontario avoided considering their province’s potential influence. Even Blake, who had so
vehemently defended the Assembly’s ‘moral’ right to interfere in the dispute, allowed Rymal
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to move the parliamentary resolution and relied on legal arguments, rather than Ontario’s
intrastate votes, for the substance of his brief supporting speech.173
Mackenzie Bowell jeered Blake’s inconsistency. When the government defeated
Rymal’s resolution by a vote of 75 to 40, the MP for Hastings North moved a nearly identical
resolution that urged the apprehension of Riel and Lépine but avoided censuring the
government for its previous inaction. According to Bowell, Blake’s “mildness and
gentleness” in parliament was
truly amazing when compared with the manner in which he fulminated his
thunders at every one [sic] who dared to think differently from him in the
Legislative Hall at Toronto. (Hear, hear.) Here he pretends it would be
useless to bring the subject of Scott’s murder before the House because he
would not carry a motion similar to the one he had introduced into the
Legislature at Toronto, when surrounded by an Ontario and Protestant
audience.
Ontario, Bowell implied, could use its votes in the House of Commons to pressure for the
arrest of the former resistance leaders. Instead of standing by his previous assertions of
Ontario’s influence, the Liberal leader contorted himself to avoid offending his Quebec allies
in parliament. 174
Bowell had a point. Although Blake supported the capture of Riel and Lépine in both
legislatures, different partisan incentives led him to adopt different tactics. In parliament,
Blake recognized that Ontario MPs lacked the unity to pursue the same course. His province
did not have the parliamentary votes to counter Quebec’s support for an amnesty.175 In this
context appealing for Ontarians to unite behind the resolution was futile and humiliating for
the Ontarian leader. Accusing Quebecers of unjustly protecting Riel and urging Ontarians to
combat their influence would only unite Quebecers against the resolutions. Ontario
Conservative MPs did not have to justify their votes on such controversial resolutions
because they could rely on Quebec MPs like Cartier to speak on behalf of the government.
173
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This opportunity allowed them to quietly sit and vote for or against Liberal resolutions
without drawing attention to their actions. The Legislative Assembly did not afford its
Conservative MPPs this luxury. Its membership was entirely Ontarian and its political
parties did not have to consider the opinions of the rest of Canada in order to gain or maintain
power. Throughout the Red River debate in Ontario, therefore, Sandfield’s supporters denied
that their province was entitled to special influence.
By December 1871, Sandfield still clung to power with a temporary majority of less
than five seats. The courts had not yet finished with the remaining eight contested ridings,
and when the Assembly reconvened, the premier stated that his government would avoid
controversial business until the seats were filled. Blake and his Liberals were unwilling to
wait. They challenged the Coalition’s right to rule by defeating it in a series of resolutions
and confidence votes. Edmund Wood, whose position in the cabinet was predicated on his
ability to control the faltering support of moderate Liberals, resigned as Treasurer in the
middle of the debate. This dramatic move sealed the government’s fate. Thoroughly
defeated, Sandfield also resigned and Blake became Ontario’s second premier on 20
December.176
Having secured the government, and with a provincial election years away, Blake
continued to pursue Riel. In January 1872 he again tried to rouse the Assembly with a more
vaguely worded resolution which “regret[ed] that no effective steps have been taken to bring
justice to the murderers” of Scott and also asked “that something should be done to that
end.”177 When defending his motion, Blake continued to espouse Ontario’s right and ability
to force the capture of Scott’s killers against the objections of French-Catholics in Manitoba
and Quebec. Legislating on provincial jurisdictions set out in the BNA Act was not the
Assembly’s only purpose. “It was entirely competent,” he declared “for this Chamber, in a
matter in which the honour of Ontario was concerned, and in a matter affecting the life of a
citizen of Ontario, to take notice of the murder of one of its people.”178 Alexander Mackenzie
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echoed his leader. He promised the Assembly that “the Government at Ottawa would not be
indifferent to the action of the great Province of Ontario.”179 Edmund Wood agreed. Having
returned to the Liberal backbenches, ‘Big Thunder’ spoke his mind. Ontarians, he
complained, had “waited in vain” for dominion action and it was now appropriate for the
provincial government to intervene.180 In response, Cameron continued to argue that the
Assembly “had no jurisdiction in the matter.” It was unwise for one province to interfere in
another government’s affairs, and he contended that the resolution “could have no effect in
the direction of bringing the murderers of Scott to justice.”181 This time, however, Ontario’s
MPPs found jurisdictional arguments uncompelling. Every present MPP, except Cameron,
voted for Blake’s resolution. With this overwhelming support in hand, Blake’s government
extended its reach beyond the provincial borders. During the budget debate in early February
the Liberal Treasurer, Alexander Mackenzie, presented the government’s allocation of a
$5,000 bounty for the arrest of Riel and Lépine. Aside from a mocking comment from
Cameron, the government encountered no opposition to the measure.182 The bounty was, as
Schull notes, “good provincial politics” but it also allowed Ontarians to circumvent
parliament and assert themselves in whatever province or state Riel and Lépine resided.183
Thereafter, the two former resistance leaders not only had to worry about being captured by
anti-Catholic or anti-French mobs wherever they went, the bounty made their capture
extremely lucrative for anyone on the Prairies.184 The law officers of the dominion, as the
Advertiser noted, had “a substantial inducement to bring them to an account.”185
Racial and religious prejudice alone does not explain the vehement reactions of many
Ontarians to the escape of Scott’s killers. When politicians and newspapers dealt with the
Red River resistance and the amnesty question from 1870 to 1872, they sought more than a
middle ground between English-Protestant and French-Catholic demands; they also
confronted the belief that Ontario could overcome Quebec’s influence and ‘compel’ the
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Manitoban and Canadian governments to pursue Thomas Scott’s killers. Liberal newspapers
and MPPs repeatedly appealed to a sense of power in Ontario to justify their aggressive
resolutions in the Legislative Assembly. Conservative MPPs and MPs knew that it was
unadvisable to advocate using Ontario’s preponderant influence to protect a ‘murderer.’
Instead, they tried to disabuse Ontarians of the belief that they could use their intrastate
influence to control government policy by appealing to the Imperial government to take
charge and by pointing out that their Legislative Assembly lacked the jurisdiction to
‘compel’ state action. Neither strategy was entirely successful. Although the Conservative’s
strategy proved effective in 1871, Blake’s Liberals used this same sense of power and
entitlement to secure the Assembly’s decisive support for their resolutions the following
year.
The 1871 to 1872 debate also demonstrated some of the ways that partisanship
impacted the willingness of Ontarians to assert that their province could dominate national
policy debates. After parliament failed to satisfy Protestant Ontarians, the prospect of using
concurrent discontentment with the province’s influence to bolster his party’s electoral
support inspired Blake’s Liberals to tie Sandfield’s government to the continued freedom of
Riel and Lépine. By emphasizing Ontario’s preponderant potential and linking its failure to
the ‘patent combination,’ Blake argued that Ontarians could punish Sir John A. Macdonald
by terminating Sandfield’s premiership. Yet partisanship also led Blake to curtail such
rhetoric in parliament. The necessity of building bridges with the Rouges made appeals for
Ontarians to combat Quebec influence bad politics. Although Blake continued his agitation
against Scott’s killers into 1872, limited his preponderant federalist attacks to the Assembly
where they did not directly affect his relationship with Quebec representatives.

New Provinces, Familiar Reactions
The desire to preserve Ontario’s intrastate preponderant potential or safeguard its
future dominance also led Ontario Liberals to object to the terms of union for both Manitoba
in 1870 and British Columbia in 1871. Each of these new provinces negotiated terms of
union that were much more generous than those enjoyed by Ontario. Manitoba had a
population of twelve thousand in 1871. According to the ‘rep by pop’ ratio that determined
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the number of ridings in each province, Manitoba was entitled to less than one seat in the
House of Commons. The Provisional Government’s ‘list of rights’ requested two
parliamentary seats in 1870. Instead, the ‘postage-stamp province’ received four seats in the
House of Commons and two Senators. When pressed about this increase, Macdonald replied
that “it would be hopeless to expect that free-men would consent to be united to Canada
without a representation in the Canadian Parliament being provided for.” One or two MPs, he
implied, did not satisfy this necessity.186 To ensure that the province of Manitoba could tend
to its jurisdictional responsibilities, the Canadian government also took the unprecedented
step of deviating from precedent and included an estimate of the province’s native population
when calculating its financial terms. Manitoba received the same eighty-cent per capita
subsidy as the other provinces, but it was calculated on the inflated assumption that Manitoba
contained 17,000 people. It also received a $30,000 annual grant. In addition, because it had
no debt, the new province received annual interest payments of $23,604 from the dominion.
In total, Manitoba received $5.50 per capita from the dominion government (see Table 2).
The dominion government accepted these terms to restore its relations with the Red River
region while the Provisional Government still controlled Red River in the spring of 1870.
These measures would also increase the Conservative’s popularity in Manitoba at the next
election.187
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Table 2: Annual Monies Per-Capita Paid to the Provinces by the Dominion in 1871
Province
$ / Capita
Ontario
0.64
Quebec
0.67
Nova Scotia
1.21
New Brunswick
1.20
Manitoba
5.50
British Columbia
6.33*
*This figure is approximate, British Columbia additional funds from the dominion
government, including a loan for dock construction at Esquimalt.
Table adapted from Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in
Canada, 34, 39-40.
The Pacific colony of British Columbia was in dire financial straits by 1870. The
population boom that accompanied its 1858 gold rush led it to borrow heavily to finance the
construction of roads in the colony’s interior. After the gold rush ended, a population exodus
left the colony’s government struggling to finance the debt. By 1870 the population of
36,247 (including 8,576 persons of British descent, 1,548 emigrants from Asia, and 25,616
Indigenous persons) shouldered a government debt of over $1 million. The colonial
government had to devote one quarter of its tax revenues to servicing the debt. After several
years of debate, the colony decided to seek terms of union with Canada.188 Because
Macdonald took ill at the end of the discussions with the Red River representatives and just
prior to the arrival of the British Columbian delegates in June 1870, Cartier led this second
set of negotiations. American interest in the colony led Cartier to offer the delegates
generous terms to ensure Canadian access to the Pacific Ocean. The most notable part of the
dominion’s offer was the construction of a transcontinental railway. The British Columbian
delegates recognized the necessity of connecting their colony to Canada but only requested a
wagon road. Cartier, however, convinced the delegates to ask for a railway. The dominion
government agreed to commence the construction of a transcontinental railway from the
Pacific Ocean to Lake Nippissing within two years and complete it within ten years of the
date of union. The other financial terms were based on the assumption that British Columbia
contained 60,000 people. By stretching this already exaggerated population estimate, the
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Canadian government justified giving British Columbia six seats in the House of Commons
and three in the Senate. This final population estimate also entitled the Pacific province to a
$48,000 annual subsidy, annual interest payments of $33,000, and an annual grant of $35,000
a year from the dominion. In spite of this generosity, British Columbia still required an
additional $100,000 a year to balance its books (see Table 2). Thus, Cartier offered an
additional twenty-year $100,000 annual subsidy to reimburse British Columbia for lands it
surrendered to the dominion to help pay for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). According
to Maxwell, this valuation of the public land was “entirely arbitrary,” but it provided the
Canadian government the necessary excuse to make up British Columbia’s deficit.189
Ontario Liberals, and even a few Conservatives, complained that these terms violated
the precedents established during the Confederation negotiations of 1864 to 1867. They
protested against the overrepresentation of both provinces because they worried that it
endangered Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance. In May 1870, the Intelligencer broke
ranks with Macdonald and criticized Manitoba’s representation. Although it was willing to
accept a temporary shift from strict representation by population, it considered four ridings to
be unjustified and called upon Ontario’s representatives to demand changes to the
government bill.190 Other Ontarians were less descript but nevertheless objected to the
violation of the ‘rep by pop’ principle. David Mills argued that dividing Manitoba into four
ridings was “unfair” to the rest of Canada. Instead of over-representing Manitoba in
anticipation of its population’s expansion, he recommended maintaining the principle of
representation by population and making adjustments in between the decennial censes.191
Robert Harrison complained that the terms exceeded the representation requested in the
Provisional Government’s list of rights.192
Ontarians, according to Liberal supporters, could not afford to allow a second FrenchCatholic province to erode their intrastate preponderance. This concern was not unfounded.
Historians note a desire among many leading Quebecers for Manitoba to become a large and
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populous French-Catholic province that would ally with Quebec in the House of Commons
against Ontario.193 They have not, however, explored how these concerns shaped the
responses of Ontario Liberals. They demanded, for example, the expansion of Manitoba’s
borders to encompass Portage La Prairie, a predominantly English-Protestant settlement that
Macdonald initially excluded from the province. Its inclusion, the Advertiser hoped, would
help to prevent the new province from becoming “another non-progressive, jealous, narrowminded Quebec.”194 Although Macdonald gave into this pressure, Ontario Liberals were still
unsatisfied. When parliament passed the Manitoba Act, the Advertiser complained that “the
door-way and hall leading into the North West has been converted into a French preserve.
As far as legislation could do so, the foundations have been laid for another Province of
Quebec, with all its bigotry, exclusiveness, and jealousy of free thought and progress.”195
The following year, Colonel Denison perpetuated this sentiment while speaking in Toronto.
He acknowledged Quebec’s “legitimate influence in Quebec and in the Dominion,” but
condemned its alleged attempts to “rule Manitoba, and rule the Dominion.”196 Ontarians had
anticipated expanding into the North-West and they believed that they could not afford to
have their preponderant influence compromised by the growth of a second French-Canadian
province. They expected to impose their interests and cultures onto the North-West and
thereby expand the power and influence of their society.
Ontario Liberal MPs and their supporting newspapers also opposed the
overrepresentation of British Columbia in 1871. The concern was an Ontarian fixation. Only
a handful of other MPs, including Alexander Galt and John Gray (the Conservative MP for
the City and County of Saint John), commented on the two provinces’ over-representation
during the parliamentary debate.197 Ontarians recognized that their concern was unique. The
deviation from the principle of representation by population was, the Globe declared in two
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editorials on 20 February, “especially offensive to the people of Ontario” who entered
Confederation expecting ‘rep by pop’ to free them from “Lower Canadian domination” and
to give them “a fair share” of influence “in the management of the affairs of the United
Provinces.”198 To protest this policy, Ebenezer Bodwell moved an amendment declaring
British Columbia’s proposed representation to be “enormously in excess of the proper
number according to population.” This deviation constituted a “violation of the fundamental
principle of the pact between the Provinces” that “ought not to be disturbed without the
assent of the Provinces.” Parliament rejected his amendment by a partisan vote of 58 to
87.199
Ontario Liberals and their supporters defended the principle of ‘rep by pop’ in 1871
because they worried that the affirmation of the Manitoban precedent would erode Ontario’s
intrastate influence. At the end of March, the Globe and the Advertiser published editorials
objecting to the new province’s overrepresentation. They opposed the inclusion of British
Columbia’s Native and Chinese populations to increase British Columbia’s seat-count. Such
inclusion had “been deliberately rejected” in the past. All of the provinces had to be treated
equally. If the West’s representation included its Native and Chinese populations, then
Ontario was entitled to additional ridings.200 The dominion government, the Globe warned,
could use the Manitoban and British Columbian precedents “for granting representation in
excess of that agreement to a dozen new Manitobas and British Columbias [sic] carved out of
the great North-West.”201 The Advertiser was equally adamant. “If this principle is not
jealously guarded by Ontario,” it warned on 29 March, “we may lose the chief advantage
sought by the Act of Confederation.”202 The London Liberal organ elaborated on this
warning the following day:
If in the case of one province we interfere with the principle of representation
by population so long struggled for, there will be no excuse for not doing the
very same thing in the case of other provinces; and we [Ontario] should thus
198
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fall back into that very same unpleasant and injurious condition under which
we laboured in the old Legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada.203
The Liberals’ concern about the new provinces’ overrepresentation did not abate. When
Edward Blake addressed his riding of West Durham at end of April, he noted that it
contained two to three times more white inhabitants than British Columbia and complained
that it only received one representative compared to the Pacific province’s six seats.204 If
Ontarians expected their province to protect themselves from the rest of Canada and
influence the national government they had to oppose reinforcing the Manitoban precedent in
British Columbia.
In addition to the threat that the new provinces allegedly posed to Ontario’s
parliamentary preponderance, Ontario Liberal MPs and their newspaper organs also opposed
British Columbia’s terms of union because they believed that the financial aspects of the
agreement were unfair. Thomas Oliver complained that the dominion assumed ten times as
much debt per capita for British Columbia as it had for Ontario and Quebec.205 They also
objected to the government’s transcontinental railway construction timetable. Having
already promised to construct the Intercolonial railway (which Upper Canadians had
traditionally avoided due to the heavy cost they would bear), Ontario Liberals opposed
committing to the dominion government’s ambitious and expensive schedule. The
Advertiser opined that “we have saddled ourselves already with an unknown total for the
Intercolonial Railway… it behoves the people of Canada – and especially of Ontario, who
will have chiefly to bear the burden – to pause and count the cost before giving new
guarantees” to British Columbia.206 Alexander Mackenzie anticipated that the railway would
cost “six to seven times” as much as the Intercolonial and therefore moved an amendment
that limited construction to that which “the state of finances will justify.”207 Edward Blake
was also outraged by the government’s extravagant promise.208 It was wrong, these Liberals
concluded, for Ontarian taxpayers to bear these financial burdens against their will.
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When justifying their support for the terms of union, Ontario Coalition MPs and their
supporters tried to assuage concerns in their province concerning the deviations from ‘rep by
pop.’ The prime minister’s parliamentary majority may have allowed him to privately brag
that he could “pretty much [do] as I please,” but his supporters felt differently.209 They
knew, for example, that Ontario voters expected explanations for the overrepresentation of
the new provinces in the House of Commons. Some Ontarians, such as George Jackson,
struggled to justify the temporary overrepresentation of British Columbia. On this occasion
the man who boldly espoused the imperative of Ontarian support for compromise in 1865
only vaguely asserted that six representatives for British Columbia was “common sense.”210
Most Coalition supporters recognized that they needed to explicitly address the Liberals’
objections. The Leader claimed that the articles concerning representation by population in
the Quebec Resolutions and the BNA Act only applied to the original four provinces and
therefore had “no more reference to the Red River country than to Patagonia or Terra Del
Fuego.”211 During the 1871 parliamentary debate, William McDougall argued that the
Manitoba Act “had been passed under peculiar circumstances,” and therefore did not set a
precedent that could be used to justify the violation of representation by population for
British Columbia. He nevertheless accepted the new province’s overrepresentation because
he expected British Columbia’s population to surge after it entered Confederation. “The
evil,” McDougall concluded, “would be temporary.”212 While speaking to his own riding in
July, John Hillyard Cameron also downplayed the significance of Manitoba’s
overrepresentation: “the Province had just four members in the House of Commons, and yet
we were told that that was too many!” Confederation needed Manitoba and British Columbia,
and temporary overrepresentation was an acceptable cost. By contending that Ontario’s
preponderance was not threatened by these exceptions, Coalitionists appealed to Ontarian
voters to support the party that focused on national interests.213
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Conservatives rarely assessed Ontario’s interests when discussing the financial terms
of union for Manitoba and British Columbia. They denied that the terms were unfavourable
to Canada and instead emphasized the imperative and benefits of constructing a
transcontinental nation. “It was absurd,” the Leader argued in May 1870, to expect Manitoba
to find the financial resources to support its own development like the larger provinces.
“Exceptional concessions” were necessary if Canadians expected it to develop into a
province capable of paying for its own governance. Despite this appeal for generosity, the
Leader still felt the need to claim that Manitoba’s terms of union were “as equitable as any
bill could be.”214 A similar pattern emerged in 1871. As many historians note, the
transcontinental railway was a key component of the Canadian government’s nation-building
vision. Ontario Conservatives voted for this bold endeavour but struggled to explain why
Ontarians should support the expensive project. Jackson suggested that the construction of
the intercontinental railway would improve Canada’s standing with “English capitalists.”215
James Grant, the Conservative MP for Russell, expected Vancouver to become a major
shipping port with Asia. The affluent empires of Persia, Rome, and Britain had each
prospered while they “controlled the trade of the East.” All of Canada, including Ontario, he
concluded, would profit from this trade. Canada’s long-term interests lay in facilitating a
strong and prosperous British Columbia.216 The Leader was more direct when discussing
Ontario’s interests in a transcontinental railway:
The railway is a matter of fifty times as much interest to Ontario and the
Dominion at large as it is to British Columbia. Were British Columbia never
to come into the Confederation, a railway, first to Fort Garry, and then on
through the fertile valley of the Saskatchewan to the Rocky Mountains, would
be an absolute necessity if we have any serious notion of populating those
distant regions within reasonable time…. The actual cost which the railway
will incur will be small compared with the advantages to be derived form it.217
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Even this exposition retained a vague quality. Why and how western settlement would
benefit Ontario was common sense and unstated. Ontario Conservatives still struggled to
link their province’s interests to the Canadian government’s policies.
Those who opposed the terms of union for Manitoba and British Columbia were,
according to Ontario Conservative MPs and their supporters, unpatriotic opportunists who
endangered Confederation by using sectional narrow-mindedness to gain popularity in their
own province. Such pretences imperilled Confederation. The Intelligencer claimed that
Ontario Liberals opposed British Columbia’s terms of union to increase their popularity even
though they knew it could have driven the Pacific colony and the North-West to seek
annexation to the United States.218 Ontarians had to be flexible. It was “impossible,” the
Leader warned in May 1870,
to govern a country like Canada – covering as it does a wide extent of territory
and containing people who pursue so many varied industries – without an
occasional clashing of interest. If, on every such occasion, we are to have
men like Mr. Mackenzie coming forward… to fan the flame of discord instead
of drawing them together by the ties of amity and goodwill, the position of
affairs will become intolerable and one of two results will necessarily follow –
either the political fabric we have reared with so much labour and pains will
fall with a crash, or the agitators will be branded as traitors and cast out as
implacable foes of society.219
It was up to Ontarians to “decide which it shall be, for upon them mainly rests the obligation”
because it was in Ontario that sectionalism “first” arose.220 Responsible use of Ontario’s
preponderance required a willingness to compromise and invest in Canada.
In the end, the Liberals’ objections accomplished little. Although they convinced
Macdonald to expand Manitoba’s borders to include Portage La Prairie, they continued to
worry that Manitoba would be a second French-Catholic province. A similar sense of
entitlement led these Ontarians to demand the curtailment of the provinces’ financial terms of
union as well as their parliamentary representation. These objections did not change the
terms of union but they did produce heated exchanges that heightened political tensions
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between Ontario and Quebec. Although Ontario’s Coalition MPs expressed their desire for a
transcontinental nation, they also addressed Liberal ascriptions of Ontario’s influence in
Confederation. They dismissed concerns about the new provinces’ overrepresentation and
contended that Ontarians needed to support the generous terms if they expected to construct
and benefit from a transcontinental country. The willingness of Ontario Coalitionists to
confront these attacks and support the dominion government’s policies helped check
discontentment that risked jeopardizing Canada’s expansion.

The 1872 Canadian Election
The 1872 Canadian election was the final clash of preponderant federalists during the
first government. The year also marked the last Canadian election when ridings polled
sequentially over several months rather than simultaneously on a single day. The practice
prolonged the campaigning and allowed governments to schedule the initial polls in ridings
where they expected a strong showing to create the impression of landslide support. In
Ontario, the election was the culmination of five years of preponderant federalist debate.
Once again, a sense of power and entitlement to decisively impact national policy
development was integral to the Liberal campaign. The hope that Liberal candidates could
sweep their province by catering to English-Protestant prejudices and a belief that Ontario
could impact national policy development, contributed to Blake and Mackenzie’s willingness
to campaign on an Ontario-centric platform at the expense of their popularity in the rest of
Canada. The Macdonald government, Liberal partisans alleged, consistently ignored
Ontario’s interests because it relied on support from the rest of Canada. While speaking at
North Lanark, Alexander Mackenzie asked Ontarians to vote Liberal because “Cartier and
his friends no doubt wished to establish in the heart of the continent a small French colony to
balance the large and growing Province of Ontario.”221 If Ontarians expected to fulfil their
longstanding desire to expand into Rupert’s Land and prevent the erosion of their
parliamentary preponderance by a second French-Catholic province, they had to elect a
government dedicated to extending English-Protestantism in the West. Blake also
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complained that the over-representation of Manitoba and British Columbia damaged
Ontario’s intrastate influence. The election, he forecast, would be close. The ten new ridings
would almost certainly return Macdonald supporters who would tip the parliamentary
balance in favour of his government. Politicians like Edward Blake and James Young, the
Liberal MP for Waterloo South, also berated the dominion government’s willingness to take
on additional financial obligations despite Liberal objections.222 Ontario would pay 55% of
Nova Scotia’s better terms and a similar proportion of British Columbia’s twenty-year
$100,000 land subsidy. It would also contribute three-fifths of other Canadian expenditures,
including the transcontinental railway’s estimated $30 million cost. “And why… has Ontario
been betrayed into this position” the Globe asked? “Why, simply THAT ONTARIO MAY
BE VOTED DOWN – simply that Sir John A. Macdonald may continue to hold office and
bid defiance to the people of Ontario!”223 The Advertiser agreed that Macdonald bribed the
other provinces to “keep Ontario down.”224
Ontarian voters had the ability, these Liberals claimed, to eject the “backers of Riel”
from parliament and to prevent their province from being “plundered.”225 The Globe noted
that Ontario contained “nearly nine-twentieths of the whole House of Commons” and “could
practically control the legislation of the country” if its voters elected a single party to
represent the province in Ottawa.226 But the Toronto Liberal organ also pointed out that such
a sweep was not necessary to increase Ontario’s intrastate power. Six additional Reform
votes from Ontario would have postponed the “rash and premature pledge to construct the
Pacific Railway within ten years,” sixteen votes would have prevented British Columbia
from securing “excessive representation,” and eighteen additional votes would have carried
Mr. Rymal’s motion for the punishment of Thomas Scott’s “murders.”227 Ontario’s
“humiliation,” the Advertiser concurred, would only end when it elected representatives who
did not trade their province’s interests to maintain power.228
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The Conservatives, who discarded the Coalitionist façade, directly confronted the
sense of entitlement that informed these attacks by denying that Ontarians could use their
parliamentary power to influence Riel’s fate. The enforcement of criminal law, they pointed
out, was a provincial responsibility. Ontario could not use its parliamentary preponderance
to force the Canadian or Manitoban governments to arrest Riel or Lépine. While speaking in
Peterborough during July 1872, a heckler prompted Macdonald for Riel’s whereabouts.
Macdonald famously responded “God knows; I wish I could catch him.” The prime minister
noted that he also had no jurisdiction to pursue the man who gunned down his good friend
D’Arcy McGee in Ottawa on 7 April 1868. If the Canadian government lacked the
jurisdiction to influence the carriage of justice in the country’s capital, he reasoned, it would
be extreme hubris for it to attempt to force the Manitoban government to take action against
Riel.229 Macdonald also attacked Blake’s attempts to use Ontario’s influence to affect Riel’s
arrest. Far from encouraging Riel’s capture, the bounty compelled the fugitive to flee the
country. Macdonald claimed that the provincial government approved the bounty to foment
anti-French and anti-Catholic sentiment in Ontario and to turn the Orange Lodges against the
Conservatives.230 Ontario’s attempts to affect Riel’s capture, the Conservatives concluded,
were misplaced and counterproductive.
The Conservatives also encouraged Ontario’s voters to elect a bloc of their
candidates. The Leader warned Ontarian voters that “upon your votes may hang the destiny
of the Dominion. Its best interests have been entrusted to your hands.”231 The province’s
tendency to split its representation between the two parties was, it contended, “so inimical to
the well-being of Ontario [and] is the worst enemy of our province.”232 The Conservative
organ warned that Ontario would set the rest of Canada against Ontario if it elected a
“phalanx” of Liberals. Such an outcome would harm national unity and could even lead to
Canada’s dissolution.233 Several Conservatives echoed this concern. Sir Francis Hincks,
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who returned from being the Governor of Bermuda in 1869 and replaced Rose as
Macdonald’s Finance Minister, told his Peterborough audience that
the avowed policy of the Globe newspaper was that a party in Ontario – he
might hardly say Ontario, but a part of Ontario, the western peninsula –
should control the legislation of the Dominion, and enjoy a prescriptive right
to abuse every man who did not assent to that policy. If anyone took the
trouble to read that newspaper he would see it laid down that Ontario had a
right to control the legislation of the country, and that if the people of Ontario
held together they would be able to do it. The party which that paper
represented had taken a course… that would make a large portion of Ontario
detested by the people of the other parts of the country.234
The Conservatives, by contrast had worked to expand Canada across the continent while
fostering unity among the provinces. Hincks appealed to Ontarian voters to continue this
work and avoid alienating their province from power by supporting Conservative candidates.
Ironically it was Charles Tupper who, while campaigning at a mass meeting in Strathroy
during the 1872 Canadian elections, explained why Ontarians needed to tolerate the
violations of representation by population in the Manitoban and British Columbian deals:
The Opposition talked of the six members that had been given to that Province
[British Columbia] as if some dreadful crime had been committed, and as if
those members were to override all the rest of the Dominion. When he (Dr
Tupper) looked at the men who were standing before him – fair specimens of
the intellect, intelligence and power of Ontario – he could not believe that
they, with eighty-eight members in the Parliament, and conscious of their
strength, would begrudge Manitoba[‘s] four members for the short time that
would elapse until the teeming immigration that would flow into it would
raise its population so as to entitle it to a greater number; nor could he believe
that there was a man present who did not know that the admission of British
Columbia into the Union was cheap on the terms that had been granted and
that in a few years – such was its geographical position, the abundance of its
resources and the attractions it would offer to settlers from other countries – it
would have a right to claim a greater number than six representatives.235
According to Tupper, the Conservatives had not endangered Ontario’s parliamentary
preponderance. Ontario could benefit from Canada’s territorial expansion, and the province
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could not afford to allow petty jealousies over temporary inequalities to jeopardise this
future. It had to use its parliamentary preponderance to safeguard these national interests.
In the end, neither party secured a decisive victory in Ontario. The Liberals only
carried 48 of its 88 seats. This was a significant improvement on their 1867 showing though
the Liberal gains hardly constituted an unstoppable voting bloc. The popular vote was a dead
heat (see Appendix 2). Macdonald was disappointed by the Conservative’s weakness in
Ontario but it was not a critical failure. The Conservatives secured enough seats in the rest of
Canada to ensure a slim majority of 8 seats in parliament.236

Conclusion
During Confederation’s first five years, Ontarians expected their province to use its
intrastate preponderance to shape Canada’s political development. The division of Ontario’s
potential parliamentary preponderance between two competing federalisms, however, limited
the province’s influence. When running in general elections or debating issues such as the
Intercolonial’s route, Nova Scotia’s better terms, the Red River resistance, and the
Manitoban and British Columbian terms of union, many Ontarians, and especially Liberals,
believed that they could decisively shape the Canadian government’s policies. This belief in
Ontario’s preponderant influence emboldened them to repeatedly oppose policy demands
from the rest of Canada. Yet aside from the inclusion of Portage la Prairie in Manitoba and
Blake’s bounty, these agitations produced few tangible results. Instead of accepting defeat,
the same sense of power and entitlement led Ontario Liberals to bring the same debates to
their provincial Assembly. The indignant rhetoric and bigoted assumptions that informed
these debates often aggravated sectional tensions in Canada. Blake’s opposition to Nova
Scotia’s better terms, and his dogged pursuit of Riel and Lépine at Ontario’s Legislative
Assembly, aggravated interprovincial tensions and delayed the Liberal’s ability to attract
support from the rest of Canada.
The willingness of these Ontarians to challenge other provinces’ influence arose from
more than political opportunism or prejudice. Their actions also flowed from a belief that
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Ontario had the intrastate and ‘moral’ influence to decisively impact national debates. They
therefore urged Ontario MPs to protect the provincial ‘compact’ when critiquing the terms of
union for Manitoba and British Columbia. Contrary to the conclusions of scholars such as
Bruce Hodgins and Christopher Armstrong, the debates concerning better terms for Nova
Scotia demonstrate that this sense of power and provincial compact theory could be mutually
reinforcing ideas. Blake and his followers denied that they ignored provincial rights when
debating the Red River resistance at Ontario’s Legislative Assembly. The Assembly
admittedly lacked the jurisdiction to impose its will on either of these questions and these
Liberals would have responded indignantly if other governments had tried to pressure
Ontario in a similar manner. Yet no law barred the provincial legislature from trying to
influence national debates and attempts to rally Ontarians in both legislatures affords the
agitations a greater consistency than existing scholarship appreciates.
Not all Ontarians accepted the rationales that informed these aggressive stands
against other parts of the country. Ontario Coalitionists (both Conservative and Liberal)
asserted a different role for Ontario. Contrary to the claims of centralist historians, these
Ontarians maintained their provincial consciousness. They acknowledged Ontario’s unique
preponderant potential but argued that using its influence to block initiatives from other parts
of the country would destroy Confederation. Instead, they urged Ontario to desist from
obstructing these policies. On several occasions, such as the 1867 and 1872 elections and
during the debates concern the terms of union for Manitoba and British Columbia, they even
contended that Ontarian support for compromise solutions to national questions was integral
to fostering national unity.
The imperative of challenging the agitators’ sense of power and entitlement to
influence national debates by proposing alternative interpretations of Ontario’s influence was
especially strong in provincial politics, where Coalition MPPs could not rely on
representatives from other provinces to defend the government. They rebuffed these
agitations by noting the Assembly’s lack of jurisdiction but also recognized that they
required further rationales to justify their acceptance of dominion policies. Acknowledging
Ontario’s potential power while claiming that its interests lay in supporting compromise
allowed Coalition supporters to oppose agitations against initiatives from other parts of the
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country while affirming the desire to preponderate in Confederation. These strategies
facilitated Ontarian support for the Coalition in 1867 the and rejection of all but one of
Blake’s resolutions concerning better terms for Nova Scotia in 1869. Although the agitations
in Ontario against these initiatives regularly increased Canadian political tensions with their
rhetoric and policy demands, the existence of two preponderant federalisms generally split
Ontario’s voice and helped to ensure that they rarely impacted the Canadian government’s
policies.
Yet the willingness of Ontario Coalitionists to suggest uniting behind compromise
also suffered from limitations. The belief that allowing Riel and Lépine to remain free was
contrary to Canadian law limited the willingness of Ontario Coalitionists to oppose the
campaign for their capture. Similarly, the unpopularity of better terms for Nova Scotia led
Coalitionists to support Blake’s 13th resolution requesting legislation barring the Canadian
government from granting any further adjustments to the financial terms of union. When an
agitation against a policy by the dominion or provincial governments enjoyed strong support
in Ontario, and especially when it was widely held to violate Canadian law, urging Ontarians
to support compromise became a political impossibility.
In 1872 both preponderant federalisms remained important to Ontario political culture
and Canadian politics. That same year, Ontarians continued to contest whether their province
was the ‘Ishmael of Confederation,’ but both types of preponderant federalists agreed that
their province was a first among equals. New political imperatives, however, reduced the
utility of that assumption.
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Chapter 4: The Curtailment of Preponderant Federalisms,
1872-1884
“It is true, as you remarked, Sir, that it is always possible for a large and powerful Province
to do something distasteful to the smaller ones, but I think it is still more likely that a
powerful neighbour will prove generous, and use its power not with a view of her own
aggrandizement, but to deal justice to all. It has been the aim of my political life to do justice
to every section, and to see that no section gets more than justice…. I hope that in the course
of the next few years the progress of this Province will be such as to lead every one to view
as favourably as possible the combination known as the Dominion of Canada.”
Alexander Mackenzie, Globe, 9 November 1875.

Alexander Mackenzie’s comments before a Halifax audience in 1875 reflected a new
unwillingness to pit Ontario against the rest of Canada. Two failed attempts to return an
overwhelming Liberal caucus from Ontario at national elections and repeated failures to rally
Ontarians to impose their will upon other parts of the country between 1867 and 1872
demonstrated that Liberal aspirations for preponderant and even dominant provincial
influence were misplaced. Ontario Liberal MPs and their supporters increasingly recognized
that their province would not supply their party with sufficient seats to dominate a national
government. This understanding led them to seek the support of representatives from the rest
of Canada by seeking compromise solutions that accommodated their diverse demands. The
change also forced these Ontarians to reconsider their opposition to demands from other parts
of the country during controversial debates such as Riel’s expulsion from parliament, a Red
River amnesty, and the New Brunswick schools question. In parliament, Ontario Liberals
pointed to provincial rights and Imperial authority to dissuade their constituents from
believing that they could use their parliamentary preponderance to impact Canadian policy.
Although the Conservatives occasionally hinted that Ontario MPs needed to block initiatives
from other parts of Canada while in opposition at Ottawa, the same partisan considerations
led them away from mounting a concerted agitation. The shift away from pitting Ontario
against the rest of Canada was also apparent in Ontario’s Legislative Assembly where
provincial Liberals almost entirely disengaged from these divisive national questions. The
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successful curtailment of the sense of power and entitlement in Ontario helped the
Macdonald and Mackenzie governments to prevent these debates from escalating into
political crises that damaged national unity.
The national Liberals did not, however, completely curtail the desire among their
Ontarian supporters to use their province’s influence to block initiatives from the rest of
Canada. This was evident during the better terms debates in 1873 and 1884. As in 1869 and
1870, the Liberals formed the parliamentary opposition during these debates, and did not
have to find compromise resolutions. Yet the goal of forming a national Liberal government
led its Ontario leaders to gradually stop from urging their province’s MPs to use their
parliamentary preponderance to block the better terms proposals. By 1884 partisan pressures
even led Edward Blake to drop his rejection of better terms and to instead support enlarged
subsidies so long as every province received a proportionate increase. Despite this
curtailment in parliament, Liberal MPs and newspapers still tried to convince the province’s
voters that Ontario would be more influential if they turned against the Conservatives. The
belief that Ontario could preponderate in national policy debates continued to hold sway but
partisan considerations led the Liberals away from alienating their support in the rest of
Canada.
Proposals for alternative applications of Ontario’s influence ebbed and flowed with
this oppositional rhetoric. The hesitancy of the Conservatives and Liberals to rally Ontarians
against other parts of the country during the expulsion, amnesty, and New Brunswick school
debates reduced the need for MPs to explain why Ontario needed to support the government.
When the Liberals showed some willingness to rally Ontarians against further better terms,
the Conservative press responded by publishing a few editorials calling attention to Ontario’s
unique ability to use its influence to foster national unity. Countering these agitations did
not, in short, necessitate a subordination of regional consciousness to nationalism.
Conservative newspapers and MPs continued to justify their support for the government by
arguing that Ontario’s influence was more usefully applied to supporting better terms.
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Partisan Developments
Ontario Conservatives and the Liberals made important adjustments in 1872.
Macdonald shed his ‘Coalitionist’ guise and refocused on his Conservative base. The prime
minister also abandoned the Leader as his primary media organ. Beaty’s newspaper did not
challenge the Globe’s ability to mould public opinion. In its place, the Conservatives
founded a new newspaper, the Mail, to carry their message across the province. Its editor,
T.C. Patteson, created a publication designed for a mass audience by including everything
from sports to international news. Soon the paper ran morning, evening, and weekly
editions. The Mail, unlike the Leader, closely followed the Conservative line and ensured
that its readers received the Conservative’s interpretation of political developments. The
Leader gradually fell into obscurity and eventually folded in 1878.1
In 1872 the Conservatives and Liberals had not yet coalesced into national parties.
Although Macdonald succeeded in constructing a national caucus, the pursuit of regional
interests continued to rival party discipline. By maintaining his alliance with Cartier,
Macdonald gained significant support from Quebec. The alliance, however, also required the
prime minister to heed Cartier’s counsel. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Reform MPs
refused to tie themselves to a party dominated by Central Canadian concerns and power.
Their members eschewed party alliances and followed whichever parliamentary leader they
believed would best serve their province or riding. Escott Reid called this strategy
“ministerialist” because it led MPs to follow ministerial patronage rather than parties. By
granting favours to regional group leaders, such as Joseph Howe, Macdonald gained the
support of the majority of Maritime representatives. In Ontario, the moderate Liberals, led by
MPs such as Howland and McDougall, dropped their Coalitionist association and gradually
re-joined the Liberal or Conservative national and provincial caucuses. At the end of 1872,
Macdonald headed a national Conservative government.2
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The Liberals lagged behind their Conservative counterparts at forming a similar party.
In 1872, their caucus remained a loose alliance of regional groups. Several factors
contributed to this dynamic. According to Paul Heppe, the Liberal tradition of privileging
individualism and provincial autonomy at the expense of “party coherence and solidarity”
made it very difficult for their members to accept the sacrifices necessary to create a
“disciplined, nationally organized party.”3 Ontario Liberals also lacked the patronage
necessary to attract Maritime ministerialists. Quebec’s Rouges shared the Reformers’
liberalism but it was difficult to convince their voters to support a Liberal government when
their Ontarian counterparts protested French-Catholic intrastate power. Many of these
Maritime Reformers and Rouges, moreover, had been anti-Confederates only a few years
before, and only gradually accepted Confederation. The Liberals thus remained even less
united in parliament. Until 1873, they could not even agree on a parliamentary leader.
George Brown remained an important influence in Ontario but his failure to secure a riding
in 1867 left the Liberals with a series of provincial and regional parliamentary heads.
Brown’s pre-Confederation voluntaryism also made him unpopular with the majority of
Catholic voters across Canada. Selecting a parliamentary leader would be a first step to
organizing a Liberal party with national appeal that could rival its Conservative counterpart.4
Alexander Mackenzie, who heard rumours that the Conservatives might suffer from
scandal during the upcoming session, arranged for leading Liberals to meet and select an
official leader before the 1873 spring session began. Mackenzie believed that his limited
education made him a poor choice. He therefore urged Edward Blake to accept the position
of party leader. Blake was young, educated, and very popular in Ontario but he suffered
from what doctors called “neurasthenia,” an emotional condition that caused him
considerable anxiety and sometimes forced him to take lengthy holidays from public duties.
Since becoming a politician in 1867, he had also neglected his lucrative legal practice, and he
told the meeting that he intended to devote much of his attention during the next few years to
building it back up. He refused to accept the leadership. Instead, Blake asserted that
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Mackenzie should assume formal leadership of the party. Since Confederation, Mackenzie
often led the party in the House and it was only logical that he should continue in this role.
Still others suggested Dorion assume the leadership. But Dorion believed the leader needed
to be an Ontarian because they compromised the caucus’ largest provincial contingent. The
meeting disbanded without a leader. Only hours before the 1873 Throne Speech, the party’s
leadership met again, and this time Mackenzie succumbed to pressure and agreed to serve as
leader.5
Selecting a Liberal leader proved to be a prudent strategy. During the spring of 1873
Lucius Seth Huntington, a Montreal Liberal MP, rocked parliament by claiming that the
Conservative party had accepted huge financial contributions (eventually found to be
$350,000) from Sir Hugh Allan during the 1872 campaign. Sir Allan, a wealthy and
influential Montreal businessman, donated the funds to the Conservatives with the
understanding that the government would give him the presidency of the company that would
construct Canada’s Pacific railway. Macdonald’s telegraph to Allan requesting “another ten
thousand” dollars to carry the party to the end of the campaign, connected him to this
violation of electoral law. As Macdonald pointed out during the subsequent inquiry,
accepting large donations for political favours was common at the time. The sheer scale of
the donations, and the revelation that Allan had secretly maintained ties with American
railwaymen who sought to undermine an all-Canadian route for the transcontinental line,
however, turned public sympathy toward the Liberals who had always claimed that they put
patriotism before party. The Governor General, Lord Dufferin, was deeply troubled by these
revelations. After reviewing the facts, and despite his family’s close friendship with
Macdonald, he asked the prime minister to resign. On 7 November 1873, Dufferin swore in
Canada’s first Liberal government.6 Partisanship remained sufficiently loose that Mackenzie
did not immediately dissolve parliament. Instead, he waited to see if sufficient ministerialists
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would switch their partisan allegiance to his government. When he failed to attract sufficient
supporters, Mackenzie called an election.7
The character and outcome of the campaign based on the ‘Pacific Scandal’ was a
forgone conclusion. Mackenzie claimed that Canadians had to “purge” parliament of
corruption. The Liberals, he declared, would provide “honest” government.8 The former
stonemason told the crowd that his government would pass significant reforms to the election
laws, including simultaneous voting across the country and a secret ballot. He also promised
to create a Canadian Supreme Court and to renegotiate the railway agreement with British
Columbia. A Liberal government would construct the transcontinental railway, but at a
slower pace. Existing water-born transportation on the rivers and lakes between the Rockies
and the Great Lakes would fill the interim gap. Aside from its railway policy, the Liberal
platform was uncontroversial and ensured that voters could focus on the scandal.
By comparison, the Conservatives were in disarray. Despite Macdonald’s public
shaming, the Conservative caucus rejected his resignation. Macdonald nevertheless
recognized that his leadership was a liability to the party, and he rarely campaigned outside
of his Kingston riding. In Ontario, most Conservative candidates criticized the Liberal
platform. The Pacific Scandal was a witch-hunt, they claimed, and voters would not be
fooled by the Liberal ploy. Canada needed a transcontinental railway as soon as possible.
Again the popular vote was close, but its distribution gave the Liberals a landslide victory. In
Ontario, the Liberals won 66 of the province’s 88 seats (see Appendix 2). They captured just
over half of the ridings in Quebec and swept the Maritimes. The Conservatives only did well
in British Columbia, where its small population clung to the Conservative promise to honour
the CPR’s ambitious construction schedule.9
This victory induced Liberal rule but their caucus remained deeply regionalized. The
Liberal win brought significant Maritime support and the government’s New Brunswick and
Nova Scotian contingents each received two seats in the new cabinet. But their cabinet
ministers rarely attained the influence of their Ontario and Quebec counterparts including
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Blake, Mackenzie, Holton, and Dorion.10 The persistence of strong regional allegiances
made pitting Ontario against the rest of Canada an extremely dangerous strategy for the
government. Mackenzie could not allow his Ontario caucus to threaten his government by
treating the rest of Canada as a force to be overcome. The Liberal government had to do
more than balance conflicting provincial and regional interests. To avoid being toppled by
national political crises, it had to sidestep the Ontarian sense of entitlement to preponderant
influence that many of its leaders had encouraged since 1867.

The Expulsion and Amnesty Questions
For the next twenty months following the 1872 national election, Ontarians only
rarely considered the fate of Riel and Lépine. In February 1873 the Ontario Assembly briefly
debated the government’s bounty. M.C. Cameron continued to insist that the measure
exceeded the province’s jurisdiction and questioned the Ontario government’s sincerity by
asking why it did not go further by appointing agents to pursue the former resistance leader
in Manitoba. Oliver Mowat, who became premier the preceding October, defended his
predecessor’s measure. Mowat claimed that the Ontario government had the right to offer a
reward for Riel’s capture but it could not appoint officers to pursue the former resistance
leader beyond Ontario’s borders. Like Blake, the new premier distinguished between
Ontario’s constitutional jurisdiction and its ability to lobby other provinces. The provincial
Liberal government continued to deny that there was a conflict between asserting Ontario’s
influence and demanding provincial autonomy.11
Cartier’s death and Riel’s re-election to the dominion riding of Provencher resumed
the debate concerning the former resistance leader. On 30 March 1874, Riel entered
parliament, took the oath of allegiance to the Queen, signed the register, was recognized, and
fled Ottawa. Many Ontarian English-Protestants were horrified by Riel’s presence in their
province. Over the next two years, Canadians focused on the futures of Riel and Lépine.
Although historians note the hesitancy of Liberal and Conservative leaders to confront the
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religious and racial antagonisms that informed the debate, they only implicitly acknowledge
how the desire for intrastate influence in Ontario and Quebec shaped their respective
responses to the questions.12 Once in power, Ontario Liberals laboured to prevent the
agitations that they had previously encouraged from destabilizing their government. They
utilized a combination of silence, delay, and disassociation, to constrain their province’s
sense of power from raising religious and racial tensions. Their successful use of these
strategies allowed Ontario Liberal MPs to sustain the Mackenzie government’s passage of an
amnesty bill. Opposition Conservatives from Ontario did not, by contrast, adopt their
predecessors’ aggressive stand against the rest of Canada. They initially avoided
preponderant federalisms entirely, and even decided against urging Ontarians to unite and
defeat the government’s amnesty policy in parliament. They did, however, foster discontent
with the Liberal party in Ontario by arguing that it no longer heeded Ontario’s voice.
Immediately following Riel’s flight from Ottawa, Bowell and Schultz moved that
parliament examine the evidence concerning Riel’s criminal status in Manitoba. They also
summoned H.J. Clarke, the Attorney General of Manitoba, to testify before parliament
concerning his province’s warrant for Riel’s arrest. Both motions passed with almost no
comment from the government side. Clarke, who was in Ottawa at the time, testified the
following day and affirmed the warrant for Riel’s arrest. At the end of the proceedings,
Bowell and Schultz moved another resolution requesting Riel attend parliament the following
day. This motion also passed without comment from the uneasy government.13
For the next two weeks, both parties’ Toronto organs fomented anti-Riel sentiment.
The Globe demanded Riel’s expulsion from parliament. The presence of a wanted man’s
name on the roll call, it opined, lowered parliament’s stature. By failing to attend the session,
moreover, Riel was not fulfilling his duties to his riding. Provencher’s constituents had the
right to expect representation in parliament.14 Conversely, the Leader alleged that the
Mackenzie government was in “alliance with the [Catholic] Hierarchy.” It tried to make the
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Canadian government the target of frustration in Ontario by claiming that it did not attempt
to catch Riel while he was in Ottawa. The Leader even speculated that the government had
facilitated Riel’s access to parliament hill and hinted that it was contemplating an amnesty.15
Although the editors of both newspapers clearly believed that the majority of Ontarians still
desired the punishment for Scott’s killers, they avoided offending Quebec by urging united
Ontarian action.
After Riel failed to respond to a second motion to attend parliament, Bowell and
Schultz moved that he be expelled from the House of Commons because he was, “beyond the
shadow of a doubt,” guilty of actions that made him “unworthy” of sitting in the House of
Commons. By mid-April 1874, Bowell initiated the two-day debate by claiming that “it was
the duty of the government” to secure Riel’s capture and expel him from parliament until he
stood trial. In response, Joseph Mousseau, the Conservative MP for Bagot, moved an
amendment requesting the Crown grant Riel full amnesty. Mackenzie was in an awkward
position. From 1870 to 1872, he and other Liberals had tried to improve their party’s
popularity in Ontario by stoking anti-Catholic sentiment and the belief that Ontario had the
right and ability to block Quebec’s influence (see Chapter 3). Now, however, his
government required French-Canadian support and sympathy in Quebec for Riel had
strengthened. The majority of Quebec newspapers now described Riel’s future as a FrenchCanadian cause worthy of the province’s intrastate support. When denouncing Bowell’s
motion for expulsion, most Quebec MPs regretted Scott’s death but claimed that it was an
execution carried out by a legitimate government. Riel and his followers were not, they
insisted, criminally liable.16
Mackenzie was eager to avoid an intrastate contest and borrowed from the
Conservatives who had previously emphasized rule of law and due process during similar
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debates following the resistance. By focusing on legal questions, rather than intrastate
influence, Mackenzie sidestepped the desire in Ontario to influence the emerging bicultural
dispute. The prime minister pledged to vote for Bowell’s motion because Riel remained a
“fugitive from justice.” He also promised to vote against Mousseau’s amnesty motion but
did not rule out supporting amnesty in the future. The prime minister claimed that he could
not support amnesty for Riel at the present time because a parliamentary committee had not
yet determined whether the Macdonald government had promised it.17 Blake made a similar
case. He claimed that “it was their duty not to be carried away by passion or prejudice” and
even suggested that the leaders of the Orange Order “regretted” some of their memberships’
extreme positions. Conscious of French-Catholic sensitivities in Quebec, Blake avoided the
question of Riel’s guilt when he addressed parliament: “it was because he [Riel] did not
come here, and because his absence from this place was occasioned by an evasion of justice
that Provencher was not represented… that they were asked to declare that seat vacant.” Riel
could not take his seat in parliament for the riding of Provencher unless he cleared his name
in a court of law. An amnesty, moreover, was out of the question at the time because
parliament would not grant Mousseau’s request and the debate would generate further
sectional discord across the country.
Aside from Bowell and a few backbenchers who briefly faulted the Liberal
government for not doing more to catch Riel, Conservative MPs from Ontario did not speak
during the debate. Macdonald was conspicuously absent. Conservative MPs from Quebec
delivered the majority of the Opposition’s responses. The Conservatives and Liberals, in
short, recognized that pitting Ontario against Quebec would destabilize their parties and
ensured that their speakers did not inflame the debate by offending either provinces’ desire
for intrastate power. But these precautions did not deter bloc voting. When it was time to
vote, most Quebecers opposed Bowell’s motion, but nearly every Ontarian representative,
including Mackenzie and Blake, supported it. Without raising the battle cries of 1870 to
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1872, a united Ontarian vote expelled Riel from parliament. The amnesty question, however,
continued to linger.18
The push to resolve the question arrived seven months later. In early November 1874
a Manitoban court sentenced Ambroise Lépine to be hanged the following January for the
execution of Thomas Scott. This ruling forced Mackenzie’s government to settle the
amnesty question. Although the public knew that the government would grant some sort of
amnesty to the vast majority of the Red River resistors, the fate of Lépine, Riel, and other
leaders, remained uncertain. Racial and religious tensions, as well as the desire in both
provinces to control the debate, increasingly divided the country and paralyzed Mackenzie’s
government.19 Quebecers believed that the Canadian government was obligated to grant a
full amnesty to all Red River resistors and they expected Mackenzie’s government to heed
their demands. The Governor General received 252 petitions bearing the names of 58,568
individuals petitioning against Lépine’s execution. Quebec’s Legislative Assembly also
unanimously requested mercy. To make matters worse for Mackenzie, his Liberal
government lacked a Quebec lieutenant that could make a compromise palatable in French
Canada because Dorion left the cabinet in late May 1874 to become Chief Justice of the
Queen’s Court Bench of Quebec. Some of Mackenzie’s Quebec cabinet ministers, who had
expressed sympathy for Lépine’s plight when campaigning in 1874 and endured Riel’s
parliamentary expulsion, threatened to resign from the government. They demanded that the
government grant Lépine and the other leaders of the Red River resistance an amnesty or at
least moderate their punishment to a few years in prison, banishment, or the loss of civil
liberties. French-Quebecers expected the dominion government to heed their demands. 20
On the other hand, Mackenzie could not afford to ignore the expectation in Ontario
that the Canadian government comply with its demands for the capture and punishment of
Thomas Scott’s killers. Lépine’s trial could not have come at a worse time. On 18 January
1875, Ontarian voters would choose between the Catholic-friendly Mowat and the well18
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known Orangeman M.C. Cameron in a provincial election. As Blake pointed out in an
understated letter to Mackenzie, any lenience by the dominion government would be
“inexpedient” for Mowat’s electoral prospects.21 Unable to find a solution that did not
offend the demands and sense of power in both provinces, Ontario Liberals and their
newspapers diverted attention from their indecision by criticizing the Conservatives for not
pursuing Scott’s killers.22
This intrastate tug-of-war paralyzed the Canadian government. Until mid-December,
the Mackenzie government, like its Conservative predecessor, avoided a parliamentary
debate and pressured the Imperial government to intervene. An Imperial amnesty would
satisfy French Quebec while absolving the Liberals in Ontario for the responsibility of
granting his freedom. Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon, however, recognized the
sensitivity of the subject and insisted that the Crown only grant an amnesty if the Canadian
government officially requested one.23
Although Lord Dufferin recognized that the amnesty question was mishandled from
the start, he also knew that neither the Imperial nor the dominion governments could act
without further dividing the country. He therefore quietly sought the permission of both
governments to commute Lépine’s sentence on his own authority. Over the Christmas break
he proposed commuting Lépine’s death sentence to two years imprisonment and the
permanent loss of civil rights. To avoid disturbing the Ontario provincial election,
Mackenzie asked Dufferin to postpone announcing the decision until after the polls closed.
The Governor General consented, and did not publish his proclamation until 21 January
1875. When justifying his decision, he expressed his unwillingness to overlook the execution
of Thomas Scott. He also noted the loyalty of Red River’s Métis to the Crown during the
Fenian raid of 1871 and pointed out that Quebec’s population was led to believe that the
resistors would receive full amnesty.24
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Free from the burden of determining Lépine’s fate, Mackenzie embraced Dufferin’s
lead and presented a similar compromise to a packed parliament on 7 February. His
government proposed a general amnesty for everyone involved in the resistance except Riel
who would also receive an amnesty after the conclusion of a five-year banishment.
Thereafter, he could return to Canada but would never be eligible to hold political office. To
justify this policy and combat the lingering sense of power and entitlement that threatened to
jeopardize the Liberal government’s stability, Mackenzie gave a lengthy speech wherein he
claimed that his Conservative predecessor had promised to grant a full amnesty and that
preserving the peace in Manitoba and the rest of the country required the Liberal government
to honour that commitment. He also criticized Macdonald for quietly bribing Riel to stay in
the United States while publicly declaring that he wanted to catch him during the 1872
election. Edward Blake, who privately believed the government policy was too lenient,
nevertheless bowed to Mackenzie’s decision and echoed his leader’s claim that the
government had to honour the amnesty promised by their Conservative predecessors.
Télesphore Fournier (the Minister of Justice), and Wilfrid Laurier (the newly elected lawyer
representing Drummond-Arthabaska) made similar speeches regretting that a full amnesty
was not possible but insisting that the government’s plan was better than no amnesty.25
Ontario Conservatives criticized the amnesty and denied their alleged culpability.
Macdonald, sitting in the opposition benches and free of the hazards of formulating policy,
vehemently attacked the government’s decision as a blatant disregard of Ontario’s demands
and influence. He repeatedly defended his honour as an Ontarian representative and denied
that his government had promised to grant Riel an amnesty. Macdonald again complained
that Blake’s bounty drove Riel out of the country. He also mocked the Liberal amnesty
compromise by noting Mackenzie and Blake’s previous demands for Riel’s capture and trial.
The Liberals, who had once attacked Macdonald for his government’s failure to capture Riel
and Lépine, now proposed a resolution that he “would never have dared to propose in this
House.”26 Mackenzie’s government was two-faced; it would tell Ontarians that Scott had
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been avenged, and Quebecers that “the punishment is very light.”27 Bowell agreed. The
Liberals were no longer willing to match their rhetoric with action.28 The Mackenzie
government, they implied, no longer heeded Ontario’s preponderant power. Although
Conservatives never explicitly called upon Ontario MPs to unite against the government,
they urged their province’s voters to believe that the Liberals had abandoned their province
and now bowed to Quebec’s influence to maintain their power.
On 12 February parliament passed the Liberal amnesty policy by a vote of 126 to 50.
Roughly two-thirds of Ontario’s representatives voted in favour of the amnesty. The
majority of Quebec MPs also supported the measure. After the debate, Ontarians debated
how their influence affected the outcome of the dispute. In an editorial published on 15
February, the Globe avoided mentioning Ontario’s vote. Instead, it continued to insist that
Macdonald bribed Riel to flee to the United States and promised an amnesty. The Liberal
government, it insisted, was obligated to fulfil his pledge. Macdonald, rather than
Mackenzie, was the cause of Ontario’s disappointment.29 The Leader addressed Ontario’s
vote and built upon Macdonald’s flirtation with its preponderant potential. In an editorial
published the same day, the Conservative organ decried the passage of the government’s
amnesty bill. It alleged that the Liberal government was dominated by Quebec’s influence.
“No one in Ontario,” it opined, “believes that the Premier had any other motive in advocating
an amnesty for the murderers of Scott, than to secure for his Administration the support of
Lower Canada, and the motives of these sixty members who supported him in it.” Ontario,
the Leader suggested, did not have to tolerate the Mackenzie government’s willingness to
service Quebec’s demands. “The Province of Ontario never intended, in sending these men to
represent it in Parliament, that they should use their influence for the purpose of freeing two
criminals from the consequence of their crimes.” Only the Conservatives, the Leader
asserted, represented the widespread disgust in Ontario.30 By waiting until after the debate’s
completion, the Leader ensured that its more explicit editorial did not heighten tensions by
inspiring Ontario MPs to unite behind an anti-French or anti-Catholic platform. The timing of
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the editorial’s publication instead points to the Conservative’s willingness to embitter
Ontarians against Quebec’s influence and the Liberal government. The Leader, moreover,
did not repeat this attack for the rest of the month. The deviation from their traditional
interpretation of Ontario’s preponderance was a calculated risk.
Neither Ontario Conservatives nor Liberals were willing to endanger their popularity
in Quebec by rallying Ontario MPs to use their collective votes to block government policy
during the expulsion and amnesty debates. In 1874, when Ontario’s MPs proved that they
could unite and overcome Quebec’s opposition, neither party urged Ontarians to force Riel’s
expulsion from parliament. The following year, Mackenzie’s Liberals adopted Macdonald’s
tactic of appealing to Imperial authorities for leadership. They also claimed that
Macdonald’s government bound them to pass an amnesty. In so doing, Liberal leaders
provided ways for their followers to circumvent the sense of entitlement in Ontario that they
had engendered from 1870 to 1872. Their evasion of this desire for influence in Ontario
allowed Mackenzie’s government to eventually despatch the amnesty question without
endangering their government.
The amnesty debate also reveals that the Conservatives were not entirely consistent
preponderant federalists. While in Opposition, Macdonald, Bowell, and the Leader,
occasionally suggested that Ontario rally against Quebec’s demands. The Conservatives,
however, only used this interpretation of Ontario’s preponderant potential to cultivate
discontentment against the Liberal party and never explicitly urged Ontarians to unite against
Quebec during a parliamentary debate. Attempting to unite Ontario MPs against an amnesty
would have been politically unwise. Eager to regain power, Macdonald was constrained by
the same regional forces as Mackenzie, and could not afford to appear to favour either
province’s influence. The Conservative’s limited forays into this confrontational vision of
Ontario’s potential preponderant influence nevertheless demonstrate that they were not
ideologically bound to advocating compromise. Macdonald and his followers were not above
encouraging a sense of grievance and power in Ontario when it suited their purposes. The
Conservative susceptibility to this temptation became more apparent in 1885.
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The New Brunswick Schools Question
The political necessity of curtailing the sense of power and entitlement in Ontario to
preponderate in national debates impacted other disputes. During the New Brunswick school
question debates of 1872 to 1875, Ontario Conservatives and Liberals dissuaded their
constituents from believing that they could use their parliamentary preponderance to shape
the Canadian government’s response to the petitions of New Brunswick Catholics by
emphasizing provincial rights and deferring to Imperial authorities. By disabusing Ontarians
of the belief that they could influence the school question, the leaders from both parties
prevented these followers from turning the question into a national political crisis that could
have toppled the Macdonald or Mackenzie governments.
By 1872, New Brunswick had enjoyed separate schools for decades. The vague
wording of the province’s 1858 Parish Schools Act allowed the Board of Education to fund
all schools as denominational institutions. Irish Protestant, Irish Catholic, and Acadian
schools all received state funding to purchase different textbooks. In 1871 Premier George
E. King’s government passed the New Brunswick Common Schools Act that created a free
and compulsory public education system and eliminated public funding for all schools that
did not adhere to the state’s new non-denominational curriculum. This last measure outraged
New Brunswick Catholics who comprised 34% of the province’s population.31
During the dominion parliamentary session of 1872, several Catholic New Brunswick
MPs pressured the government to intervene. John Costigan, the Irish Catholic Conservative
MP for the province’s Victoria riding, moved a resolution requesting the Canadian
government to disallow King’s anti-Catholic legislation. During the parliamentary debate on
Costigan’s motion, most Canadian political leaders used provincial rights to dissuade their
followers from believing that their province could influence the debate. Macdonald
expressed sympathy for New Brunswick’s Catholic minority. Yet he contended that the
province’s school system had never been codified in law, and that it was therefore beyond the
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protection of section 93 of the BNA Act. The dominion government, he concluded, had no
right to intervene. McDougall echoed his leader’s stance. Cartier convinced the Bleus to
hold to this constitutional interpretation by suggesting that ignoring the limitations of section
93 would expose Quebec’s provincial autonomy to parliamentary interference in the future.
Like Macdonald, Edward Blake expressed strong sympathy for New Brunswick Catholics
but argued that Confederation was a provincial compact and that intervening in such a
dispute would endanger local autonomy. The Rouges, including Dorion, were the only group
from central Canada to support Costigan’s protest of the “injustice” suffered by the New
Brunswick minority.32 Parliament’s rebuff forced Costigan to allow his resolution to be
watered-down to a statement regretting “that the School Act of the Province of New
Brunswick is unsatisfactory to a portion of the inhabitants,” and requesting the provincial
government to amend its own legislation.33 Parliament passed this limited expression of
sympathy for New Brunswick Catholics and, in an attempt to avoid the divisive issue in the
future, asked the Imperial government to determine whether section 93 of the BNA Act
applied to the New Brunswick case.34 A few months later, Imperial lawyers confirmed the
validity of the Canadian government’s policy. Section 93 could not be applied to New
Brunswick’s 1872 legislation. By emphasizing provincial autonomy, the Liberals,
Conservatives, and Bleus, all avoided goading each other into an intrastate confrontation.
Ontario Liberals and Conservatives also avoided making the school question a test of
their provincial intrastate influence in 1873. Earlier that year, the government of New
Brunswick passed new measures to close loopholes being used by Catholics to avoid
contributing to the new public school system. It empowered officials to coerce payment from
resisting ratepayers. In Ottawa, Costigan proposed a resolution requesting the dominion
government to disallow the legislation until the JCPC ruled on its constitutionality. Despite
his preference for a legislative union, Macdonald continued to disabuse his province of any
sense of entitlement to influence the debate. There was no need for Ontarians to mobilize
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against Quebec interference. Section 93 of the BNA Act, he still insisted, did not apply to the
New Brunswick case. Disallowance was therefore unconstitutional.35
This time, however, most Quebec Bleus refused to follow the prime minister. Acadian
French-Catholics needed Quebec’s protection. The Catholic Church’s recent publication of
the “Programme Catholique,” which required politicians to closely follow the political vision
of the Clergy, convinced many Bleu MPs to support Costigan. Most Rouge MPs also
supported Costigan’s resolution because, according to Dorion, the dominion government had
the constitutional right to intervene on behalf of the minority. Honoré Mercier, the Liberal
MP for Rouville, went even further. As a founding member of the Parti National, a
movement that was mainly Liberal but aimed to unite moderates from both parties in
Quebec, he argued that a “united” Catholic vote “could not fail to obtain justice.”36 Quebec’s
mobilization did not, however, spark a confrontational response from Ontario. Instead of
reiterating their provincial rights stance, Ontario Liberals tried to topple the government by
exploiting the Bleus defection. In a speech defending his position, Mackenzie, like
Macdonald, focused on the legalities of the dispute. But the Liberal leader claimed that it
was unclear whether section 93 applied to the New Brunswick case. This uncertainty, he
claimed, compelled his party to defend New Brunswick’s minority until the JCPC ruled on
the constitutionality of the provincial legislation. Even in this moment of Ontario-Quebec
agreement, Mackenzie did not suggest that Ontarians needed to throw their political weight
behind compromise. The Ontarian Protestants’ distaste for separate schools, in addition to
the knowledge that the province’s Conservative MPs would continue to oppose Costigan,
made the strategy politically unappealing. Parliament passed Costigan’s resolution by a vote
of 98 to 63. When the prime minister refused to disallow the legislation the opposition
drafted a non-confidence motion. Macdonald’s promise to fund the minority’s appeal to the
JCPC, however, convinced Quebec’s Bishops to reverse their partisan position. The Bleus
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refused to support the non-confidence motion and the school question again dropped from
national politics. Both Macdonald’s need to salvage his Quebec support and Mackenzie’s
desire to profit from rising discontentment in Quebec with the Conservative government’s
inaction, precluded setting Ontario MPs against their Quebec counterparts.37
In 1875, Costigan tried to circumvent parliament’s limited jurisdiction on education.
On 8 March he moved another resolution requesting the Imperial government amend the
BNA Act to give New Brunswick Catholics the same system of separate schools and tax
exemptions enjoyed by the religious minorities in Quebec and Ontario. The constitution, he
argued, was not “cast iron… which could never be altered.” When the interests of the
country were at stake, he contended that parliament had the right to seek change. Parliament
had, after all, passed his 1873 resolution. He appealed directly to Ontarian and Quebec MPs
to again support his resolution.38
Many Quebecers answered Costigan’s call. Several Quebec newspapers, including
Le Courrier de St.Hyacinthe, La Minerve, and Le Journal des Trois-Rivières, urged their
province’s MPs to ensure the passage of the resolution. English Canada and especially
Ontario, they asserted, sought the destruction of French-Catholic life in Canada. Quebec, as
the “principal representative of the Catholics in Confederation,” was the only province with
sufficient intrastate strength to protect these minorities. If Quebecers did not defend these
minorities, they would eventually be unable to prevent a Protestant onslaught from curtailing
their own rights.39
The Quebec agitation could have sparked a reciprocal response in Ontario. It
prompted Albert J. Smith, the Liberal MP for Westmorland, New Brunswick to appeal to
Ontario MPs to safeguard New Brunswick’s provincial autonomy by voting against
Costigan’s resolution. According to Smith, New Brunswickers believed “that the Province of
Ontario was great and powerful, and being powerful they felt the utmost assurance that she
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(Ontario) would permit no injustice to be done to them.”40 Despite the threat of a united
Quebec vote in favour of Costigan’s resolution, as well as the urgings of politicians like
Smith, Mackenzie could not afford to alienate his Catholic followers by resuming his
attempts to pit Ontario against other parts of the country. The heated tensions resulting from
the amnesty debate as well as the national concern created by the deaths of two individuals
during a riot at Caraquet, led Ontarian newspapers and politicians to engage the New
Brunswick school question more intensely in 1875. Yet they still avoided rallying Ontario
MPs to vote as a bloc against Costigan’s resolution.41 On 10 March Mackenzie instead
responded to Costigan by proposing an amendment which stated that it would be
“inexpedient and fraught with danger to the autonomy of each of the provinces” to ask the
Imperial government to amend the BNA Act to protect the Catholic minority in New
Brunswick. Provincial jurisdiction in education was assured by an “Imperial compact to
which all the parties submitted in the Act of Confederation,” and the Canadian parliament
had no right to amend it. Joseph Cauchon and Blake then amended Mackenzie’s amendment
by requesting that the Imperial government use its moral (as opposed to legislative) influence
to urge the New Brunswick government to better accommodate the educational demands of
its Catholic population.42
Other Ontario Liberals also used provincial rights arguments to oppose Costigan’s
resolution without fomenting an intrastate contest. David Mills warned that intervention
would endanger the autonomy of every province.43 The Liberal also cautioned against
setting precedents that would permit parliamentary majorities to seek constitutional
amendments: “once give a mere majority in the Dominion Parliament the right to override
the free action of Local Legislatures, and to tamper with the Constitution in order to do so,
and the rights of at least the smaller Provinces are no longer safe, and especially the rights of
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sectarian minorities in educational matters are left utterly defenceless.”44 It submitted that
Ontario was better equipped than the ‘smaller provinces’ to defend itself from parliamentary
majorities but insisted that all provinces needed to oppose a precedent that would endanger
provincial autonomy. The Globe adopted a similar tone and, without naming Quebec,
warned Costigan’s “co-religionists” against setting a precedent that could be used to deprive
Ontario Catholics of their separate school rights.45
The Advertiser was one of the few newspapers to explicitly link Ontario’s
parliamentary preponderance to safeguarding provincial autonomy. “The great motive in
forming the Confederation was the securing of Ontario’s rights.” It concluded that “there
ought to be among Ontario members [of parliament] an anxiety that no example should be set
in the way of trespassing upon the functions of the Legislature of any province.”46 Yet even
this editorial avoided describing Quebec’s support for Costigan’s resolution. In fact, the
following week the same newspaper urged parliamentarians to avoid further intrastate
conflict by endorsing the Cauchon-Blake amendment inviting the Imperial government to
exercise its moral influence to convince New Brunswick to change its own legislation.47
At the end of the debate, a party vote passed the Mackenzie and Cauchon-Blake
amendments. Although the Canadian parliament did petition the Imperial government to
urge the New Brunswick legislature to amend its school laws, Great Britain refused to
meddle in a province’s local affairs. In the end, such pressure was unnecessary. The
upheaval of the Caraquet riots convinced the King government to amend its legislation the
following year.48 By referring to provincial rights and inviting the Imperial government to
use its moral authority to intervene in the dispute, both parties tried to move the New
Brunswick school question out of parliament’s jurisdiction. In so doing, they disabused
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Ontarians of the belief that they could use their intrastate preponderance to influence the
dispute. Their successful curtailment of this impulse in Ontario prevented the debate from
alienating both parties’ Quebec supporters. The admittedly high likelihood that the courts
would find that section 93 did not apply to the New Brunswick case likely facilitated this
constitutional piety, but the tactic nevertheless prevented Ontarians from believing that they
needed to contest Quebec support for Costigan’s resolutions. In 1872 and 1873, Ontario
Conservatives like Macdonald denied that the Canadian government could disallow the
provincial legislation and allowed the Imperial courts to dispel any lingering jurisdictional
questions. Ontario Liberals adopted a similar strategy in 1872 but joined Quebecers the
following year in an attempt to unseat the government. When the Liberals again encountered
the thorny question in 1875, their Ontario supporters almost never suggested the employment
of Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance to bloc Costigan’s resolution. Such aggressive
rhetoric would have made it extremely difficult for Quebec Liberals to support the
government. The Mackenzie government’s focus on provincial rights and Imperial moral (as
opposed to legislative) influence made it easier for Quebec Liberals to reverse their
longstanding support for Costigan. By dissuading Ontarians from responding to activism in
Quebec, the dispute’s consideration in parliament did not spark a contest for intrastate
supremacy that could have harmed national unity and toppled governments.

Better Terms
Ontario Liberals were more willing to stoke the belief that their province possessed
the intrastate power to block initiatives from the rest of Canada during subsequent debates
concerning better terms. Blake had been right about one thing during the Nova Scotia better
terms debates: Macdonald’s government set precedents that allowed the other provinces to
seek their own better terms. After 1869, hardly a year passed without a province requesting
the dominion government grant more generous financial arrangements. The debates in 1873
and 1884 were particularly heated. The first debate during the early 1870s concerned better
terms for New Brunswick and settlement of the Province of Canada’s debts. In 1884,
appeals primarily from Quebec for the Canadian government to issue new railway subsidies
and increase the provincial debt allowance generated a second major debate. On both
occasions, many Ontario Liberals asserted that their province had the right as well as the
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ability to prevent the passage of better terms. As in 1869 and 1870, this sense of power
emboldened Ontarians to oppose the better terms and contributed to interprovincial
animosity. MPs from different provinces demanded conflicting policies and the
Conservatives could not use constitutional precedents or the Imperial government to evade a
decision. These debates were not, however, a repeat of 1869. Although the Liberals
continued to argue that their province could use its parliamentary preponderance to shape
these financial policies, partisan considerations limited their willingness to act on these
claims. In these subsequent better terms debates, engaging the belief in Ontario’s ability and
right to influence national debates increasingly became a means to embitter Ontarians against
the Conservatives, rather than a tool to spur decisive assertions of intrastate unity. This shift
reduced the need for Ontario Conservatives to acknowledge their province’s ability to
influence dominion policies. The unpopularity of financial terms severely limited the
willingness of Conservatives to urge Ontarians to unite behind the government. Instead the
Conservatives responded to the Liberal attacks by accusing their opponents of being
sectionalists and describing the better terms as nation-building measures. Yet the
continuation of assertions that Ontarians could use their intrastate preponderance to block
better terms prompted some Ontario Conservative supporters to prevent the erosion of their
electoral support by contending that alignment of their province’s preponderant influence
behind the better terms was important to maintaining national unity.
Since Confederation, New Brunswick’s provincial government often struggled to
balance its budget. To make matters worse, the Treaty of Washington of 1871 terminated the
province’s temporary special right to set and collect a duty on timber and lumber.49 In 1871
the New Brunswick legislature responded to these developments by sending a delegation to
Ottawa to negotiate a new financial deal. Little came of these talks but their occurrence
sparked the ire of the Globe.50 According to the Liberal organ, the smaller provinces needed
to respect the original provincial compact. In the future, it forecast, Ontario would gain a
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larger portion of the country’s parliamentary ridings. If parliamentary majorities continued
to grant better terms, Ontario would soon possess the intrastate influence to overturn any
aspect of the Confederation compact. The Globe called upon Ontario’s MPs to oppose any
better terms for New Brunswick. “As the most powerful member of the Federation, and the
largest contributor by far to its revenue, Ontario is especially bound to insist” that the
dominion government desist from using parliamentary majorities to ratify better terms to the
provinces.51 The Globe was not, however, above using the desires of New Brunswickers to
support the Liberal bid for power. It argued that “New Brunswick can do better for herself
than by waiting hat in hand at the door of a Dominion Minister. She can unite with Ontario
in securing a good and honest Government for the whole country; a Government that will not
raise taxes with one hand to spend them in jobbery and corruption with the other.” The
editorial also admitted that such an alliance might force the New Brunswick government to
resort to direct taxation to balance its books. At the time, the concept of direct taxation by
provincial governments was very unpopular. The Globe nevertheless argued that preserving
provincial autonomy was more valuable than an increase in local taxation.52
The Leader, by contrast, accepted the legitimacy of several of New Brunswick’s
claims, and applauded its government for seeking better terms “in a loyal and constitutional
manner” instead of agitating for secession. Although neither government disclosed the value
of New Brunswick’s demands, the Leader dismissed the Globe’s objections as parsimonious
drivel. “The fact that the resources of this province are infinitely greater than those of New
Brunswick,” the Leader contended, “seems to be altogether lost sight of.” The Conservative
organ concluded by assuring New Brunswickers that their “equitable demands… have lost
none of their force with the people of Ontario.” New Brunswickers, it suggested, could count
on Ontario to use its intrastate preponderance to support the resolution of their grievances.53
The following year, the New Brunswick government again sent a delegation to
Ottawa and its perseverance paid off. The provincial government could not hope to balance
its budget, and it was entitled to compensation for the premature loss of its timber and lumber
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duties. At the beginning of the 1873 parliamentary session, the Conservative government
used this fact to introduce legislation granting New Brunswick’s government a grant of
$150,000 per year. Because New Brunswick’s grievance was not part of the provincial
subsidies or grants, the dominion government claimed that the legislation did not violate the
original terms of union. When the opposition pointed out that the New Brunswick duty only
generated $60,000 to $70,000 per year, Sir Leonard Tilley (the new Minister of Finance)
claimed that new railways would have dramatically increased the lumber trade in New
Brunswick, and that the additional money compensated the provincial government for this
additional forecasted loss of revenue.54
At the same parliamentary session, the Canadian government raised the provincial
debt allowance at Quebec’s prompting. During the union of the Province of Canada, Upper
and Lower Canada accrued a combined debt of $72,900,000 but the BNA Act required
Ontario and Quebec to pay 5% interest on the roughly $10.5 million above its $62.5 debt
allowance. The Upper and Lower Canadian delegates could not, however, agree on each
section’s liability for this remaining debt. The BNA Act declared that three arbitrators would
determine the division of the debt but they were also unable to arrive at a consensus. After
Confederation, Quebec’s provincial government struggled to pass balanced budgets and was
not eager to assume additional liabilities. The Ontario government, by contrast, enjoyed
immense surpluses due to its municipal tax system and revenues from renting lands to timber
companies. After several meetings, the Quebec arbitrator, Judge C.D. Day, insisted that
Ontario fully repay the $5,900,000 debt that Upper Canada brought into the union and that
the two provinces split the remaining balance equally. This arrangement would have resulted
in Ontario assuming responsibility for $8,245,000 of debt and Quebec a paltry $2,155,000.
The dominion arbitrator, Col. J.H. Gray, proposed an alternative plan that allocated the
liability for the surplus debt according to the province that benefitted from its expenditure.
Based on a complex formula, and inexact accounts of the expenditures, they calculated that
Ontario should assume 52.8% of the debt and Quebec the remaining 47.2%. After prolonged
debate, Gray and Ontario’s arbitrator, D.L. MacPherson, approved this plan in September
1870. Day resigned from the arbitration board in protest. The following year two Rouge

54

Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in Canada, 64-65; Globe, 19 May 1873.

216

MPs proposed that the dominion resolve the conflict by assuming liability for the entire debt.
During the same session David Mills moved that the government put Gray’s plan into action.
Sensing a political landmine, the Canadian government refused to intervene in the dispute.55
By 1873 strong pressure from the Bleus compelled Macdonald to act. Immediately
after proposing better terms for New Brunswick, the dominion government announced its
intention to assume the additional debt. To maintain provincial equality, the government
raised each provincial debt allowance by a value proportionate to their respective populations
(see Table 3). The dominion government denied that its decision stemmed from Quebec
pressure. Instead, Tilley justified the government’s action by arguing that it had more
financial strength than Confederation’s founders had anticipated. Canada, he concluded,
could afford to assume this additional debt. After four days of debate, parliament voted to
raise the debt allowance by a vote of 110 to 33. Ontario Liberals voted as an almost
completely united bloc, comprising 31 of the 33 dissenting votes.56
Table 3: Additions to the Provincial Debt Allowances (1873)
Additional Allowances
Granted in 1873 ($)
Ontario and Quebec
10,506,100
Nova Scotia
1,544,300
New Brunswick
1,176,700
British Columbia
280,100
Manitoba
79,400
Chart is from Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial
Governments in Canada, 55.
Province

Ontario Liberals were critical of the proposals. The Advertiser doubted that the
Canadian government could afford to raise the debt allowance for all of the provinces.57
Mackenzie took a different tack. Although he agreed that New Brunswick had a right to
reimbursement for its lost timber revenues, he declared that the $150 million grant was
“disguised better terms.” He argued that Ontario’s provincial government enjoyed large
revenue infusions because it had a municipal tax system that raised its own revenues to pay
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for roads and other public works. New Brunswick’s lack of a municipal tax system forced
the provincial government to assume these additional expenses.58 Aside from being an
unreasonable increase, the Liberals contended that giving better terms to New Brunswick and
raising the debt allowance of all of the provinces further compromised the provincial
compact. The financial terms of Confederation were final, and could not be modified
without creating provincial jealousy and endangering national unity. By arranging for the
dominion to pay the New Brunswick government double its current revenues, the
Conservatives were reaffirming the 1869 Nova Scotian precedent. In future years, each
province would take a turn at “blood-sucking the Dominion Treasury.”59
The Liberals, however, did not entirely oppose modifying the terms of union. If
changes were necessary, they needed to be made in a manner that affirmed the provincial
compact. Richard Cartwright told a Kingston audience that he supported better terms if they
were on an “equitable” basis and were approved by an interprovincial provincial
conference.60 Although the Globe did not call for a constitutional conference, it agreed that
the Canadian government needed to standardize the mode by which the provinces sought
modifications to the terms of union. By dolling out dominion funds “piece-meal,” the
Conservatives were encouraging corrupt backroom deals, inconsistent policy, and disunity
across the dominion.61
The Liberals also used the rhetoric of entitlement and power when opposing New
Brunswick’s better terms. Before the parliamentary debates, the Advertiser alleged that MPs
from Quebec only agreed to back the New Brunswick grant after the former promised to
support raising the provincial debt allowance. It urged Ontario MPs to be especially vigilant
and to expose any government corruption.62 When opposing New Brunswick’s better terms
in parliament, Mackenzie claimed that the Conservatives maintained their power by turning
the rest of Canada against the “more powerful Province.” Despite his confrontational
rhetoric, the Liberal leader likely recognized that the government measure would pass, and
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that the dissent of Liberal Ontarians would only harm his party’s still fresh and untested
alliance with Maritime Liberals. Mackenzie did not, therefore, call for a vote on the measure.
To save face with his Ontario caucus, he unequivocally warned that the “greater province”
would unite against the government and “swamp both them and their power” in the House of
Commons if the government pursued better terms in the future.63 Even at this early stage of
his leadership of the Liberal party, Mackenzie was unwilling to divide his party by stoking
the desire in Ontario to preponderate over the Canadian government’s policies. Although he
felt the need to pay homage to his Reform roots and tried to turn his province’s voters against
the Conservative government, he could no longer afford to match his rhetoric with action.
Ontario Conservatives once again justified these financial adjustments by
emphasizing their importance to national unity and territorial expansion. The Leader argued
that Confederation was a “colonial alliance,” and praised Macdonald’s government for
helping the country to balance the “influence and interests” of each province. Better terms
were necessary to correct the “inadequacy” of the original terms of union. Because the
Conservatives had a record for satisfying the legitimate needs of each section of the
dominion, “colony after colony has so naturally fallen into line in this vast Union,
extending… from Atlantic to Pacific.”64 During the 1874 election campaign, Macdonald
continued to defend his government’s willingness to grant better terms to Canada’s
provinces. While speaking at an Ottawa banquet on 22 November, he bragged that “Nova
Scotia is now tranquil and satisfied,” and described the dominion’s assumption of Upper and
Lower Canada’s debts as another example of the dominion resolving interprovincial quarrels
and promoting national unity. During the same speech he railed against Ontario Liberals.
Had Mackenzie been elected prime minister in 1867, Macdonald speculated, Nova Scotia
would have remained discontented, Manitoba and British Columbia would not have joined
the union, and Confederation would have dissolved. Upper and Lower Canada would have
resumed their status as “insignificant” and deadlocked colonies on the verge of “civil war.”65
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Conservative editorialists also joined in the fray. They accused the Liberals of being
a badly-led Ontarian party that could only maintain its power by inciting their province
against the rest of Canada and thereby fracturing national unity. The Mail claimed that the
vote on the debt allowance revealed that “there was nothing national about” the Liberal party,
and that it was “sectional in the extreme.” The “average Grit,” the Mail alleged, suffered
from “bigotry and jealousy” and felt “enmity to five-sixths of Confederation.”66 The
newspaper repeatedly mocked Liberal disunity as well as their inability to oppose the
government on the debt allowance vote. Virtually all MPs, save Ontario Liberals, ignored
voted with the government despite their respective partisan affiliations. Mackenzie could
only tour in Ontario because the rest of Canada would not listen to him. Conservative
leaders such as Tupper, by contrast, received warm welcome throughout the dominion,
including Ontario.67 This sectionalism, the Leader jeered, “might be expected from such
poor, half-educated misanthropic individuals” as Brown and Mackenzie.68
Ontario Conservatives did not justify their support for these measures during the
parliamentary debate by suggesting that Ontario use its influence to support better terms.
These politicians recognized that most Ontarians did not approve of the Canadian
government sending more of their tax dollars to other parts of the country in excess of the
original financial terms of union. But Mackenzie’s threat in parliament lacked force and
could be safely discarded. The non-parliamentary discussion, however, included limited
attempts to address the preponderant federalist assumptions that underlay the opposition’s
limited cultivation of a sense of grievance and power in Ontario. Although Macdonald did
not explicitly appeal to Ontario’s preponderant influence during his Ottawa banquet speech,
he speculated that “the people of Ontario are decidedly in favour of the party of Union and
Progress [sic].”69 As usual, the Mail was more direct. It admitted that Ontario was powerful
but asserted that its representatives had to consider the needs of the rest of Canada:
Ontario is great, but the Dominion is greater. Our people by reason of their
wealth and importance ought to have almost a controlling influence in the
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destinies of the country; but there are now five Provinces, and beside us, who
claim a stake in the commonwealth, and of that claim Mr. Brown will take no
account. He would have the sun to rise and set here, while the rest of the
Dominion remained in Arctic darkness.70
National prosperity necessitated unity and left no room for “selfishness and sectionalism.”71
These few examples demonstrate the Conservative’s measured attempts to address the
Liberal’s preponderant federalist attacks during the 1873 debate. It was safer to attack the
Liberals and appeal to nation-building mantras than to ask Ontarians to rally behind an
unpopular policy. Yet this very direct attempt to address the desire in Ontario to
preponderate on financial disputes demonstrated the sense of vulnerability that the agitation
inspired among Conservative leaders.
Liberal pressure also forced the Conservatives to defend their government’s measures
by explaining how they served Ontario’s interests. The New Brunswick subsidy was a
difficult linkage. Although Macdonald did not explain how, he claimed that giving New
Brunswick a special grant “would be to the advantage of the whole Dominion, and especially
to the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.”72 By attending to national interests, the
government also served Ontario’s interests. The increased debt allowance offered more
obvious linkages. The Mail admitted that the Ontario government’s revenues were growing
while most of the provinces were struggling to balance their budgets, but nevertheless
contended that even Ontario would soon struggle to pay for its share of the state’s
increasingly burdensome load (which at the time included constructing local roads and
railways as well as education). Allowing the dominion government to assume more
provincial debt was therefore “common sense.” This measure would save every province,
including Ontario, hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in interest payments and allow
each provincial government to avoid implementing direct taxation for a few more years.73
Parliament ultimately approved both adjustments. During the following decade
multiple provinces tried to secure better terms. The results were mixed, and generally
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resulted in only modest increases. Ontarian opposition during these debates did not match the
intensity of 1873.74 Only in 1884 did frustrations with better terms again reach critical mass
in Ontario. In January of that year, the Canadian Pacific Railway neared bankruptcy and
requested a $22.5 million loan from the dominion government. Macdonald, who regained
the prime ministership in 1878, hesitated. The loan would be almost as large as the
government’s original outlay, and he worried that securing parliamentary approval would be
a “political impossibility.”75 The Maritime provinces were unlikely to support the loan. They
were struggling to pass balanced budgets and would not be keen to see more Canadian tax
dollars spent on a transcontinental railway that they believed served the interests of Ontario
and Quebec. Yet support from Quebec was also doubtful. After the 1873 debt settlement,
the Quebec government issued a series of railway subsidies and paid outright for the
construction of the North Shore Railway linking Quebec City to Montreal as well as the
Montreal Colonization Railway linking the Laurentian port to Ottawa (see Figure 3). By
1882, the Quebec government owed $15 million. Its revenues from dominion subsidies and
land grants, however, remained static. To get some financial relief, the Quebec government
sold these lines for $7.6 million. But it was not enough. The Quebec government required
dominion support to help it rebalance its books.76
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Figure 3: Map of Selected Railways in Ontario and Quebec in 188477
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The French province sent a delegation to Ottawa to seek rectification for two
financial grievances in February 1884. First, the delegates claimed that the dominion still
owed Quebec funds from the 1873 debt settlement. Although the Canadian government had
assumed the debt, Quebec politicians claimed that it still owed the provincial government the
interest it charged the province for the surplus debt from 1867 to 1873. Second, Quebec
politicians complained that the dominion government unfairly supported Ontario railways.
The CPR’s eastern terminus was Lake Nipissing and the dominion government had originally
assumed that the promise of rail traffic from Ontario and Quebec would induce private
companies to link these provinces to the transcontinental line. This hope proved ill founded.
North-eastern Ontario’s rough terrain and the lack of sufficient European inhabitants
rendered the region unattractive to investors. Without a railway stretching across northeastern Ontario towards Quebec, the CPR could not serve its nation-building purpose. The
Mackenzie government used this fact to justify its financial support for the Canada Central
Railway (see Figure 3). In 1874 Mackenzie’s Liberal government approved a $12,000 per
mile subsidy for the construction of the Canada Central railway linking the CPR to
Pembroke. In 1882 and 1883, the Macdonald government employed the same rationale to
subsidize the construction of another line from Callander to Gravenhurst (see Figure 3). By
1884, however, Quebec politicians contended that the Canada Central was a local railway
that benefited Ontario, and they requested the dominion to provide comparable financial
support for its equally important railways linking the CPR to the ports at Montreal and
Quebec City.78
The Canadian government heard the provincial government’s delegation but refused
to act. Deeply frustrated by this intransigence, the Bleus and Rouges closed ranks and made
their support of the government’s CPR Relief Bill contingent upon the satisfaction of their
province’s debt and railway claims. Maritime MPs also jumped on this bandwagon,
demanding dominion support for a new line connecting Saint John to Halifax. Macdonald
bowed to the pressure.79 On 9 April, his government obliged the first of these demands by
proposing a series of subsidies for existing and proposed railways. The largest allotments, by
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far, were a $12,000 per mile retroactive subsidy for Colonization Railway, as well as a
$6,000 per mile subsidy for the North Shore line. The government would capitalize these
funds and pay the Quebec government the interest each year. The resolution also proposed
funding for several Maritime railways including a new line connecting Saint John and
Halifax. There were also small allotments for railways in eastern Ontario.80
When defending their railway policy, the Conservatives insisted that their measure
was constitutional. The BNA Act only allowed the dominion government to subsidize
interprovincial railways or lines that served the “general advantage” of two or more
provinces or the “general advantage of Canada.”81 Tupper denied that the government’s new
subsidies funded local lines. Each of the named railways, he claimed, was in the national
interest.82 More often, however, Conservatives claimed that the dominion had unfairly
favoured Ontario, and that Quebec deserved “justice.” It was, they claimed, unreasonable for
the dominion government to subsidize the Canada Central and Callander to Gravenhurst
railways without subsidizing Quebec railways. The new legislation rebalanced government
subsidies that had previously favoured Ontario. Macdonald denied that threats from his
Quebec caucus forced his government to propose the legislation. In fact, he strained
credulity by claiming that he had planned to pass similar legislation since Quebec initiated
construction of the railways over a decade before.83 When asked why his government did not
propose comparable legislation after the protective tariff gave the government immense
surpluses, Macdonald vaguely replied that “the Dominion had weight enough” until 1884,
and claimed that this was the government’s first opportunity to address the imbalance.84
Despite their obvious hidden agenda, the Conservatives continued to insist that nation-
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building and fairness required the dominion government to grant new subsidies for Quebec’s
railways.
Ontario Liberals denied that the railways listed in the bill contributed to the “general
advantage of Canada.” Instead, they alleged that the lines served local and provincial
interests and that the subsidy was better terms in disguise. In an era of transcontinental
railway construction Blake wondered aloud how the government could credibly claim that
several small railways, including a seven-mile stretch in the Maritimes, served the national
interest.85 The Liberals also denied that the Canada Central was a local work, or that it
served Ontario’s interests. Even though the Canada Central was mainly located in Ontario,
they claimed that its planners designed the line’s route to service Quebec railways. As
evidence, they pointed to the dominion government’s past subsidization of the Callander to
Gravenhurst railway and the Macdonald government’s past claim that this second line
balanced the Canada Central’s benefits to Quebec. The Liberals also argued that comparing
the railway expenditures of the two provinces was misleading because Ontario’s
municipalities contributed much more financial resources to railway construction than their
Quebec counterparts.86
The Liberals claimed that Macdonald perpetuated a system of corruption, waste, and
centralization by subsidizing railways on an ad hoc basis. Blake noted that all provincial
governments (including Ontario’s) lacked the financial means to construct the additional
railways required for continued economic development. By giving the provinces more funds
upon request, the dominion government encouraged provincial governments to spend beyond
their means. Encouraging the provinces to come to Ottawa with their hats in hand to
negotiate their budgets with the dominion government was “a degrading and demoralizing
policy.”87 This bargaining also compromised provincial autonomy. Granting better terms on
an ad hoc basis also led the dominion to spend unevenly across Canada, and this
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inconsistency created interprovincial jealousies. Fostering national unity required a more
equal and systematic tax distribution system.
Instead of repeating the 1873 proposals for a new interprovincial conference to
renegotiate the terms of union, however, Blake and other Liberals signalled their willingness
to support a readjustment of the terms of union if they reflected the symmetry that provincial
compact advocates claimed underlay Confederation. If the dominion government planned to
continue granting better terms, Blake asserted that it should follow a set principle ratified by
both the dominion and provincial legislatures. Towards this end, he proposed an amendment
to the government’s railway subsidy resolution regretting that the government did not offer a
“proportionate measure of relief” to each province.88 Although his resolution failed, it
caught the attention of provincial politicians. The following February, Alexander M. Ross
(Ontario’s Treasurer from 1883 to 1890) noted the provincial government’s financial
difficulties and insisted that fairness required the dominion government to distribute better
terms in proportion to each province’s population.89 Taxing Ontario for the benefit of the rest
of Canada without providing its government the same funds was intolerable. Confederation
would not last, Ontario Liberals warned, if the dominion did not heed their demands.90
Ontario’s inability to turn its financial contributions into influence remained a sore spot with
the province’s Liberal partisans.
Yet the imperative of securing supporters in Quebec, combined with the fact that the
Ontarian provincial government ran deficits in 1883 and 1884, made Blake and other Ontario
Liberals more amenable to the demands for better terms.91 Throughout the debate, Blake
struggled to oppose the Canadian government’s railway policy without appearing prejudicial
to Quebec’s interests. He suggested, for example, that careless spending and inadequate
municipal taxation contributed to the Quebec government’s deficits. He also attacked
Macdonald for bowing to Quebec pressure. Yet in the same speech, Blake recognized that
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the Colonization railway was “one of the most important that could be constructed in the
Province of Quebec,” and re-emphasized his willingness to consider better terms if they were
proportionate to population.92 Laurier tried to heal the intra-party rift by making a lengthy
speech highlighting Blake’s sympathy for Quebec and repeating many of his leader’s main
arguments. He even concluded his speech by asking his fellow Quebec MPs to “give justice
to other Provinces,” by supporting Blake’s amendment.93 The attempt made little difference.
Although he supported Blake’s amendment, the majority of Quebec MPs ultimately
supported the government. Even Laurier had to follow-suit. The railway subsidy measure
ultimately passed by a vote of 128 to 35. Ontario Liberal MPs comprised all but three of the
dissenting votes. Prominent caucus members, including Blake and Mills were not present for
the vote.94
The Liberal party’s disunity on the railway question likely dissuaded Ontario MPs
from urging provincial unity against the rest of Canada’s influence during the parliamentary
debate. It was abundantly clear that Quebec and Maritime Liberals were determined to
support the railway measure and it would have been futile to oppose them. After the railway
bill’s passage, however, some Ontarians tried to encourage voters to believe that their
province could exercise preponderant influence in the next national election. As in
Confederation’s early years, the Globe continued to remind its readers that the BNA Act
provided Ontario with intrastate preponderant potential. It pointed out that “whenever
Ontario sends to the House of Commons a decided majority resolved that right must
prevail…there will at once be an end to the state of things which excites” the province. If
Ontarian voters united in this manner, their province “would be, as she ought to be, the first
among her equals.”95 A few days later, the Globe repeated this theme by claiming that “all
the Ontario Tories are not willing that this should go on forever…Ontario, even in her
gerrymandered condition, will not always send a majority to the House of Commons to
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support Sir John Macdonald in his systematic ill treatment of her, and to join in his taunts and
sneers.”96
A month later Cartwright followed the Globe’s line. Although he voted against the
railway measure, he did not participate in the parliamentary debate. While giving a speech in
Toronto the following month, however, he bitterly complained that “the great Province of
Ontario has been deprived of its due weight in the council of the nation.” Cartwright refused
to blame Quebec for Ontario’s ‘deprivation’ because its representatives were using the tools
available to them. Instead, he declared, “I blame ourselves... I blame the members from
Ontario because they will not stand up for the rights of their own province.” He advised
Ontarian voters to select representatives who would vote as a bloc against better terms in the
House of Commons.97 Like the Globe, Cartwright only attempted to rally Ontarians to
oppose the railway deal after the debate’s conclusion. This tactic reduced preponderant
federalism from a parliamentary strategy to post-debate rallying cry.
Given the curtailment of preponderant federalist agitations in Ontario against the rest
of Canada during the parliamentary debates, there was little need for the province’s
government supporters to suggest an alternative application of Ontario’s influence. With the
exception of Macdonald, Ontario Conservative MPs voted for the railway subsidy without
comment. The unpopularity of the railway subsidy in Ontario ruled out an appeal for an
Ontarian bloc vote supporting the government. The Mail never explicitly asked Ontarian
representatives to support the dominion railway subsidy but in early June it complimented
the province’s Conservative MPs for voting in favour the measure and mocked a resolution
passed by the Liberals of the riding of East Simcoe which claimed that “Ontario is robbed for
the benefit of the smaller and poorer provinces.” Ontario’s Liberals were so fixated on their
own interests, the Mail jeered, that they probably could not spell the names of the rest of
Canada’s provinces. The article went on to thank the “Grit party” of Ontario for disabusing
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the rest of Canada’s Liberals of the impression that they were affiliated with a national party.
It concluded by sarcastically warning that “the ‘smaller and poorer Grits’ of the ‘smaller and
poorer’ provinces will present their compliments to Mr. Blake” by voting Conservative in the
next national election.98 The moral was simple: MPs desiring national unity and the
inclusion of Ontario in the Canadian government’s decisions needed to support Macdonald.
But these comments were exceptional and hardly amounted to a rousing call for Ontarian
support of the railway bill. Conservative MPs avoided the railway bill when speaking in
public, and the Mail’s few additional editorials on the subject claimed that the Liberal’s
railway subsidy policies were inconsistent and mocked the party’s division.99
The day after proposing its railway better terms, the Canadian government impressed
Quebecers by exceeding their surplus debt demands. Not only did the government offer to
reimburse the approximately $3.1 million it charged Quebec and Ontario for carrying their
surplus debt from 1867 to 1873, it also paid them 5% interest for holding these fees until 1
July 1884. The dominion proposal thus exceeded Quebec’s expectations by 70%. By adding
these obligations to each province’s debt allowance it raised Quebec’s annual subsidy by
$130,000 and Ontario’s by $142,400. In addition, the government raised the debt allowances
of the other provinces by a proportionate value.100
The government’s proposal to increase the debt allowances of each province allowed
the Liberals to demonstrate that they no longer responded to every better terms request by
urging united Ontarian opposition. They were willing to consider better financial terms if the
adjustments were proportionate. Because the dominion government scaled its proposal to
raise the debt allowances of each province by population, and because each provincial
government (including Ontario) welcomed the additional revenue, the Liberals did not
contest the government proposal. When political expediency required it, Ontario Liberals
were willing to bend their demands for provincial ratification of alterations to the financial
terms of union. Rather than attacking the debt allowance alteration as a further violation of
the finality of the terms of union, Blake filled his speech with an insignificant historical
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overview of the purpose of the 1873 debt allowance adjustment.101 In fact the Liberals were
so uninterested in contesting the measure that they did not arrange for a vote on the
government’s resolution.102 The press likewise took little interest in the debate.103 Ontarians
had few reasons to think about their parliamentary preponderance on a measure that enjoyed
such widespread support.
The better terms debates of 1873 and 1884 demonstrated the continued appeal of
preponderant federalisms in Ontario. When the Canadian government promised additional
subsidies to New Brunswick in 1873 or Quebec and the Maritimes in 1884 without providing
commensurate funds to Ontario, Liberals responded with limited attempts to turn Ontarians
against the rest of Canada. On both occasions, Liberal supporters claimed that Ontarian
representatives needed to use their province’s preponderant influence to safeguard provincial
equality. Intrastate preponderance and provincial compact theory remained complimentary
ideals.
The Liberal’s decision to avoid pitting Ontario against the rest of Canada during 1873
and 1884 parliamentary debates ensured that these statements did not alienate their
supporters from the rest of Canada. The struggle of Ontario Liberals to form a national
government reduced the parliamentary and electoral utility of the strategy during these later
better terms debates. Even when Ontario Liberals were willing to go it alone during the 1884
railway subsidy debate, they did not antagonize their party’s split by broadcasting their
willingness to stand up against the demands of the rest of Canada in parliament. Instead,
Blake tried to persuade the rest of Canada to join him by arguing that the government’s
policies were unsound. A belief in Ontario’s ability to influence national policies, however,
continued to inform the extra-parliamentary debate where it was less likely to create partisan
rifts. In the context of better terms debates then, this assessment of Ontario’s preponderant
potential became a partisan rallying cry to attract Ontarian voters, rather than a power
strategy to influence dominion policy. The softened parliamentary debates in 1873 and 1884
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demonstrate that conflicting provincial interests were not always adequate to spark national
crises. A sense of entitlement in Ontario to influence national debates was often necessary.
Without the threat of an Ontarian voting bloc against better terms, it was unnecessary
for Conservatives to propose an alternative use of Ontario’s preponderant potential. Ontario
politicians almost never discussed this possibility during the parliamentary debates. Instead,
Ontario Conservative MPs claimed that their opponents were sectionalists uninterested in
nation-building initiatives. This strategy allowed the majority of Canadian MPs, including
Ontario Conservatives, to support better terms and placate provincial discontent. Yet the
continued assertion that Ontario could block better terms in the extra-parliamentary debate
led a few Conservative supporters to also suggest that Ontario’s support for these measures
was important to national-unity. The employment of this cooperative preponderant
federalism in policy debates continued to follow the ebb and flow of its confrontational
counterpart.
The dominion government reduced the temptation to try to rally Ontarians against
better terms when it treated each province equally. In 1884 the Liberals did not oppose the
dominion government’s decision to raise the provincial debt allowance. All of the provinces,
including Ontario, required additional funds. In this rare instance of regional agreement,
preponderant federalisms were inapplicable.

Conclusion
The fear of damaging national alliances led Liberal and Conservative Ontarians to
discourage the sense of power and entitlement to influence national policy development in
their province during many of the controversial national debates from 1872 to 1884. During
the debates concerning Riel’s expulsion from parliament, an amnesty for the Red River
resistance’s leadership, and the New Brunswick schools question, both parties avoided
alienating their Catholic supporters by pitting Canada’s most populous Protestant and
Catholic provinces against each other in parliament. By emphasizing provincial rights and
deferring to Imperial authority, they denied that Ontarians could use their intrastate
preponderance to shape the Canadian government’s responses to these questions. This
strategic shift had important political consequences. In 1875, the Conservative’s
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unwillingness to embarrass the Mackenzie government by agitating for an Ontarian block
vote against an amnesty made it easier for Ontario Liberals to support the bill. Similarly, the
inclination of both parties to avoid framing parliament’s 1875 New Brunswick school debate
as a test of Ontario’s influence meant that Quebec Liberals could switch their vote from
Costigan to Mackenzie without appearing to succumb to Ontario’s demands. Similar
hesitation was also apparent during the 1873 and 1884 better terms debates. Although the
Liberals hinted that Ontario could block other provinces’ requests for better terms, their
suggestions were partisan attempts to disenchant Ontarian voters, and did not constitute
attempts to rally Ontario’s MPs to block the government’s proposals. In short, the
curtailment of a belief that Ontarians could preponderate in parliament prevented these
debates from becoming heated intrastate contests between Ontario and Quebec that might
have jeopardized the Macdonald and Mackenzie governments.
Compared to the opening years of Confederation, Ontarians during the subsequent
decade were also less inclined to suggest employing their province’s preponderant potential
to support compromises. The English-Protestant Ontarian belief that Riel and Lépine were
guilty of murder in addition to widespread anti-French and anti-Catholic sentiments made
appealing to Ontarians to unite behind Mackenzie’s amnesty proposal an unpromising
political strategy. Such tactics were also inapplicable to the New Brunswick school debates.
Even in 1873, when Ontario Liberals joined Quebec MPs in supporting Costigan’s
resolution, Mackenzie and his followers avoided addressing Ontario’s potential preponderant
influence to justify their actions because the implausibility of a pan-Ontarian voting bloc
made such comments unnecessary. Yet the limited suggestions that Ontarians could retaliate
at the polls in the Liberal press prompted a proportionate Conservative response that asserted
the importance of Ontarian support. Both preponderant federalisms still retained some
political value.
Despite these limitations, the 1870s and 1880s were not without ardent preponderant
federalist contests. The willingness of Oliver Mowat to exploit the desire in Ontario for
preponderant influence in Canadian politics during the prolonged debate concerning the
province’s northwest boundaries led Ontario Conservatives to once again resort to urging
their constituents to avoid antagonizing the rest of Canada with their preponderant potential.
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Chapter 5: Ontario’s Northwest Boundary Dispute, 1871-1884
“It doubled our power, our extent, our population, and our importance in every way.”
Oliver Mowat on the disputed territory. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Scrapbook
Hansard, 23 February 1880.

At the time of Confederation, Ontario was much smaller than it is today.1 On July 1
1867, the Ontario government assumed responsibility for the territories of Canada West /
Upper Canada. That territory’s western and northern boundaries, however, remained
unclear. At the time, the question seemed unimportant. Few settlers inhabited the region
until after Confederation. When the Canadian government purchased Rupert’s Land from
the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1869 and created Manitoba in 1870, Ontarian settlers began
to flood west. Determining the territorial reach of Ontario’s jurisdiction took on new
importance. In July 1871 the Sandfield and Macdonald governments appointed a commission
consisting of William McDougall (who had recently returned from the North-West as a failed
Governor) and E.E. Taché to try to determine the boundary. The two men soon deadlocked
on different interpretations of what Morrison describes as a “vast maze of somewhat
conflicting documentary evidence.”2 Taché used the Quebec Act of 1774 to contend that the
boundary fell due north from the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers until it met
the height of land below Hudson Bay. He placed Ontario’s western boundary at
approximately 88° West, or just east of Port Arthur (present day Thunder Bay). McDougall
disagreed. By using a different set of documents and by noting that many eighteenth century
explorers assumed that the Mississippi connected to the Lake of the Woods, McDougall
advocated an Ontarian boundary approximately 300 miles further west at the 95° West. He
did not propose a northern boundary because he believed that the documentary record did not
provide a clear answer.3 In the years that followed, Macdonald’s Conservatives adopted
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Taché’s line, while Blake’s Liberals (and subsequently Mowat) used McDougall’s
interpretation to legitimize their claims for a more westerly boundary (see Figure 5). Over
the next decade the dominion-provincial dispute went through increasingly heated phases
and, from 1880 to 1884, became one of the dominant issues of Ontario politics.
Why did the contest for the disputed territory reach such a fever pitch? Ontarians,
according to H.V. Nelles, hoped that “New Ontario” would ensure the province’s long-term
prosperity. Rural Ontarians believed that much of the disputed territory was potential
farmland. Farmers hoped that such vast unexploited lands would ensure the “permanent
renewal of the pioneer cycle” by ensuring that it would be generations before rural Ontarians
suffered the land shortage that characterized the late 1850s and 1860s.4 Urban workers also
eagerly anticipated Ontario’s expansion because they hoped it would create new markets for
their manufactured goods. Industrialists noted the region’s immense mineral and especially
timber reserves. The state’s expansion during the 1870s and 1880s required additional
revenues. The Mowat government’s new expenditures included an $8,000 per mile railway
subsidy, the centralization of initiatives to prevent epidemics, and new facilities for the
mentally ill.5 No provincial politician wanted to support the first government to implement
direct taxation. Charging licence fees for timber and mineral companies to exploit publicly
owned lands promised large government revenues and the postponement of direct taxation
for the foreseeable future.6
There was also a link between the boundary dispute and Mowat’s provincial rights
campaign. By the late 1870s, the Mowat and Macdonald governments locked horns in a
number of jurisdictional disputes that pitted Liberal provincial rights movement against
Macdonald’s desire for centralization. They contested questions such as which government
possessed the jurisdiction to regulate liquor during a time when temperance was on the rise,
as well as the legal constraints to the dominion government’s power to disallow provincial
legislation. The boundary dispute became another site of this contest between provincial
4
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rights and an overbearing dominion government. From start to finish, the boundary dispute
had a legal character. Politicians and newspapers debated the legal merits of each side’s
territorial claim at great length. Margaret Evans describes the dominion-provincial
jurisdictional tug-of war as “fundamentally important” to the boundary dispute.7 Paul
Romney correctly describes the JCPC 1884 award as a “legal victory.”8 Donald
McMurchy’s study of David Mills also focuses on Ontario’s legal claim to the territory when
analysing Mowat’s aggressive pursuit of the territory.9 Peter Dembski contends that the
centralist convictions of W.R. Meredith (who assumed leadership of the provincial
Conservatives in 1879) were “pivotal” to his decision to oppose Mowat’s provincial rights
stand during the later stages of the dispute.10 The boundary dispute, according to these
authors, was another example of the legal contest between centralist and provincial rights
politicians for more control of the Canadian state.
The boundary dispute was also fuelled by personal antipathy and partisanship.
Premier Mowat, who as a Conservative youth articled in Macdonald’s Kingston law practice,
became a major obstruction to Macdonald’s centralist policies. The prime minister publicly
denounced Mowat as a “little tyrant,” and in his private correspondence called the premier a
“jackal.” Both parties also actively exploited the contest for partisan purposes. Mowat’s
Liberals denounced the Conservatives as “traitors” to Ontario’s interests and found the
attacks so useful that they focused their 1883 election campaign on provincial rights. The
Conservatives responded in kind by claiming that the Liberals were “anti-confederates.”
Aside from its campaigning utility, control of the disputed territory also promised significant
patronage power. The party that controlled the region could leverage its patronage at
upcoming elections.11 The boundary dispute therefore also had personal and partisan roots.
Historians have acknowledged, but failed to fully explore, the significance of one
additional motivation that fuelled the contest. The desire to control the disputed territory, as
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S.J.R. Noel points out, “had not sprung purely and perhaps not even mainly, from economic
motives; it had sprung also from an abiding and at times almost obsessive concern over
status.”12 J.C. Morrison agrees. Ontarians desired the disputed territory to secure “sufficient
population and political strength to dominate French-Canada for fear lest she herself be
dominated. Fundamentally, therefore, the Boundary Dispute was a political struggle to
secure for Ontario preponderating influence in Canadian affairs.”13 Neither Noel nor
Morrison, however, explore how this linkage to Ontario’s influence in Confederation
impacted the boundary dispute debate over time. For much of the contest, Mowat and his
followers equated territorial expansion with increased population and preponderant influence.
They expected this population growth to maintain or even increase their province’s
proportionate representation in parliament and the cabinet. They also expected it to lead to
the election of more prime ministers from Ontario. These Liberals also claimed that
Ontarians had to use their existing preponderant potential to overcome French-Quebec’s
attempts to ‘rob’ them of this future influence. Their sense of entitlement and power, in
short, emboldened them to elevate the dispute from a contest for financial or legal rights to a
fight for the very future of Ontario’s status as a ‘first among equal’ provinces.
Centralist historians contend that Ontario Conservatives opposed Mowat because they
valued national unity more than their province’s enlargement. Kenneth MacKirdy suggests
that Meredith and his followers opposed Mowat because they “subordinated” their provincial
loyalties to their “Canadian national consciousness.”14 Donald Creighton and even
provincial rights historian Margaret Evans note Macdonald’s concern that Ontario’s
enlargement would unnerve the rest of Canada and destabilize Confederation, and conclude
that the prime minister privileged national unity at the expense of his own province’s
interests.15 Although Ontario Conservative MPPs and newspaper editors offered mixed
support for the prime minister’s efforts to limit their province’s expansion, they did not
forsake their province’s interests or subordinate their provincial consciousness to Canadian
nationalism. Instead, they addressed the sense of power and entitlement that informed the
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agitation while suggesting a different interpretation of their province’s interests. Like the
Liberals, most of these Conservatives desired the disputed territory. Yet they recognized that
the rest of Canada did not welcome Ontario’s expansion and therefore tried to ameliorate
rather than antagonize these concerns. They opposed Mowat’s attempts to seize the territory
from 1882 to 1883 by demanding that the courts determine Ontario’s ‘true boundaries,’ and a
few even discounted the linkage between the region and Ontario’s intrastate representation.
In the 1882 and 1883 dominion and provincial elections, this alternative interpretation of
Ontario’s present and future role and influence within Confederation prevented the
Conservative’s opposition to Mowat’s boundary dispute tactics from becoming a stumbling
bloc for Ontarian voters. By emphasizing their province’s ability to destroy national unity
while nevertheless acknowledging the desirability of acquiring the disputed territory,
Meredith and his supporters asked voters to reinterpret Ontario’s preponderant potential
within Canada. The consequent split of Ontario’s political representatives forced Mowat’s
government to submit its claims to the JCPC.

A Dominion-Provincial Dispute
Until early 1879 Ontario politicians and newspapers focused on the merits of various
proposed resolution mechanisms and rarely commented on the significance of the disputed
territory. Macdonald proposed resolving the dispute by referring it to the JCPC in 1872.16
The Liberals, however, were unprepared for a court case. Although they advocated a more
westerly boundary, they were less sure of its precise location. Fearing that they might lose a
legal dispute, Blake and Mowat insisted on continued negotiations between the two
governments.17 To strengthen the Liberal claim for a more westerly boundary, Mowat hired
David Mills to review the archival evidence. His 1873 report propounded a western
boundary line drawn due north from the headwaters of the Mississippi river, and a northern
boundary near 53° North. The report also asserted that various treaties proved that Imperial
authorities of the late eighteenth century intended Upper Canada to extend westward to the
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fork of the Saskatchewan River and as far north as the Nelson River.18 Mills recognized that
Ontario’s failure to oppose the establishment of Manitoba and various territorial districts
made this claim unachievable. Yet he still believed that it was worth asserting. In a private
letter to Mowat, he suggested that the Liberal leader use the claim for political and
negotiating leverage by claiming that the failure of Cameron and Sandfield supporters to
oppose these developments made it impossible for the Liberals to secure “all that belonged to
the Province.”19 Mowat could claim compensation for the alleged loss of territory in the
North-West while diminishing the appeal of the Conservatives at the polls.
Mowat caught a break when Mackenzie won the 1874 dominion election. With the
Liberals controlling both legislatures, political observers expected the dominion and
provincial governments to quickly resolve the dispute. The two governments soon agreed to
the formation of an arbitration board consisting of Ontario Chief Justice William B. Richards
and Lemuel A. Wilmot of New Brunswick. The board achieved little. Richards became the
first Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court in 1875 and Wilmot died in May 1878.
During the interim, the provincial and federal governments corresponded and canvased
Canadian and European documents pertaining to the western and northern boundaries.20
Despite Mackenzie’s sympathy for Ontario’s interests, he penned a letter to Mowat in
September 1876 rejecting Mills’ extravagant claim for territory beyond the Lake of the
Woods as a “suppositious claim… that cannot under any circumstances be even spoken of by
us.” Mackenzie also abided by Macdonald’s stance on the northern boundary. The Hudson
Bay’s watershed was part of the former Company’s territory, and therefore belonged to the
dominion.21 With this impasse, both governments allowed negotiations to lag. Mowat
refused to relinquish his province’s claim to compensation, and Mackenzie, as Armstrong
points out, “could not make such concessions without arousing protests in other provinces.”22
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By November 1877 Mowat worried that the upcoming dominion election might
unseat the friendly Mackenzie Liberals, so he expressed his desire to rejuvenate the
arbitration process. The prime minister obliged, and the two governments appointed a
replacement arbitration board. Ontario selected Robert Harrison (who had assumed
Richard’s position as Chief Justice) as its representative, the dominion government selected
Sir Francis Hincks, and both governments approved the appointment of Sir Edward Thornton
(Britain’s ambassador to Washington) as the third member. Each government also promised
to accept the board’s decision as “final and conclusive.” The board heard evidence during
the first three days of August 1878. When Mowat appeared before the arbitration board, he
heeded Mackenzie’s warning and focused on Ontario’s claims to the Lake of the Woods.
Although he alluded to Ontario’s more westerly claim, he did not pursue it. He also argued
that Ontario extended to James Bay, but claimed a northern boundary south of Mills’
suggestion.23 In the end, the board unanimously decided in favour of the Ontario
government. Ontario’s western border would lie at the Lake of the Woods, and its northern
border would follow the English and Albany Rivers. The award nearly doubled Ontario’s
size by adding 110,000 square miles to its jurisdiction (see Figure 5). The board did not
substantiate its decision with evidence, but most Ontarians were too busy celebrating the
award to care.24
From 1871 to 1878 few Ontarians openly discussed the linkages between the
province’s size, population, and potential preponderant influence. Ontario’s press and
politicians were generally content to allow the dominion and provincial governments to
continue to negotiate behind closed doors. When they discussed the dispute, several Liberal
MPPs echoed Mills’ speculations that Ontario had a right to expand to the forks of the
Saskatchewan River or even the Rocky Mountains.25 In 1877 John Clarke, the Liberal MPP
for Norfolk South, even alluded to the 1840s British-American dispute for the Oregon
Territory by declaring that the provincial government’s rallying cry should be “to the Rocky
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Mountains or fight.”26 Such an immense province would have possessed dominant intrastate
power but the Liberals did not describe this eventuality. Instead they emphasized the
provincial government’s legal case, the region’s resources, and alleged that the dominion
government was trying to “despoil” Ontario by advocating a smaller expansion.27
Simon James Dawson was one of the only Ontario Conservative politicians to
explicitly evaluate the relationship between Ontario’s territorial expansion and preponderant
potential. Raised in the Ottawa valley, Dawson joined the Hind expedition as a surveyor and
ventured to the region between Lake Superior and Red River during the late 1850s. During
the next two decades he supervised the construction of a road linking these two provinces
and became involved in the growth of Port Arthur. Dawson ran as an independent Liberal
during the 1875 provincial election and won the expansive northern Ontario riding of
Algoma (which encompassed the territory between Quebec, Hudson’s Bay and Ontario’s
western boundary).28 When reacting against John Clarke’s provocative cry in the Legislative
Assembly, Dawson strongly denounced the expansion of Ontario:
Supposing… that Ontario had all that the strongest advocates for western
extension could desire, would it be to her advantage? The policy which was
the best for the Dominion at large would be the best also for Ontario as a
Province. Would it be to the advantage of the Dominion that Ontario should
extend over the plains of the Saskatchewan and Assiniboine? – that there
would be one Province of over-powering wealth, influence, and extent as
compared to the others? What would Quebec say? What would the other
Provinces say, and how would Confederation work under such circumstances?
Ontario would gain most by such a policy as would lead the soonest to the
development of those Western Territories. If their development would be
more readily promoted by forming them into separate provinces, with separate
governments, then that policy would be the best for Ontario.29
Dawson was less than altruistic. As an outspoken advocate of converting the disputed region
into a separate territory that would eventually become its own province, he had a strong
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interest in preventing Ontario from absorbing the region. There was little sympathy for
Dawson’s separatism in the rest of Ontario. As time passed, however, Mowat’s increasingly
aggressive agitation drove Ontario Conservatives to adopt Dawson’s alternative preponderant
federalist interpretation.30
In the meantime, most Ontario Conservatives repeated Macdonald’s suggestion to
submit the boundary dispute to the JCPC. Although most Conservatives avoided supporting
Macdonald’s easterly boundary, they repeated his contention that arbitration boards were
illegitimate and unsafe ways of pursuing Ontario’s territorial claims. McDougall, for
example, alleged that Wilmot’s New Brunswick connection predisposed him to ignore the
law and embrace Maritime prejudices against Ontario’s enlargement. Like other Ontario
Conservatives, McDougall constructed the boundary question as a legal dispute. Ontario
lacked the constitutional jurisdiction to change its boundaries, even if it was only by
empowering an arbitration board. Arbitration boards, moreover, generally favoured
compromise solutions. Conservative MPs and newspapers consistently warned that the
process could force Ontario to accept less than its full territorial entitlement. Only the JCPC
could provide a degree of finality and determine Ontario’s “true” boundary.31
The arbitration ruling, however, came too late in the year for ratification by
Mackenzie’s Liberals. Mowat’s worst fears were realized when Canadian electors returned
Macdonald to power. Despite the prime minister’s well-established hostility to the
arbitration board, the provincial government initially focused on solidifying Ontarian opinion
behind the award. It admitted that the award was not as large as originally desired but did not
morn the loss. Preparing the North-West for European settlers would be extremely
expensive, and the dominion was better suited to administer this long-term investment.32
Mowat went so far as to concede that the award was “a great deal less than the old Province
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of Canada, and the Dominion after Confederation, used to claim.”33 Yet he and his supporters
contended that the award ensured their province’s continued preponderance because it
effectively doubled the province’s size. With the disputed territory, the premier pointed out
to the Assembly, Ontario was “as large as France” and larger than the United Kingdom. He
forecast that Ontario would someday “sustain as large a population as either of these
countries.”34 Like France in Europe, Ontario would continue to wield great influence within
Confederation.
Macdonald, however, had other plans. His government refused to ratify the award.
To support its patron party, the Mail noted that only one of the three arbiters was a lawyer,
and emphasized the provincial government’s admissions that the award was less than Ontario
might have secured.35 In 1880, Macdonald attacked the award outright. The BNA Act gave
Ontario the territories of Upper Canada but the arbitration award was a compromise line. He
therefore disallowed Ontario’s legislation for the disputed region because he claimed it
pertained to territory that was not within the province’s jurisdiction. Mowat, he repeated,
needed to transfer the dispute to the JCPC if he desired the confirmation of Ontario’s “true”
legal boundary.36 Macdonald also allowed Dawson, who became Algoma’s MP in 1878, to
form a parliamentary committee to investigate the boundary’s location.
When proposing the establishment of this committee, Dawson elaborated on his wellestablished concerns about Ontario’s expansion. Ontario could not, he claimed, afford to
develop the territory. “In this territory she [Ontario] would have a white elephant which
might amuse the people at first, but the older districts would soon become weary of so costly
a pet.”37 The dominion could more rapidly develop the territory, and he argued that
development, rather than their province’s territorial enlargement, was in the best interests of
Ontario and the dominion. Dawson also repeated his claim that Ontario’s assumption of the
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disputed territory would destabilize Confederation. The award, he noted, would create
“something like a continent in one constituency;” it would create a single province that was
larger than the Maritime provinces, Newfoundland, and the Gaspé combined.38 He opined
that the inhabitants of the rest of Canada’s provinces accepted Confederation in 1867 on the
basis that Ontario would span to the edge of the height of land south of Hudson Bay:
Had it then been suggested that its area would, in the near future, be more than
doubled by the addition of the fairest portion of the vast territories at that time
claimed by, and afterwards purchased from, the Hudson's Bay Company,
would the other Provinces have consented to an arrangement which they must
have believed would ultimately give to Ontario a vastly preponderating
influence in the Confederacy.39
It was not in Ontario’s interest to antagonize the rest of Canada and endanger national unity
by seeking its own illegitimate and unreasonable enlargement.
In the early 1880 Ontario’s Conservative politicians and newspapers still did not echo
Dawson’s arguments. Instead, the Intelligencer repeated Macdonald’s claim that the
boundary could only be satisfactorily determined by the JCPC. It also reversed the Liberal
allegation that Conservatives were acting against Ontario’s interests. Ontario’s Liberals, it
alleged, were “hostile to the interest of the province” because they settled for an award that
was less than what they claimed to be Ontario’s true boundary.40 This continued divergence
between Dawson and Ontario Conservatives did not last.
Ontario Liberals reacted harshly to Macdonald’s inaction and began to reveal the
preponderant federalist aspirations that underlay their quest for disputed territory. The Globe
alleged that “the Tories of Quebec are compelling Sir John Macdonald to withhold her rights
from his native Province for fear that Ontario should become powerful enough in the
Confederation to outvote the Conservative Party.”41 The Grip used a political cartoon to
make similar accusations (see Figure 4). The Advertiser also alleged that Ontario
Conservatives believed voters from the disputed territory would support Liberal candidates.
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Macdonald, it claimed, wanted to keep the region’s patronage and votes to himself.42 The
same newspaper also argued that the disputed territory was a natural extension of Ontario,
and insisted that the province had the resources to support its economic development.43 On 3
March Mowat moved a series of thirteen resolutions in the provincial Assembly that
reaffirmed the validity of the arbitration board as well as the binding nature of its decision,
regretted the dominion government’s unwillingness to ratify the award, and requested the
provincial government to ensure the continued administration of justice in the territory.44
As Evans notes, “Meredith and the Conservative opposition had little choice but to
join the government in passing the resolutions” given the widespread desire to acquire the
disputed territory in Ontario.45 Yet neither Evans, nor Noel, explore what the latter calls the
“somewhat grudging” way Meredith approved the measure.46 The provincial Conservative
leader cautioned against Mowat’s aggressive rallying call. Although he supported Ontario’s
acquisition of the disputed territory Meredith began to adopt Dawson’s interpretation of
Ontario’s present and future role with Confederation. Meredith noted that Ontario’s status as
the “premier Province of Canada… caused the smaller and weaker Provinces to look upon us
with jealousy.” He therefore advised Mowat to desist from rousing “sectional feeling” in the
rest of Canada with his aggression. Despite these concerns regarding Mowat’s tactics,
Meredith justified his party's support of the government by claiming that the resolutions were
constitutional, and by noting that acquisition of the territory was in Ontario’s interests.47
With the sole exception of John Miller (who, like Dawson, was a representative for Northern
Ontario and favoured the creation of a separate province in the disputed territory), the
Assembly unanimously passed the government’s resolutions.48
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Figure 4: 'French Influence' shackling Ontario. Grip, 28 February 1880
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The Mail continued to support Macdonald. It rejected Meredith’s assessment of the
disputed territory, and instead discounted the region’s value. Macdonald’s Toronto organ
estimated the disputed region to be almost as large as “the German Empire” and predicted
that it would be extremely expensive to prepare the region for European settlement. Why, it
asked, was it necessary to “make haste to pay through the nose for governing a region of rock
and water, where even the Indian has a hard struggle for existence?”49 Perhaps desperate for
additional reasons to oppose Mowat, the Mail also justified the Canadian government’s
continued delay by echoing Dawson’s and Meredith’s concerns regarding the proportionality
of Ontario compared to the other provinces. Ontario was already a “large and populous
province.” It did not require the disputed territory to maintain intrastate influence.50
The same patterns persisted into 1881. On the anniversary of the passage of the
previous year’s boundary dispute resolutions, Mowat proposed a shorter list of three
resolutions that reaffirmed the Assembly’s commitment to the award and again urged the
dominion government to ratify the award. The Liberal leader again requested non-partisan
support for his resolutions. Christopher Fraser, the Commissioner for Public Works, accused
the Canadian government of harbouring “some special hostility” against the Ontario
government that stemmed from the “increased representation at Ottawa” the additional
territory would furnish. Again Meredith and his followers justified their support of the
government’s resolutions by maintaining that Ontario’s Legislative Assembly could send a
strong message of consensus to Parliament Hill that would pressure the dominion
government to ratify the arbitrator’s award. In response, Meredith again expressed his
dismay at the Mowat government’s tactics. “There were many difficulties surrounding the
question at Ottawa because of the prejudices of the other Provinces,” he noted, “and the
government was entitled to consideration at the hands of Ontario. The Government had
endeavoured to place this side of the House at a disadvantage regarding the question. They
also endeavoured to excite a prejudice against the Dominion Government, and to excite the
jealousies of the other Provinces.” Ontario, in short, had to respect the concerns of the other
provinces if it expected to acquire the disputed territory. Meredith went on to note the lack
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of dominion-provincial correspondence during the past year and accused Mowat of trying to
avoid resolving the dispute so that he could use it as a rallying cry during a general election.
Using the boundary dispute to boost partisan appeal at the expense of Canadian unity was
shameful and contrary to Ontario’s interests. Despite these reservations, Meredith’s party
supported the resolutions, which passed 75 to 1.51

Contesting Ontario’s Preponderance
Only two weeks later, Macdonald complicated the dispute. On the last day of the
parliamentary session, when many Liberals had already begun to return to their ridings, the
prime minister informed parliament that his government would ask the Senate to move
Manitoba’s eastern boundary all the way to Port Arthur. Like previous years, he argued that
the boundary award was not Ontario’s true boundary and could not “be supported in any
Court or tribunal in the world.” Macdonald noted that Manitoba’s constitution gave the
dominion control of natural resources; Ontario’s did not. He admitted that this difference
made Manitoban control of the territory more attractive to his government because it would
gain additional revenues that would otherwise go into the Ontario government’s coffers.52
Macdonald had one additional motive for bringing Manitoba into the dispute. “It is
important, “ he told Alexander Campbell in a letter during May 1881, “that the Dominion
should be rid of the Boundary question, and that Manitoba and Ontario should be left to fight
it out.”53 By this triangulation scheme, Macdonald hoped Ontarians would stop blaming him
for the boundary dispute. Parliament ultimately affirmed the government’s legislation by a
vote of 84 to 17. With the exception of McDougall, Ontario Conservatives voted with the
government. Only eleven Ontario Liberals (the rest were absent) and a handful of Liberals
from the other provinces compromised the dissenting votes.54
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The scheme backfired. Macdonald’s expansion of Manitoba’s borders to encompass
the western portion of the disputed territory demonstrated that he was not merely delaying
the award, but actively working against it. This shift rejuvenated Liberal allegations that the
Prime Minster was “hostile,” or even a “traitor,” to Ontario. They blamed Bleu jealousy and
conspiracy for the miscarriage of “justice.” A growing number of Ontarians alleged that the
Maritimes supported their province’s claim to the disputed territory.55 Macdonald put party
before province and country by catering to Bleu pressure. By pitting Manitoba against
Ontario, moreover, the prime minister promoted sectionalism at the expense of national
unity.56
Macdonald’s 1881 actions also encouraged Ontario Liberals to frame the dispute as a
test of their province’s preponderant influence. The prime minister’s use of parliament, the
very institution where Ontario’s intrastate representation was supposed to ensure that it could
protect its rights, enraged many Ontarians. Liberal newspaper editors and politicians began
to mobilize their Ontario followers against pressures allegedly emanating from Quebec.
McDougall, who returned to parliament as the Conservative MP for Halton in the 1878
election, wrote to Macdonald warning him that he and other national Liberals who had joined
the Conservative fold would reunite with Blake and “fight once more the old battle against
French domination” if the prime minister did not ratify the arbitrators’ award.57 While
speaking at Cobourg on 12 July 1881, Cartwright tried to rally Ontarians to pressure their
MPs to overturn Macdonald’s opposition. Although he recognized that Ontario was already
“the largest and most powerful of all of the provinces” he called upon Ontarian voters to fight
for their rights. He linked Macdonald’s refusal to ratify the award to the violations of the
principle of representation by population during the admissions of Manitoba and British
Columbia into Confederation. The prime minister was, in short, systematically depriving
Ontario “of the weight we ought probably to have in the councils of the Confederation.”58 On
5 January 1882 the Globe also urged Ontarians to use their parliamentary preponderance to
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secure the boundary award. “If the representatives of Ontario had walked out of the House,”
it claimed, “the members from other Provinces would have been in honour bound to ratify
the award.”59 Ontarians needed to pressure their MPs to unite and overturn Macdonald’s
Manitoban legislation.
Political tensions continued to rise during the remainder of the year. John Norquay,
the premier of Manitoba, passed legislation to send officers to administer and police the
disputed territory. He also passed an Act incorporating Rat Portage (Kenora) despite the fact
that Ontario had administered the town since 1871.60 The prime minister also increased his
pressure on the Mowat administration by convincing Meredith to cease supporting the
premier’s demands for the Canadian government to ratify the boundary award. Macdonald
likely encouraged this shift by offering Meredith much needed political support as well as
access to the national party’s “bottomless barrel of political patronage.”61 Meredith’s
willingness to concede the dominion’s right to delay the boundary award left the provincial
Conservatives open to allegations of corruption and treachery to Ontario. Historians have not
adequately questioned these allegations.62 Meredith never supported the premier’s aggression
and the shift brought him closer to his own bias favouring a strong and centralized federal
government. Since assuming the leadership of his party, Meredith preferred close and
amicable dominion-provincial relations, and was unlikely to support measures that ignored
the dominion’s jurisdiction in the disputed territory.63 Moreover, during the next two years
Meredith continued to favour Ontarian ownership of the disputed territory.
In the opening months of 1882, both parties looked ahead to a spring federal and a
winter provincial election. The Liberals welcomed the boundary dispute as an issue that
would give them an edge with the Ontario electorate. Meredith’s decision to cease opposing
Macdonald on the boundary dispute made the province’s territorial claims an especially
appealing Liberal campaign cry. Many, including David Mills, believed Mowat’s stand on
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the boundary dispute was so popular among the province’s voters that he advised Blake to
“make it the issue” of his upcoming campaign. If Mowat provoked a crisis, by appointing
surveyors and police officers to Rat Portage, he predicted that “Ontario will be won as she
never has before.”64 Mowat appears to have taken Mills’ advice. In March his government
tried to trap the Conservatives by raising the political stakes. In the Assembly, the premier
pledged to only consider an appeal to the JCPC if it was immediate, if it was based upon the
evidence examined by the arbitration board, and if the Canadian government granted Ontario
the provisional right to administer the territory. Since it was obvious that Macdonald would
reject these terms, the Ontario government announced its intention to take the territory by
force. The imposition of conflicting Manitoban and Ontarian legal codes in the territory
harmed the disputed region’s development. Settlers did not know which set of laws to obey.
“Peace and order” required the establishment of a single legal judicial system. Mowat’s
government despatched magistrates and other officials to the disputed territory to assert
Ontarian control and jurisdiction throughout the region. Ontario, moreover, could no longer
idly wait while the dominion government continued to profit from granting timber and
mining licences. Although the government expressed the hope that dominion or Manitoban
officials in the region would not oppose their Ontarian counterparts, it refused to be bullied.65
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Figure 5: Ontario's Size Compared to Other Provinces.
For the next year and a half, preponderant federalisms were a fundamental part of the
boundary debate in Ontario. Liberals emphasized the importance of the disputed territory to
their province’s future intrastate influence. If Ontario acquired the disputed territory, it would
have jurisdiction of roughly 200,000 square miles. By comparison Quebec controlled over
200,000 square miles and British Columbia controlled 350,000 square miles.66 Both the
Globe and the Advertiser repeatedly printed a map of the disputed territory accompanied by a
66
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chart showing the “comparative sizes” of the provinces (see Figure 5).67 Timothy Pardee, the
Commissioner of Crown Lands and the MPP for Lambton West, echoed his premier by
arguing that Ontario would become a “third-rate power in the Confederation. Quebec,
Manitoba, and British Columbia would have a larger territory, and would take precedence of
us in this respect.”68 Mowat’s supporters insisted that their province’s territorial enlargement
would increase its population and representation in parliament. Liberal newspapers agreed
with the Commissioner of Crown Lands. Quebec, the Globe complained, could not be
allowed to be twice as large as Ontario because this would give it a “preponderating
influence” in parliament. Ontario’s enlargement was therefore essential to Confederation’s
balance of power.69 If Ontario did not secure the award, the Advertiser forecast, it would
“cease to grow in population to any extent. Manitoba would fill up and Quebec would fill
up. This later province especially would have a greater population and more representatives
in Parliament than we would have.”70
Becoming a ‘third rate’ province would also diminish Ontario’s representation and
weight in other national institutions. During the dominion election campaign, Liberal
newspapers reprinted a fictitious discussion of the boundary dispute between a Liberal named
Mr. Thornbury and an undecided voter named Mr. Sherwood. When Sherwood doubted the
importance of the territory to Ontario, Thornbury pounced. “How long do you suppose we
could hold our position as the keystone Province of the Dominion,” he asked rhetorically.
“So soon as all the territory left us was settled Quebec would rapidly gain on us, and in a few
years the positions of the Provinces would be reversed. Quebec would have more
population, more wealth, a greater number of representatives in the Cabinet and the House at
Ottawa.” Even Ontario’s influence in the Prime Minister’s Office was at stake. Although
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Thornbury admitted that the Maritimes produced men of great political ability, Ontario’s
immense patronage and caucus afforded its representatives the power to lead national parties.
Thus if Ontario became a “third or fourth rate province,” its ability to produce party leaders
would also diminish. The disputed territory was therefore integral to maintaining the
prominence of Ontarian politicians in national politics. Without the additional territory,
Ontario’s leading MPs would have “about as much influence in the Dominion as Vermont or
New Hampshire have in American politics.”71
Mowat repeatedly denied that the disputed territory would give Ontario an
“overpowering influence.” The territory merely made Ontario the same size as other sections
of the country like Quebec. British Columbia, Liberals frequently noted, would still be
several times larger than Ontario. Only Quebec Bleus opposed Ontario’s acquisition of the
disputed territory. The Maritimes, Ontario Liberals continued to vaguely claim, were not
jealous of the award. The rest of Canada had little to fear from Ontario’s enlargement
because their combined parliamentary representatives still outnumbered Ontario’s.72
Situating the boundary dispute within provincial rights allowed Ontario Liberals to
claim that their province’s enlargement was in the rest of Canada’s interest. If properly
interpreted, the BNA Act gave every province the autonomy necessary to preserve national
unity. But if remaining a part of Confederation required Ontario to surrender half of its
territory then, as Mowat famously declared, “Confederation must go.”73 Romney and Evans
point out that the Liberals claimed the dominion would deal a mighty blow to provincial
rights if Ontario, the largest and most powerful province, was ‘robbed’ of half of its territory.
At the 1883 Liberal provincial convention, the boundary dispute was situated among a long
list of provincial grievances. Over six thousand delegates heard speaker after speaker rail
against the Conservative government’s disallowance of the province’s Rivers and Streams
Bill, its gerrymandering of Ontario ridings, as well its attempt to ‘rob’ Ontario of half of its
territory. They claimed that pursing the boundary award was not sectionalist; it was pursuing
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and protecting the same rights and autonomy enjoyed by all of the provinces.74 Yet Mowat
contended that Confederation was sound, and merely had to be saved from the clutches of the
corrupt and centralizing Conservatives.
When appealing to voters during the national election campaign the Liberals
connected Ontario’s preponderant potential to the boundary dispute. Mowat told a London
audience that Ontarian voters controlled the fate of the award. By voting Liberal, “they
could overturn the Government and place in power men who could deal fairly by Ontario,
and give her what she was justly entitled to.”75 Macdonald, the Advertiser agreed, sought to
dispossess Ontario of the timber and mineral resources of the disputed territory “by the right
of the strongest.” Ontario, however, had the strength to overcome the Conservative-Bleu
alliance, and the London newspaper warned that “it will be the fault of the men of Ontario if
they lose the disputed territory.”76 J.W. Bengough, the editor of the Grip, composed an
election song entitled “Ontario Ontario” calling upon the province’s voters to rise against
Quebec’s opposition. Part of the first verse, which could be sung to the tune of “O Christmas
Tree,” read:
But how her foe, with ruthless hand,
Would take away her border land.
Ontario, Ontario,
Arise and lay the traitors low.77
According to the Globe, it was Ontario’s duty, “as the premier Province” of the dominion to
“set an example” for Canada’s other provinces, by standing upon the constitution and
opposing precedents that would endanger provincial autonomy.78 The newspaper even
appealed to the representatives from the rest of Canada to support Ontario’s claim.79 Yet
again, the Liberals described seeking intrastate preponderance and provincial rights as
mutually reinforcing and good for Confederation. Ontarians had to exercise their province’s
preponderant power to simultaneously secure the disputed territory and fortify the provincial
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rights by overwhelmingly electing Liberal MPs to eject Macdonald and the Bleus from
power.
Not all Ontario Liberals appreciated these intense assertions of their province’s
entitlement to influence. Crowds first sang the “Ontario Ontario” song as a surprise for
Blake during a June election rally in Toronto. Upon hearing the lyrics, Blake became
agitated. “These smart gentlemen have cost us the province of Quebec,” he told his fellow
stage members. Blake, who refused to extensively campaign on the boundary question
because the other provinces did not relish Ontario’s territorial enlargement, almost left the
Toronto stage in disgust. Cooler heads prevailed, however, and Blake devoted part of his
speech to praising Quebec. Although P.B. Waite doubts that the song significantly impacted
the Liberal’s electoral prospects in Quebec, Blake’s hesitancy to campaign on the boundary
dispute once again demonstrates his desire to curtail the desire among many Ontarians to use
their preponderant influence to block initiatives from the rest of Canada.80
Ontario Conservatives struck back against the provincial Liberal barrage. The
Canadian government, they claimed, was not bound to the arbitrators’ award. When the
Mowat and Mackenzie governments submitted the dispute to arbitration in 1874, they agreed
that both legislatures would ratify the award. Mackenzie’s failure to secure parliament’s
ratification of this agreement, Meredith argued, gave the Macdonald government the right to
evaluate and even discard the arbitrators’ award. As Dembski points out, however, Meredith
continued to contend that the award (or a proximate line) was Ontario’s true boundary. He
deferred to the dominion’s jurisdiction to ratify the award; he did not accept Macdonald’s
boundary.81
Ontarians, the Conservatives insisted, would get no more, and no less, than its full
territorial entitlement by submitting their claim to the JCPC.82 Macdonald did not, and could
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not, they alleged, ‘rob’ Ontario. His 1881 legislation merely placed Manitoba’s eastern
border at Ontario’s western edge. No one, including the dominion government, knew the
western and northern boundaries of Ontario. An appeal to the JCPC would not ‘rob’ Ontario;
it would give the province its true territory. In May 1882 Mackenzie Bowell told his riding
that, “all that was wanted by the Dominion Government was, that right and justice be done”
by the definition of Ontario’s “legal boundary.”83 The Canadian government, Ontario
Conservatives pointed out, lacked the power to change provincial boundaries without the
consent of the effected provinces.84 Meredith repeatedly emphasized these points while
delivering the opening speech of his provincial campaign the following February.85
In fact, many Conservatives speculated that the JCPC would give Ontario more
territory than the arbitration board. The Conservatives tempted Ontarian voters by repeating
Liberal admissions that the arbitrators’ award was less than Ontario’s full entitlement.86 In
February 1882, Hincks provided further fodder for this argument. While defending the
arbitrators’ award in a series of public letters, he admitted that the archival evidence for the
northern and western boundaries was so “vague” that it was “simply impossible to find any
line positively laid down by authority.” He also admitted that the arbitrators believed
Ontario was technically entitled to more territory.87 Conservative newspapers regularly cited
these admissions to legitimize their claim that Ontario might get more territory by submitting
their claim to the JCPC.88 The London Free Press even speculated that the JCPC might
award Ontario “several millions of acres” beyond the arbitrators’ award.89 By refusing to
seek Ontario’s “true legal boundary” Mowat, rather than Macdonald, was “robbing” the
province of its territory.90
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Ontario Conservatives also claimed that Mowat prolonged the dispute for partisan
gain. Macdonald had advocated the dispute’s submission to the JCPC since 1872; Mowat
was the intransigent leader. The premier, Conservatives vehemently asserted, had partisan
rather than patriotic interests at heart when he refused to submit the dispute to the JCPC.
Meredith, for example, alleged that his rival needlessly prolonged the dispute so that it could
misrepresent the Conservatives during the election.91 While speaking at Lennox, Macdonald
made a similar point. Had the Ontario government heeded Conservative advice, “the
question would have been settled long ago.”92
Ontarians could not allow their boundary dispute frustrations to lead them to
endanger national unity. Representatives from other provinces warned of this danger.
During the 1882 parliamentary debate MPs from Quebec and Manitoba openly admitted that
they were concerned that Ontario would take advantage of its “preponderance” and “assume
an over-important role” if it acquired the disputed territory.93 Laurier even urged Quebec
MPs to support the arbitrators’ award in case the JCPC awarded Ontario an even larger
territory that would further increase its population and parliamentary preponderance.94
Mowat, the Conservatives claimed, was willing to destroy Confederation to secure the
disputed territory. From the very outset of the 1882 debate Meredith supported Ontario’s
territorial enlargement but rejected tactics that jeopardized national unity and claimed that it
was not in the dominion’s or Ontario’s interests for the province to set itself against the rest
of Canada.95 In March 1882, the Liberal-Conservative Association of West Peterborough
described this argument in more detail. It passed a resolution regretting that the Mowat
government’s language during the past session “was intended to force the Province of
Ontario into a position of hostility to her sister provinces, to sap the foundation of
Confederation, and to place this province in a state of isolation utterly at variance with its
true interests.”96 The Irish Canadian agreed, and was particularly incensed by the
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willingness of Ontario Liberals to sing the “Ontario Ontario” song’s anti-Quebec message at
the expense of national unity.97 The province’s interests, these Ontarians insisted, lay in
interprovincial harmony.
The sectionalism of the Mowat government, Ontario Conservatives repeatedly
cautioned, could even lead to civil war. “It was through a similar attempt to set the North
against the South in the United States” the Mail warned, that “the ruin and bloodshed of the
civil war [sic] had been caused.”98 A month later, the same publication declared that “he who
threatens the Dominion, under whatever pretence, is an enemy of his province as well as to
the country at large.”99 Macdonald took the Conservative stance against sectionalism to the
extreme. While speaking in Cornwall a few weeks after the national election, he claimed that
even Ontario’s Legislative Assembly could not raise sectional cries without risking civil war.
Canadian voters had to “return true patriots. You must not return Ontarians in Ontario, or
Quebecers in Quebec, or Nova Scotians in Nova Scotia,” the prime minister warned, “but
men who think first of the whole Dominion before they think of these little wretched
sectional cries.”100
Meredith and his supporters did not accept Macdonald’s disparagement of provincial
consciousness as some historians assume.101 Despite Conservative assertions that the JCPC
would award Ontario more territory than the arbitrators, Meredith and his followers denied
that their province required the additional territory to preserve its intrastate preponderant
potential. While speaking in Chatham during the national election, the provincial
Conservative leader reassured his audience that “the representative strength of Ontario was
quite sufficient in the Dominion Parliament to protect the interests of this great province.”102
The Mail was even more blunt. The Liberal attempts to conflate territory and population
were ridiculous. “Area has nothing to do with” intrastate preponderance, it complained.
Ontario had always controlled a smaller territory than Quebec, yet its climate and soil
allowed it to rival Quebec’s influence. Comparisons of Ontario and British Columbia were
97
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“still more absurd.” The Mail assured its readers that “Ontario will remain the keystone
province so long as she retains superiority in wealth and population, and it is utterly out of
the power of anybody to degrade it to the position of a fifth-rate province.”103
This desire to maintain Ontario’s preponderant potential worried Macdonald. He
privately confessed his concern that Ontario’s territorial enlargement would increase its
influence. His leadership style was based on regional brokerage and, according to Creighton,
Macdonald worried that “the preponderance of Ontario endangered the economic and
political equilibrium of the whole Dominion.”104 The prime minister explained this rationale
most fully in an oft-reprinted letter he wrote to Alexander Campbell in December 1887.
Quebec’s political leaders, Macdonald noted, would never accept Ontario’s expansion unless
the dominion granted a similar territory to the French province:
…if you will look at the map and see the enormous extent of country proposed
to be added to the two Provinces, you will see what a vast preponderance it
gives to them over the other Provinces of the Dominion. History will repeat
itself and posterity will find out that the evils that existed in other federations
from the preponderance of one or more members will again happen. It is our
duty as founders of a nation to look far into the future. I know it will be said
that the additional territory desired by Ontario and Quebec is inhospitable in
climate and ill adapted for settlement, but we used to hear the same thing of
the Red River country and the North West. I have little doubt that a great
portion of the vast region asked for by the two Provinces will be capable of
receiving, and will receive, a large population.105
Macdonald tried to prevent the expansion of Ontario and Quebec because he feared that their
preponderance would endanger brokerage politics and national unity.
The Conservatives also acknowledged Ontario’s preponderant potential by insisting
that it was necessary for their province to resist the urge to seize the region without the
dominion’s consent. As the wealthiest and most powerful province of the dominion,
Meredith claimed, Ontario could easily rouse interprovincial jealousy and disturb national
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unity. It therefore had to act with prudence, rather than rashness. “Is there any question”
Meredith asked his Hamilton audience, “which can possibly arise [that is] more likely to
create heartburnings [sic] throughout the Dominion than if it was ever felt by any of the
smaller provinces that Ontario, this great and wealthy Province of Ontario, had got more than
she was entitled to, and which was taken away from the interests of those provinces?”106
“Statesmen,” Meredith claimed, recognized that Ontario could not force the rest of the
country to accept their demands. The only way to definitively resolve the boundary dispute
was to seek what Conservatives consistently described as the “true legal boundary.” By
rushing into the disputed territory, the Mowat government annexed land that it might not
own. Until a court determined the boundary, it was premature and possibly illegal for
Mowat’s government to annex the disputed territory.107
D’Alton McCarthy expanded on this position. As a well-known lawyer and antiCatholic from Simcoe, McCarthy was a rising star who many believed would eventually
replace Macdonald as party leader. Although he never joined the Orange Order because he
did not believe in importing European conflicts to North America, his father was a former
Grand Master, and he maintained strong ties to the organization.108 While campaigning in
Toronto for the provincial Conservatives a few days before the election, McCarthy decried
Ontario’s annexation of the disputed territory:
Were they [Ontarians] to swallow the award, gobble it down whether right or
wrong? They knew the people of the other provinces were dissatisfied, and it
was natural enough that they should be dissatisfied. They said: ‘When we
entered Confederation we knew Ontario was rich, we believed she was
destined to grow, but we had no idea that she extended in the North-West
beyond that part of the country which was then settled by the people of the
province, and practically controlled by her Government. Rightly or wrongly,
we understood it in that way, and if Ontario goes to the Rocky mountains, if
she is to absorb Manitoba, if she really is such an enormous province, then we
have to submit; but before we can submit in the interests of our own provinces
we must be satisfied as a matter of law, as a matter of right, and as a matter of
justice that these are the limits of that province.’109
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Rhetorical excess aside, McCarthy recognized that preserving national unity required
Ontario’s government to be especially considerate of the rest of Canada’s concerns because
their province already possessed preponderant influence. The rest of Canada required the
reassurance of the impartial JCPC before it consented to the enlargement of an already
preponderant province. Flouting these concerns and going-it-alone, McCarthy warned, was
not in Ontario’s interests:
Will they not feel that Ontario, because she is powerful in this Confederation,
is not willing to give justice to the weaker provinces, but will grab and take
what is not justly hers? He said with full conviction that no province was so
much interested in doing justice and right, in doing no more than justice and
right, than the great province of Ontario. (Cheers.) We stand nearly two
millions out of something like four and a half millions of people in the whole
Dominion. Demands are being continually made upon the Federal
Government by the smaller provinces for ‘better terms’ than those granted by
the Confederation Act, and there is therefore no province more interested in a
pecuniary and material sense in doing what is just and right, though no more,
than the province of Ontario. Once she goes up there and takes what does not
belong to her merely because she is stronger than the other provinces, did they
not suppose the others would be asking for and wanting compensation?”110
It was not in Ontario’s interests to set a precedent of ‘might makes right’ because its MPs did
not control the parliamentary majority. Ontario could secure its legal boundaries, but its
government had to work with, rather than against, the other provinces if it wanted to secure
its interests and get the most out of Confederation. By putting national unity first, Ontarians
could more rapidly and decisively secure their territory.
Despite this elaborate justification of their position, the Conservatives remained
vulnerable. Many were uncomfortable with their party’s stance. As Evans points out,
Meredith doubted the popularity of the Conservative’s boundary policies. In his private
correspondence with Macdonald during 1882 Meredith twice urged the prime minister to
either find a common ground with Mowat for an appeal to the JCPC, or ratify the disputed
territory before the elections so it would not become a campaign issue.111 Because
Macdonald refused to heed this advice, Meredith and his followers awkwardly supported the
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dominion government’s right to reject the arbitrators’ award while agreeing with its
substance.
In the end, the national and provincial elections reinforced the existing political
power dynamics. The electors returned both governments with identical or reduced Ontarian
majorities. The popular votes remained close (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). Although
the boundary dispute figured prominently in the national and provincial campaigns, the
electoral results were not a referendum on the issue. The tariff and Macdonald’s
gerrymandering of Ontario were also prominent topics during the national campaign.
Provincial campaigners asked Ontarian voters to choose between provincial autonomy and a
more centralized federation. In this contest newspapers and candidates debated the boundary
dispute alongside other dominion-provincial relations questions, including the equally
controversial Rivers and Streams debate.112 Many Ontarian voters, according to Evans,
found Mowat’s confrontational stance against the Canadian government and his flirtation
with secession to be distasteful. His platform of provincial rights thus failed to furnish the
desired electoral breakthrough.113 The Mowat-Meredith consensus regarding the boundary’s
location, however, indicates a fairly unified Ontarian desire to expand to the Lake of the
Woods. Expressing distinct preponderant federalist interpretations allowed the two
provincial leaders to differentiate themselves without flouting voter preferences. The
Conservative platform allowed its voters to believe that they were voting for a larger Ontario.
When voting in dominion elections, the same voters likely privileged other platforms
including the tariff, or Conservative patronage, above their desire for the disputed territory.
The boundary dispute took a new direction in 1883, and preponderant federalisms
receded from the Ontarian debate. By the summer of that year, Manitoban and Ontarian
constables at Rat Portage raised the territorial dispute to a near conflict by arresting each
other. During this “battle,” the town’s residents began to take sides and the heated
atmosphere raised public fears that violence or even civil war was possible. Norquay decided
that the territory was not worth the fuss. Most of the land was unsuitable for wheat farming,
and even if Manitoba ultimately prevailed the dominion government would continue to
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control and collect revenues from the region’s natural resource revenues. After meeting that
fall, Mowat and Norquay agreed to submit the dispute to the JCPC. The two provincial
governments requested the JCPC to determine whether the 1878 arbitration award was
binding, if the award was correct, and whether imperial legislation was necessary to redraw
the provincial boundaries. Although Macdonald’s government initially agreed to participate
in the case, he withdrew its cooperation at the last minute because he overestimated
Manitoba’s chances of success.114
The JCPC heard the case in the spring of 1884. Mowat was senior counsel for
Ontario, and presented a detailed case using maps, legislation, and other details amassed
since the Sandfield era. The Manitoban counsel including McCarthy, was much less
prepared, and provided a weaker argument. In July, the JCPC ruled that the 1878 arbitration
was not binding but nevertheless “substantially correct.”115 “Empire Ontario” as Evans notes,
was finally secured.116 The award, moreover, came at the end of a long series of victories at
the JCPC for Mowat. During the past eight months, the same court upheld his government’s
right to regulate liquor in Hodge v. The Queen and curtailed the dominion government’s
powers of disallowance in McLaren v. Caldwell. Provincial rights were triumphant. “What
luck Mowat has had with the P.C!” Macdonald moped.117
A few months later, the premier sailed from Britain to New York City in triumph.
Immense crowds greeted his carriage when he crossed the border at Niagara Falls. A
torchlight procession led Mowat to his hotel where he addressed the enthusiastic gathering.
The following day a special train brought him through south-eastern Ontario’s towns,
including Welland, St. Catherines, and Hamilton. At each town the train stopped so that the
premier could address the huge crowds. These were, of course, orchestrated events, but the
enthusiasm was “genuine” according to one scholar. The most extravagant celebrations were
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in the normally pro-Conservative Toronto. Here, thousands gathered to watch Mowat pass in
an open carriage, followed by a three-mile long procession of fifteen bands and twelve
thousand men representing over fifty provincial constituencies. A few days later the Liberals
continued the spectacle in Woodstock (the largest city in Mowat’s riding of North Oxford).
118

Liberal newspapers hailed the premier as the defender of provincial autonomy and the

hero of the boundary dispute. All of the provinces benefited from his government’s courage.
The Conservative press, as Evans notes, tried to claim that the victory belonged to their party.
Ontario only secured this victory once it accepted his advice. These claims were not as
contrived as Evans and others claim.119 Meredith had always favoured the arbitrators’ award
and its validation by the JCPC. The political victory belonged to Mowat but the ruling also
ratified the demands of Meredith and his followers.120
Given the vociferous four-year debate that so heavily utilized preponderant
federalisms, it is surprising how infrequently Ontarians used these frameworks when
celebrating the JCPC’s ruling. Mowat only once referred to Ontario’s future intrastate
preponderance in his Toronto victory speech:
Now, why is it that we are so anxious that the limits of our province shall not
be curtailed? First and foremost, the reason is because we love Ontario; that
we believe in Ontario; that we know from our past experience that it is for the
interest of the Dominion as well as of the provinces that the limits of Ontario
should not be restricted. Ontario, in fact, is the backbone of the Dominion,
and the more we are interested in the success of Confederation the more
anxious we are that Ontario’s extent should not be contracted. (Hear, hear.)
Hitherto that has been the position of our Province. We desire that that should
continue to be the position of our Province for all time; that it should not be
brought down to be one of the least of all the great Provinces (loud cheers);
that there should be [an] extent of country enough to admit of development, so
that as the other Provinces develop so should Ontario develop (loud cheers).121
This was an exceptional statement. At subsequent and separate events David Mills and
Mowat suggested that Ontario’s northern expansion set a precedent that entitled Quebec to a
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similar swath of territory. “The two were,” Mowat told a crowd in Chateauguay, Quebec in
October 1884, “the great provinces of the dominion.”122 With the victory secure, fomenting
jealousy in the other provinces was counterproductive to Liberal attempts to unseat
Macdonald’s government.
The boundary dispute did not end until 1889. The Canadian government claimed that
the Indian Titles Act gave it the right to retain ownership of the disputed region’s resources.
The Mowat government insisted that it had the right to replace the dominion as the agent of
the Crown, and the dispute was not resolved until the provincial government took the case to
the JCPC in 1888. The court again found in Ontario’s favour and the following year the
Imperial government passed legislation ratifying both JCPC rulings. Ontario now extended
west to the Lake of the Woods and North to the Albany and English rivers.123 This final
dispute, however, concerned government revenues from the disputed territory, and therefore
had little or no bearing on population growth and intrastate preponderance. Dominionprovincial negotiations and then judicial appeal were the preferred means of resolution.
Exerting parliamentary influence was never seriously considered. Preponderant federalisms
therefore did not inform this final stage of the boundary dispute.

Conclusion
Provincial autonomy, access to natural resources, and partisanship, were not the only
reasons Ontarians desired the disputed territory. They also believed that Ontarian ownership
of the region would safeguard their province’s potential preponderant influence.
Macdonald’s refusal to concede the territory to Ontario elicited strong responses from
Ontarians who not only believed that the territory was integral to their political influence, but
who also believed that their province possessed the power to secure it. If their quest failed,
Ontario would become a ‘third rate province’ that could not compete with the influence of
Manitoba, British Columbia, or Quebec, in the House of Commons or cabinet. Ontario’s
provincial Liberals were therefore much bolder than rivals such as Norquay, who were
ultimately unwilling to risk their political reputations to gain the territory. By capitalizing on
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this sense of entitlement to present and future influence, Mowat’s Liberals elevated a
dominion-provincial dispute into a massive campaign that ignited the premier’s supporters
and alarmed the rest of Canada.
Ontario Conservatives opposed this assault with a variety of arguments. Macdonald
emphasized national interests and dismissed the movement to expand Ontario’s borders as
unjust and sectionalist. The Mail’s editorials often echoed this stand. Yet the Conservative
organ also supported Meredith and his followers who generally valued the disputed territory
and did not slavishly follow the prime minister’s lead. An alternative preponderant federalist
interpretation helped Meredith and his followers to fracture Ontarian support for annexing
the territory. Ontario, he and his followers insisted, endangered national unity and provincial
autonomy by seizing the disputed territory. The province’s large intrastate representation
made such action too alarming to Canada’s other provinces. He therefore urged Ontarians to
abandon the idea that Ontario could profit by ignoring the concerns of the rest of Canada. An
appeal to the JCPC was the only means to resolve the dispute in a way that the rest of Canada
would accept. This alternative interpretation allowed Meredith and his followers to oppose
Mowat’s tactics without rejecting the widespread Ontarian desire to preserve their province’s
preponderance. The political acceptability of this position helped the Conservatives to
deprive Mowat of the electoral support he required to continue holding the disputed territory
without dominion ratification. This contribution, when combined with Norquay’s willingness
to resolve the dispute at the JCPC, led Mowat to abandon further escalation and instead
submit the dispute to judicial review.
During the boundary dispute, Ontario’s national and provincial Conservative
caucuses did not suffer from the defections that characterized the Coalition period. Unlike
the Red River amnesty or New Brunswick School questions of 1874 to 1875, Macdonald’s
government retained power throughout much of the boundary dispute, and the prime minister
regularly asked his Ontario Conservatives to support unpopular policies. In 1881, for
example, Macdonald’s Ontario MPs supported Manitoba’s expansion into the disputed
region. Although Meredith did not echo all of Macdonald’s arguments, he also managed to
keep his followers aligned against Mowat beginning in 1882. This partisan unity was integral
to limiting the impact of Mowat’s preponderant federalist campaign. Party discipline,
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however, would soon experience new strains. An increasingly strong and widespread belief
that Ontario possessed the preponderant influence to block demands from the rest of Canada
during the succeeding decade once again eroded partisan unity and turned racial and religious
conflicts into national political crises.
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Chapter 6: Creed and Culture, 1885-1889
“It will certainly not be ended by Ontario until the people of Quebec understand, once and
for all, that whilst they are entitled equally with Ontario to share in the government of the
Dominion, they must equally with us bow to the law of the land and suffer like us for its
violation.”
Toronto Mail, 4 September 1886.

Beginning in 1885, a series of racial and religious disputes racked Canadian politics.
The public debates surrounding Louis Riel’s execution and the Jesuits’ Estates Act pitted
English-Protestant Ontarians against French-Catholic Quebecers. Historians focus on racial
and religious antagonisms to explain why these debates sparked passionate responses in both
provinces. Emphasizing the attempts of Ontarian political leaders and editorialists to avoid or
stoke these prejudices, however, leads historians away from analysing how the sense of
power and entitlement shaped the Ontarian and Canadian debates. Many of the Ontarian
agitators imagined that they could harness their province’s preponderant influence to
determine Canada’s responses to Riel’s execution and the Jesuits’ Estates Act. This sense of
power and entitlement was so strong that it overcame partisan loyalties during the Jesuits’
Estates Act debate and attracted followers from both parties. The longstanding belief that
Ontario possessed the preponderant power to influence national debates, in short, inspired
bold, intransigent, and offensive attitudes that helped to turn these questions into national
political crises.
Not all Ontarians, however, supported these agitations. In fact, many combatted
attempts to rally their province against the dominion government’s policies by denying that
Ontario had the right to influence the debate. They contended that parliament was not
obligated to pronounce on the justice of Riel’s execution and that the Jesuits’ Estates Act
could not be disallowed because it was within provincial jurisdiction. But these evasive legal
arguments were not the only way these Ontarians justified their opposition to the agitations.
Historians overlook the willingness of a minority of Ontarians to advocate an alternative
application of Ontario’s preponderant influence. Those opposing the agitations conceded
269

that Ontario had the power to ‘smash Confederation.’ They contended that Canadian unity
could not withstand Ontarians celebrating Riel’s execution or endure the interference of a
powerful province like Ontario in Quebec’s settlement of the Jesuits’ Estates question. These
politicians and newspaper editors therefore urged Ontarians to desist from harming national
unity by supporting the agitations. The English-Protestant Ontarian belief that the Riel and
Jesuits’ Estates agitations had legal or constitutional merit, however, deterred all but the most
determined from advocating the use of their province’s preponderant power to support
compromises that most Ontario-Protestants found distasteful. Yet these alternative
constructions of Ontario’s role in the two disputes made it easier for some Ontarian
politicians and newspaper editorialists to oppose the agitations in their province. In so doing,
they demonstrated that Ontarians recognized the concerns emanating from Quebec but did
not subordinate their provincial culture to maintaining national unity. Instead they
acknowledged the preponderant federalist aspect of Ontario’s political culture and attempted
to use this provincial consciousness to challenge the agitations and contribute to the
restoration of national unity.

The North-West Rebellion and the Execution of Louis Riel
The North-West rebellion revived racial tensions between Ontario and Quebec that
simmered beneath the national political surface since the 1875 amnesty. Historians focus on
Riel’s trial and psychological evaluations. They also generalize about Ontarian opposition to
clemency and its frustration with Quebec post-execution protests.1 Two historians question
this approach. In 1969 Donald Kubesh claimed that Ontario and Quebec had nothing to gain
or lose by Riel’s execution. The Riel debate, he concluded, was not really a racial contest.
At its heart, the crisis was instead a “brilliant propaganda programme… behind which
contending factions in Canadian life struggled for power.”2 Arthur Silver agrees that
Ontarian newspapers focused on Riel’s “actions rather than his origin,” and also concludes
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that the Ontarian desire for ‘justice’ was not the product of racial “fanaticism.” Despite these
observations, he still admits that the public debate produced “real ethnic hostility” that both
parties were unable to contain.3
Ontario’s sense of entitlement to influence the post-execution debate led some
newspapers and MPPs to heighten political tensions by suggesting that their province could
prevent Quebec from censuring the Canadian government. Yet questions about Riel’s sanity
that jeopardized the legality of his execution as well as the necessity of maintaining national
parties, led some Ontarian politicians and newspaper editors to deny Ontario’s right to
influence the debate. A few even confronted the agitation by suggesting that Ontario use its
influence to restore national unity. Examining the Ontario Assembly’s debate concerning
Riel’s execution, as well as the provincial and dominion election campaigns of 1886 and
early 1887, demonstrate both parties’ continued use of preponderant federalisms to stoke and
abate political tensions. Ontarians were not as unified as historians claim.
During the winter of 1874 to 1875 Riel visited Washington D.C. and had a series of
visions. God, he claimed, appointed him to be a “prophet of the New World.” During the
mid-1870s his increasingly unusual and outspoken behaviour led his family to commit him to
several Quebec asylums. He was released in 1878 and moved to Montana to join an
emerging Métis settlement. He subsequently married Marguerite Monet dit Bellehumeur,
became a father, and worked at the St. Peter’s mission as a teacher educating the nearby
native population.4
Discontentment, meanwhile, grew on the Canadian Prairies. The region’s aboriginal
inhabitants were frustrated by the state’s neglect. The dominion government had negotiated
a series of Numbered Treaties with the native population to prepare the territory for western
settlement. Discontentment with the treaty terms, the government’s willingness to withhold
rations from bands that refused to sign the treaties, and the dominion government’s failure to
meet their limited obligations led the Cree Chief Big Bear to push for their renegotiation to
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afford greater Native territory and autonomy. The Métis were also upset. Many came to the
districts of Saskatchewan and Assiniboia after the Red River resistance but found that their
lives did not substantially improve. These districts lacked responsible government during the
1880s. Not only did a Lieutenant Governor appointed by the dominion government control
the local government but the territories’ inhabitants also lacked representation in the House
of Commons and the Senate. The lack of French-speaking land agents and surveyors to
resolve ambiguous or conflicting land claims also made the Métis uneasy. A “chronic lack of
federal financial support” also contributed to regional discontent. The absence of political
representation or a road map to provincial status, as well as the relocation of the CPR to a
southern route, made White farmers and businessmen from Prince Albert to Edmonton “more
vitriolic in their attacks on Ottawa than even the natives and the metis.” Without access to an
institution where they could express their grievances, and emboldened by the widespread
dissatisfaction in the North-West, the Métis began to organize a protest movement. But they
lacked a leader. A delegation went to Montana and convinced Riel to lead their protest. The
former exile returned to Canada during the summer and fall of 1884 and began urging the
formation of an alliance that would command Ottawa’s attention at peaceful and wellattended English, French, and Native gatherings.5
By March 1885, however, the Macdonald government’s refusal to address these
grievances as well as the NWMP’s decision to reinforce a local detachment led Riel to
initiate a rebellion. Under Gabriel Dumont’s command, the Métis seized arms, supplies and
hostages at Batoche and formed a Provisional Government with Riel as its leader. Their
subsequent victory against Canadian forces at Duck Lake convinced Ottawa to send
Frederick Middleton’s North-West Field Force of 800 men to combat the approximately 350
Métis and Indian rebels. After a series of clashes, the government forces crushed the
rebellion at Batoche and captured Riel. Since Riel’s leadership of the rebellion was beyond
question, his subsequent trial at Regina in July and August 1885 focused on his sanity.
According to the McNaughten Rules of British criminal law, the defence had to prove that
Riel was unable to comprehend the nature and quality of his actions, or if he was aware of
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these facts, the defence had to demonstrate that he did not understand that his actions were
“wrong.” During the court’s proceedings, Riel obstructed his defence team’s insanity plea,
and compromised its case by speaking eloquently about the Métis’ cause. The jury found
Riel guilty but requested mercy. The judge, however, had little choice. The penalty for
treason was death.6
The sentence offended Quebecers. Although Silver notes how the Métis’ resort to
armed rebellion initially made Quebecers “ambivalent” about the rebellion, they could not
accept Riel’s death sentence. They doubted Riel’s sanity, and believed that the legitimacy of
the Métis’ grievances entitled him to clemency. The only reason the government would
persevere with the execution was to placate anti-French and anti-Catholic bigotry in Ontario.
The public outcry was so strong that newspapers across the province demanded clemency
and urged their readers to sign petitions supporting the same cause.7
Throughout the fall of 1885 Ontarians anxiously watched to see whether Macdonald’s
government would commute Riel’s sentence. Recalling Quebec’s support for the 1875
amnesty, many Ontarians worried that the current demands for clemency emanating from the
same province arose from racial and religious sympathy and therefore violated the principle
of equality before the law.8 Although many Ontarians admitted that the Métis had legitimate
grievances against the dominion government, they noted that Riel had not suffered their
plight while living in Montana and suggested that he came from the United States to stir up
trouble. They did not doubt Riel’s sanity and claimed that he was a “recidivistic” rebel who
had not shown mercy to Thomas Scott, and who even urged Native Canadians to join his
campaign. The rule of law, rather than Quebec pressure, had to determine Riel’s fate.
Ontarian newspapers were confident that the course of justice would result in Riel’s
execution.9
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Macdonald’s Conservatives were in a precarious position. Infighting among HectorLouis Langevin, Joseph Chapleau, and Joseph Caron for leadership of the Bleus
compromised their party’s ability to manage public opinion in Quebec. Laurier’s efforts to
convert the traditionally anti-clerical Rouges into British liberals were also beginning to pay
dividends and made the Conservatives more vulnerable at the polls. In the short term Honoré
Mercier, the new provincial Rouge leader, was even more dangerous because he was willing
to work with the Castors (ultramontane Conservatives) to create a Parti National. If it gained
electoral support this Catholic nationaliste party would demand heavy concessions from
Macdonald (as a similar but brief alliance secured in 1884), or support the Liberals.10 To
avoid further weakening his party’s popularity in Quebec, the Canadian government
discouraged its Ontario supporters from trying to influence the dominion government or
making provocative statements that would raise racial tensions. Despite their expressed
desire to see Thomas Scott’s killers avenged, for example, Ontario’s Orange Lodges avoided
commenting on the sentence. In the House of Commons on 12 March 1886, N. Clarke
Wallace estimated that only six of over two thousand lodges across Canada discussed
petitioning for Riel’s execution. As the Order’s future Grand Master (1887 to 1902),
Wallace’s desire to avoid antagonizing French-Catholics carried considerable weight. One
week later, the Secretary of State confirmed that the dominion government only received
three petitions (two from Prairie lodges and one from a Toronto lodge) requesting Riel’s
execution.11 The Mail also avoided commenting on Riel’s fate during the fall. When rival
newspapers noted the Mail’s silence, the government organ defended its reticence by
asserting that it was “no part of a newspaper’s business to attempt to influence Executive
action one way or the other.”12 The state could only use the facts of the case and the law to
determine Riel’s fate. The relative silence of the Orange Order and the Mail demonstrates
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more than the curtailment of racial outbursts, Conservatives also avoided stoking the belief
that Ontarians could influence the carriage of justice.
These efforts to subdue the sense of entitlement in Ontario to influence the Canadian
government’s decision were only partially successful. Although Ontarian newspapers did not
explicitly advocate the use of their province’s parliamentary preponderance to affect Riel’s
fate, the province’s political leaders nevertheless recognized that clemency would generate a
strong reaction in Ontario against Macdonald’s government and Quebec influence during the
next election. Alexander Campbell, for example, counselled Macdonald that “there are other
Provinces than Quebec,” and urged him to consider the “deep feeling” in English Canada to
hang Riel.13 James Edgar, the Liberal MP for Ontario West and the party’s political manager
in Ontario, similarly warned Laurier that “not only Orangeman, but many other
conservatives, and a good many reformers, are very decided in favour of hanging.”14 Such
warnings indicated that these leaders believed that their constituents would interpret a
decision to grant clemency as the product of Quebec pressure. Ontario voters, they warned,
could punish governments that supported clemency.
The Canadian government, searching for a means to escape responsibility for the
politically divisive question, repeatedly postponed the execution and despatched three
medical examiners to reassess Riel’s sanity. If Riel could not be held responsible for his
actions, the law precluded his execution. The first two examiners confirmed his sanity, but
the third reported that Riel was “unable to distinguish between wrong and right on political
and religious subjects.”15 After debating these reports in cabinet, the Conservative
government decided against intervention and Riel climbed the scaffold on 16 November.
Riel’s execution intensified the national debate. In Quebec, his death spurred a series
of demonstrations against the Canadian government. According to Silver, each of these
rallies denounced the execution as “an act of aggression by English Canadians against French
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Canada.”16 The most famous gathering was at the Champ de Mars in Montreal where forty
thousand people, including thirty-seven French-Canadian politicians from both sides of the
parliamentary aisle, protested the execution. During the proceedings Macdonald was burned
in effigy. On the rally’s platform, Mercier cried out: “Riel is dead” and blamed Ontarian
“fanaticism and hatred against everything French.”17 Laurier also denounced the execution
as unjust. “Had I been born on the banks of the Saskatchewan,” he famously exclaimed, “I
would myself have shouldered a musket to fight against the neglect of government and the
shameless greed of speculators.”18 The only prominent MPs to avoid the rally were
Macdonald’s three French-Canadian Quebec cabinet ministers: Langevin, Chapleau, and
Caron. The formation of the Parti National now seemed likely.19
Ontarian newspapers exploited the demonstrations in Quebec to serve their own
purposes. Liberal organs, for example, tried to use the demonstrations in Quebec to break
Macdonald’s grip on the province and unseat his government. Within days of Riel’s
execution, the leading Liberal newspapers accused Macdonald of executing Riel to improve
his party’s popularity in Ontario. The Globe now doubted Riel’s sanity and implied that his
sentence should have been commuted.20 The Advertiser noted that the British and American
governments no longer executed rebels such as Jefferson Davis, and therefore opined that
French-Canadians had a right to seek “justice” against Macdonald’s government. The state
should have instead tried Riel for murder.21 Macdonald’s government, more than Riel, was
“responsible for the shedding of French blood and English alike.”22
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The Mail initially responded by claiming that the Liberal organs supported the
protests in Quebec to unseat Macdonald. This privileging of party at the expense of national
unity, it opined, was unpatriotic.23 The Liberals had, in fact, become the “Rielite party.”24
But the Mail’s management soon tired of these pat attacks against the Liberals. The
convalescence, and subsequent death of Mail co-owner John Riordon in 1884, left his brother
Charles in charge. The latter was, according to Paul Rutherford, “more interested in making
money than in advancing the Conservative cause.”25 He made several important changes to
the Mail’s staff including hiring Christopher Bunting as Managing Director. When his
Conservative editor Martin Griffin resigned, Charles rehired Edward Farrer. Farrer worked
on and off at the Mail from 1872 to 1882, moved to New York to become a foreign editor,
and then to Winnipeg to edit the Winnipeg Times and later the Sun before returning to the
Mail in 1884. Although he was an Irish republican with strong annexationist and anticlerical feelings, Farrer’s editorials had not heretofore strayed far from the party line.26
The Conservative organ now pivoted and suggested Ontarians confront Quebec’s
influence head-on. The day after the Champ de Mars demonstration, the Mail alleged that
the Bleus, Rouges, and Blake Liberals, expected their combined influence to convince the
courts to “suspend the operation of the law” when it threatened the wellbeing of a FrenchCanadian. Ontario and the Maritimes, “by virtue of numbers,” had the ability to overcome
this attempt to violate the separation of powers and equality before the law. If this opposition
failed, “Ontario would smash Confederation into its original fragments, preferring that the
dream of a united Canada should be shattered forever, than that unity should be purchased at
the expense of equality.”27 Two days later, the Mail pushed this assertion to its absolute limit.
If Quebecers did not cease pressing for a government that would support “injustice,” then
“Britons” would unite and refight the “conquest.” If this transpired, the Mail warned, there
would be “no Treaty of 1763,” French-Canadians would “lose everything.”28 Ontario, with
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some support from the rest of English Canada, the Mail concluded, could control
Confederation’s fate.
The Mail’s new editorial stance was extremely popular in Ontario but partisan
considerations prevented the majority of Ontarian politicians and newspapers from adopting
it. Blake continued to straddle the demands emanating from both provinces. Despite private
appeals from Mercier for Blake to position the Liberal party behind the growing movement
against Riel’s execution in Quebec, the Liberal leader refused to move his party decisively
behind the Quebec or Ontarian majority. He recognized that his caucus was deeply divided,
and refused to “make a platform out of a scaffold.” In his public speeches Blake therefore
repeated the doubts expressed by the Globe and the Advertiser but admitted that no
consensus was possible on Riel’s execution. He therefore promised that he would allow his
MPs to vote freely on the question when it came before parliament.29 Macdonald was equally
unsure of how to prevent the crisis from toppling his government. His Bleu cabinet ministers
advocated delay and the prime minister concurred. “Old tomorrow” postponed the next
parliamentary session for a month.30
In the interim, however, many Ontarians accepted the Mail’s claim that their province
could influence the post-execution debate. At Ontario’s provincial Assembly in February
1886, Solomon White (the Conservative MPP for Essex North) moved an amendment that
approved of the Crown’s attempts to subdue the rebellion and punish its “principal
participants” but also asked it to be “merciful” when trying the remaining rebels. White’s
amendment was a blatant attempt to capitalize on Riel’s execution before the upcoming
provincial and national elections. The request for mercy for the remaining rebels was in line
with public opinion in Ontario, but Quebec Bleus could also use it to assuage concerns about
alleged Ontarian anti-Catholic ‘fanaticism.’ Meredith rejected Liberal assertions that the
Assembly lacked the constitutional jurisdiction to comment on the punishment of the rebels.
The question, he retorted, “affected Confederation itself.” Meredith insisted that the
“demagogues [who] claimed that the law should be turned aside simply because the offender
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was a Frenchman,” had to be stopped. “Under such circumstances was it to be said that the
people of Ontario were not entitled to say they protested against any such position[?]” Like
Blake in the early 1870s, Meredith also claimed that “the people of the North West were
composed largely of persons who had gone from Ontario.” The Assembly, he opined, had the
“right” to protect Ontarians across the country by affirming the rule of law. On this occasion,
the provincial Conservatives concluded that encouraging rather than discouraging a sense of
power and entitlement in Ontario was the best means to improve their party’s political
standing.31
Mowat was in a difficult position. Meredith was capitalizing on the widespread anger
in Ontario concerning the Quebec demonstrations. Yet the provincial Liberals were also
aware of Blake’s desire to make inroads in Quebec and could not support White’s
amendment. The Liberals therefore attacked White’s resolution as a partisan ploy. The
premier and Christopher Fraser, the cabinet’s Catholic representative, also used provincial
rights to oppose White’s amendment. The Assembly, they argued, was not an appropriate
venue for campaigning for the upcoming elections. Fraser, in fact, moved his own
amendment asserting that it “would be an unwise and unwarranted intrusion upon the proper
domain… of the Dominion Parliament” to pronounce on its decision to execute Riel. Yet
Mowat’s government could not resist using the occasion to boost Blake’s Quebec prospects.
Despite its warning against interfering in dominion affairs, Fraser’s resolution also asked the
Crown to be merciful when trying the remaining rebels. When the Conservatives pointed out
the inherent contradiction in Fraser’s resolution and reminded him that Blake had previously
used the Assembly to interfere in dominion affairs, Fraser appealed to Ontario’s unique
ability to lead Confederation. He warned the Assembly against alienating the inhabitants of
the North-West or Quebec. The cabinet minister also noted that George Cartier, who had
once rebelled against the Crown, was presently commemorated in statuary on parliament hill.
One day, Fraser suggested, Riel’s admirers in the North-West might erect a similar
monument. He therefore urged the Assembly to seize the opportunity to salvage Canadian
unity from the rebellion. “This province,” which was “the foremost in the Dominion for
wealth and influence, and which represents the largest Protestant population in the
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Dominion” could contribute to the restoration of national harmony by requesting mercy for
the remaining rebels and by avoiding the controversial topic of Riel’s execution. This
argument did not explain how asking the Crown to be merciful respected the separation of
powers or provincial rights. Instead, it asserted that Ontario was uniquely suited to help heal
the sectional animosity generated by Riel’s execution. In the end, the Assembly adopted
Fraser’s resolution by a party vote of 47 to 31. Despite the Assembly’s lack of constitutional
jurisdiction, preponderant federalisms led both parties in the Ontario legislature to claim that
they had the ‘right’ to influence the debate concerning Riel’s execution and the punishment
of the remaining North-West rebels. Partisan calculations as well as different beliefs about
how Ontario could best support Confederation, however, led to the continued division of its
MPPs.32
When parliament eventually considered Riel’s execution internal party divisions and
political considerations precluded Ontarians from espousing preponderant federalisms. On
12 March A.G.P.R. Landry, the MP for Montmagny and President of the Quebec
Conservative Association, moved a resolution regretting the Canadian government’s decision
to allow Riel’s execution. Although Blake allowed Laurier to lead the debate, he asked
parliament to support Landry’s resolution. The government, he alleged, had ignored
evidence that Riel was not responsible for his actions and executed the rebel leader to shore
up its support in Ontario. As promised, the Liberal leader allowed his party to vote freely.
James Edgar and David Mills joined Blake in supporting Landry’s resolution. Most Ontario
Liberals, including Richard Cartwright, John Charlton, and Alexander Mackenzie, however,
voted with the government.33 The latter found Blake’s willingness to ignore much of his
Ontarian caucus and to instead cater to Quebec tastes in order to attain office to be “most
humiliating.”34 Ontario Conservatives responded to Blake’s allegations by claiming that he
and his Ontarian followers were hypocrites. They repeatedly pointed out the incongruities
between Blake’s demands for Riel’s capture from 1870 to 1872 and his present denunciations
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of the Macdonald government. How could the Liberal Leader, they wondered, support a man
like Laurier who claimed that he would have joined Riel’s forces and shot Ontarian
volunteers? A party that performed such political “somersaults” to woo Quebecers did not
deserve electoral support.35 Several Ontario MPs, including Clarke Wallace denied that the
Orange Order had lobbied for Riel’s execution. They insisted that the rebel leader’s demise
was the result of the carriage of justice, not racial prejudice.36
After a week-and-a-half’s debate, the Conservatives prevailed. Approximately twothirds of Ontario Liberals supported the government. Only seventeen French-speaking
Conservatives sided with Landry. A concerted campaign by leading Bleus newspapers
sufficiently ameliorated public angst to permit the majority of its membership to vote against
Landry’s resolution. Although Bleu party discipline never entirely recovered from the
rupture, the government survived the crisis.37 In this chaotic and divisive environment,
neither preponderant federalism was an attractive strategy. The imperative of preserving
partisan support in Quebec made rallying Ontarians to oppose Landry’s motion unthinkable
for Liberal and Conservative leaders. The sense of justice that reinforced the popularity of
Riel’s execution in Ontario rendered suggesting the alignment of Ontarian parliamentary
representation behind Landry’s motion political suicide.
Preponderant federalisms, however, resurged during the provincial and national
election campaigns. The fall provincial campaign emphasized racial and religious disputes.
The Mowat government’s concessions to Ontario separate schools and the so-called “Ross
Bible” both figured prominently.38 Yet Meredith’s Conservatives also tried to associate their
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party with Riel’s execution. According to Evans, they were disappointed by the Mail’s
hesitancy to emphasize anti-Riel positions during the campaign.39 The Mail’s reticence
likely stemmed from Macdonald’s warning against anti-Catholic stances. In a private letter
that May, he reminded William Bunting that each province contained significant Catholic
populations. He also warned that readers across the country considered the Mail to be “the
organ of the government.”40 This admonishment appears to have tempered the Mail’s
editorials during the elections. The Mail was not yet, as Paul Rutherford and Carman
Cumming contend, beyond Macdonald’s influence.41 Yet the Riel issue allowed the Mail to
rail against Quebec and affirm Ontario’s ability to block its intrastate influence. The Mail
therefore limited its indulgence of this linkage to six editorials during the remainder of the
year. In these editorials, the Mail encouraged Ontarian voters to support the provincial
Conservatives by alleging that Mowat and his followers were “Rielites.” Ontarians needed to
reject a premier that allowed Mercier’s “race and revenge” movement to prevent the
provincial Assembly from expressing its approval for Riel’s execution.42 In case readers
missed its point, in the closing days of the campaign the Mail declared that “all Ontario
should speak decisively upon” Riel’s execution by supporting the provincial Conservatives at
the polls.43 This same sense of power and entitlement also occasionally informed the
national Conservative campaign during the winter of 1886 to 1887. While speaking at Barrie,
D’Alton McCarthy criticized Blake’s attempts to use Quebec support to gain power. “Do
you suppose,” he asked rhetorically, “that the men of Ontario are willing to submit for a long
period to a condition of subjection to one race.” Ontario and the other English-Canadian
provinces, he insisted, had the power to overcome Quebec’s racial animosity.44
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Other politicians acknowledged Ontario’s preponderant potential but nevertheless
cautioned against antagonizing national unity when discussing Riel’s execution. While
campaigning for the provincial and dominion Conservatives in Perth on 25 November, John
Thompson, a Catholic convert, Minister of Justice, and MP for Antigonish, told his Listowel
audience that
he believed the loyal men of that constituency would stand by law and order,
and would enter an emphatic protest against the Reform party, which was
seeking to set people against people and creed against creed. (Loud Cheers.)
The very front of the battle, where the battle was to be fought and won, was
the Province of Ontario. As coming from one of the smaller provinces he
could say that the honest inhabitants of Nova Scotia watched with keen
interest the step Ontario was taking.45
Such statements encouraged Ontarian voters to support the Conservatives because they
would keep the country united. Ontario was unique. Its provincial election had national
significance.
The Liberals, on the other hand, sensed the popularity of the Riel cry in Ontario, and
therefore avoided preponderant federalisms during the elections. On the day after the
provincial polls closed, however, the Globe celebrated Mowat’s success as a Canadian
victory:
Not Ontario only, but all of Canada may thankfully rejoice in yesterday’s
magnificent victory for the Mowat Administration… Had the Conservative
attempt to gain power by the ‘No Popery’ cry succeeded, the Roman Catholics
all over Canada would have justly conceived their liberties to be imperilled.
With so large an element in anxious alarm, with the ‘No Popery’ men
insolently triumphant, the materials for riot would have been provided, and
any riot in the circumstances might have extended to the dimensions of civil
war.46
Ontario’s provincial government had the power to destabilize Confederation and even
precipitate civil war. Yet it also had the power to unify the country. Mowat’s re-election, the
Globe concluded, “united Ontario and Quebec as they never were united before, and
Canadians may look forward with confidence to a long period of happy co-operation between
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the two races… the safety of the nation is assured.”47 At least some Ontarians asserted that
their province could contribute to national unity by electing a government that respected
Catholic rights.
The elections did not change the political status quo. Macdonald’s share of Ontario’s
seats remained unchanged, and Mowat returned with an increased majority. The popular
vote remained close (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). The high political tensions in Ontario
and Quebec that followed Riel’s execution arose from more than prejudice and political
opportunism. They were also the result of an Ontarian sense of entitlement to influence the
national debate concerning his fate. In an attempt to bolster their popularity, the Mail and
Conservative MPPs upset national unity after 16 November by encouraging Ontarians to
believe that their province could oppose Quebec’s influence and decisively shape Canadian
memory of Riel. On the other hand, the widespread belief in Ontario that Riel’s execution
was just48 limited the willingness of its politicians and newspaper editorialists to confront
these agitations by proposing alternative roles for Ontario. There were, however, a few
notable exceptions. Fraser’s bold assertion that Ontario could harm national unity by
overextending its influence helped Mowat’s government avoid antagonizing Quebec. Similar
suggestions during and immediately following the provincial election also demonstrated that
the linkage of Ontario’s preponderant influence to national unity made it easier for Protestant
Ontarians to support Mowat despite Meredith’s anti-Catholic appeals.
The partisan motivations that often underlay the use of preponderant federalisms
during the post-execution debate in Ontario do not prove that they were insincere
‘propaganda’ as Kubesh contends. Fraser, for example, allowed his personal sympathies for
Catholics across Canada to lead him to doubt that the country would always remember Riel
as a traitor and could not resist suggesting that Ontario was uniquely capable of contributing
to the restoration of Canadian unity. Although Evans does not note Meredith’s assertions of
Ontario’s influence, she contends that his willingness to campaign against concessions to
Catholics in Ontario stemmed from a combination of political intrigue and genuine
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conviction.49 Partisan considerations influenced the use of preponderant federalisms but the
leaders and newspapers of both parties also believed in Ontario’s ability to influence national
debates and tried to co-opt it to facilitate their vision of Canada.

The Jesuits’ Estates Controversy
After the Champ de Mars rally, Honoré Mercier continued to build his Parti National.
His continued protest of Riel’s execution at public meetings increased the movement’s
popularity. His close ties with the Catholic Church convinced many Quebecers that the Parti
National was not the old anti-clerical Rouge. In the fall of 1886 Mercier’s new party
narrowly won the provincial election. Upon taking office the following year, he formed a
government composed mainly of former Rouges and a significant number of Castors. At
first, the Mowat and Mercier governments cooperated to pursue common goals. The Quebec
premier’s willingness to use provincial rights to frame his nationalist appeals to preserve
Quebec as a French-Catholic homeland made him a tantalizing ally in Mowat’s fight against
Macdonald’s centralizing designs.50 In his government’s first throne speech, Mercier
proposed the convening of an interprovincial conference to renegotiate the terms of union.
He invited Macdonald and all of Canada’s premiers, but Macdonald and the Conservative
premiers of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island refused to attend. Although this
gave the conference a strong Liberal flavour (Norquay was the only nominal Conservative),
the conference was still an unprecedented gathering. When the Conference convened in
October of that year at Quebec City, Mowat and Mercier worked with the other provincial
delegations to compose and unanimously adopt twenty-two resolutions that affirmed
provincial compact theory. The first resolution, for example, requested the abolition of the
dominion government’s power of disallowance. The sixteenth resolution requested the
ratification of Ontario’s western and northern boundaries. The seventeenth resolution
requested a rearrangement of the financial terms of Confederation. To make better terms
palatable in Ontario, the conference pinned the new subsidies to each province’s population
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and declared that these new terms would be “final and unalterable.”51 Although Macdonald’s
refusal to consider the resolutions prevented their realization in the short term, the conference
nevertheless popularized provincial compact theory.52
The political feasibility of interprovincial cooperation between Ontario and Quebec,
however, was short-lived. To maintain the Parti National, Mercier looked for new ways to
solidify ultramontane support. He found an answer in the Jesuits’ Estates question. Before
the Conquest in 1763, the Jesuit Order held vast tracts of land donated by devout seigneurs in
New France. Some of the revenues from the lands funded an education system. A few dozen
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priests, brothers, and scholars instructed French and especially Native pupils in Acadia, New
France, the Great Lakes region, and Illinois. The centre of these activities was the Jesuit
college in Quebec City. During the 1750s and 1760s, political rivalries led several Imperial
Courts, including those of France and Portugal, to suppress or expel the Order. Even the
Pope acceded to secular pressure and suppressed the order in 1773. Without European
support, Lower Canadian Jesuits lingered. The British closed their educational institutions in
1763 and converted the Quebec City college into a military barracks in 1776. The Imperial
authorities did not, however, seize the Order’s lands until its final member died in 1800.53 A
lengthy legal and political battle ensued to control the Estates. Imperial authorities claimed
that they could use the revenues from the Jesuits’ Estates for any purpose. The Lower
Canadian Assembly asserted that it had the sole right to use the Estates to finance FrenchCatholic education. By 1831 the Imperial government granted the Assembly exclusive
power to administer the Estates to fund the colony’s educational institutions.54 After the
Napoleonic Wars, the Papacy reversed its suppression of the Jesuits, and the Order’s
influence in Lower Canada rebounded. During the 1870s and 1880s, Bishop Bourget
supported its desire to reclaim the Estates funds and use them to establish a university in
Montreal to rival the allegedly liberal Laval University. Quebec’s Archbishop E.A.
Taschereau, however, was a Gallician. This body of Catholic clergy were more tolerant of
dissent as well as the civil state, and he opposed the expansion of the Jesuit Order in Quebec.
He and his followers advocated the continued use of the Estates to support Laval University’s
monopoly of the province’s post-secondary education system.55
Mercier, who had been educated by the Jesuits and appreciated their political support
during the Riel debates, used their claim to prove that the Parti National forsook its anticlerical Rouge roots and solidify his ties with Quebec’s religious authorities. In 1887 his
government incorporated the Jesuits and gave them degree-granting powers. After hearing
petitions from both sections of Quebec’s clerical hierarchy, the Pope assumed Taschereau’s
authority to represent the Catholic Church’s claims in the negotiations with Mercier’s
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government regarding the Jesuits’ Estates. After a few months of negotiating, the Papacy
agreed to relinquish all claims to the Estates upon receipt of four hundred thousand dollars
compensation. Because Quebec’s Protestant secondary schools also received funds from the
Estates, Mercier’s government promised to give their system a proportionate grant of sixty
thousand dollars. The government’s subsequent Jesuits’ Estates Act fulfilled these
commitments.56 The bill’s preamble, however, contained the correspondence between the
Mercier government and the Papacy. This correspondence included phrases such as “the
Holy Father reserved for himself the right of settling the [Estates] question” and “any
agreement… will be binding only in so far as it shall be ratified by the Pope and the
Legislature of this Province.”57 Historians do not agree why Mercier took the unusual step of
including the government’s Papal correspondence in the preamble. J.R. Miller accepts
Mercier’s claims that its inclusion was necessary to bypass the authority of Taschereau and
his allies. He also suggests that the Quebec premier did “his best to prevent misinterpretation
of the preamble.”58 Although Waite accepts this sort of argument, he also asserts that the
lengthy preamble was “almost certainly, a deliberate tease at Ontario Protestants who had
made such a row against Riel three years before.”59 Regardless of Mercier’s intentions,
Quebec Protestants barely opposed the legislation. The Assembly unanimously approved the
bill which became law later that July. By late January 1889, an Ontario-dominated movement
against the Jesuits’ Estates Act emerged that soon led to an intense parliamentary debate to
disallow the legislation. When that failed, the Equal Rights Association (ERA), a primarily
Ontarian movement, organized a powerful disallowance agitation that elevated the dispute to
a national political crisis which severely rattled the Conservative and Liberal parties
throughout the following year.
Several developments contributed to this intense response in Ontario. In the mid1880s, English-Protestants living in Ontario increasingly believed that nation-building
required more than transcontinental railways and common political institutions. They
interpreted Social Darwinism to require the dominance of a single race in each country.
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Canada’s future economic, political and cultural strength, these nationalists believed, lay with
the dominance of the Protestant Anglo-Saxons. Other ‘races’ would eventually assimilate
into this majority. These Ontarians believed that Catholicism remained a “medieval religion
that blocked the advancement of its adherents by discouraging education, individualism and
the pursuit of material progress.”60 The rise of ultramontanism in Quebec during the 1870s
and 1880s, combined with the movement’s insistence that the Church be a vehicle for the
strengthening of Quebec Catholicism and nationalism, made the Jesuits a target for these
English-Protestant nationalists. According to Christopher Pennington, many Ontarian
Protestants “regarded the Jesuits as the Pope’s fanatical foot soldiers, priests who were loyal
to no country or sovereign and who would resort to any means necessary to exterminate the
Protestant faith.”61 The Parti National benefited from ultramontanism, and its ascension to
power was partly due to its objections to Riel’s execution. Now Mercier’s party had,
according to its Ontarian detractors, recognized the Papacy’s right to claim British territory.
‘Jesuitism,’ according to these Ontarians, could not be allowed to enter Canada. From
Quebec it would spread its influence across the country. If Canada was to remain a
progressive and Protestant country where the separation of church and state was sacrosanct, it
could not tolerate the Jesuit Order.62 According to most historians, this “bellicose and
intractable English-Canadian nationalism” was largely responsible for intense agitation in
Ontario against the Jesuits’ Estates Act.63
The political importance of these beliefs was compounded by several additional
factors. First, the province’s provincial culture included a well-established fear of ‘French
domination.’ Ontarians contested real and imagined French-Catholic influence since the
1840s. After Confederation, they repeatedly opposed legislation for expensive railway deals
and better terms that emanated from Quebec.64 Second, French-Catholicism’s expansion into
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Ontario alarmed many of its Protestant inhabitants. In 1871 Franco-Ontarians comprised
only 4% of the province’s population. The scarcity of cultivable land in Quebec, however,
led tens of thousands of Quebecers to move to Eastern Ontario during the 1870s and 1880s.
By 1901, 7% of Ontarians were of French descent.65 As Miller notes, “many [Protestant]
Ontarians tended to view the migration of Francophones not as the edge of a moving
agricultural frontier but as the entering wedge of a nationaliste drive to take over Ontario for
the French Canadians.”66 In addition to this population growth, geographies of religion may
have also contributed to anti-Catholic sentiment in Ontario. Waite believes that the
distribution of this population significantly increased the Ontarian susceptibility to antiCatholic prejudice. Unlike Nova Scotia, for example, where the Catholic populations existed
throughout the province, Ontarian Catholics tended to live in ethnic groupings. In much of
Ontario Protestants rarely confronted Catholics and this lack of familiarity facilitated
misunderstanding and sensationalization.67
Some Ontario Conservatives also agitated for the disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates
Act because they believed that Macdonald needed their province’s support to form his next
government. After Riel’s execution McCarthy, and to a lesser extent Wallace, recognized
that the Conservative party’s hold on Quebec was slipping and that the party needed to make
inroads in other provinces. Many Ontario Conservatives were also frustrated by the prime
minister’s willingness to satisfy Bleu demands. Since Sandfield’s 1871 loss to Blake,
Macdonald also neglected the Ontarian wing of the provincial Conservative party. For
example, he gave little patronage to Meredith’s followers and his attempt to prevent the
boundary dispute from arousing Quebec jealousies made the provincial Conservatives appear
to be traitors to Ontario’s interests.68 From 1886 to 1889 McCarthy therefore repeatedly told
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Macdonald that stirring anti-Protestant sentiment in Ontario would relieve the prime minister
of his reliance on Bleu support.69
These religious and partisan motivations were fundamental to the disallowance
campaign in Ontario. But another conviction reinforced the agitation. In the conclusion of
his study of the ERA, J.R. Miller describes a sense of power and entitlement that contributed
to the “confident and aggressive” nature of the movement:
The reason for the positive tone of the Ontario movement was that Ontarians
viewed their province as the key-stone, the leader, the fulcrum of
Confederation. Naturally, they had responsibilities to their weaker relatives,
such as the Quebec Protestants or the transplanted Ontario farmers on the
plains, but on the whole they thought it fair to say what was good for Ontario
would benefit the whole country. Ontario defined the causes of national ills
and prescribed remedies which were not regional but national, for Canada was
but Ontario writ large. This attitude in Ontario accounted for its patronizing
tone toward the west and its assertiveness in meddling in Quebec’s internal
affairs.70
Miller’s study does not, however, document this important observation with evidence. He
instead equates the leading role Ontarians played in the movement with this sense of
entitlement. His decision to treat the ERA as a national movement leads him away from
interrogating the development and significance of this peculiarly Ontarian attitude. Miller
does not, for example, describe the parliamentary and financial understandings that informed
the disallowance agitation in Ontario. He also does not explain how this sense of entitlement
contributed to the ERA’s adoption of policies that limited its pan-Canadian support.
Historians’ focus on the Protestant-Catholic tensions that informed the Jesuits’
Estates dispute also leads them to overlook how Ontarians occasionally opposed the
disallowance campaign by exploiting this same sense of entitlement to influence. Some
Ontarians opposing the disallowance and ERA movements argued that their province could
preserve national unity by withholding its support from the agitations. The increasingly
widespread belief in Ontario that the Jesuits’ Estates Act was unconstitutional in addition to
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anti-French and anti-Catholic prejudice, however, limited the willingness of politicians and
newspaper editors to combat the disallowance campaign by asking the province’s population
to support politicians who respected Quebec’s provincial autonomy. Nevertheless, the limited
assertion of an alternative assessment of Ontario’s right and ability to influence the dispute
demonstrates that its politicians and newspapers remained aware that opposing the agitation
necessitated more than demands for religious tolerance. It also required addressing the
preponderant federalism that contributed to the agitation’s widespread popularity.
The mobilization in Ontario concerning the Jesuits’ Estates question did not
immediately follow the Act’s passage. Montreal’s major dailies debated the merits of the Act
along partisan lines without rousing any sectional tension until the autumn of 1888 when
Montreal Presbyterians formed the Evangelical Alliance and requested the Act’s
disallowance.71 Aware of the necessity of preserving partisan unity on a potentially sensitive
subject, Ontario Conservatives treaded lightly. Edward F. Clarke, who was the editor of the
Orange Lodge’s Sentinel, the former mayor of Toronto, and the MPP for West Toronto,
allowed the newspaper to suggest that Canadian Protestants would support disallowance. The
Orange organ did not yet advocate the Canadian government’s intervention. Clarke Wallace
also successfully opposed the passage of a resolution for disallowance at the Grand Lodge
meeting in Winnipeg later that August.72 Despite these efforts, tensions slowly rose in
Ontario and Quebec throughout the remainder of the year. By January 1889, the Orange
Order’s Ottawa district held a mass meeting and sent petitions requesting the GovernorGeneral to refuse his assent to every Orange Lodge and Protestant congregation in Canada.73
Shortly thereafter Macdonald’s government tried to counter this pressure by announcing that
it would not exercise its power of disallowance because the Jesuits’ Estates Act was intra
vires.74
The campaign against the Act, however, continued to grow. A few Ontarians began
to suggest that their province had a special role to play in securing disallowance. Often the
sense of entitlement was implied in appeals for Protestant unity. The Sentinel advocated non71
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partisan support for disallowance. “Let Protestant members on both sides of the House unite
and compel the present administration to disallow them,” it encouraged.75 The Mail also
frequently called for Protestant MPs to force the government to disallow the legislation.76
Ontario was the largest and most populous province; any pan-Canadian Protestant initiative
would derive most of its support from its MPs. If these men overcame partisan divisions
they could strengthen the disallowance movement.
On other occasions the rallying cries were more explicit. The Mail complained that
Ontarian voters were tired of Conservative and Liberal leaders ignoring their province’s
demands. It warned that “such members as shirk their obvious duty on this occasion will be
held to strict account.”77 The Victoria Warder called upon “Ontario’s warriors” to stand up
to “Romish” interference.78 Two weeks later it repeated this call. “Let Ontario set the
example and sweep Jesuitical influence out of the arena of politics.”79 On the day before
parliament took up the disallowance question, the Toronto Pavilion hosted a meeting of three
thousand Protestants. The gathering was an important step in the development of the
disallowance agitation in Ontario. It was non-partisan by design, and this increased the
movement’s support across the province. It also established the Toronto Citizens’
Committee to coordinate the region’s opposition of “Jesuitism.” As Miller notes, this meeting
was the final shift from a largely Orange and Ministerial campaign to a “truly public” and
“nondenominational” movement with widespread appeal.80 But the meeting produced other
important developments. Its speakers popularized the movement by espousing Ontario’s
unique right and ability to secure the bill’s disallowance against the wishes of the majority of
Quebecers. In his opening address, the chairman of the meeting emphasized the province’s
power. “The citizens of Ontario,” he brashly announced, “had made up their minds to put a
stop to the encroachments of the Order of Jesus.”81 The keynote speaker for the evening was
William Caven. As a Presbyterian minister and the Principal of Knox College, he was one of
the movement’s most powerful and respected leaders. When concluding his speech, Caven
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warned that Ontario MPs who disregarded the widespread desire for disallowance would be
punished at the next election.82 The message was clear. Disgruntled Ontarians had a right to
expect disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act because their province possessed the
parliamentary muscle to force the dominion government’s hand. Religious prejudice does
not entirely explain the aggressive reaction in Ontario to the Jesuits’ Estates Act. A belief in
their province’s power and entitlement emboldened these Ontarians to believe that they could
turn their prejudices into government policy.
Aside from Ontario’s intrastate influence, a few agitators also claimed that Ontario
was entitled to push for disallowance because it would indirectly pay for the Jesuits’ Estates
Act. In late January 1889 the Mail noted the financial struggles of Quebec’s provincial
government. By giving up the Estates, it alleged, the government would have even more
difficulty providing grants to its education system, and would soon ask Ottawa for another
round of ‘better terms.’ “Ontario,” it concluded, “has been freely bled in the past in order
that the demands of Quebec might be satisfied; she may well protest, therefore, against a
continuation of the process for the purpose of restoring life to an institution which is a deadly
enemy not only to herself but of the whole dominion.”83 At the March Pavilion meeting
Caven also claimed that “the Dominion, and consequently Ontario” had a “financial interest”
in the Estates dispute. No newspaper printed his elaboration, but he presumably also
contended that Quebec’s recent receipt of better terms entitled Ontario to influence Quebec’
expenditures.84 Like the better terms debates, Ontario’s self-imposed right to influence
dominion policy was based on more than its parliamentary preponderance, it was also rooted
in the province’s contributions to dominion revenues.
In February, the leading newspaper organs of both parties combated the preponderant
federalist aspect of the disallowance campaign. Although they did not ask Ontarians to use
their preponderant influence to approve of Quebec’s actions, they recognized that Ontario’s
restraint would help to preserve national unity. On 7 February the Globe used this argument
to justify its stand against disallowance. Although it found the Papacy’s involvement in the
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Estates question to be distasteful, the Globe claimed that opposing the Act would foment
racial tensions, civil war, and “the smashing of Confederation into its original fragments.”85
This allusion to the Mail’s 1885 threat proved popular with those attempting to provide an
alternative preponderant federalist interpretation of the dispute. Quebec was becoming
“more thoroughly Roman Catholic,” and the Act was very popular in the province. Ontarians
were at a “crossroads.” They had to either accept that Confederation afforded the Quebec
Assembly the right to pass the legislation, or support a dissolution movement that would
ultimately undermine Confederation.86 On 11 February the Conservative’s new Toronto
organ, the Empire, concurred with its Liberal rival in a rare moment of partisan alignment by
also encouraging Ontarians to reject the temptation of using their parliamentary
preponderance to challenge the Quebec government’s Act. “It cannot be concealed that what
the people of Ontario are being asked to do is to get up a war of creeds that would… ‘smash
confederation into its original fragments.’” Two days later it again advised the “Protestant
majority of Ontario” to avoid endangering provincial rights by interfering with legislation
that was within the Quebec Assembly’s jurisdiction.87 The Mail’s Riel agitation, and its
continued support for commercial union demonstrated its unreliability as a party organ.
Macdonald pushed for the establishment of a new newspaper, and with McCarthy’s
assistance, raised the necessary funds to establish the Empire in 1887 under the editorship of
David Creighton, an established Conservative editor from Owen Sound and former Ontario
MPP for Grey North.88 Although demonstrations against the Jesuits’ Estates Act continued,
Creighton believed that his newspaper’s editorials “stiffened” many Ontario Conservatives
who were beginning to succumb to the mounting pressure for disallowance by giving them
the “key note for their replies to the agitation.”89 Ontario, according to these newspapers,
had the power to destroy or foster national-unity, and its citizenry had to support the
dominion government by withholding their support from the agitation.
This stand, however, was difficult to maintain. The Globe’s management judged that
the popularity of the disallowance movement was too strong for the newspaper to withstand.
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The Mail’s anti-French and anti-Catholic editorials stole too many of the Globe’s
subscribers. To salvage its popularity, the Globe reversed its disallowance position on 16
March 1886. Using two recent articles from Canadian law journals to justify its about-face,
the Globe claimed that its editorialists had not realized that the law imported “a foreign
jurisdiction into the civil government of a Canadian province.” The newspaper also pandered
to the growing sense of power and entitlement in Ontario to pressure for the Act’s
disallowance. Regardless of “whatever the majority in Quebec may wish, the majority in
Canada must not be made to appear to adopt and assent to an Act of such liberty-destroying
and wholly impossible admissions” of allowing a foreign government to determine the
validity of provincial legislation.90 Although the Advertiser did not immediately join the
Globe’s call for disallowance, it also reversed its position by asking Mercier’s government to
repeal the Estates Act and re-pass it without the preface. If Mercier refused to heed this
advice, the London newspaper warned that “the Protestants of Canada” would not hesitate to
prevent “Jesuitical encroachment.”91 These editorial reversals were resignations to antiCatholic and anti-ultramontane sentiments in Ontario as J.R. Miller notes.92 They were also
the product of a faith in Ontario’s ability to preponderate in national debates. Ontarians, the
Liberal organs agreed, possessed the influence to ensure the disallowance of the Jesuits’
Estates Act.
The agitators predictably denied that their actions harmed national unity. In fact, they
claimed that disallowing the Jesuits’ Estates Act would unite the country. For example,
Globe writer E.W. Thomson denied that the newspaper’s reversal would harm the Liberal
party. In a letter he encouraged Laurier to use disallowance to supplant Macdonald and unite
the country. If Laurier supported disallowance, Thomson claimed, the Liberal leader “could
do anything in Ontario and the Protestant Provinces.” He doubted that “any reasonable
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Roman Catholic or French Canadian” would object to the argument that the Jesuits’ Estates
Act surrendered important functions to the Papacy, and also recommended that Mercier repass the legislation without the preface. Such a course, he claimed, would have the added
bonus of bringing Quebec’s provincial and national Liberals into alignment on the Jesuits’
Estates question.93
Some agitators even claimed that Quebec’s Protestant minority required Ontario’s
parliamentary muscle to save them from the Act. According to the Warder, Quebec
Protestants required the “backing of their Ontario friends” to overturn the Estates Act.94 One
of its editorials also claimed that if Ontarians made clear that they were pushing against
Papal rather than French influence in Canada, “a phalanx from Quebec, of French-Canadians
will be found to stand firmly for the old Gallician church.”95 Quebec Protestants, a Dr.
Hunter alleged during a meeting of religious leaders in Toronto, were “hopelessly
overmatched” during the passage of the Estates Act and “are looking to us in Ontario to stand
by them.” By protecting Quebec Protestants, Ontarians would save rather than ‘smash’
Confederation.96
Parliamentarians had the opportunity to debate the Jesuit Estates question in late
March when Colonel William Edward O’Brien, the Conservative MP for Muskoka, moved a
lengthy resolution advocating disallowance. During the ensuing debate, few Ontarians
utilized preponderant federalisms to justify their position on disallowance. Most of the
disallowance advocates used anti-Jesuit or constitutional arguments to justify their
opposition. O’Brien, for example, argued that the Jesuit Order was an “alien, secret and
politico-religious body” that most European states had expelled and which remained a
dangerous threat to the people of Canada. The Act, he claimed, also demonstrated the
interference of the Catholic Church in provincial governance and therefore violated the
principle of the separation of church and state.97 McCarthy contended that the Act
diminished the sovereignty of the Crown by recognizing a foreign power. But even if the
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Act was intra vires, he nevertheless advocated disallowance because he claimed that it
harmed national unity. The rest of Canada, he insisted, would not tolerate the growth of the
Jesuit Order in Quebec.98 A few speakers, such as Alexander McNeil (the Conservative MP
for Bruce North), built on McCarthy’s argument by hinting at Ontario’s parliamentary
preponderance. Canada, he claimed was a Protestant country, and while he wanted every
citizen to enjoy the “fullest rights and liberty” on religious matters, he nevertheless asserted
that Ontario MPs “have a right to remember that the Protestant majority in this country have
some few rights and privileges.”99 Disallowance’s advocates, however, knew that O’Brien’s
resolution was doomed. John Charlton believed that his decision to support O’Brien and
break with the Liberals would end his political career.100 With such limited support, most of
O’Brien’s supporters tried to minimize their self-alienation. It was difficult enough for
Ontario MPs to vote against O’Brien’s resolution without being embarrassed by appeals by
their provincial peers to unite behind a measure that enjoyed considerable popular support
among their constituents.
Instead, most Ontario MPs supported the government’s stand against disallowance.
The Estates Act, the government claimed, was intra vires. John Thompson, the Minister of
Justice, responded to O’Brien and McCarthy by using this argument. The provincial
government owned the Estates and had the right to settle disputes with the Catholic Church.
McCarthy, O’Brien, and other Ontarians misrepresented the preamble when they claimed
that it surrendered provincial sovereignty to a foreign power. The Act’s preamble allowed the
Pope to divide the funds between the different Catholic education projects. He was, after all,
the only religious authority recognized by Bourget and Taschereau. Thompson was widely
congratulated for his speech from members of both sides of the aisle, including Blake. But
Thompson’s Catholicism, as well as his desire to avoid driving off a section of the
Conservative’s Ontario caucus, limited his response.101 David Mills said the rest. As one of
the Ontario’s leading Liberals, and a well-respected constitutional expert, he affirmed
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Thompson’s interpretation and also suggested that the disallowance movement was designed
to arouse religious animosity. He therefore applauded the government’s handling of the
divisive question and asked parliament to end the dispute by decisively voting against
O’Brien’s resolution. Canadians, he said, had to “continue to be one people, or at all events a
people of one country.” It was therefore inadvisable to create sectional grievances by
interfering in provincial affairs.102 When the time to vote finally arrived at two o’clock in the
morning of 28 March, 188 MPs voted against disallowance. Only 5 Liberals, including John
Charlton, and 8 Conservatives, including McCarthy, Wallace, and O’Brien, supported the
resolution. All but one of the so-called ‘noble thirteen’ or ‘devil’s dozen’ came from
Ontario.103
The close of the parliamentary debate on disallowance did not dampen the belief that
Ontario could still affect disallowance. The agitators may have lost the parliamentary battle
but they now looked to public opinion in Ontario to reverse their defeat. Dissent for the 188
government supporters was widespread, and the agitators were emboldened by the belief that
their province could still successfully pressure the government to disallow the legislation.
The Governor General, Lord Stanley, could disallow the Act anytime before the first
anniversary of its passage on 8 August. Toward this end, disallowance advocates initiated a
petition campaign that stretched across Canada but centred in Ontario. Rallies were held
throughout the province. Thousands congregated to hear members of the ‘noble thirteen,’ the
Toronto Citizens’ Committee, Caven, and other leaders of the movement speak against the
Jesuits’ Estates Act.104 The petition’s proponents actively fostered the sense that Ontarians
could influence the Governor General’s decision. At a meeting protesting the Jesuits’ Estates
Act in Harriston, for example, the leading speaker appealed to Ontarians to “take their stand”
and sign the petition.105 The Globe urged the citizens of all of the provinces, but especially
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Ontario, to convene and sign petitions requesting disallowance.106 The Advertiser also
supported the petition campaign. “Let this work be done with courage and energy
throughout Ontario and the other Provinces,” it encouraged.107
The agitators also continued to claim that Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance
could be salvaged and utilized to combat ‘French domination’ in future parliamentary
sessions. They used the frustration in Ontario with the Jesuits’ Estates question to spur the
election of a new bloc of Ontario MPs who would join together as a bulwark against ‘French
domination.’ This power, however, was only possible if Ontarians ceased supporting parties
that worked with the Bleus. Beginning the day after the parliamentary vote, the Mail claimed
that “it is for the Province of Ontario to say whether this extraordinary condition of things is
to continue or not.” Ontarians had the power to “put an end to the campaign of clerical
usurpation in the name of religious liberty” but they had to demonstrate their willingness to
abandon their ties to the Liberals and Conservatives by filling parliament “with men who are
neither invertebrate nor corrupt.”108 While speaking at a rally honouring the ‘noble thirteen’
at the Granite Rink in Toronto in late April, McCarthy claimed that he was “ashamed to say
that both parties, instead of appealing to the broad Province of Ontario and other English
provinces” succumbed to the pressure exerted by “organized” Quebec MPs.109 At the same
meeting Charlton, the Liberal MP for Norfolk North, noted that “Quebec has always been
solid although Ontario might be divided.” So long as Ontarians elected politicians who
sought Quebec support, Canada would suffer from the subordination of Ontario’s AngloSaxon and Protestant demands.110 At another protest meeting in Peterborough in May, J.
Carnegie “considered that the electorate of this province and of the Dominion were very
much to blame,” for the weak parliamentary support for disallowance because they refused to
punish the Liberal and Conservative parties for courting support from Quebec MPs.111 On 9
August, the day after the first anniversary of the Jesuits’ Estates Act’s passage into law, the
Victoria Warder also appealed to Ontarian voters to act. “Electors of Ontario, of Canada,” it
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asked “what is your answer?”112 Ontarians, in short, did not have to accept ‘French
domination.’ Their province’s parliamentary preponderance would allow the disallowance
agitators to fight for intrastate influence at the next general election.
The agitation entered a new phase after the Equal Rights convention at the Toronto
Pavilion on 11 and 12 June. Eight hundred delegates, the majority of which were elected
from across Ontario at the urging of the Citizen’s Committee, attended the proceedings.
During the two-day event, the conventionists founded the Equal Rights Association. The
ERA adopted the Orange Order’s hierarchical institutional structure with local branches,
district and provincial councils, as well as an executive committee. The convention also
settled on six resolutions that defined its mission. The first four emphasized the need to
maintain the separation of church and state across the country, and the imperative of securing
the disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. The fifth and sixth extended the convention’s
campaign beyond the Estates question by committing the Association to lobbying for the
elimination of French as a language of instruction in Ontario as well as the elimination of its
separate school system. These additional resolutions turned the campaign against the Jesuits’
Estates Act into a more generalized anti-French and anti-Catholic agitation.113
Several speakers at the convention suggested that Ontario’s preponderant influence
was critical to saving English-Protestant Quebecers from French-Catholic domination. On
the first day of the convention, for example, George Stephens of Montreal declared that
“Ontario had to act, thinking of the unfortunate people who reside in Quebec. It depended
upon Ontario and the other provinces to help Quebec.”114 Rev. Dr. Douglas of Montreal
claimed that “the Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, British citizens of Quebec stretch out their hands
to the two millions in the great Province of Ontario, and united we stand… in spite of
Jesuitry and the devil.”115 The Ontarian audience internalized and responded to these
appeals. When delivering his own speech to the convention John Carnegie, an ex-MPP for
Peterborough-West, agreed that Ontario needed to protect the Protestants in Quebec. “They
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had to show that Ontario was firm as a Protestant province in this Dominion,” he declared, by
sending “determined” men to parliament to oppose “political Jesuits.”116
Despite these expressed desires for interprovincial cooperation, however, the ERA
remained an Ontarian movement. The Quebec representatives objected to the convention’s
5th and 6th resolutions because they jeopardized the reciprocal separate school rights of
minorities in Ontario and Quebec. If the Ontario government acted on these resolutions, the
Quebec delegates feared, its Quebec counterpart would respond in kind. A strong belief in
Ontario’s preponderant influence, however, made it easier for the conventionists to alienate
their Quebec supporters. Fulfilling the 5th and 6th resolutions would have required an
amendment to section 93 of the BNA Act. Several delegates, including Carnegie and a Dr.
Wild argued that Ontario possessed the influence to secure such action. The latter contended
that “there was no constitution in the world which was finally determined” and urged the
“majority of Protestants” to use their votes to ensure the election of politicians that would
enact the convention’s resolutions. The ERA, they implied, did not have to honour a
bicultural pact between Ontario and Quebec in order to impact Canadian policy. These
agitators believed that their province’s parliamentary preponderance gave it the power to
force the Canadian government to disallow the Jesuits’ Estates Act, disband the separate
school system in Ontario, and preserve Protestant rights in Quebec. This hubris made it
easier for the majority of the Ontarian delegates to ignore the objections of their Quebec
counterparts and pursue an uncompromisingly anti-Catholic platform. It also ensured that
the Association lacked the support of Quebec Protestants. A belief that Ontario did not
require support from the other provinces to shape national policies, in short, inspired an
overconfidence that limited the Association’s appeal outside of Ontario.117
This hubris did not, however, readily translate into power. The formation of an
Ontarian voting bloc suffered from partisan complications. Many ERA members recognized
that the Liberal and Conservative parties were unwilling to abandon their Quebec supporters
and therefore advocated the creation of a third party that would enjoy the support of
Protestants from across the country and especially Ontario. This party, they hoped would
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win enough seats to form the government, or at least control the balance of power in
parliament. Some of the delegates at the ERA convention believed that their new
Association would serve this purpose. Liberal and Conservative politicians like Charlton and
McCarthy as well as newspapers like the Sentinel and the Mail, however, recognized that a
separate party would falter at the polls because it would not overcome well-established
partisan allegiances. McCarthy and Charlton demonstrated the intensity of these allegiances
by attacking each other’s parties during the Granite Rink rally. Developing a full third
platform would also be problematic. Although the potential members of an Equal Rights
party agreed on religious questions, Liberal and Conservative members remained far apart on
a variety of other issues including the tariff as well as Canada’s imperial and continental
relations. Finding a middle ground that could form a credible party platform on these issues
was extremely unlikely. An Equal Rights party would also scare Quebecers, increase
sectional alarm, and possibly lead to Confederation’s dissolution. Third party detractors
therefore urged Ontarians to unite by utilizing the existing two-party system.118 By
supporting Conservative and Liberal parliamentary candidates committed to the ERA’s
resolutions, Ontarians could best ensure the exertion of their parliamentary preponderance.
These disagreements over partisan arrangements led to divisions and infighting within the
movement that eventually contributed to the institution’s downfall.
The leading politicians from both parties spent the rest of the spring and summer
debating how to manage the rise of the ERA. Almost none were willing to directly challenge
the sense of power and entitlement that informed the campaign. Even as ERA branches
sprang up across the province, national Conservative leaders knew that they could not
maintain their government by ‘mounting the Protestant horse.’ Instead they emphasized the
need to preserve national unity by avoiding further intrastate contests. In mid-April
Macdonald led a caucus meeting with his Ontario MPs and told them that the Catholic vote
in Ontario was too important to alienate. Playing to Protestant prejudices would only drive
Catholic voters to support Liberal candidates. He used Meredith’s failed attempt to unseat
Mowat with this strategy during the 1886 election campaign to illustrate his point. Ontario
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MPs, he claimed, would only weaken or destroy the Conservative government by supporting
the agitation against the Jesuits’ Estates Act.119 Similarly, the Empire denied that the
government’s refusal to disallow the Act was tantamount to an endorsement. It continued to
find the Act distasteful but insisted that it was within Quebec’s jurisdiction and therefore
impossible to disallow.120 The Orange Order’s leadership also tried to steer the Lodge away
from supporting the agitation by suggesting that it instead support an appeal to the JCPC to
rule on the constitutionality of the Act. The Sentinel, however, prepared its readers for the
likely ruling that the Act was intra vires and it discouraged Ontarians from resorting to other
constraints – including constitutional amendments - that would reduce the freedom of
provincial governments to work with churches to assist the needy. Resorting to coercion, the
Sentinel warned, would destroy national unity, ‘smash confederation,’ and likely result in the
annexation of the Canadian provinces to the United States. Instead of relying upon “force or
intolerance,” it advised its readers to depend upon “the rapid advance of education and
enlightenment.”121 At the Grand Lodge meeting in May 1889, Bowell and Wallace utilized
the same arguments to prevent the Estate question from splitting the Order as well as Ontario
Conservatives. After a stormy debate Wallace prevented the majority of delegates from
censuring the government by successfully channelling their frustration into a resolution
committing the Grand Lodge to contribute $1,000 towards a JCPC submission.122
That May, at Lord Stanley’s prompting, Macdonald ordered Thompson to compose a
“semi-official paper” exploring the constitutionality of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. This would
be forwarded to Tupper who was the Canadian High Commissioner in London. Macdonald
asked Tupper to then meet with British legal advisors as well as the Law Officers of the
Crown and try to use the brief to get the Imperial authorities to state that there was no need
for the JCPC to review the Act. In the meantime, however, Macdonald did not want to
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alienate McCarthy and his followers because he still desired their support in parliament and
on the hustings. He therefore spent the summer quietly and anxiously awaiting a reply from
London that would excuse his refusal to disallow the Jesuits’ Estates Act.123
The Liberals also struggled with how to respond to the ERA. John Willison, who
would become the Globe’s co-editor the following year, assured Laurier that he and the
Globe remained committed to serving the Liberal party.124 E.W. Thomson, another
editorialist for the Globe, also reassured the Liberal leader. Although he contended that the
newspaper had to continue supporting the disallowance campaign, he also promised to allay
tensions by refocusing the newspaper’s editorials on unrestricted reciprocity at the expense of
the Jesuits’ Estates question. Refocusing public debate to a secular subject, he hoped, would
erode the ERA’s popularity.125 Most Ontario Liberals were willing to let the Globe try.
Cartwright, for example, recognized the benefits of evasion. The Liberals, he suggested to
Laurier, could not confront the agitators for the time being without becoming a “welcome
target to Sir John A’s Orange friends.” The Liberals would eventually have to confront the
ERA, but the time was not yet fortuitous.126
By the second half of June, however, Ontario’s Liberal leaders concluded that it was
time to confront the ERA. Yet they still avoided challenging the sense of power and
entitlement in Ontario to influence the disallowance question by blaming the Conservatives
for O’Brien’s failure. Despite Willison’s denial of ‘collusion,’ three leading Toronto
Liberals wrote Laurier on 17 June advocating a more aggressive defence of the party’s
opposition to disallowance. Cartwright now promised to give Ontario Liberals a “safe line”
that would “direct the wrath of the agitators against Macdonald.”127 Thomson also suggested
that the Liberals actively defend their vote.128 Willison went the furthest by inviting Laurier
to join the Ontario Liberal picnic campaign and directly confront the Jesuits’ Estates
question. “If the Liberal parliamentarians voted right, as they believed they ought to have
voted, they need not fear to go to any hustings.” Only by taking a bold stand, Willison
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believed, could the Liberals convince Ontarians to blame the government for the
disallowance vote.129 On 3 July, Mills made a similar appeal. Macdonald’s government, he
claimed, used the vote on O’Brien’s motion to try to shift the blame for rejecting
disallowance from the government to parliament so that it could share the political fallout
with the Liberals. He advocated attacking the Conservatives for allowing the subject to come
before parliament.130
Laurier eventually conceded the point and both parties spent June, July and August
blaming each other for parliament’s unwillingness to disallow the Jesuits’ Estates Act. On 1
July Cartwright gave a lengthy speech before a Liberal “Speaking and Sporting” event in
Toronto. He alleged that Macdonald had a double standard on disallowance. Cartwright
noted the prime minister’s repeated disallowance of Ontarian and Manitoban legislation
during the 1880s and asserted that this precedent obligated him to do the same in Quebec.
The Liberals, by contrast, had a long track record of advocating provincial rights, and thus
had no choice but to vote against O’Brien’s motion. He therefore urged Ontarians to blame
the Conservatives for parliament’s unwillingness to disallow the Act.131 Instead of justifying
the Conservative’s vote, the Empire responded to these attacks by pointing out Cartwright’s
support for disallowance during the Mackenzie administration. The Liberals, they
concluded, were not bound to reject disallowance.132 By engaging in this sort of blame game
throughout the summer both parties attempted to avoid accountability for their disallowance
votes.133 The debate also avoided the preponderant federalist aspect of the disallowance
agitation.
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The disallowance contest came to a head on 2 August when an ERA delegation met
with Lord Stanley. They presented him with a 160 yard-long petition from Ontario
containing 156,000 signatures of individuals requesting the disallowance of the Jesuits’
Estates Act. In some cities the response had been astounding. In Toronto, for example, just
over half of the city’s ratepayers signed the petition. Approximately one-third of voters in
the Ottawa district, London, and Kingston, also recorded their names. The delegation also
list similar petitions from Quebec containing nine thousand signatures, as well as a petition
from the June ERA convention containing a further 860 names.134 The Governor General,
however, did not heed these impressive petitions. Instead he rebuked their cause. He
admitted that the Act’s references to the Papacy were unusual but denied that they
compromised the Crown’s sovereignty. The Act was intra vires. Moreover, the petitions
were misplaced. The Governor General could only act on the advice of parliament and his
Ministers. Since parliament had so decisively rejected disallowance and the cabinet
remained steadfast, he had no choice but to allow the anniversary of the Act to pass. He also
denied that the Jesuits of the 19th century were a threat to Canada, and argued that members
of their Order were just as “law abiding” and “loyal” as other citizens.135 The meeting’s
closure marked the final defeat of the disallowance movement.
The sense of power and entitlement in Ontario, however, persisted. The week
following the ERA’s meeting with Lord Stanley David Mills directly confronted the belief
that Ontario had the right and ability to secure disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act
despite general support for the measure in Quebec. In a speech to his constituents at
Highgate, the ‘philosopher from Bothwell’ acknowledged the widespread disapproval of the
Jesuits’ Estates Act in Ontario and admitted that he found the Act to be distasteful. He also
noted that the constitution afforded Ontario “a voice in the affairs of Canada” and did not
question Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance. When defending the Liberal’s
parliamentary vote, however, Mills used provincial rights arguments to explicitly disavow
Ontario’s right to lobby for disallowance. He repeatedly told the crowds that the Act was
within provincial jurisdiction and therefore concluded that “neither the people of Ontario, nor
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the parliament of Canada, nor the Governor General upon the advice of his ministers, has any
right to interfere. If they do, they are constitutional trespassers.” In case the audience missed
his point, he insisted “you have no voice in the matter.” Although the Bothwell MP did not
explicitly urge Ontarians to use their parliamentary preponderance to safeguard national
unity or provincial autonomy, his speech intimated this message. Canada, like Britain,
contained two “races.” French-Catholics, like Britain’s Scots, would not hinder Canada’s
development. Ontarians, therefore, had no right to interfere in the cultural and religious
traditions or policies of French-Canadians and needed to instead support politicians who
preserved national unity.136 Although Mills’ speech came after the decisive defeat of the
disallowance movement, its content reveals that even this pioneer of provincial compact
theory understood that challenging the agitation necessitated more than appeals to
constitutional jurisdictions. It also required arguing that the movement misapplied Ontario’s
right to a ‘voice’ in national debates.
Mills’ speech was surprisingly well received in Ontario but other Liberals lacked the
courage to repeat his performance. In fact, when Mills sent a copy of the speech to the Globe
for publication, Thomson begged Laurier to delay its release until after the Liberal leader
spoke in Toronto. Thomson admitted that the speech was “strong” but worried that its
circulation throughout Ontario would drive wavering Orangemen to return to Macdonald’s
fold. Laurier’s status as leader, combined with his plans to speak on additional issues such as
the tariff, Thomson hoped, would cushion the blow to the Liberal party’s popularity in
Ontario.137 The editorialist did not get his wish. The Globe published the speech on 13
August along with an unenthusiastic editorial that described it as “erudite” but
“superfluous.”138
Despite Lord Stanley’s decision and Mills’ speech, however, frustration with the
outcome of the Jesuits’ Estates Act continued to linger. The ERA shifted its lobbying to the
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provincial sphere, and ran its own candidates in the 1890 provincial election.139 Laurier
toyed with coming to Toronto during the summer of 1889 but Ontarian leaders like
Cartwright and Edgar cautioned against it because they feared it would create riots and
violence that would humiliate the leader and his party. Willison, however, eventually
convinced Laurier to ignore this advice and on 30 September, the latter arrived at the Toronto
Pavilion to convince Ontarians that they could support the Liberals and their FrenchCanadian leader. After some initial interruptions, the crowd listened to Laurier’s plea to
overcome the distrust that underlay sectional disputes like the Jesuits’ Estates question.
Canadians descended from two races, he admitted, but he proudly declared that they were all
British citizens. Neither he, nor any Canadian could tolerate Papal interference in their
country’s political affairs. As the crowd began to cheer these remarks, Laurier moved to the
non-religious subject of reciprocity.140
Not all, however, were immediately convinced that the crowd accepted Laurier’s
emotive stand. Even Mowat, who closed the meeting, had his doubts. Although the crowd
gave the premier a much warmer welcome than Laurier, Mowat was afraid to support
Laurier’s speech. He discarded his prepared text that echoed the French-Canadian leader,
and instead delivered a brief and lacklustre speech that focused on reciprocity and admitted
that Ontarians likely disagreed with Laurier’s assessment of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. The
premier, moreover, disavowed any involvement in the dispute. “It is one [subject] that has
no reference whatever to the Ontario government, nor has it come within the jurisdiction of
the Ontario Legislature,” he declared.141 Several Liberal newspapers supported this stance.
The Advertiser, for example, asked “why should a question of that kind be dragged before a
tribunal that has no more to do with it than the man in the moon?”142 On the other hand, the
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Empire contended that it was “cowardly” for Mowat to hide behind provincial rights on the
Jesuits’ Estates question when he was willing to discuss other dominion policies, such as
trade.143 As it turned out, Mowat’s hesitancy was unnecessary. Laurier’s widely circulated
speech proved to be much more popular in Ontario than Liberal strategists had feared. The
following morning at a luncheon at the Reform Club, Mowat incensed Laurier by praising
the leader’s speech. “Why didn’t he say that last night?” Laurier angrily whispered to
Willison.144 Although Laurier’s stand won him considerable respect in Ontario, the Jesuits’
Estates question remained a sore spot in the province’s politics. Mowat continued to
disavow his government’s potential influence of the question throughout the rest of the
year.145
The agitation to disallow the Jesuits’ Estates Act in Ontario was the result of more
than anti-French and anti-Catholic attitudes. The movement’s agitators were emboldened to
lobby for disallowance by a sense of power and entitlement to influence Canadian politics.
When these efforts failed, the ERA claimed that Ontario’s parliamentary prowess could be
restored by the election of MPs who would resist French or ultramontane policies. Although
it was extra-parliamentary, the petition campaign spurred from the same belief that Ontarians
possessed the influence to secure disallowance. Several newspapers tried to arrest the
agitation in February by conceding Ontario’s ability ‘smash Confederation’ while cautioning
against harming national unity and provincial autonomy by using that influence to pressure
for disallowance. Yet the Ontarian distaste for the Jesuits’ Estates Act soon rendered this
stand untenable. Thereafter, only a handful of individuals like Mills were willing to dispute
the agitators’ belief that Ontario had the ability and right to secure the Act’s disallowance.
Yet Mills waited until after Lord Stanley’s meeting with the ERA to state this alternative
assessment of Ontario’s role in the dispute. Even then, he focused on provincial rights and
only hinted at Ontario’s ability to preserve national unity.
By going beyond Ontarian demands and examining why the province’s agitators
expected to influence the debate, the obtuseness of the movement becomes more intelligible.
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The province’s agitators were not only upset by the Jesuits’ Estates Act, they also believed
that they had the right and the power to contest the bill. The widespread anti-Catholic and
anti-French prejudice in Ontario in addition to the belief that it was ultra vires, made this
campaign difficult for politicians and newspapers to oppose. Situating the disallowance
movement within a longstanding tradition of Ontarian entitlement gave the movement a
political heritage that dramatically increased its allure. With the notable exception of Mills,
Ontarian politicians and newspapers preferred attacking each other to redirecting this sense
of entitlement. A long established (though rarely realized) belief in Ontario’s ability and right
to use its preponderant influence to shape national policies over the demands of other
provinces encouraged overconfidence among the movement’s Ontarian membership. For all
of its pan-Canadian rhetoric, many of the ERA’s Ontarian members believed that they did
not require the support of the other provinces. The willingness of the June convention’s
delegates to marginalize the non-Ontarian delegates, as well as the disallowance movement’s
consistent references to Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance demonstrated that the
agitators looked first and foremost to their own province to provide the parliamentary and
electoral muscle when formulating and pursuing their goals.

Conclusion
The agitations in Ontario concerning Riel’s execution and the disallowance of the
Jesuits’ Estates Act were the result of more than mounting racial and religious tensions in
Canada. In both the post-execution and Jesuits’ Estates Act debates, Ontarian agitators were
emboldened by the belief that they could use their province’s preponderant influence to
affect national debates. This sense of power and entitlement was strong enough to overcome
partisan constraints. After Riel’s execution, the Mail broke with the Conservatives and
increased its circulation by encouraging Ontarians to believe that their province could
decisively influence both debates. The strategy was so effective that the Globe reversed its
editorial position and joined the campaign for disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. After
loosely aligning himself with Macdonald during the final stages of the Ontario boundary
dispute, Meredith’s party ‘mounted the Protestant horse’ and appealed to the Ontario
electorate to lend him its preponderant influence during the 1886 election campaign. In
1889, individuals such as McCarthy and Charlton broke with their respective parties and
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attempted to rally all Ontarians to support their cause. These assertions of Ontarian influence
alarmed French-Catholic Quebecers and damaged national unity.
The ability of Ontarians to challenge these agitations continued to suffer from a
significant flaw. From 1885 to 1889 an unusual degree of consensus developed among
Ontarians. The province’s inhabitants generally believed that Riel’s execution was just and
legal. The Jesuits’ Estates Act was also widely purported to be unconstitutional. Few
politicians or editorialists were willing to suggest that Ontario use its preponderant influence
to support Quebecers when Ontarians believed that the policies in question violated Canadian
law or the constitution. Instead, they relied heavily on legal and jurisdictional arguments to
excuse themselves from supporting these movements.
Only a few Ontarians, therefore, suggested alternative ways of employing Ontario’s
influence. Fraser used it to encourage his fellow MPPs to avoid further antagonizing national
unity. Although Liberals did not repeat his suggestion that Riel might be memorialized in
statuary, other newspapers and editorialists agreed that Ontario could use its preponderant
influence to restore national unity. During and after the 1886 campaigns, both the Liberals
and Conservatives urged Ontarians to cease antagonizing Quebec and the West by misusing
their province’s preponderant influence. Providing an alternative purpose for Ontario’s
influence made it easier for the Liberals to accommodate Ontarian prejudices without
alienating their Quebec supporters. Most Ontario Liberal and Conservative also affirmed
their province’s preponderant potential during the Jesuits’ Estates debate while arguing that
withholding its support would reduce political tensions. The agitation, however, became so
popular that only David Mills had the courage to even intimate that Ontarians use their
parliamentary preponderance to restore national unity. Yet even this modest assertion
demonstrated the continued political utility of an alternative interpretation of Ontario’s
preponderant role in Confederation.
Despite the ultimate success of Macdonald and Mowat at blocking these agitations in
parliament and the Ontario Assembly, their decision to generally evade rather than directly
confront the use of Ontario’s preponderant influence against the initiatives of other parts of
Canada allowed the sense of power and entitlement to influence these questions to expand at
the expense of Canadian unity. Conservative and Liberal leaders had to do a better job of
312

managing this sentiment if they expected to maintain national unity as well as their support in
Quebec and Ontario.
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Chapter 7: Language and Education on the Prairies, 18891896
“Manitoba and the North-West Territory have been organized and given responsible
governments, and the English language is everywhere spoken… The people of Ontario will
not allow either of the two political parties to prevent these young Provinces [from] enjoying
their full measure of provincial rights and responsible government.”
Toronto Sentinel, 10 August 1893.

Even in the midst of the Jesuits’ Estates agitation, the North-West and Manitoba
offered fertile ground for new calls for Ontarians to rally against the dominion government’s
policies. Beginning in 1888, the North-West territorial government requested the elimination
of its dual language obligations. In 1890, Manitoba’s government eliminated state support
for its separate school system. During the ensuing years of national debates, Quebec and
Ontario MPs repeatedly clashed over these disputes and an increasing number of Ontarians
supported the Prairie governments’ policies. When exploring the agitations, historians
overlook preponderant federalisms’ contributions to the debates. Instead, they focus on antiFrench and anti-Catholic sentiment in Ontario to explain the province’s strong support for
these policies. Paul Crunican, for example, describes the Manitoba school question as the
“culmination” of “a series of racial and religious crises” that began in 1885. This
understanding leads him to focus on the Catholic Church’s role in shaping the Manitoba
school debate and partisan jockeying to satisfy the demands of both sections of the country.1
Joseph Schull, Lovell Clark, Christopher Pennington, and Susan Mann, also focus on how
the Liberals and Conservative tried to balance the competing demands of French-Catholic
Quebec and English-Protestant Ontario.2 Other historians, such as Kenneth McLaughlin and
Carman Cumming, treat the racial and religious debate as an outlet for class tensions or as a

1

Paul Crunican, Priests and Politicians: Manitoba Schools and the Election of 1896 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974), 4.
2
Schull, Laurier, esp 275-276, 296-297; Lovell Clark, ed., The Manitoba School Question: Majority Rule or
Minority Rights? Issues in Canadian History (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968); Pennington, The Destiny of
Canada, 112-115, 276-280; Mann, The Dream of Nation, 159-162.

314

means to encourage Canadian disunity and annexation to the United States.3 None of these
scholars interrogate the significance of the sense of power and entitlement that pervaded the
Ontarian responses to these debates.
An increasing number of Ontarians not only wanted the inhabitants of the Prairies to
be English-speaking and Protestant, they were emboldened by the belief that their province
could use its preponderance to safeguard the Prairie's local autonomy from Quebec’s
‘interference.’ This sense of power inspired an activism and intransigence in Ontario that
offended French-Catholics, elevated both questions into tense political crises, and strained
the unity of both political parties. Laurier managed to contain these tensions and his Ontario
partisans exploited this desire for their province to preponderate on the question without
endangering their support in Quebec. The agitators’ claims that they were protecting
Manitoba’s provincial autonomy also demonstrated that strong intrastate influence and
provincial rights could be mutually reinforcing ideas. The Conservatives, on the other hand,
were less successful at bridling the belief that Ontario possessed the preponderant influence
to safeguard the Manitoban legislation and the resulting disunity ultimately contributed to
their defeat in the 1896 Canadian election.
The development of a preponderant federalist critique of this agitation ebbed and
flowed with its counterpart. The ambiguous existence of a bicultural compact combined with
the need to prevent a sectional impasse in parliament elicited limited attempts to link
Ontario’s preponderant influence to compromise resolutions during the North-West language
debate. The Canadian government’s deference to the courts postponed its decision to
intervene in the Manitoba school question and consequently also relieved its Ontario
supporters from needing to suggest alternative uses for Ontario’s influence until 1894. After
the JCPC’s second ruling on the dispute, however, the Canadian government’s claim that it
was constitutionally obligated to pass remedial legislation, in addition to the increasingly
pervasive anti-remedial agitation in Ontario, necessitated trying to link the sense of power
and entitlement that informed the movement to remedial action. When discussing the
Conservative government’s handling of the Manitoba school question after its July 1895
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remedial announcement, historians emphasize the Conservative’s tendency to defend their
policy by appealing to a sense of ‘justice’ and by claiming that the JCPC’s ruling required it
to take remedial action.4 This analysis creates the impression that the Conservatives
convinced their Ontarian supporters to set aside their prejudices and vote according to
national, instead of provincial, political cultures. Although the Conservative platform often
included this message, many remedialists asked Ontarians to use their province’s
preponderant influence to restore national unity. According to these appeals, Ontarians did
not have to choose between their provincial and national preferences. They did not have to
forsake their provincial political culture in order to support the remedial bill because
Conservatives fused the desire in Ontario for national unity and preponderant influence. This
linkage helped to preserve some support for remedial action in Ontario by allowing its
Conservatives to defend the unpopular measure in a way that appealed to Ontarian political
culture.

The North-West Language Question
The defeat of the ERA during the Jesuits’ Estates debate did not dampen the belief
that Ontario had the ability and right to challenge the demands of other provinces. Before
that debate concluded, Ontarians reapplied this sense of power to the North-West language
question and strained the unity of both political parties. The North-West Territories Act of
1875 established a separate government for the territories as well as public support for
separate schools in the region. Two years later, parliament amended the Act by making
French and English official languages of the state. Both measures recognized the territory’s
large French-Catholic Métis population. During the next few years, and especially after the
Canadian Pacific Railway began transcontinental operations in 1886, English-Protestant
settlers overwhelmed the French-Catholic population.5 By 1888, the territory’s population
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was adequate to justify the election of representatives to a new Legislative Assembly. When
it first convened that October, the Assembly lacked the jurisdiction to change the territory’s
school system. Instead, it impeded the expansion of the school system by declining to change
laws governing the establishment of school districts. During the next eight months,
newspapers like the Regina Journal demanded the establishment a “national school” system.
The term came from the United States where a single school system spread across much of
the country. Nativists believed that the system assimilated children to the country’s cultural
norms.6
D’Alton McCarthy capitalized on this agitation. He was a follower of the theories of
Oxford Professors Edward A. Freeman and Max Miller who claimed that unilingualism was
essential to the creation of national unity. He believed that the development of unilingual
European states demonstrated that Canada needed to discard its bicultural heritage. Although
McCarthy did not oppose the preservation of French-Canadian rights in Quebec, he
vehemently resisted the extension of French into other parts of the country.7 While the
disallowance campaign was still in its closing month, McCarthy exploited these prejudices
when speaking at Stayner, Ontario. French Canada, he decried, was a “bastard nationality”
that was “antagonistic” to the development of a strong English-Canadian identity because its
peoples refused to assimilate into Anglo-Saxon society. He alleged that Quebecers threw
down the “gauntlet” when Bleu and Rouge MPs combined their influence in parliament to
block the disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. McCarthy now urged English-Canadian
MPs from both parties to unite and form a “majority in parliament” that could stop the
extension of the French language and influence into the North-West. The rogue Conservative
pledged to move resolutions at the next parliamentary session that would make English the
sole official language of the North-West. He hoped that English-Canada’s parliamentary
majority, which largely comprised of Ontario MPs, would support his attempt to unify the
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North-West with a single tongue.8 In the fall of 1889, the North-West territorial government
obliged McCarthy’s offer by approving a memorandum requesting the repeal of the separate
school and French language guarantees in the North-West Territories Act.9
McCarthy fulfilled his promise during the 1890 parliamentary session by tabling a bill
expunging the dual language provisions of the North-West Territories Act. The most
controversial aspect of the bill was the preamble stating that it was “expedient in the interest
of national unity in the Dominion that there should be community of language among the
people of Canada.”10 Linguistic “dualism,” McCarthy repeatedly claimed while defending
his bill, hindered the development of national identity in the West. Canadian unity, therefore,
depended upon the eventual predominance of the English language.11 His direct assault on
biculturalism in Canada sparked an intense debate that threatened to split the country and
both political parties.
Although McCarthy’s parliamentary speech lacked a forthright appeal for unified
Ontarian support, his desire for English-Protestant dominance combined with his Stayner
remarks made his intent abundantly clear. Liberal MPs repeatedly attacked his attempts to
raise an Ontarian voting bloc during the debate. Laurier accused McCarthy of using the
North-West language question to create “an English Protestant united Ontario… for party
purposes.”12 Cartwright claimed that McCarthy wanted to “play the part of an Ontario
Parnell, and to return to this House with twenty or thirty stout Protestant Home Rulers” and
“hold the balance of power and to dictate terms” to the Canadian government.13 McCarthy’s
actions were informed by the belief that Ontarian support could be decisive.
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Additional Ontario MPs analysed the dispute as an intrastate question. Charlton did
not explicitly urge Ontarians to use their parliamentary preponderance to ensure the bill’s
passage, yet concerns about of English-Protestantism’s future influence in Canada informed
his analysis of the North-West language question:
The North-West is like to become the seat of power in this Dominion; it is
likely to have the great majority of the people of this Dominion; it is likely to
become the most productive part of the Dominion, and therefore it is of the
utmost importance, at this time, that this change should be made, when it can
be done without any great trouble. When that country is young and in a
formative state, we should put it on the right track.14
Charlton’s support for McCarthy’s proposal came from more than English-Protestant
nationalism. He recognized that encouraging English settlement in the North-West would
bolster English-Protestant parliamentary preponderance. Alexander McNeill, the
Conservative MP for Bruce North, directly appealed for Ontarian support. He suggested that
“forbearance” in the recent bicultural disputes had “been pretty much all on one side” and he
urged Ontario MPs to back McCarthy’s assimilationist proposal.15 The Mail also concurred.
If the Catholic Church used its influence with French-Canadian MPs to shape the North-West
language question, it warned that “the British portion of Canada will know how to avenge
it.”16 ‘French domination’ these Ontarians insisted, could not be allowed to spread westward
and they urged Ontarian representatives to use their aggregate influence to preserve EnglishProtestant rule in Canada. Ontarians, as the dominant section of this demographic, needed to
unite to ensure the realization of this vision.
Although few MPs adopted the rhetoric of McCarthy, Charlton, and McNeill,
Ontarian support for the bill remained strong. It was also abundantly clear that Quebec MPs
wanted to protect the North-West’s French-Catholic minority. The resulting linguistic split
alarmed Conservative and Liberal leaders. When confronting these rising tensions, they
focused on bicultural tolerance. Neither race, Macdonald insisted, could dominate Canada.
Ontario and Quebec, he pointed out, had a long history of accommodating English and
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French demands.17 Laurier made a similar argument. Canada, he asserted, could never
survive by “the humiliation of one race, one class, or one creed.”18 He instructed Ontarians
and Quebecers to stop interfering with matters beyond their borders.19 Both leaders sought a
means to postpone the territorial government’s request and allow the region to determine its
own linguistic future.
To some Ontarians, however, these appeals for tolerance seemed inadequate. Two
prominent Ontario Liberals suggested that their province’s representatives needed to instead
use their parliamentary preponderance to support the passage of a compromise amendment
that would sustain national unity. Blake found the preamble to be particularly destructive to
national unity and argued that the dual language and separate schools “covenants” in the
North-West were integral to the rapid settlement of the North-West. The territory’s laws had
to be acceptable to settlers from Ontario and Quebec if Canada expected to rapidly populate
the region. He therefore urged parliament to defer the language and schools questions until
each section of the territory achieved province-hood. The former Liberal leader challenged
“the representatives of Ontario constituencies” to follow his example despite the dissenting
hearing many MPs would receive when they returned to their constituencies.20 James Edgar
also asserted that “Confederation… is a compromise” and encouraged Ontario MPs to join
his opposition to McCarthy. He suggested that the “liberal English-speaking inhabitants” in
his riding and across Ontario would support his opposition to McCarthy’s bill.21 Appealing
for tolerance was not an adequate strategy to check the belief that Ontario could ram through
legislation affecting other parts of Canada. Blake and Edgar recognized that they had to
address the sense of power that partly underlay McCarthy’s cause. Suggesting an alternative
application of Ontario’s preponderant potential allowed them to appeal for tolerance while
acknowledging the desire in Ontario to exert decisive influence in national policy debates.
This recognition of Ontario’s preponderant federalist culture, Blake and Edgar hoped, would
make it easier for the province’s MPs to oppose McCarthy’s bill.
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At first the attempts to salvage national unity failed. An amendment by Cléophas
Beausolei, the Liberal MP for Berthier, affirming the existing dual language system in the
North-West attracted the support of almost every French-speaking MP and a handful of Irish
MPs. The remaining 117 English-speaking MPs (excluding Macdonald and Blake who were
conspicuously absent) opposed the measure.22 McCarthy, it seemed, had split the country.
An amendment by Thompson, however, giving the territorial Assembly the right to regulate
the language of its own proceedings after its next election allowed parliament to escape the
impasse. Neither linguistic group was enthused by the compromise. McCarthy won the
substance of his bill but he and his followers were frustrated by the additional delay that the
proposal entailed. Quebecers were embittered by the knowledge that the North-West
territorial government would repeal French as an official language at its first opportunity.
The compromise nevertheless attracted support from both English and French members and
passed by a vote of 149 to 50.23
The 1890 debate demonstrated the continued political currency of preponderant
federalisms. McCarthy and his most ardent supporters were emboldened by the belief that
they could wield Ontario’s parliamentary votes to shape the Prairie’s future. The vote on
Beausolei’s amendment demonstrated that this expectation was not unrealistic. The unity of
Ontario MPs helped to force the Canadian government to accept the substance of McCarthy’s
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bill. It is difficult to determine the effectiveness of Blake and Edgar’s attempts to rally
Ontarian to oppose McCarthy. The formulation of an alternative use of Ontario’s intrastate
preponderance in parliamentary debates, however, is noteworthy. Again, expressions of an
Ontarian entitlement to influence national policies over the objections of other provinces
usually elicited an alternative preponderant federalist response. The fear that Ontarians would
use their parliamentary preponderance to overpower the desire of Quebecers to protect
French-Catholic rights in the rest of Canada was fundamental to how both parties handled the
Manitoba school question.

The Manitoba Schools Question
In 1889, a second agitation began in Manitoba that prompted a more concerted and
long-term agitation against Quebec’s influence in Ontario. The belief that Ontarians could
affect the Canadian government’s response to the question emboldened many Ontario
Protestants to abjectly oppose the Canadian government’s intervention in the education
question. The intransigence that arose from this sense of power helped to elevate the
Manitoba school question into a national political crisis.
Since 1870, Manitoba had a dual school system with public and Catholic schools.
Both systems received provincial grants, and the parents of Catholic students were exempt
from paying taxes that supported the public system. The separate schools enjoyed some
protection via section 22 of the Manitoba Act. Section 22(1) barred the provincial Assembly
from passing any law that “prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to
Denominational Schools which any class of persons have by Law or practice in the Province
at the Union.” Section 22(2) gave Catholics and Protestants the right to appeal to the
Governor General if any educational “right or privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic
minority” were violated. Section 22(3) repeated the gist of the BNA Act’s section 93(4)
giving the Canadian government the power to pass remedial legislation to correct any
violation of minority education rights if the provincial government refused to rectify the
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minority’s grievance.24 Manitoba’s dual education system functioned with relatively little
protest from its Protestant population for decades.
This general acceptance declined in the 1880s. Manitoba Catholics’ proportion of the
provincial population shrank from approximately one-half in 1870 to one-eighth in 1886.
This decline reduced their political importance and made it easier for Protestants to imagine
Manitoba as an English province.25 By the mid-1880s there was also mounting public support
for the abolition of separate schools and the official use of French in government.
Discussions of the ERA agitation against the Jesuits’ Estates controversy spurred ascriptions
of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and contributed to the growth of the Orange Order in the
province. The dispute also had financial roots. Manitoba’s school system was governed by a
Board of Education with separate Protestant and Catholic sections. The provincial
government’s financial difficulties, however, limited its ability to provide financial support
for needed expansions of the school system. As the decade drew to a close, Manitoba’s
Protestant population grew increasingly tired of the economic inefficiencies of this system.
Cutting spending to separate schools was also a logical extension of Manitoban Premier
Thomas Greenway’s campaign for reduced government expenditures. In addition, Greenway
was eager to redirect the public’s attention away from the Northern Pacific Railway scandal.
The line had not produced the expected reductions in freight rates and had implicated his
government in a bribery scandal. Reforming the school system distracted Manitobans from
these developments. As James Mochoruk notes, all of these developments made the
curtailment of separate school rights “good politics” in Manitoba.26
By the spring of 1889, Greenway’s Liberal caucus agreed to support the replacement
of the Board of Education with a distinct department. Whether separate schools would persist
under the supervision of this department (as they did in Ontario) remained undetermined.
The Brandon Sun, which had close ties with Joseph Martin, the Attorney General and
Commissioner of Railways, began to test public opinion by calling for the introduction of a
24
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‘national school’ system. That summer, ten additional newspapers from Winnipeg and
Western Manitoba also disparaged the separate school system as inefficient, expensive, and a
barrier to the development a united community.27
While on vacation, McCarthy agreed at the last moment to give a speech at Portage
La Prairie on 5 August. He repeated his frustration with the Jesuits’ Estates Act and railed
against French-Canadian nationalism. Separate schools and dual official languages, he
opined, created “fratricidal strife” that prevented Canada from becoming “a British country
in fact as it is in name.” McCarthy repeated his vision of an English-Protestant Western
Canada and urged Manitobans to join other provinces in opposing the spread of French and
ultramontane influence beyond Quebec. After McCarthy sat down, Joseph Martin rose to
speak. He described French as a “foreign language” that had no place in an “English
country,” and also claimed that the separate school system received three times as much
financial support from the government as its “public” counterpart. The “British
constitution,” he also asserted, established the principle of the separation of church and state.
He therefore promised to “stand or fall” in the Assembly on this platform for a national and
secular school system in Manitoba.28
Although Martin’s speech went beyond the government’s plans and initially
infuriated Greenway, the Attorney General eventually managed to convince the government
to abolish separate schools. On 12 February 1890 the Attorney General introduced legislation
that established a Department of Education and eliminated public funding for separate
schools in Manitoba. Separate schools could still exist but the parents of enrolled students
were no longer exempt from taxation for the ‘national schools.’ Although Catholic
Manitobans opposed the bill, it passed and received royal assent on 31 March.29 Archbishop
Alexandre-Antonin Taché petitioned Manitoba’s Lieutenant Governor to reserve the
legislation, and when that failed, he turned to Ottawa’s power of disallowance to defeat the
measure. The Greenway government’s legislation, he protested, violated the Manitoba Act
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and was ultra vires. Yet neither the Conservative nor the Liberal leaders wanted to take sides
in the Manitoban dispute. Disallowance or non-interference would harm their popularity in
Ontario or Quebec. During the 1890 parliamentary session, both parties therefore rallied
behind a resolution by Edward Blake suggesting that it was “expedient” for judicial tribunals
to evaluate questions of disallowance or the appellate powers of section 93 of the BNA Act
for the executive branch of the government. Although Blake and Macdonald did not bind the
government to the court’s verdict, their support for the resolution afforded both parties time
to manage discontentment in their caucuses and among the electorate. The resolution was
also useful because its execution would contextualize any parliamentary debate that followed
the verdict with a highly legal, as opposed to political, flavour that both parties had
traditionally used to absolve themselves from supporting unpopular policies. Blake’s
amendment passed and Thompson codified the measure into law the following year. After
some protest, Quebec Bishops accepted this judicial path.30
In October 1890 John K. Barrett, a Catholic resident of Winnipeg filed suit against
the city’s government for discontinuing its funding of separate schools. The resulting Barrett
vs. City of Winnipeg tested the protective power of section 22(1) of the Manitoba Act and
section 93 of the BNA Act. Barrett’s lawyers included John Ewart and his partner Gerald
Brophy. Ewart was Oliver Mowat’s nephew, and supported the Liberal party. A capable and
respected Manitoba lawyer, Ewart sympathized with the Manitoban minority and partnered
with the less talented and Catholic Conservative Brophy to oversee the minority’s legal
case.31 They argued that this section assured the perpetual public support of denominational
schools because they existed prior to 1870. An affidavit from Taché also pointed out that all
of Manitoba’s schools were denominational and concluded that the new “national” schools
were in fact “Protestant” and therefore “unfit” for Catholic children.32 Before joining
Confederation, however, Manitoba had no publicly supported school system, and the city of
Winnipeg used this to argue that publicly supported separate schools did not exist “by Law or
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practice” at the time of union. Their lawyers also argued that section 93 of the BNA Act
only applied to Canada’s original provinces. Even if it did apply to new provinces, the
Manitoba Schools Act of 1890 abolished public funding for separate schools but it did not
preclude their continuation via private funding. By November 1890 Justice Albert Clements
Killam of the Court of Queen's Bench of Manitoba upheld the Manitoba Schools Act and
denied that the Governor General could intervene because the Greenway government’s
legislation did not preclude the continued existence of separate schools. Over the next two
years the case wound its way through the court system.33
This judicial strategy limited Ontarian debate concerning the Manitoba school
question. So long as parliament remained uninvolved, political pressure would be
ineffective. The Canadian government’s decision to proceed with a second case that took the
form of Brophy vs the City of Winnipeg in 1893 and its subsequent decision to proceed with
remedial action, however, brought the Manitoba school question back into the political arena
and eventually culminated in a national debate that damaged national unity. Racial and
religious antipathies do not adequately explain the heightened political tensions. The antiremedialist agitation in Ontario also arose from the belief that their province’s representatives
could exercise their parliamentary preponderance to force the Canadian government to accept
an English-Protestant vision for the Canadian Prairies. The Liberals and Conservatives used
different strategies to cope with this agitation. Despite internal disagreements regarding
when and how to exploit the anti-remedial movement in Ontario, the Liberals cultivated this
sense of power and entitlement without endangering their support in Quebec. This delicate
balance helped them to achieve power in the 1896 Canadian election. The Conservative
party was less successful at adapting to the agitation and ultimately resorted to a combination
of downplaying the importance of the Manitoba school question and recognizing Ontario’s
preponderant federalist culture by trying to co-opt it to support their remedial bill. This
strategy helped government supporters to believe that they could survive the political crisis
and limited defections to the anti-remedialist camp.
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The Manitoba school dispute could have become a major political problem during the
1891 Canadian election but the leaders of both parties recognized that a racially charged
campaign would destabilize their electoral prospects. Laurier was particularly aware of his
vulnerability as a French-Catholic leader. His party’s campaign therefore focused on its
unrestricted reciprocity platform. The Conservatives obliged this strategy by construing the
Liberals as annexationists and campaigning on the National Policy and Canada’s imperial
connection.34 Despite Taché’s continued petitions, the Conservatives even convinced
Quebec’s clergy to resist the urge to agitate for Manitoba Catholics before the election. The
likelihood of a ruling from the Supreme Court favouring the minority in addition to
assurances from Chapleau that he would resign from the cabinet if he could not restore the
rights of Manitoba Catholics, facilitated this clerical cooperation. Quebec editorialists
consequently gave Ontarians little cause for alarm during the 1891 election campaign.35
The Manitoba school question was not, however entirely absent from the Ontarian
political debate during the early 1890s. When the province’s Liberal and Conservative
organs discussed the dispute from 1890 to 1893, they contended that provincial autonomy
precluded dominion intervention. The Manitoba Schools Act was, according to the Toronto
World, “the tit for the Jesuit Estates tat.” If the Protestants of Ontario were not permitted to
interfere in the Jesuits’ Estates question, then Quebec Catholics had to accept the same
limitations regarding the Manitoba school question.36 The Globe adopted a more extreme
position by using provincial rights to explicitly disavow Ontario’s ability to influence the
Canadian government’s response to the dispute. As early as August 1889, the Globe
anticipated the sense of entitlement in Ontario and tried to diminish it by telling readers that
there was no need for parliament to intervene in the provincial dispute. “Manitoba,” it
insisted, “will decide.”
Ontario is not charged with the government of that Province. Attempts to
regulate its affairs from this Province will be met with a sharper ‘mind your
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own business’ than ever came from much-lectured Quebec. There are, indeed,
those who seem to presume that Ontario – nay, a very small portion of Ontario
– is entitled to play Mentor and Bully [sic] to the other Provinces. Fortunately
the people of our excellent Province have better sense than to approve the
impudence that courts the mob.37
In August 1892 the Globe still communicated the same message. It denounced Quebecers
who wanted to use their province’s intrastate influence to push the dominion government to
table remedial legislation and also criticized those who shouted that the “voice of Ontario
must be heard” in reply. The “agitators” of both sides, it suggested, would create religious
strife across the country. “What is to be gained,” it asked, “by re-opening the healing
wound? It is Manitoba’s business, not ours.”38 Both parties, therefore, minimized political
tensions by denying Ontario’s ability to influence the Manitoba school question with its
parliamentary preponderance and deferring to the courts.
The judicial strategy did not entirely deter Ontarians from suggesting that they could
use their preponderant influence to impact dominion policy regarding the Manitoba school
question. During the lead up to the 1891 election McCarthy asked “Ontario [to] give the
freest expression of its will” on the Manitoban dispute.39 Similarly, the Globe responded to a
provocative speech by Chapleau in Hochelega in October 1892. The Minister of Customs
reportedly told his audience that “it would be better to discuss the terms of union anew” if the
Canadian government refused to intervene in Manitoba.40 The Globe replied by declaring
that “the people of this Province know what it is to struggle for their rights against Federal
aggression, and to win them; and unless we very much mistake their temper they will be
prepared to stand by a weaker member of Confederation engaged in the like defence.”41
These statements suggesting Ontario’s ability to protect Manitoba’s autonomy, however,
were rare and did not impact the policies or fortunes of either political party in Ontario. For
the time being, the courts kept Ontario’s sense of entitlement in abeyance.
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This respite ended on 30 July 1892 when the JCPC confirmed the Manitoban Court’s
initial decision: the Manitoba Schools Act was intra vires. The ruling also discounted the
allegation that the new school system used Protestant curriculum. The Schools Act, the
JCPC pointed out, promised that the schools would be “entirely unsectarian.”42 As Crunican
notes, the ruling “placed the presumption of the law… on the side of the Manitoba
government.”43 The province’s French-Catholic population had to find other legislative
guarantees to continue its fight and also demonstrate that they superseded the JCPC’s
interpretation of Section 22(1). For a great many Protestant Manitobans and Ontarians, the
Barrett verdict resolved the question of dominion interference. The British Empire’s highest
court ruled that the Manitoban minority had no grievance.44
Despite the JCPC’s ruling, however, the pressure for dominion intervention
increased. In January 1893, Sir John Thompson, who assumed the prime ministership after
John A. Macdonald’s death in 1891 and Sir John Abbott’s resignation due to ill health in late
1892, tried to contain the politically volatile dispute. The new prime minister arranged for
both sides to appear before the Conservative cabinet for what Larry Kulinek describes as a
“quasi-judicial” hearing. Thompson hoped that the proceedings would foster the belief that
justice, rather than political influence, drove the government’s policy. Ewart appeared on
behalf of the Manitoban minority, but the Greenway government heeded McCarthy’s legal
counsel and refused to appoint a representative. It insisted that the JCPC’s decision was final.
There could be no further debate.45 Without a politically satisfactory means to settle the
dispute, the Thompson government decided to submit a series of questions to the Canadian
Supreme Court that would further probe the rights of Manitoban Catholics.46
The Canadian government’s decision to pursue additional legal action displeased
impatient MPs from Quebec and Ontario. It led Joseph Israel Tarte to initiate a four-day
parliamentary debate on 6 March 1893. Tarte, an ambitious former Conservative Quebec
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MP who ran as an independent in a January 1893 by-election due to his lack of influence
among Quebec’s fractured Conservative leadership, moved a resolution disapproving the
government’s actions including its assumption of “judicial functions.” In 1890, Tarte
recalled, Macdonald had stipulated that the JCPC decision was advisory rather than
compulsory, and he also noted that Conservative ministers had repeatedly promised to restore
the public funding of separate schools in Manitoba. The Canadian government, he
concluded, should have disallowed the Manitoba Schools Act or passed remedial legislation
instead of continuing to use the courts as an excuse for inaction. Tarte’s speech was
emblematic of the emerging frustration in Quebec with the Conservative government over
the Manitoba schools question. As Silver explains, Quebecers had come to believe that
Confederation was based on a bicultural compact rooted in dualistic respect for English and
French, Catholic and Protestant. The very nature of Confederation, therefore, compelled the
government to intervene in Manitoba.
The most novel aspect of the debate, however, was McCarthy’s support for Tarte’s
motion. McCarthy, who broke all party ties in January over his desire to see the protective
tariff replaced by an Imperial preference, used Tarte’s resolution to criticize the
government’s willingness to keep the Manitoba school question alive with cabinet hearings.
He repeated his belief that the JCPC’s ruling on the Barrett case negated any requirement for
further discussion. Macdonald had decisively rejected interference during the New
Brunswick Schools question, and McCarthy criticized Thompson for not following the late
prime minister’s example. McCarthy and his small band of followers therefore expressed
their dissent by also supporting Tarte’s resolution. The government ultimately defeated
Tarte’s motion by a vote of 120 to 71. The support of McCarthyites increased the profile of
the dispute in Ontario and alerted its voters to the possibility of parliamentary action on the
question.47
The Thompson government proceeded with its exploration of Catholic rights in
Manitoba. The six questions that it eventually submitted to the courts became Brophy vs. the
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City of Winnipeg. According to Crunican, these six questions centred on three points. First,
did a legitimate grievance exist according to section 22(2) of the Manitoba Act as well as
section 93(3) of the BNA Act? Second, did the Barrett case negate any possibility of further
appeals? Lastly, did the Canadian government have the executive or legislative power to
take remedial action? Either a positive or a negative verdict, the members of the dominion
government hoped, would resolve the politically thorny question.48 Negative responses
would terminate the minority agitation. If the JCPC responded positively, then the
government could claim that it was merely following the ruling of the empire’s highest court.
Despite these hopes, Shaw points out that the Thompson government “dissociated” itself
from the proceedings by allowing Brophy to file suit as part of its continued effort to avoid
being entangled in the divisive dispute during the summer of 1893. In early October, the
Supreme Court began hearing the case.49
The parliamentary debate on Tarte’s resolution and the Supreme Court’s hearings
demonstrated that the cabinet and parliament, rather than the courts, could influence the fate
of Manitoba’s separate schools. From March 1893 to the fall of 1894, politicians and
newspapers in Ontario began to cultivate a sense of entitlement to protect Manitoba’s
provincial autonomy via their province’s parliamentary preponderance. “Under no
circumstances,” McCarthy told a Toronto audience in mid-April 1893, “would the people of
Ontario tolerate interference.”50 Six months later the Globe issued a similar threat. “The
people of Ontario,” it warned, did not have “the slightest intention of countenancing Federal
interference with the educational law of Manitoba.”51 The following year, the Mail also
opined that Ontario had an “interest” in preserving provincial autonomy if the dominion
government ever proposed remedial legislation.52 Although these editorials and speeches
were more vehement, they remained infrequent. Most Ontarians accepted that their
province’s parliamentary power was in abeyance until the JCPC ruled on the Brophy case.
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The exception to this rule was the Sentinel, which was one of the first newspapers to
consistently assert Ontario’s right and ability to block remedial action. On 4 May 1893 it
claimed that Ontarians “sympathized” with the Manitoban desire for ‘normal’ schools and
promised that “any government that attempts to thwart the will of this Province and of the
West will most assuredly come to grief.”53 It repeated this message during the summer and
early fall. Ontarians, it “emphatically” declared in October, “will never consent to allow a
Conservative or Liberal government at Ottawa to force on Manitoba the evils of separate
schools.”54 Time only emboldened the Orange organ, and by August 1894 it was even more
aggressive. “Quebec no longer rules Canada,” it boasted. “There is now a solid Ontario as an
offset to it, and Ontario will see that no man attains or holds power in this country at the
command of the priesthood.”55 The Sentinel encapsulated this sense of power and entitlement
with its oft-repeated cry: “hands off Manitoba.”56 In 1893 and 1894, suggestions that
Ontarians would need to rally against remedial action remained a largely Orange preserve.
The limited calls for obstructive Ontarian mobilization against remedialism,
combined with the dominion government’s refusal to act, created little impetus for appeals to
Ontarians to support dominion intervention. The Conservative press instead responded to the
sabre-rattling in Ontario by attacking Laurier. Several Conservative newspapers speculated
that Laurier would support separate schools in Manitoba because his Catholicism would lead
him to sympathise with allegations that the public schools taught Protestant curriculum.57
Laurier provided limited evidence for this contention. The Liberal leader consistently warned
that he would support remedial legislation if the minority’s allegations proved to be accurate
and if Greenway refused to amend the School Act. Until the character of the curriculum was
determined, however, he refused to take a firm stand for or against dominion intervention.58
The Conservative newspapers mocked this political hedging and demanded the Liberal leader
come down decisively for or against remedial action.59 By criticizing their opponents, the
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Conservatives tried to draw attention away from their own inability to satisfy political
frustrations in Ontario.
The JCPC’s verdict on the Canadian government’s six questions did not provide the
Canadian government with a politically expedient solution to the Manitoba school question.
The court’s ruling, published on 29 January 1895, concluded that Manitoban Catholics had a
grievance that met the requirements for an appeal for remedial action. Unlike the Barrett
ruling, which focused on section 22(1) of the Manitoba Act, the JCPC case used section 22(2,
3) of the Manitoba Act to conclude that the Manitoban minority could demand the restoration
of the education rights that they had enjoyed since Confederation. It also found that these
same articles furnished the dominion government with the jurisdiction to pass remedial
legislation. The JCPC did not, however, assert that remedial action or the restoration of
separate schools was necessary to rectify the minority’s grievance. After the announcement
of this ruling, as Crunican notes, “the day of political reckoning could no longer be
postponed.”60 The Manitoba schools question was now a parliamentary question. Ontario’s
political representatives would have the opportunity to vote on the dominion government’s
response.
Both parties were unsure of how to proceed, and they initially avoided taking a stand
on remedial legislation. Throughout February and most of March, the cabinet wavered. Sir
Charles Hibbert Tupper, the Minister of Justice and son of father of Confederation Sir
Charles Tupper, advocated announcing remedial legislation and then dissolving parliament to
solicit a new mandate for action. French-Canada’s cabinet ministers as well as Arthur
Dickey (the Secretary of State and MP for Cumberland, Nova Scotia) supported this policy.
Bowell, who assumed the prime ministership after Thompson’s death in December 1894,
worried that this proposal would destroy the government’s support in Ontario. Instead, the
cabinet asked the Manitoban government and the Catholic minority to send representatives to
present their grievances to the cabinet. By assuming the role of a tribunal, the cabinet again
hoped to garner an aura of impartiality that would diminish the belief that Quebec or Ontario
intrastate influence could impact its response to the dispute. Ewart and McCarthy presented
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the respective cases of the Catholic minority and Manitoban government but the meeting did
not alleviate the sense of entitlement in either Ontario or Quebec.61
After tumultuous debate, Bowell’s government finally issued a remedial threat on 21
March. Manitoban Catholics, according to the minute-of-council, had the right to their own
schools, to proportionate public funding, and to exemption from contributing taxes to the
public school system. The JCPC’s ruling, the order stressed, required the Canadian
government to reintroduce separate schools to Manitoba.62 Rather than committing itself to
immediately tabling a remedial bill, however, the Bowell government asked Greenway to
reinstate these rights and only promised to table a bill if he ignored their appeal.63 By
offering Greenway a chance to act, Bowell hoped to avoid backing divisive legislation. In an
attempt to quell further agitation in Ontario and Quebec, Bowell also postponed the
dissolution of parliament. He believed that going to the polls in Ontario during the current
agitation was “political folly.”64 The government, he promised, would not propose remedial
legislation during the 1895 session. Instead, he called for a special sixth session at the
beginning of 1896 that would act on the Manitoba government’s response.65 In the meantime,
he and his followers continued to hope that Greenway’s government would amend its own
legislation.66
The Liberals struggled with how to respond to the simmering sense of power in
Ontario. In late February George Ross, Mowat’s Minister of Education, expressed his
concern about the emerging agitation in Ontario and urged Laurier in a private letter to
evaluate the contest “as a judicial question.” The JCPC ruling, he believed, required the
dominion government to restore the Manitoban Catholics’ “constitutional right” to separate
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schools.67 Laurier concurred with Ross’ assessment but worried that Ontario Liberals would
not support it.68 By early March, Ross began to doubt the viability of this strategy. Public
clamouring led him to believe that Ontario MPs had to oppose remedial legislation until “all
other means of settlement are exhausted.”69 The party’s president, as well as Ross and
Willison, met and agreed that the Globe had to take a stand on remedial action.70 In a
lengthy editorial published in its 4 March edition, the Globe again discounted the wisdom of
remedial legislation. “The people of Manitoba,” the editorial opined, could be counted on to
adopt a “generous” stance and to correct any legitimate grievances aired by Manitoban
Catholics. What could be gained, it questioned, “by turning the question over to the
Protestant of Ontario and the Catholic of Quebec? For this is what is involved in Federal
interference. Are we in either Province fit guides for our brethren in Manitoba?” Despite
this attempt to check the belief that Ontario had the right and ability to influence the dispute,
the Globe warned that if the Canadian government proposed remedial legislation, “each
member [of parliament] will be free to vote yea or nay, and will probably be swayed quite as
much by the opinions of his constituents as by the judgement of the Privy Council.” The
majority of Ontario MPs, it predicted, would heed their constituents’ obstructionist desires.71
Although the Globe continued to emphasize provincial rights when opposing remedial action,
by March 1895 it also began to expand its opposition by arguing that few Ontarians would
support remedial action.
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The Conservatives and Liberals, however, were not able to entirely stall the agitation
in Ontario. In February the Sentinel continued to predict that Ontario MPs would not allow
the dominion government to pass remedial legislation. “Protestant Ontario” it pledged, “will
see that this little Province is not crushed by weight of numbers” in parliament.72 In March,
Stapleton Caldecott, the 1895 President of the Toronto Board of Trade, also submitted a letter
to the editor of the Globe arguing that the Canadian government’s refusal to intervene in the
Jesuits’ Estates question set a precedent that prevented it from interfering in the Manitoban
schools question. “What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,” he declared.
Caldecott went on to claim that “the temper of the people of Ontario will not permit
Manitoba to be treated unjustly, or allow her Provincial rights to be trifled with.”73 In April,
McCarthy and Clifford Sifton, who became Manitoba’s Attorney General after Martin’s
departure for national politics, encouraged Ontarians to believe that their province was
uniquely capable of impacting the Canadian government’s school policy. Historians such as
David Hall, Larry Kulisek, and Paul Crunican, note the willingness of Sifton to come to
Ontario to help McCarthy popularize the Greenway government’s policy but they do not note
both men’s attempts to invigorate their supporters with preponderant federalism.74 At a
reception at Toronto’s Massey Hall in late April Sifton explained that “he had not come
down to Ontario solely to get their approval.” If the Canadian government ever tabled its
remedial bill, he hoped that his “brethren of Ontario would stand by” the Manitoban
government. McCarthy, who spoke shortly after Sifton, was glad to oblige his guest. He
claimed that the majority of Manitoba’s MPs would support the Canadian government at the
expense of their province’s autonomy, and that the Prairie province’s inhabitants had to look
to “Ontario, and Ontario alone” for protection from the dominion government.75 Although
action was not yet required, the anti-remedialist assertion that Ontario could use its
preponderant influence to impact the outcome of the dispute was gaining momentum.
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The Manitoban government published its response to the dominion’s threat on 15
June. It completely rejected the Canadian government’s appeal for corrective action.
Catholic schools, Greenway’s government contended, were “inefficient” and their
administration was “defective.” Their reply also denied that there was any evidence proving
that Manitoban Catholics required separate schools, and concluded that the Canadian
government needed to further investigate the claims of both parties before it could table
effective legislation.76 Bowell had little choice but to carry out his threat. On 8 July his
Minister of Finance, George Foster, informed parliament that the Canadian government
would table remedial legislation to a special session of parliament in January of 1896 if the
Manitoban government continued to refuse to amend its Schools Act. Without a remedial
bill, the 1895 parliamentary discussion of the Manitoba Schools question was brief and was
not informed by preponderant federalisms. Parliamentarians instead questioned the likelihood
that Greenway would still amend his government’s legislation, noted the unease of both
political parties with the question, and explored the merits of remedial legislation for
minority rights as well as its implications for provincial autonomy.77
Despite this postponement, the belief that Ontario could block remedial action
continued to spread. The World, which had with rare exception cautiously supported the
Canadian government’s handling of the Manitoba schools question until 8 July, declared that
“Ontario Ministers have surrendered everything, and the French wing of the Conservative
party have obtained everything they sought. Ontario is to be humiliated, and Quebec is to be
triumphant over the coercion of Manitoba.”78 A few days later, it warned that Ontario, the
North-West, and Maritime MPs would combine their votes to prevent the passage of the
government’s legislation.79 The Orange Order was especially bold when demanding that
Ontario use its parliamentary preponderance to protect provincial autonomy. E.F. Clarke told
the Orange Lodge in Toronto that “the people of Ontario must insist that the Province of
Quebec shall not interfere” with another province’s administration of civil and religious
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liberties.80 The Sentinel echoed its editor’s stand. “Ontario,” it repeatedly warned, was “on
guard.” The dominion government needed to keep its “hands off Manitoba” if it expected to
be re-elected.81 This slogan achieved widespread popularity. For example, William
Fitzgerald, the Grand Master of the youth-based Loyal True Blue Association of the Orange
Order, repeated the slogan during his speech in London.82 This opposition continued into
November when the Sentinel encouraged “the whole might of this great Protestant Province”
to defend “the child of Ontario” from “the insolent hierarchy of Quebec.”83
The Liberals struggled to cope with the burgeoning belief that Ontario could block
remedial action. On 16 July they held a key caucus meeting. Laurier advised the party to
take advantage of its opposition status, continue to wait for the government’s policy to
unfold, and to avoid making any commitments in the interim. John Charlton disagreed. He
claimed that the party had to either affirm or reject remedial legislation. “There was no
middle course,” he argued. In his estimation parliament was not obligated to pass remedial
legislation and he contended that Manitobans had to settle the matter themselves. If Laurier
publicly rejected remedial legislation, the party would gain “the confidence of the Protestant
Liberal electorate.” According to his memoirs, the caucus listened silently to his proposal,
but no one, including Charlton’s sympathizers, rose to support this position.84 Undaunted,
Charlton continued to pressure Laurier. He composed a letter to Willison the following day
that repeated the substance of his proposal and confessed that he desired the formation of a
Liberal government that could survive without the assistance of “a single Quebec vote.”85
Forming such a government would have required the Liberal party to sweep Ontario.
Charlton’s belief that Ontario was entitled to such immense influence at Quebec’s expense
contributed to his political alienation.
Willison, however, sympathized with Charlton’s desire to make gains in Ontario by
swinging the party behind anti-remedialism. The Globe’s editor and Cartwright had
repeatedly advised Laurier during the preceding months to come out against remedial action
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by arguing that it violated provincial rights. These Ontario advisers believed that it was the
only platform that could carry the province.86 Willison, for example, insisted that “this
province will destroy any party that attempts arbitrary interference with Manitoba.”87
Believing that the Globe could no longer wait for the Liberal leader to come out for or
against remedial action without losing readers, the organ published an editorial entitled “No
Coercion” that declared remedial legislation to be “out of the question.” But this editorial did
far more than cater to the disgust in Ontario against remedial action. It also threatened the
use of Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance to veto any remedial bill. “Let the matter be
really forced to an issue,” the Globe taunted, “and the Province which has done so much to
maintain Provincial rights and to magnify Provincial powers will speak out for Manitoba in
such a way that there will be no excuse for mistaking its meaning.” Ontario’s voters, it
concluded, would ensure that a remedialist government would not stand.88
Laurier was furious. He immediately wrote Willison complaining that “the Globe
seems to be of the opinion that the whole of Canada is composed of one province.” He
lectured the editor against encouraging Ontarians to believe that they could dictate the
Canadian government’s policy.89 The Liberal leader, however, recognized that he needed to
placate the Ontarian wing of his party. A few days later Laurier and Tarte met with Charlton
and gave him the impression that they would oppose remedial legislation.90 The following
week Laurier also reconciled with Willison, admitting that the Globe had little choice but to
oppose dominion action. He nevertheless urged the editor to recognize that remedial action
could be constitutional and to avoid taking an unequivocal stand against it.91 Balancing the
policy preferences of Ontario and Quebec was not the only reason Laurier continued to hedge
on the remedial bill. The knowledge that he would offend the sense of entitlement in Ontario
to veto dominion interference also tempered his action.
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Laurier therefore refused to take a firm stand for or against remedial action. Since
1893 he challenged the Canadian government to demonstrate the need for remedial
legislation by proving the veracity of the Catholic minority’s claims of Protestant curriculum
in Manitoba’s public schools. When George Munro Grant, a Presbyterian minister and the
principal of Queen’s University, composed a series of letters to the editor of the Globe in
September 1895 sympathizing with Manitoba’s Roman Catholics and suggesting that the
dominion government form an inquiry, Laurier seized the Ontario opinion leader’s proposal.
At Morrisburg in early October, the Liberal leader used this policy to differentiate himself
from the Conservatives. Remedial threats, he pointed out, spurred resistance. Laurier
blamed the Conservative government for the current policy impasse and rising tensions
across the country. He famously borrowed from Aesop’s fable by suggesting that he had
found the ‘sunny way’ to resolve the crisis. The Liberal leader suggested the dominion
government form an investigative commission, and promised that if it found that the public
schools contained Protestant curriculum, he would appeal to the Manitoban’s sense of justice
to reform their own legislation. Ontario’s parliamentary influence, Laurier implied, would be
unnecessary. Investigation and dominion-provincial negotiation, rather than remedial
legislation, would address Catholic and Protestant concerns. Laurier repeated this message in
fifty-six stump speeches across Ontario during the next two months.92
After Laurier’s ‘sunny ways’ speech, the Globe sea-sawed on whether Ontario had
the right and ability to influence the dispute. Despite its July editorial, the Liberal organ
dropped its appeals for Ontarians to use their power to oppose remedial legislation.
Throughout the remainder of the year it generally repeated Laurier’s policy and focused on
discrediting the government’s remedial bill. It submitted that the bill would only make the
provincial government more intransigent and delve the entire country into “racial and
sectarian conflict.” Manitoban Catholics were better off seeking adjustments through the
provincial legislature. The province’s Protestants, the Globe unconvincingly reassured its
readers, would “do no great or permanent injustice to the Catholic minority.” A dominion
commission that would uncover existing grievances and offer them to the Manitoban and
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dominion governments for ‘conciliation’ was the best way to resolve the dispute.93 In late
October, the Globe even published an editorial noting the slight decline of French-Canadians
in Ontario and Quebec as a percentage of each province’s population. Ontarians did not have
to worry about “French-Canadian preponderance.” Manitoba and the North-West, which
would enjoy Canada’s greatest population growth in the coming decades, were
“overwhelmingly English and Protestant.” The Liberal organ concluded that “there is,
therefore, really no necessity for any Canadian to lose sleep in dreaming of French
domination.”94 French-Canadian influence, the Globe at least temporarily encouraged its
readers to believe, did not endanger Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance or EnglishProtestant rights in Canada.
As Richard Clippingdale notes, however, the Globe often attacked Conservative MPs
like Wallace for their continued support of Bowell’s government. How could the Orange
Grand Master remain a member of a government that so blatantly contravened the Lodge’s
position?95 These attacks, however, did more than discredit the Conservatives. They also
hinted at the possibility of Ontario’s parliamentary power. On 31 July, the Globe urged
Wallace to “contribute influentially” to the defeat of the remedial bill by resigning from the
government.96 It also reprinted anti-remedial speeches and resolutions from across Ontario.97
Although the Globe rarely explicitly urged Ontario Liberal MPs to use their parliamentary
preponderance to defeat the remedial legislation during the latter half of 1895, it faulted their
Conservative counterparts for compromising their province’s ability to block remedial action.
Attacking the Conservatives for not joining an Ontarian voting bloc continued to be a means
for opposition parties to discredit government supporters.
Bowell’s endless stalling, lack of leadership, and cautious commitment to remedial
legislation from July to December 1895, allowed divisions in his party to fester. According to
historian Lovell Clark, four cabinet members, including Ontario’s John Haggart (the Minister
of Railways and Canals and MP for Lanark South since 1872), vehemently opposed remedial
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action. It was also rumoured that Haggart had the support of forty Ontario MPs who signed a
petition threatening to abandon the cabinet if it proposed a remedial bill. Immediately
following Foster’s announcement, the Minister of Agriculture and Castor cabinet
representative, Senator Auguste-Réal Angers, resigned. He did not believe that Bowell
would follow through on his threat to restore separate schools. Joseph Caron and JosephAldric Ouimet, the other two French cabinet ministers, soon followed, but were quickly
convinced to rescind their resignations.98
Clarke Wallace also found the party’s commitment difficult to accept. He refrained
from commenting on the government’s threat to Manitoba during May and June but found
Foster’s announcement too much to swallow. The Grand Master approached the prime
minister and informed him that he planned to support anti-remedialism during his 12th of July
address to the Orange Order. Since these comments conflicted with the government’s
position he offered his resignation. Bowell, however, refused to accept. The prime minister
still hoped that Greenway would succumb to the Canadian government’s pressure and amend
his provincial legislation. He therefore hoped that Wallace would not have to vote on a
remedial bill and urged the Controller of Customs to remain in the government. The prime
minister gave Wallace permission to distance himself from remedial legislation in a
“moderate way.”99 When speaking at the Order’s 12th of July celebrations in Toronto,
however, Wallace did more than express his support for the anti-remedial movement; he
encouraged the agitators to link their cause with Ontario’s preponderant influence. Wallace
alluded to Ontario’s power by repeatedly predicting that “the great majority of the citizens of
Canada will answer no when called upon to render their verdict” on the government’s
remedial pledge.100 While speaking to a Toronto Conservative Association crowd three-anda-half months later, he encouraged Ontarians to provide “guidance” for their MPs by voting
for anti-remedial candidates during the three upcoming by-elections in Ontario North,
Cardwell, and Huron West.101 To maintain his status in the Orange Order, Wallace violated
cabinet solidarity by affirming the anti-Catholicism and sense of provincial power and
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entitlement that informed the anti-remedial movement in Ontario. Although this decision
exposed Wallace and the government to considerable Liberal ridicule, it allowed the
Conservatives to maintain a semblance of unity.
Conservative newspapers also struggled to counter the belief that Ontario’s
preponderance could be used to block remedial action. In Toronto, towing the party line did
not prove to be profitable. The Empire’s slavish support of the Conservative party limited its
circulation and led to its gradual financial ruin. The oversaturated Toronto market caused the
Mail considerable financial hardship and Christopher Bunting wanted to bring it back into
the Conservative fold. It was not until January 1895, however, that he convinced the
Conservatives to allow him to purchase the Empire.102 The Mail and Empire contended that
Bowell, rather than Laurier, was for ‘conciliation,’ and that remedial legislation was only a
last resort. Although both the Mail and Empire as well as the Intelligencer continued to
encourage Greenway’s government to resolve the Catholics’ grievances or to reach some sort
of compromise with the dominion government, they claimed that the continued provincial
intransigence forced Bowell to proceed with remedial action.103 In general, however,
government newspapers preferred attacking Laurier to defending their own party’s platform.
For example, they lambasted Laurier for his continued refusal to come down decisively for or
against remedial legislation. There was no need for a commission, they insisted. The JCPC
and Principal Grant confirmed the existence of a grievance. In their public utterances and
private correspondence, Ontario Conservatives dismissed Laurier’s demands for a
commission as nothing more than a delaying tactic designed to postpone the announcement
of a Liberal policy until after a general election.104 His ‘sunny ways’ were unrealistic and
misleading. If “the minority in Manitoba have a grievance which ought to be remedied and if
Mr. Greenway refuses to yield,” the Intelligencer wondered, “how can Mr. Laurier secure
justice without coercing Mr. Greenway?”105 The truth, both newspapers alleged, was that
Laurier was posing as the hero of the extremists in both Ontario and Quebec. He upheld

102

Cumming, Secret Craft, 245.
For the Mail and Empire consult the discussion in: Clark, "A History of the Conservative Administrations,”
405-407; Intelligencer, 18 July 1895; Ibid, 2 October 1895; Ibid, 15 November 1895.
104
Intelligencer, 1 November 1895; Mail and Empire, 24 December 1895; Bowell to Tupper, 22 November
1895, LAC, MG26-F. See also Catholic Register, 17 October 1895.
105
Intelligencer, 29 October 1895.
103

343

provincial rights when speaking in Ontario but then pledged to support remedial legislation
when addressing Quebecers.106 The Conservatives even suggested that Laurier was behind
the entire dispute.107 Although these editorials implied that Ontarians should support the
government’s remedial policy, newspapers and politicians almost never explicitly asked the
province to lend its influence to the passage of the government’s bill.
There were a few exceptions to this trend. On 15 July, the Intelligencer urged
Ontarians to support the government by comparing the complaints of Manitoban Catholics to
Quebec Protestants. “Suppose that the Quebec Government tomorrow was to impair the
system of [separate] Protestant schools,” it hypothesized,
would the Ontario people abstain from intervention because of their devotion
to provincial rights? Would they cry out so enthusiastically that the question
was one solely for Quebec itself? Would they not, on the contrary, thunder at
the doors of Parliament for redress? And, if that would be their undoubted
attitude in the supposed case, why do not justice and equality demand that
they shall observe the same attitude in Manitoba?108
Similarly, at a rally in Orangeville in December 1895, Thomas Daly, the Minister of the
Interior and MP for the riding of Selkirk, speculated that Mercier would have curtailed the
rights of Protestant schools in Quebec if had he not died in 1894. Daly encouraged “the
people of Ontario” to recognize that McCarthy would not have defended Quebec’s provincial
rights in such circumstances and therefore urged them to support the “even-handed justice”
of the Bowell government.109 As the sense of power and entitlement in Ontario strengthened,
the need to discount this sentiment also mounted. The Canadian government’s supporters
from Ontario were uncomfortable defending their actions with appeals for compromise. Yet
they recognized that maintaining support for the government also necessitated addressing
Ontario’s preponderant influence. At this stage this alternative vision of Ontario’s potential
impact on the school question were expressed too infrequently to significantly impact public
debate in Ontario during the last half of 1895. The most intense anti-remedial pressures,
however, still lay ahead.
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The agitators’ claim that Ontario could decisively impact the school debate continued
to win adherents. Manitoba’s intransigence put Clarke Wallace in an untenable position. On
14 December 1895 he succumbed to the mounting public pressure in Ontario and resigned as
Controller of Customs. In his resignation speech, Wallace repeated his desire for national
and non-sectarian schools, but also warned the government that “the sentiments of the
Province of Ontario” and the “majority of the people of Canada” opposed remedial action.110
Wallace’s resignation, as Buell points out, was a hard blow to the Conservative party in
Ontario. So long as the Grand Master remained in the cabinet, most of the anti-Catholic
wing of the Conservative caucus refused to follow the example of McCarthy and O’Brien.
His decision to oppose remedial legislation and encourage his province’s voters to believe
that they could block the remedial bill, however, made it politically feasible for many other
Ontarians to join the movement.111 Wallace’s resignation, in short, made concerted Ontarian
opposition to the remedial legislation much more plausible.
Behind the scenes, the Conservative government’s chance of re-election continued to
decline. Ontario’s anti-remedial power became even more impressive in December. The
recent by-elections demonstrated the futility of splitting the popular vote between Liberal,
McCarthyite, and Patrons of Industry candidates in Ontario. The Patrons of Industry was an
agrarian movement imported from the United States. It attracted individuals who were
concerned about the falling prices of farm products, rural depopulation, costly freight rates,
as well as the high cost of living that resulted from protective tariffs. Their platform
therefore included a revenue tariff and reciprocal trade relations. Most Patron candidates
were also anti-remedialists. The overlapping consensus against protective tariffs and the
remedial bill provided the basis for an alliance between the three parties. McCarthy had
formed a relationship with the Patrons in 1893 by presenting their ideas in parliament. He
also enjoyed the support of the Protestant Protective Association (PPA). On 25 December
Liberal President Alexander Smith and Edward Farrer met with Patron President C.A.
Mallory. By the end of the meeting, the representatives agreed to withdraw candidates from
key ridings in order to improve the electoral chances of a single anti-remedial candidate. The
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desire among Patron leaders to appear non-partisan, as well as the damaging effect that the
alliance with McCarthyites would have on the Liberal campaign in Quebec, however, led the
latter two parties to deny the alliance’s existence.112
Parliament should have resumed its consideration of remedial legislation in January,
but it was delayed by a cabinet crisis. Seven Protestant ministers, including C.H. Tupper as
well as Ontarian ministers John Haggart and John Wood (the MP for Brockville and
Controller of Customs) resigned on 4 January. This so-called ‘nest of traitors,’ as Bowell
later dubbed them, ostensibly resigned over the prime minister’s failure to fill Angers’ seat in
the cabinet. The front was a thinly veiled attempt to hide their discontent with Bowell’s
leadership and desire for a new cabinet that could salvage the party’s electoral prospects.
After a week of negotiations, Bowell managed to convince most of his former ministers to
return to a new reconstructed cabinet. In return, he acknowledged the returned parliamentary
leadership of Sir Charles Tupper (senior), and promised to resign as leader of the
Conservative party after the election. Tupper remained an unequivocal supporter of remedial
legislation, and this limited his popularity among the party’s Ontario caucus. Although the
government survived the crisis, it still lacked the unity it required to ensure the passage of its
remedial bill.113
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After Sir Charles Tupper won a by-election and assumed his seat in parliament, the
government finally tabled its remedial bill on 11 February 1896. The bill restored FrenchCatholic rights in Manitoba by creating a separate school board of nine Trustees that could
levy taxes on all ratepayers who did not wish to support the public system. The board was
also entitled to grants from the provincial government. Schoolteachers were subject to two
inspection systems. The board conducted regular inspections but the provincial government
could also conduct occasional inspections to ensure that students received instruction
consistent with the public system’s standards.114
For the next three months, the possibility of Ontario’s political representatives uniting
to effectively veto the bill emboldened anti-remedialists. During a rally at Massey Hall in
Toronto a week into the debate, McCarthy, Wallace, and other anti-remedialists encouraged
Ontarians of all political persuasions to unite and oppose “French influence.”115 In
parliament, McCarthy also claimed that the Canadian government would use its patronage to
silence Ontario’s voice. Ontario’s Conservative MPs, he charged, would “eat dirt… for a
consideration.”116 Orangemen predictably continued to urge Ontarians to unite against the
influence of Catholic-pressure emanating from Quebec.117 The World also encouraged
Ontarians unite against the bill. It admitted the value of Maritime, Prairie, and even British
Columbian opposition to the government’s policy, but contended that “a united Ontario” was
integral to the defeat of the remedial bill.118 During the parliamentary debate William
MacLean, who was the co-founder and owner of the World as well as the Conservative MP
for York South, claimed that Ontarians had a unique right to influence the Manitoba schools
question. “The province of Ontario,” he suggested, “regards her relations to the province of
Manitoba in the light of the ancient Greek idea. Ontario regards herself as the metropolis, the
mother city, the mother state, and Manitoba as her child, her offspring, and her colony. And,
Sir, the province of Ontario will resent…such interference as is proposed under this Bill and
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under existing circumstances.”119 Several additional MPs, including Wallace, claimed that
Ontarian representatives would prevent the passage of the remedial bill.120
From an Ontarian perspective, however, the most notable development of the
February to April debates was the new voices that joined the political choir asserting
Ontario’s ability and right to block remedial action. As the World’s political cartoons
depicted (see Figure 6), Clarke Wallace could legitimately claim that “more’n me an D’Alton
McCarthy” led the anti-remedialist movement. The agitation enjoyed the support of other
provincial leaders including Manitoba’s Joseph Martin (who moved from provincial to
national politics in 1893), William Mulock (a leading Ontario Liberal and the MP for York
North) as well as Richard Weldon of New Brunswick. The World’s political cartoon actually
understated the growth of the sense of power and entitlement in Ontario to decisively impact
the Manitoba school question.121 An increasingly wide variety of Ontarians believed that
their province could stop the remedial bill in its tracks. James Young, a former Liberal MP
and MPP for Galt, did not have an anti-Catholic or anti-French record. After his retirement
from political office in 1886, he maintained his political relevance by publicly advocating an
independent Canada with expanded trade relations with the United States.122 On 26 February,
however, Young broke with this strategy by composing a lengthy letter to the editor of the
Globe concerning the Manitoba school question. Most of the editorial echoed Laurier’s
policy but it also urged Ontario Conservative and Liberals MPs to unite against the remedial
bill. He alleged that Ontario MPs who supported the bill were guilty of submitting to
“badgering” or “bribery” and warned that the electorate would not return them at the next
election.123 Cartwright, who anticipated the agitation would be heightened by a belief that
Ontario could preponderate as early as August 1889, and whose concern with the Orange and
Catholic vote in Ontario and Quebec led him away from exploiting this belief to frame his
response to the Manitoba school question, now urged its MPs to defeat the bill.124 The
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government, he charged, was “endeavouring to delude their supporters from Ontario, whom
they are leading like sheep to the shambles.” Ontario Conservative MPs, he implied, could
block the bill’s passage by voting against the government.125 Anti-Catholic and anti-French
prejudices in Ontario as well as the belief that its preponderant influence could be used to
defeat the bill made it increasingly difficult for government MPs to support remedial action.
The belief that Ontario’s preponderant influence could be used to derail the Canadian
government’s bill even pulled Sir Oliver Mowat’s government (he was knighted in 1892)
into the dominion-Manitoban dispute. Ramsay Cook notes the inconsistency of Mowat’s
determination to stop the Assembly from debating the Jesuits’ Estates question and his
consequent willingness to consider the Manitoba schools question in early March. He blames
partisan posturing for this exceptional reversal. “Not even so strict a provincialist as Oliver
Mowat,” Cook points out, “could resist the temptation to reach out beyond the province when
party advantage was to be gained.” Margaret Evans’ brief discussion of the debate sidesteps
the jurisdictional question and instead frames Mowat’s actions as another example of his
longstanding support for provincial rights. Charles Humphries provides more analysis of the
debate in his study of James Pliny Whitney, who became the provincial Conservative’s new
leader the following month. His analysis, however, focuses on Whitney’s use of
jurisdictional arguments to coax his party towards “dismounting from ‘the Protestant Horse’”
that they rode during the previous three provincial election campaigns. All of these historians
overlook the longstanding sense of power and entitlement that contributed to the debate’s
initiation as well as its subsequent impact on national politics.126
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Figure 6: The World on the ‘snowballing’ movement against remedial legislation.
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On 4 March Thomas Crawford, a former Toronto Alderman, well-known antiCatholic, and current Conservative MPP for Toronto West, moved a resolution stating that
the provincial Assembly had “a deep interest in all that concerns the well-being of every part
of the Dominion of Canada” and consequently “cannot but look upon the legislation which is
being promoted at Ottawa as an attack upon the Legislative rights of a sister Province, and as
a measure fraught with grave danger to the peace and prosperity of Confederation.”127
Rather than opposing the resolution because it ignored the JCPC’s ruling as well as the
Assembly’s lack of jurisdiction in the dispute, Mowat responded with his own lengthy
amendment that did not explicitly declare the right of the Assembly to pronounce on the
Manitoba school question but, by its very existence, affirmed the belief that Ontario had the
ability and right to influence a school dispute from another province. “In the judgement of his
House,” the amendment asserted, “remedial legislation by the Dominion is only to be thought
of, if at all, as a last resort.” Another part of the amendment declared that the Canadian
government’s “hasty” decision to pass a remedial bill was “in the judgement of this House,
fraught with great danger to the best interests of the Dominion as a whole, including the
interests of the Roman Catholic minority.”128 Like Crawford, the premier, famous for his
steadfast defence of provincial autonomy, asserted Ontario’s right pronounce on matters that
were beyond its constitutional jurisdiction.
Conservative leaders Oliver Howland (the MPP for Toronto South) and James
Whitney provided the Conservative’s response. Howland disavowed Ontario’s potential
influence. Crawford and Mowat’s resolutions “could have no moral or legal effect” on the
parliamentary debate. Yet he went on to reinforce Ontario’s right to influence the national
debate by suggesting his own lengthy draft amendment (which he did not move) stating that
the dominion government was constitutionally obligated to propose remedial legislation and
that it deserved non-partisan support. Whitney was a more consistent provincial autonomist.
“The people of Ontario,” he pointed out, “had not elected the present Legislature to
pronounce upon that question.” He charged Mowat with pursuing the question to harm the
Conservatives in the upcoming election and moved an amendment stating that “any
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expression of opinion of this House” concerning the remedial debate constituted “an unwise
and unwarrantable intrusion upon the proper domain of the Parliament of Canada.”129 In so
doing, Whitney repeated the Conservative habit of using the Assembly’s limited jurisdiction
to rebuff the sense of entitlement and power that spurred the debate.
Only fourteen MPPs supported Whitney’s amendment. Except for one Independent
MPP, all of the supporters were Conservatives. Seventy-two MPPs, including six
Conservatives and all of the Liberal and Patrons of Industry representatives were unwilling to
disavow influencing the parliamentary debate. They did not agree, however, on what policy
to endorse. A much less decisive fifty-one of the eighty-eight present representatives
supported the Mowat and Crawford resolutions. It was largely a party vote. Liberals
supported the resolutions; the Conservatives opposed them. Three-quarters of the PPA MPPs
sided with the Conservatives.130
The outcome of the Assembly’s debate alarmed the remedial bill’s supporters and
emboldened its detractors. The Catholic Register, which adhered to the opinions of the
Toronto Catholic hierarchy (and became the sole Catholic Toronto weekly after it merged the
Irish Canadian and the short-lived Catholic Review in January 1893131), was deeply troubled
by the results. It criticized the willingness of prominent Catholic Liberals like William
Harty132 and François Evanturel to put partisan ties before alleged Catholic interests. The
Assembly’s votes verified the organ’s doubts regarding the generosity and tolerance of
“Protestant majorities.” It used the vote to justify an appeal for Quebec MPs to protect the
rights of Manitoban Catholics. “The eyes of the Catholic world are upon the FrenchCanadian public men…If the minority of their race is to remain down-trodden they will be
responsible.”133 Once again, an agitation based on the belief that Ontario could oppose
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demands from other parts of Canada gave the province’s Catholic inhabitants reason to
believe that their elected officials did not represent their religious interests.
Mowat’s success alarmed the dominion cabinet enough for it to allow William Ives,
the Conservative MP for Sherbroke and the Minister of Trade and Commerce, to comment
on the resolution during the parliamentary debate. Ives avoided offending Ontarians by
denouncing the premier’s resolution. Instead, he emphasized Mowat’s acknowledgment of
the grievances of Manitoban Catholics, as well as his desire that remedial legislation be a last
resort. In fact, aside from the allegation that the dominion government acted ‘hastily,’ he
praised the premier’s resolutions and claimed that it was “surprising… how near the two
parties are together at the present moment.”134 Almost two weeks later, Sir Charles Tupper
echoed this interpretation of Mowat’s stand.135 The dominion government’s message was
clear. Canadian, and especially Ontario MPs, did not have to fear the Assembly’s effort to
influence popular opinion in Ontario on the remedial question. The Liberals challenged this
sentiment. In parliament Cartwright used the Assembly’s vote to bolster the anti-remedial
cause. Mowat’s opinion, he contended, “ought to have very considerable weight with this
House.”136 By referring to the Assembly’s debate, as one Nova Scotian MP subsequently
charged, Cartwright “threatened the Government with the hostility and opposition of the
Protestant majority of Ontario.”137 The pressure emanating from Queen’s Park (the
Legislative Assembly moved to the new facilities in 1893) therefore impacted the national
debate. It emboldened Liberals like Cartwright to confidently assert their anti-remedial
platform. The same pressure also led Ives and Tupper to defend their Ontario MPs from
allegations of ignoring the will of their constituents. This damage control had little effect.
Few Ontarians gave speeches supporting the bill.138
The Globe also stoked the belief that Ontario could use its intrastate preponderant
potential to defeat the government’s bill. For example, it reprinted the letters and speeches of

134

Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 5 March 1896, cols 2901-2902.
Ibid, 17 March 1896; cols 3695-3696.
136
Ibid, 11 March 1896, col 3285.
137
The MP was Thomas Kenny, the Conservative MP for Halifax. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 12
March 1896, col 3407.
138
Several Ontarian anti-remedialists noted the silence of their province’s Conservative MPs: Globe, 13 March
1896; Ibid, 19 March 1896; Ibid 8 April 1896.
135

353

individuals who demanded the assertion of Ontario’s power.139 Its own editorials also urged
Ontarians to unite against the remedial bill. On 22 February it encouraged Ontarians to lobby
their MPs to oppose the government’s legislation. “If public opinion in Ontario is plainly
expressed… the Government’s uncertain mind will be convinced that their bargain with the
Quebec Bishops is too expensive to keep.”140 That same month, the Globe hinted at
Ontario’s potential influence. It expected Tupper to “force” many Ontario Conservative MPs
to “stultify their record in regard to education questions” in order to secure the bill’s
passage.141 On 10 March it again urged Ontario Conservatives to defeat the remedial bill.142
Ontario had the power to defeat the government’s legislation but the Globe doubted that
Conservative MPs would support this aspiration. Partisanship, it insisted, was the only
barrier to exercising Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance.
Ontario Conservatives adopted several strategies to combat these attempts to
encourage Ontarian unity against the government’s bill. Attacking Laurier remained one of
their most popular tactics. On the one hand, they insisted that the Liberal leader orchestrated
Manitoba’s intransigence to overthrow the government. He “pulled wires” and “intrigued”
with Greenway to prevent a resolution to the dispute. The Liberals would continue to
antagonize prejudices across the country until they toppled the Conservative government.
Parties that adopted such divisive and destructive strategies, they concluded, did not deserve
electoral support.143 On the other hand, Conservative newspapers speculated that Laurier
would propose even harsher remedial legislation if Greenway did not respond to his ‘sunny
ways.’ To redeem himself with the clerical right, the Mail and Empire asserted, the Liberal
leader would go “bishop baiting” by denouncing the bill as inadequate but then draft his own
remedial bill that exceeded the provisions of the Conservative government’s legislation.
Laurier, it continued would assert that these additional provisions were constitutional
obligations. Such a bill would not be based on any “principle acceptable in Ontario.” Yet the
Mail and Empire asserted that Ontario Liberal MPs would ‘swallow’ the measure to maintain
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their grip on power (see Figure 7).144 Ontarian voters, these Conservative newspapers
concluded, could not trust Liberal candidates or their party leader to heed their province’s
voice. Only the Conservative’s remedial bill, which they insisted fulfilled the dominion
government’s minimum constitutional obligations, deserved Ontario’s support.145

Figure 7: "Laurier the Mesmerist." Mail and Empire, 2 March 1896
During the parliamentary debate, however, the Conservatives did more than attack the
Liberals and discount Ontario’s voice in Liberal policy development. The strong assertions
of Ontario’s preponderant potential in parliament, Queen’s Park, public rallies, and the press,
sparked more consistent attempts to reposition this sense of power and entitlement behind the
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remedial bill. The Mail and Empire offered only one timid linkage. “A great many among
us object” it admitted,
on either religious or provincial grounds, to [remedial] legislation of any kind.
Such objection challenges respect. But, assuming that the action proposed is
of a moderate and conciliatory nature, the objection, while still held to by
those entertaining it, will certainly not be of such a character as to necessitate
the abandonment of our national and material interests.146
The Liberal platform, the Mail and Empire concluded, was “scarcely deep enough for an
intelligent electorate such as that of Ontario.”147 John Haggart, despite his private misgivings
about the remedial bill, was more direct. He defended his decision to remain a government
minister by characterizing the anti-remedialist campaign as an agitation stirred by the petty
jealousies of individuals like McCarthy to secure more influence within the Conservative
party. He claimed that “the Protestant electors of Ontario” desired the continuation of
religious teaching in Manitoban schools and wondered aloud “what interest is it to them to
refuse religious training” in a “few” Roman Catholic schools. When the Conservatives had a
chance to present their case to the electorate, Haggart claimed that “the people of my
province will… give a practically unanimous verdict in favour of the Government and of the
policy they have adopted of giving this moiety of justice to the minority of Manitoba.”148 The
boldest attempt to co-opt the Ontarian desire to preponderate during the parliamentary
debates, however, came from James Grant, who returned to politics in 1893 as the
Conservative MP for Ottawa after losing his seat during the Pacific scandal. Grant
characterized the “great province of Ontario” as a place that produced “great men” of
“integrity” who were not afraid to do their “duty” by defying their anti-remedialist
constituents. He repeatedly urged his Ontarian peers to join a “phalanx” of MPs who would
foster “peace and goodwill” across Canada by supporting the government’s bill.149 The
arrival of concerted attempts to redirect preponderant federalist energies from Ontario during
the remedial debate demonstrates the Conservatives’ desperation to survive the agitation.
Government supporters from Ontario did not believe that the constitutional arguments
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provided by Tupper and his supporters adequately justified their support of the bill. They
therefore specifically addressed the Ontarian sense of entitlement to influence the Manitoba
schools debate and claimed that ‘justice’ could only be secured with the assistance of
Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance. This unique justification made it easier for
Conservative MPs from Ontario to support remedial action.
In the end, Tupper was unable to secure the remedial bill’s passage. During the
second reading, Laurier continued to insist that the government needed to appoint a
commission to investigate the claims of the Manitoban minority before it entertained
remedial action. The Liberal leader moved an amendment for a six months’ hoist of the
remedial bill. This brilliant move allowed him to attract the support of dissatisfied Ontarians
from both sides of the aisle who refused to support any remedial legislation, as well as
dissatisfied Quebecers who believed that the bill was inadequate. The bill, however, passed
its second reading on 20 March by a vote of 112 to 94. Seventeen Ontario Conservatives, as
well as McCarthy and the Independent Conservative William Stubbs voted against the
government. Many more Ontarians only supported the measure with the understanding that
it would undergo substantial moderation in Committee. In the following weeks, the
parliamentary contest continued to a third and final reading. Anti-remedialists mounted a
lengthy filibuster that Tupper often forced to persist through the night. Time, however, was
on the side of the anti-remedialists. The session had to end by the 26th and the government
still had to pass important legislation unrelated to the Manitoba schools question. By 16
April the government admitted defeat and withdrew its remedial bill. Bowell resigned as
party leader on the 27th. Canada’s voters would decide whether Tupper or Laurier would
oversee the resolution of the Manitoba separate school question.150
During the election campaign, anti-remedial candidates actively justified their
position by insisting that Ontarian opposition was integral to defeating the remedial
movement. The dozen McCarthyite candidates even signed pledges to oppose any
government that proposed remedial legislation. By taking this extreme stand, McCarthy
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hoped that his third party would hold the balance of power in parliament. In fact, despite his
willingness to endorse Liberal and Patron candidates in other ridings, McCarthy warned a
Brockville audience that Laurier might still resort to remedial legislation if Greenway did not
respond to his ‘sunny ways.’ McCarthy therefore exhorted Ontarian voters to give him
“twenty followers” to “keep Mr. Laurier straight.”151 Ontario, in McCarthy’s estimation,
could exert important influence against remedialists.
The intransigence that this sense of power and entitlement inspired was particularly
well documented in the riding of Toronto East. On 7 May the riding’s Liberal-Conservative
Association held a convention to select its candidate. The incumbent, Emerson Coatsworth,
voted for the remedial bill. Several individuals contested Coatsworth’s candidacy. One of
the other nominees was Dr. Beattie Nesbitt. Nesbitt, who would later represent Toronto
North in the Legislative Assembly, informed the convention of his opposition to ‘coercion.’
“Had the Conservative members in Ontario only stood up and told the Government their
honest opinions,” he declared during the nomination meeting, “this difficulty would never
have occurred.” Because the majority of the association desired a remedialist candidate,
Nesbitt asked for his name to be withdrawn from the convention. On two occasions, John
Hewitt, who was treasurer for the Provincial Grand Lodge of Ontario West, tried to pass a
resolution denouncing the government’s remedial legislation and committing its nominee to
support non-interference. When the convention refused to vote on the resolution, Hewitt and
“fifty or sixty” other MPs left the meeting “amidst considerable uproar.”152 The disgruntled
Hewitt subsequently took a leading role in the campaign of John Ross Robertson who ran
against Coatsworth as an anti-remedialist Conservative. As the editor of the Toronto
Telegraph and supporter of the Orange Order, Robertson proved to be a strong and
outspoken opponent.153 Near the end of his campaign, Robertson claimed that Ontario had a
right to protect Manitoba from dominion interference.
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Our sons and daughters in the west are fighting against great odds for the
freedom which is the birthright [sic] of the children of the empire. Shall we of
Ontario desert them, or shall we in this crisis stand by them and scatter to the
winds the forces of coercion? Yes, surely we shall be with them, for, as
certain as the waters roll over the brink of Niagara, as surely as the St.
Lawrence sweeps its mighty current to the sea, so surely will Ontario send to
Parliament at Ottawa a cohort who shall sweep away the last vestige of
remedial legislation.154
The Manitoba school question was the only major point of contention between the two
Toronto East candidates because they both supported the National Policy. On election day
Robertson won the riding with 61% of the popular vote.155
Other Ontarians insisted that their province’s opposition was indispensible to their
fight against ‘French domination’ and separate schools in Manitoba. The World claimed that
the majority of Quebec MPs pledged to support remedial action but argued that this support
was inadequate. “No government” it obstinately declared, “can carry it through Parliament if
Ontario and Manitoba are against it.”156 McCarthy similarly claimed that the government
“was depending upon Ontario for its majority.” He continued to argue that separate schools
provided “inadequate” education and urged Ontarians to support anti-remedial candidates.157
The agitators in Ontario also specifically argued that their province had to use their
parliamentary preponderance to protect provincial rights. The World, which supported antiremedialist Conservatives and continued to criticize Laurier’s conciliatory platform
throughout the campaign, pushed Ontarian voters to “side with the Province of Manitoba in
its determination to maintain national schools as against the dual system.” Ontario, it
claimed, was entitled to this influence.
If the people of Quebec and their bishops have the right to say that Parliament
must impose a dual system on Manitoba, then it surely follows that the people
of Ontario through their representatives, and the people of Manitoba and the
Northwest Territories, and for that matter all the other provinces outside of
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Quebec, have also the right to say that Parliament must not interfere with
Manitoba in the matter of education.158
“What is sauce for the goose” the World repeated, “is sauce for the gander.”159 While
speaking in Welland, Sir Richard Cartwright also encouraged Ontarians to protect “the rights
of a sister Province” from being “trampled.” He therefore encouraged his province’s voters
to support Laurier’s “amicable” solution to the impasse.160 Similarly, on the last day of the
campaign, Edmund Osler, the anti-remedialist Conservative candidate for Toronto West,
boasted that “the question should be left to the people of Manitoba alone to settle, and
Ontario is going to see that this is done.”161
In the last month of the election campaign, even Laurier encouraged Ontarian voters
to believe that they could decisively impact the fate of the remedial legislation. To avoid
playing into the hands of his opponents in Quebec, however, Laurier skilfully counselled
Ontarians and Quebecers to combine their electoral influence against Tupper. While
speaking at Glencoe, for example, the Liberal leader suggested that if Ontario and Quebec
voters “did their duties the result would be that the present Conservative Administration
would be wiped off the face of the earth.”162 On the closing day of his campaign at Lachine,
Quebec Laurier expressed similar hopes. Remedial legislation, he claimed, would only
further antagonize the Manitoban government, and its passage was thus contrary to the
interest of Manitoban Catholics. He therefore urged Quebecers to support his policy of
“conciliation.” Although he assured Quebecers that their province would “not take second
place to her sister Province,” he nevertheless asserted that they “look[ed] to the Province of
Ontario for assistance” to defeat remedialism.163 The utility of exploiting the belief that
Ontario possessed the preponderant influence to stop the passage of remedial legislation was
too tempting for even a French-Catholic leader to ignore.
Yet the Liberals risked jeopardizing their Catholic support in Ontario and Quebec if
they catered too strongly to the Anglo-Saxon prejudices in Ontario. The Globe, for example,
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tried to curtail Ontario’s sense of entitlement to influence the school debate. In its estimation,
the election results in Manitoba would be “of more importance than that of Ontario or
Quebec.”164 Ontario, it acknowledged, “will give a great majority” against remedial
legislation, but that majority would lack the authority to protect Manitoba if its electors
supported “Tupperism.”165 The Advertiser also generally avoided discussing Ontario’s ability
to influence the remedial policy of a Canadian Liberal government.166 Mowat also avoided
discussing the preponderant federalism that inspired his government’s March anti-remedial
resolutions.167 The threat of turning Quebec voters off of the Liberal party by too loudly
trumpeting Ontario’s parliamentary power appears to have kept its leaders from capitalizing
on the preponderant federalist impulse as strongly as Liberals like Blake had done in the late
1860s. They carefully managed the belief in Ontario’s power to improve their electoral
prospects without damaging their chances in Quebec. This skilful manipulation made them a
potent electoral force.
The Liberals used additional strategies to attack remedialist candidates in Ontario that
did not endanger their Quebec support. According to Lovell Clark, they emphasized the
divisions between the Conservative’s Quebec “coercionists” and Ontarian “anti-coercionists”
and wondered aloud how such a divided party could possibly resolve the dispute. They also
railed against “coercion” and claimed that they were the only party that could arrange
“conciliation.” Violating Manitoba’s autonomy, they insisted, would only heighten national
disunity. Liberal candidates regularly expressed sympathy for Manitoba’s Catholic minority
while disavowing remedial action. They emphasized the “very narrow differences” that
separated the Manitoban and Canadian governments and insisted that the Manitoban
government would accommodate the JCPC’s ruling if the Canadian government ceased
issuing threats and instead negotiated in good faith. Although many Ontario Liberals were
against separate schools in principle, they did not join partners like McCarthy and antiremedialist Conservatives in attacking these institutions and denying that Manitoban FrenchCatholics had a legitimate grievance. This avoidance allowed the Liberals to differentiate
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themselves from their anti-remedialist Conservative rivals. It also allowed the Liberal party
to benefit from stoked anti-Catholic and anti-French attitudes in Ontario without alienating
their French and Catholic supporters across the country with similar statements. These tactics
were not new, but their combination facilitated a façade of unity between Quebec and
Ontario Liberals. They also ensured that 'provincial autonomy, rather than the
(un)desirability of separate schools, remained the focal point of their Manitoba platform.168
The Liberal’s recruitment of Oliver Mowat also facilitated English-Protestant and
French-Catholic alignment while giving additional credence to the belief that Ontario was
entitled to special influence. Beginning in April, Laurier worked through John Smart, the
premier’s nephew, to recruit Mowat. Although Mowat’s infirmity made him hesitant to
commit to the stresses of travelling to Ottawa and occupying a cabinet post, Laurier
eventually persuaded him to contribute his prestige to the campaign. At the beginning of
May 1896, the premier announced that he would accept a seat in Laurier’s cabinet.169
Mowat, as Kenneth McLaughlin notes, embodied the political balance sought by Laurier.
The premier was a warrior of provincial rights and also had a long and proven track record of
tolerance and generosity when dealing with Ontario’s Catholic separate schools. His
commitment to chair a Commission of Inquiry on the Manitoba school question ensured that
Ontario’s Protestant provincial rights advocates could trust a French-Catholic prime minister
to not overstep Manitoba’s constitutional rights; it also ensured that Ontario and Quebec
Catholics could support a government that included Ontario Liberals.170 Yet Mowat’s
recruitment was more than a nod to Ontario’s provincial autonomists. The promise of his
inclusion in Laurier’s cabinet was also a subtle way of affirming that Ontario could influence
the Manitoba school question. Without acknowledging a special entitlement to leadership,
the promise of Mowat’s chairmanship of the Commission encouraged Ontarian agitators to
believe that their province’s values would impact the outcome of the dispute.171
Conservative party leaders downplayed the Manitoba school question during the
election campaign. As one historian notes, “the Manitoba school question was cited as
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merely one in a series of major proposals put forth by the party.”172 Party loyalists focused
on the protective tariff and its alleged benefits to the Canadian economy. On the hustings,
the prime minister often gave lengthy speeches that proclaimed the necessity of the tariff to
Canadian prosperity and gave comparatively brief attention to the school dispute. Over the
last two decades Ontario Liberals had swung between commercial union, unrestricted
reciprocity, and a revenue tariff. As McLaughlin explains, these policies appeared to be
“inconsistent” when compared to the Conservative’s unfluctuating support for the National
Policy. The only commonality among the Liberal platforms was closer ties to the United
States and the Conservatives tried to construe this as annexationism.173 The Manitoban
school question, Tupper supporters insisted, was therefore “a subsidiary question and not of
anything like the importance” of the tariff.174
Tupper also avoided alienating anti-remedialist Conservatives. Although their
appearance as Conservative candidates hurt the party’s credibility in Quebec, the prime
minister recognized that he lacked the power to oppose their nomination and he also accepted
that alienating them would only widen the party breach. His government, moreover, required
these renegades’ support to maintain power. Tupper therefore limited himself to
discouraging the intensification of anti-remedialism among Conservative candidates. For
example, when Edmund Osler refused to sign McCarthy’s anti-remedial pledge, Tupper sent
a letter applauding his unwillingness to allow his anti-remedial stand to hinder his support for
the rest of the Conservative party’s platform.175
When Tupper Conservatives addressed the Manitoba school question in Ontario,
however, they boldly defended the government’s remedial legislation. In May, John
Haggart, George Foster, as well as James Whitney repeatedly told Ontarians that the
government was constitutionally bound to honour the French and English “compact” that
formed the basis of Confederation.176 Tupper repeated this argument during his own
gruelling tour through Ontario. From 9 to 22 June the seventy-six year-old prime minister
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gave thirty-nine speeches across the province. The Manitoba school question, he insisted,
was not a referendum on separate schools or a religious question; remedial action was a
constitutional obligation. He claimed that the same constitutional guarantees protected
Quebec Protestants and Manitoban Catholics. Failure to honour these bicultural safeguards
violated the ruling of the JCPC and threatened to destabilize Confederation. The
Conservatives were not, however, above taking advantage of anti-Catholicism in Ontario.
Tupper repeatedly referred to Laurier’s campaign speech in St. Roche, Quebec, the only
occasion when the Liberal leader made the mistake of suggesting that his government would
support remedial legislation if it could not reach an agreement with the Greenway
government. Laurier, according to the prime minister and the Mail and Empire, could not be
trusted to stand up to Quebec’s Catholic Bishops. They warned that the French-Canadian
Roman Catholic’s remedial legislation might go well beyond the dominion government’s
constitutional obligations and fully restore the separate school system in Manitoba. By
contrast, Tupper described his own remedial bill as moderate and measured.177 The
Conservative bill, he concluded, best suited Ontarian Protestant preferences.
Although Tupper and his followers most often limited their defence of the
government’s policy to restating the dominion’s alleged constitutional obligation, a few
government supporters found this tactic to be unsatisfactory and therefore tried to encourage
Ontarians to instead unite behind government. The unpopularity of the government’s
remedial bill led the Mail and Empire to link it to the tariff. The Liberals, it deviously
suggested, stoked the anti-remedial movement to garner support when their real agenda was
free trade and even annexation with the United States. Ontario’s support, the Conservative
organ decried, was critical to saving Canada from annexation. The tariff always figured more
prominently in these linkages. Editorialists sometimes managed to entirely avoid the words
“remedial bill.” On 20 May, for example, the Toronto organ denied that the government had
“done wrong in Manitoba” and claimed that “Ontario must reject Sir Richard, it must also, in
the interests of public morality and as a protest and a protection against theft, oppose
vigorously and patriotically the advance of Mr. Laurier and his men.”178 Nine days later, the
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same newspaper issued a similar warning and claimed that Cartwright used “religious
feelings” to bring the Liberals and his trade policies into ascendancy. “Ontario” had to
“thwart the attempt to hand her [Canada] over bound to the boodlers” Laurier and
Cartwright.179 Tupper’s Conservatives, therefore, did not have to ask Ontarians to set aside
their provincial identities when they were campaigning on their party’s platform. Instead
they framed their remedial pitch in a way that appealed to the Ontarian sense of entitlement
to shape Canadian policy. The government’s Ontarian supporters retained a provincial
consciousness and did not simply defer to national imperatives.
Occasionally the Mail and Empire entirely avoided any allusion to the Manitoba
school question and simply linked Ontario’s parliamentary preponderance to the tariff. On
28 May it alleged that “the farmers of Ontario have, in the present election, a duty to perform
to themselves, and, indeed, to the whole country” by supporting the Conservative’s National
Policy.180 Tupper also hinted at similar themes when he opened his campaign in Winnipeg.
the biggest surprise that is going to come to the Liberal party is going to come
from Ontario. The Province of Ontario has too much at stake to sacrifice the
interests of that Great Province and all the rest of Canada by doing the behests
of Mr. Laurier. I says this, I am not prophesying, but I am speaking that
which I know: That the Maritime Provinces will stand by me, and the majority
of the present Administration will be greater in the new House than in the
old.181
Again, Tupper and his followers encouraged Ontarians to believe that they could shape
national debates. Ontarians had to exercise their intrastate influence to safeguard Canadian
prosperity by supporting the protective tariff at the polls.
In the final days of the campaign, the Mail and Empire found another reason for
Ontarian voters to support the Conservatives. It claimed that Laurier promised to grant better
terms to Quebec in return for Mercier’s support during the 1891 national election. Although
Mercier had died in 1894, his supporters continued to support the Liberals. “Ontario,” the
Mail and Empire warned, “has much to fear from these men. We pay a reasonably fair
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proportion of the taxes; and whatever they gobble up will be taken out of our pockets. This
province must keep them where they can do no harm, or we shall find them exceedingly rich
and ourselves unpleasantly poor.”182 By exploiting Ontarian memories of Mercier and better
terms, the Mail and Empire urged Ontarians to oppose Quebec’s empowerment. Addressing
Ontario’s sense of power, the editors of the Mail and Empire clearly hoped, would bolster the
party’s electoral prospects.
On 23 June 1896, Canadian voters elected the first Liberal government in nearly two
decades (see Appendix 2). The Liberal gains were most impressive in Quebec, where the
party captured 49 of the province’s 65 seats. In Ontario, the results were less decisive. The
Liberals and the Conservatives each took 43 of the province’s seats with 45% versus 47% of
the popular vote. But Ontario gave additional support to the Liberal government. The
Patrons and McCarthyites each secured an additional 3 seats and promised to support most
government measures. On the Manitoba school question, the new government could also
count on 15 anti-remedial Conservatives to support its conciliation policy. As Paul Stevens
notes, Ontarian voters were “clearly opposed to remedial legislation.”183 Yet the election
also demonstrated that a significant minority of Ontarians remained willing to accept
remedial legislation if it ensured the perpetuation of the National Policy.

Conclusion
After 1889, Ontarians persevered in the pursuit of a voting bloc that could
successfully pressure the Canadian government to adopt its policies. The emerging appetite
in Ontario to use the province’s preponderance to protect local autonomy concerning
language and separate schools on the Prairies emboldened a wide variety of political leaders
and editorialists to demand policies that alarmed French and Catholic Canadians. In 1890
Ontario MPs voted as a solid bloc against Beausolei’s resolution and only a compromise
amendment by Thompson that embodied the substance of McCarthy’s bill prevented further
division. The Manitoba school question allowed Ontarians to decisively link provincial
rights with their province’s preponderance influence. At first, pressure that partly arose from
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the belief in Ontario’s preponderant potential in newspapers like the Sentinel, Mail, and the
Globe, as well as from politicians like McCarthy, contributed to the impetus that led Prime
Minsters Macdonald, Abbott, and Thompson, to keep the Manitoba school question away
from parliament by sending it to the courts. The same pressure contributed to Laurier’s
decision to evade a decisive stand on the dispute. After parliament briefly considered the
question in 1893 and especially after the Brophy ruling in early 1895, the plausibility of an
Ontarian voting bloc energized the campaign against the Canadian government’s remedial
bill. This widespread intransigence alarmed the dominion government’s Ontarian supporters,
and helped to convert the dispute into a national political crisis.
This sense of entitlement and power to overcome pressure from Quebec had a
profound effect on the 1895 and 1896 debates. It was, for example, a major impetus for the
Queen’s Park debate. Even Mowat, a leader of the provincial rights movement, could not
resist ignoring the precedent he set during the Jesuits’ Estates controversy. His government
passed resolutions at Queen’s park endorsing Laurier’s ‘sunny ways’ and instructed the
dominion government to desist from remedial action. The passage of the provincial
government’s resolutions emboldened politicians like Cartwright to raise political tensions by
threatening the Bowell government with Ontario’s disapproval. During the national election,
the longstanding dream of a non-partisan anti-remedial power bloc seemed achievable, and
this sense of empowerment contributed to the willingness of Ontario Liberals, McCarthyites
and Patrons to endorse each other’s candidates. The intensity of this belief in Ontario’s right
and ability to influence the Canadian government’s response to the dispute, however, varied.
McCarthyites hoped for an Ontarian power-bloc that was large enough to defeat any party
that considered remedial action. Liberals like Charlton shared this desire. Other Liberals,
including Willison and Laurier, recognized that such an absolutist application Ontarian
influence would fracture the country. Instead, they stoked the belief in Ontario’s right and
ability to stop remedial action when they believed that it would not harm their party’s
electoral prospects in the rest of Canada. These tactics contributed to the intransigence in
Ontario that made it increasingly difficult for the province’s Conservatives to support
remedial action.
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At various times, both parties tried to dissuade Ontarians from believing that they
could use their preponderant potential to overcome Quebec’s pressure. In 1890, Thompson
managed to end the parliamentary impasse by allowing the territories to resolve the question.
Most Liberals supported this policy, yet the disturbing sectional splits led Blake and Edgar to
try to rally Ontario MPs against McCarthy. At the outset of the Manitoba school question,
Blake, Macdonald, and Thompson, temporarily defused the sense of power and entitlement
by referring the dispute to the courts. This deference allowed both national parties to avoid
taking a stand on intervention and largely quieted attempts to rouse Ontarians to defeat
remedial action. Inaction also negated the possibility of defending a remedial policy with
suggestions that Ontarian support was key to maintaining national unity.
Beginning in 1895, however, the Conservative government began to address Ontarian
concerns about the remedial bill. Provincial rights, anti-Catholicism, and anti-French
attitudes, and the increasingly widespread belief that their province’s intrastate influence
could be used to defeat remedial action, combined to make the remedial bill a hard pill for
most Ontario voters to swallow. Tupper Conservatives recognized that referencing minority
rights and constitutional obligations was not compelling to the majority of Ontarians. They
therefore argued that Ontarian support for remedial action was integral to the preservation of
national unity. By suggesting that Ontarians use their province’s parliamentary
preponderance to foster national unity, these candidates appealed to the long-standing
provincial sense of power and entitlement. They hoped that linking this political culture to
the tariff and the remedial bill would create an Ontarian reason to support their candidates.
The prospect of Ontarian voters splitting their influence between remedial and anti-remedial
candidates also likely helped to convince individuals like Haggart that it was in their best
political interests to remain loyal to Tupper. This hope, however, proved to be ill-founded.
A largely Ontarian-led filibuster blocked the bill’s passage through parliament and Tupper’s
Ontario nominees failed to even win a near majority of the province’s seats. By electing an
absolute majority of anti-remedialist candidates, Ontarian voters expressed a clear desire to
use their province’s parliamentary preponderance to safeguard Manitoba’s autonomy. The
belief that an Ontarian voting bloc could block remedial action helped to seal the fate of
French-Catholic rights in Manitoba.
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Ontario: ‘First Among Equals’
The Upper Canadian, and subsequently Ontarian, expectation that their province
would preponderate in Confederation was integral to their federalism and Canada’s political
development. Support for the federal principle in Upper Canada remained superficial and
fleeting until a sufficient portion of the population recognized that representation by
population in a federation could give their colony local autonomy and the potential to exert
preponderant intrastate influence. Prior to the 1850s, Upper Canadians frequently considered
the federal principle but they almost always treated it as a means to secure a British North
American Union and either avoided the question of intrastate representation or feared that
Lower Canadians would use their larger population to compromise Upper Canadian
autonomy. The revelation that Upper Canadians outnumbered Lower Canadians by the early
1850s led Reformers to reject federal proposals and to instead embrace representation by
population. They believed that federations were expensive and complicated structures of
government that would impede the Upper Canadian preponderance that ‘rep by pop’ would
facilitate. Even the linkage of ‘rep by pop’ and the federal principle at the 1859 Reform
convention failed to overcome this preference for unencumbered ‘rep by pop.’ After Lower
Canadian representatives refused to support Brown’s interpretation of the convention’s
platform during the Assembly’s 1860 session, he and his followers resumed advocating ‘rep
by pop’ alone. The combination of ‘rep by pop’ and federation only garnered lasting support
after the formation of the Great Coalition. Upper Canadian Reformers at the Charlottetown
and Quebec conferences jealously guarded the principle of ‘rep by pop’ to ensure their
colony’s potential intrastate preponderance. Even then, the need to assuage Lower Canadian
and Maritime concerns about Upper Canada’s potential influence led them to either avoid
discussing their colony’s potential influence, or to describe it as a defensive power. It was
only after the conclusion of the 1866 London Conference that Brownites openly expressed
their aspirations to preponderate and even dominate Confederation. These espousals
prompted the Conservatives to develop of an alternative assessment of Upper Canada’s place
in Confederation that acknowledged its preponderant potential but denied that Upper Canada
could dominate the dominion government’s policies. Aggravating the rest of Canada with
their province’s influence would only harm national unity. These Conservatives instead
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suggested that Upper Canada could better secure its interests by using its intrastate influence
to facilitate the passage of compromise policies that fostered national unity.
Governing Canada after 1867 necessitated more than juggling the demands of each
province or region. It also required engaging preponderant federalisms. Ontario Liberals
and a few Independent MPs expected ‘rep by pop’ and their province’s wealth to give them
preponderant, or even dominant, influence in Canadian policy debates. They hoped that
Ontarians would unite during parliamentary debates and only require a handful of votes from
the rest of Canada’s MPs to impose their vision of Canada upon the country. Not even
Quebec possessed the votes to oppose this combination. When national elections and
parliamentary votes disappointed these expectations, the same sense of power and
entitlement unexpectedly led Ontario MPPs to protest the dominion government’s policies.
Unlike these MPs, the province’s MPPs did not have to maintain a caucus comprised of
representatives from across the country to form the government. The absence of this
constraint often led to the Legislative Assembly hosting some of the boldest assertions of
Ontarian entitlement. When this sentiment peaked following events such as the Red River
resistance or the passage of the Jesuits’ Estates and Manitoba School Acts, its adherents
harmed national unity by demanding that the rest of Canada adopt their policy preferences.
Preventing these agitations from harming national unity required more than
formulating compromise policies. Conservatives and Liberal-Coalitionists also contested the
assertion that their province possessed the right to impose its will upon other parts of the
country. Sometimes this opposition looked to the constitution, nation-building, or Imperial
authorities, to justify their support of unpopular policies. When these tactics failed to stop
the onslaught, those opposing the agitations directly addressed the preponderant federalists’
contentions. They acknowledged Ontario’s potential intrastate influence but contended that
it was insufficient to assure its dominance of Confederation. Ontarians, they insisted, had to
desist from alienating Canada’s smaller provinces. Sometimes they adopted a more positive
approach by admitting that the policies of the dominion and provincial governments did not
always please Ontarians but nevertheless argued that their province would ultimately benefit
from the growth of national unity and prosperity across the country. Ontario, they
concluded, had to use its preponderant influence to support compromises that facilitated
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these goals. These alternative interpretations of Ontario’s role in Confederation generally
attracted enough support to prevent the agitations from forming a provincial power bloc and
consequently limited their ability to secure their demands at the expense of rest of Canada’s
objections.
Yet the willingness of Ontarians to propose this alternative use of Ontario’s potential
influence had its limits. The strategy was politically unwise when Ontarians believed that
another province’s request was illegal. A widespread belief that Louis Riel would be found
guilty of murder made it difficult for Ontarians to advocate using their province’s
preponderant influence to deter prosecution. Similarly, the Globe and the Empire only
rejected calls for the disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act while the constitutionality of the
Jesuits’ Estates Act remained an open question with the majority of Ontarians. After March
1889, David Mills only dared to question the disallowance’s movement’s attempts to assert
Ontarian influence after delivering a lengthy and compelling speech that confirmed Lord
Stanley’s assessment of the Act’s constitutionality. The hesitancy of Ontarians to urge their
province to use its preponderance to facilitate compromise and national unity often hampered
their attempts to counter such agitations and limited their ability to assuage rising alarm in
other parts of the country.
This dissertation’s analysis of preponderant federalisms challenges several wellestablished scholarly assertions. It calls into question the political scientists’ tendency to
focus on senates when analysing intrastate influence in federations. Although further
research is necessary to determine whether the voters, newspaper editors, and political
leaders of other asymmetrically populated provinces and states such as New South Wales and
Victoria in Australia made similar assumptions, it is clear that Upper Canadians / Ontarians
regularly imagined the House of Commons as an intrastate institution. Political scientists
also generally assume that preponderant provinces, states, and cantons, of federations will
behave as power blocs. They have not considered the possibility of divisions within these
units, or how such divisions impact a federation’s politics and policy development. Despite
aspirations for Ontarian preponderance or even dominance during national debates, the
province’s political representatives rarely formed a provincial ‘phalanx’ that repelled or
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affirmed initiatives from the rest of Canada. The division of Ontario’s voice generally
ensured that the province exercised less influence than these scholars impart.
This dissertation also challenges the analysis of provincial rights scholarship by
demonstrating that many Ontarians desired provincial autonomy and preponderant influence.
In 1859, a few Reformers understood that they could use ‘rep by pop’ to safeguard Upper
Canadian autonomy in a federation and to also shape British North America’s development.
This dual expectation persisted after 1867. Ontario Liberals regularly urged their province’s
political representatives to unite and assert preponderant influence to safeguard provincial
rights. The linkage was especially important to the better terms, boundary dispute, and
Manitoba school debates. This sense of power and entitlement to use Ontario’s preponderant
influence to protect provincial rights also took on a more dubious form in the Legislative
Assembly where MPPs tried to exert their province’s ‘moral’ influence to persuade the
Canadian or other provincial governments to conform to Ontario’s preferences during their
many debates concerning Louis Riel. Even Oliver Mowat, a champion of provincial rights,
used these arguments to frame his party’s response to the boundary dispute and the Manitoba
school question. Although these initiatives in the Assembly often violated the spirit of
jurisdictional autonomy inherent to provincial rights, evaluating them in the context of
preponderant federalist debates affords the agitations a greater degree of consistency than
existing scholarship appreciates.
Ontarians who supported nation-building compromises did not have to forsake their
provincial consciousness as centralist scholars often contend or imply. Affirming the sense
of power and entitlement that often pervaded agitations against dominion or other provincial
policies gave many Conservatives and some Liberals an alternative strategy. In 1867, for
example, the provincial and national Coalition supporters contended that the success of
Confederation depended on Ontarians electing a strong contingent of their candidates to work
with the rest of Canada to create a national community. This idea ebbed and flowed
throughout the following decades, and even allowed Conservative supporters to appeal to the
preponderant federalist impulse in Ontario during the 1896 election. Ontarian support for the
Canadian government’s nation-building policies did not require, in short, the abandonment or
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subordination of provincial consciousness. Their actions were often rooted in their province’s
preponderant federalist culture.
Lastly, this dissertation challenges regional alienation scholars who claim that
Ontarians were unconcerned with the policy demands of the rest of Canada. Although the
belief that Ontario had preponderant potential emboldened many agitators to ignore demands
from other parts of Canada, their support for Greenway’s Manitoba government was essential
to the defeat of the Conservative’s remedial bill. Regional alienation scholarship also
overlooks the existence of preponderant federalists who urged Ontarians to use their
influence to support appeals from other parts of the country. In the years immediately
following Confederation, the Canadian government benefited from the political flexibility
that this idea afforded Ontario’s government supporters when it proposed better terms for
Nova Scotia or incorporated Manitoba and British Columbia into Confederation. In
subsequent decades the same strategies were less useful for maintaining national unity. Yet
attempting to co-opt the sense of power and entitlement to influence dominion policy
remained one of the few ways to oppose the agitations and this utility ensured the strategy’s
continued political currency. During the latter stages of the boundary dispute, for example,
the provincial Conservatives’ ability to maintain electoral support for their anti-annexation
platform contributed to Mowat’s decision to go to the JCPC to resolve the Ontario-Manitoba
boundary dispute. The Conservatives also tried to use the same strategies to salvage their
electoral prospects in 1896. This appeal admittedly failed to capture the imagination of a
majority of Ontarians but a significant minority of voters continued to accept that their
province needed to use its preponderant influence to support Quebecers at the expense of
their own preferences.
The dissertation, moreover, demonstrates that Ontarians did not feel as influential as
regional alienation scholars lead their readers to believe. Visions of Ontarian preponderance
or even dominance were rarely achieved in practice. Ontario Liberal aspirations to determine
the route of the Intercolonial Railway, derail better financial terms for Nova Scotia, or revise
the terms of union for Manitoba and British Columbia came to naught. The Nova Scotian
debate, in fact, shook Blake’s preponderant federalism. Similar frustrations are evident
during subsequent better terms debates and the disallowance agitation that followed the
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passage of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. Ontarian support for dominion policy initiatives was
important to the political calculations of the Liberal and Conservative parties but Ontarians
often expressed frustration with their inability to shape policy development.
Neither type of preponderant federalism was inherently more meritorious than the
other. Many agitations in Ontario against initiatives from other parts of Canada were often
informed by English-Protestant intolerance. During the repeated contests concerning Louis
Riel as well as the Jesuits’ Estates dispute, the North-West language question, and the
Manitoba school debate, Ontario agitators were emboldened by the belief that their province
possessed the influence to force the Canadian government to implement their anti-Catholic
and anti-French demands. Yet this sense of power and entitlement was not always used to
pursue such distasteful policies. The same aspiration for preponderant influence emboldened
Ontarians to oppose better financial terms in 1869-1870, 1873, and 1884. It also led them to
pursue the disputed territory. The attempts to rally Ontario’s preponderant potential behind
compromises that satisfied demands from the rest of Canada also had a mixed record. The
Conservative’s attempts to redirect Ontario’s preponderant potential away from obstructing
compromise policies led them to oppose bigoted debates. The better terms debates, however,
demonstrated their willingness to support incorrect recollections of past government action
and dubious constitutional interpretations to preserve national unity or their party’s
empowerment. Neither preponderant federalism was beyond reproach.
Partisan considerations heavily influenced the ebb and flow of both preponderant
federalisms. From 1867 to 1896 Ontario Liberal-Coalitionists and Conservatives regularly
justified their support of compromise solutions to maintain their electoral prospects. They
justified these positions by claiming that Ontarian opposition to demands from other parts of
the country would harm national unity. At the outset of his political career, Edward Blake
pitted Ontario against the rest of Canada to advance himself and his party in Ontario. Yet the
realization that Ontario Liberals could not win sufficient seats to form a Canadian
government on their own led them to drop this strategy. By 1872 Blake began to refocus on
building a political party with national appeal and evaded the agitations emanating from his
province. When discussing Louis Riel in 1874 to 1875 and again in 1885 to 1886, for
example, he refused to antagonize national unity and jeopardize his party’s electoral
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prospects by rallying Ontarians to unite against Quebec. He also avoided commenting on the
Ontario-Manitoba boundary dispute and was upset when Liberal partisans surprised him with
the song “Ontario Ontario.” In 1890, Blake even gently urged Ontario MPs to unite against
McCarthy’s North-West language bill. The preponderant federalism of Mackenzie Bowell,
an independent and later Conservative MP and prime minister, underwent a similar
transformation. The shifts by these men and many of their supporters helped to prevent the
amnesty debate, New Brunswick school question, the 1884 better terms debate, and the
North-West school question, from jeopardizing the survivability of Liberal and Conservative
Canadian governments. Although the threat of Ontarians uniting to oppose demands from
other parts of the country continued to threaten these debates, the curtailment of this impulse
in parliament made it easier for the Liberals and Conservatives to maintain their unity, avoid
divisive issues, and support compromise policies.
The incentive to forge national parties was weaker outside of parliament. Ontario’s
Legislative Assembly remained a hotbed for preponderant federalist debate. In the years
immediately following Confederation, Edward Blake was much more willing to criticize the
government’s handling of Thomas Scott’s killers in the Assembly than in parliament.
Despite Blake’s subsequent attempts to curtail this sense of entitlement and power, Oliver
Mowat used the same assumptions to frame his response to Ontario’s boundary dispute and
the Manitoba school question. William Meredith also ignored the implications to national
unity when his party tried to use Riel’s execution to boost its electoral prospects in 1886.
The willingness of these politicians to incite prejudice and sectional jealousies made it more
difficult for their national counterparts to preserve Canadian unity. On a few occasions, the
Legislative Assembly’s debates even emboldened the province’s MPs to urge Ontarians to
unite and oppose initiatives backed by other parts of Canada in parliament. Yet the Assembly
could also be a force for unity. John Sandfield Macdonald, Matthew Crooks Cameron, and
William Meredith, all used preponderant federalist arguments to challenge Blake and
Mowat’s attempts to pit Ontario against the rest of Canada. Conversely, Mowat’s
government urged Ontarians to avoid antagonizing Catholic Canadians and to instead use
their province’s influence help restore Canadian unity in 1886. These strategies often
prevented the passage of inflammatory resolutions that could have harmed national unity.
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Ontario’s newspaper editorialists were also often bolder preponderant federalists than
most of the province’s Members of Parliament. The Globe, which supported the national and
provincial Liberal parties, frequently expressed blunt but inconsistent preponderant federalist
positions. Prior to and immediately following Confederation, the Globe regularly urged
Ontarians to unite against initiatives supported by other parts of the country. After 1872, it
supported Blake’s stand on the amnesty and New Brunswick school questions but also
promoted Mowat’s boundary dispute platform. During the Jesuits’ Estates Act and Manitoba
school debates, it flip-flopped between stoking and discouraging the belief that Ontario could
impact the Canadian government’s policies. The Mail’s editorialists also utilized both
preponderant federalisms. Until 1885, the Conservative organ discouraged Ontarians from
uniting against the rest of Canada. After the execution of Louis Riel, it famously reversed its
position and championed the sense of entitlement and power that it had previously opposed.
After the Mail purchased the Empire, however, its publications generally returned to
encouraging Ontarians to avoid antagonizing the rest of Canada with their preponderant
potential. Like the debates in Ontario’s Legislative Assembly, these editorial divisions in
Ontario’s press ensured the popularization of preponderant federalist-based agitations but
frequently prevented their supporters from achieving the prerequisite provincial unity that
they sought.
All of these shifts and reversals could be used to conclude that preponderant
federalisms were simply a partisan ploy. A sense of grievance and a desire for reform are
enticing rallying calls for any politician or newspaper editor. At various times George
Brown, Edward Blake, Alexander Mackenzie, D’Alton McCarthy, William Meredith,
Richard Cartwright, and Oliver Mowat tried to pit Ontario against other parts of the country
to bolster their personal or party’s electoral prospects. Newspapers such as the Globe,
Advertiser, Sentinel, and Mail, also appealed to Ontario’s sense of power and entitlement to
improve their circulation. Conversely, those desiring the formation of national parties
recognized the political utility of co-opting these sentiments. The aforementioned national
and provincial Conservative leaders as well as newspapers including the Leader,
Intelligencer, Mail, and Mail and Empire, used this same belief in Ontario’s preponderant
potential to help maintain their popularity after supporting policies that many their
constituents and readers perceived to be undesirable. The preponderant federalist
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transformations of politicians like Blake are also subject to this criticism. Ontarian
politicians and newspaper editors, in short, had strong incentives to use preponderant
federalisms to frame their responses to Canadian politics. At times, they even switched
between the two ideals in order to embarrass their opponents and gain the largest public
following.
Neither party strictly adhered to a single preponderant federalism. Liberals generally
encouraged Ontarians to oppose other parts of the country while Conservatives mainly urged
their province to desist from antagonizing the rest of Canada or to even use their influence to
support compromise policies. Yet each party utilized both federalisms between 1867 and
1896. Macdonald and his supporters hinted that Ontarians should punish the Mackenzie
government for partially satisfying Quebec demands for an amnesty in 1875. The allure of
an Ontarian power bloc dictating national policies according to its own vision of Canada
produced a host of partisan defections. On various occasions, Conservative supporters
including Mackenzie Bowell, D’Alton McCarthy, William O’Brien, Clarke Wallace, and the
Mail refused to tow the party line and instead tried to rally Ontarians to oppose compromise.
This impulse was also too strong for individuals like John Charlton and the Globe to resist.
Wilfrid Laurier even tickled the dragon’s tail in 1896 by cautiously urging Ontarians to use
their parliamentary preponderance to elect Liberal candidates. Canadian politics sometimes
produced strange bedfellows. Although this dissertation uncovers partisan preponderant
federalist predispositions, neither party was ideologically constrained to either interpretation
of Ontario’s role in Canadian politics.
Yet the use of preponderant federalisms usually spurred from more than the desire to
create a sense of grievance or superiority that could be channelled against political
adversaries. From the 1850s to the 1890s, Ontario’s politicians and newspaper editors
recognized that their province’s population and wealth afforded it real preponderant
potential. Ontarians usually divided their influence but their representatives occasionally
rallied behind policies. Ontario’s MPs, for example, united to expel Louis Riel from
parliament. They also safeguarded the Manitoba School Act. Such events demonstrated that
Ontarians could virtually dictate Canadian politics when they acted in concert. United action
against the demands of the rest of Canada also seemed possible during the debates
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concerning the Intercolonial railway’s route, the Nova Scotian better terms debate, and the
disallowance of the Jesuits’ Estates Act. During these debates, detractors tried to disabuse
Ontarians of the belief that they could impact Canadian policy with a combination of
jurisdictional arguments as well as suggestions that Ontario desist from antagonizing other
parts of the country or use its influence to support compromise policies. Ontario’s sheer
importance, they argued, required it to either mind its own business, or to use its influence to
foster national unity. Preponderant federalisms were more than crowd-pleasing rhetorical
flourish; they were plausible means to align Ontario’s potential intrastate influence with or
against proposals from other parts of the country and affect Canadian politics.
During the first three decades following Confederation, Ontario had the largest share
of parliamentary seats and contributed the largest portion of the dominion government’s
revenues. These attributes gave the province a unique opportunity to shape Canadian
politics. Conservative and Liberal leaders could not afford to propose policies without
knowing that they would garner the support of at least a significant minority of Ontarian
representatives. Yet analysing what Ontarians wanted only reveals a portion of their agency
in Canadian politics. A fuller understanding of Ontario’s significance to Canada’s political
development also requires an understanding of when and why Ontarians expected to be
influential. Despite its limited success as a power strategy, a belief in Ontario’s preponderant
potential inspired an intransigence that prolonged Canadian debates and often antagonized
the rest of Canada. Such agitations usually failed because other Ontarians contested these
assertions of entitlement and power and consequently split Ontario’s vote. This bisection
often allowed the rest of Canada to shape the country’s political development. Most
Ontarians believed that their province was a first among equals, but the bark of preponderant
federalist agitations against policy initiatives from other parts of the country was usually
more consequential than its bite.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Redistribution of Ontario's Parliamentary Seats Compared to Other
Regions, 1867-1903

Year
1867
1871
1872
1873
1882
1887
1892
1903

Ontario
45.30%
44.32%
44.00%
42.72%
43.60%
42.79%
43.19%
40.19%

Quebec
35.91%
35.14%
32.50%
31.55%
30.81%
30.23%
30.52%
30.37%

Maritimes
18.78%
18.38%
18.50%
20.87%
20.38%
20.00%
18.31%
16.36%

West
2.16%
5.00%
4.85%
5.21%
6.98%
7.98%
13.08%

Statistics calculated from: Howard A. Scarrow, Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal
and Provincial Election Data: (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1962), 14.
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Appendix 2: Ontario in Canadian Elections, 1867-1900

Year

Conservative
Seats

Conservative
% of
Popular
Vote

Liberal
Seats

Liberal %
of Popular
Vote

Other
Seats

Other %
of
Popular
Vote

Ontario
Conservative
and Liberal
Popular Vote
Variance in
Dominion
Elections

1867
1872
1874
1878
1882
1887
1891
1896
1900

52
40
22
62
55
55
48
43
55

51.1
49.8
46.6
51.4
50.4
50.7
49.4
44.8
49.7

30
48
66
26
37
37
44
43
37

48.4
49.9
52.8
48.2
49.0
49.2
49.1
40.2
48.5

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0

0.5
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.1
1.5
15.0
1.8

2.7
0.1
6.2
3.2
1.4
1.5
0.3
4.6
1.2

Governing
Party

Con
Con
Lib
Con
Con
Con
Con
Lib
Lib

%s	
  are	
  rounded	
  to	
  nearest	
  tenth.	
  	
  Coalition,	
  Conservative,	
  Liberal	
  Conservative,	
  Conservative	
  Independent,	
  Conservative	
  
Patron	
  are	
  combined.	
  	
  Liberal,	
  Liberal	
  Independent,	
  Liberal	
  Patron	
  are	
  also	
  combined.	
  
Source: J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ontario; London: Prentice-Hall of
Canada, 1968).

380

Ontario%in%Canadian%Elections%
70"

60"

50"
Conservative""Seats"

40"

Conservative""%"of"Popular"Vote"
Liberal"Seats"

30"

Liberal"%"of""Popular"Vote"
Other:"Seats"
Other"C"Popular"Vote"

20"

10"

0"
1867"

1872"

1874"

1878"

1882"

1887"

1891"

1896"

1900"

Year%

Source: J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ontario; London: Prentice-Hall
of Canada, 1968).
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of Canada, 1968).
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Appendix 3: Ontario Provincial Elections, 1867-1898

Year

Conservative
Seats

Conservati
ve % of
Popular
Vote

Liberal
Seats

Liberal %
of Popular
Vote

Other
Seats

Other %
of Popular
Vote

Ontario
Conservative
and Liberal
Popular Vote
Variance in
Provincial
Elections

Governing
Party

1867*
41
50.3
41
48.8
0
0.9
1.5
1871**
39
46.7
43
52.3
0
1
5.6
1875
36
47.1
52
49.0
0
3.9
1.9
1879
31
48.7
57
48.0
0
3.3
0.7
1883
37
47.5
50
49.4
1
3.1
1.9
1886
32
47.1
57
48.4
1
4.5
1.3
1890 ***
36
47.9
55
51.1
0
1.0
3.2
1894 ****
30
37.4
58
52.9
6
9.7
15.5
1898
43
48.1
51
47.3
0
4.6
0.8
*#Margaret#Small#contents#that#the#Sandfield#government#had#closer#to#50#seats.#
**#J.D.#Livermore#contends#that#the#working#Liberal#majority#after#Blake#assumed#the#premiership#was#closer#to#50#seats.#
***#‘Other’#columns#includes#Independent#Equal#Rights#candidates.#
****#‘Other’#columns#Includes#Independent#and#PPA#candidates.#

Con
Lib
Lib
Lib
Lib
Lib
Lib
Lib
Lib

%s are rounded to nearest tenth. Coalition, Conservative, Liberal Conservative, Conservative Independent, Conservative Patron are
combined. Liberal, Liberal Independent, Liberal Patron are also combined.
Source: Ontario Chief Election Officer, Electoral History of Ontario: Candidates and Results with Statistics From the
Records 1867-1982 (Toronto: Office of the Chief Election Officer, 1984).
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Appendix 4: Ontario Conservative and Liberal Popular Vote Variance in Provincial and Canadian Elections, 18671903
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Percent%
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Sources: J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ontario; London: PrenticeHall of Canada, 1968); Ontario Chief Election Officer, Electoral History of Ontario: Candidates and Results
with Statistics From the Records 1867-1982 (Toronto: Office of the Chief Election Officer, 1984).
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